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ABSTRACT  
When  states  use   force  extraterritorially,   they   invariably  claim  a   right  of  self-­
defence.  They  also  accept   that   its  exercise   is  conditioned  by   the  customary  
international  law  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality.  To  date,  these  
requirements   have   received   little   attention.   They   are   notorious   for   being  
normatively   indeterminate  and  operationally  complex.  As  a  breach  of  either  
requirement  transforms  lawful  acts  of  self-­defence  into  unlawful  uses  of  force,  
increased  determinacy  regarding  their  scope  and  substance  is  crucial  to  how  
international  law  constrains  military  force.  
This  thesis  addresses  this  fact.  It  examines  the  conceptual  meaning,  content  
and  practical  application  of  necessity  and  proportionality  as  they  relate  to  the  
right  of  self-­defence   following   the  adoption  of   the  UN  Charter.   It  provides  a  
coherent  and  up-­to-­date  description  of  the  lex  lata  and  an  analytical  framework  
to   guide   its   operation   and   appraisal.   It   does   this   by   undertaking   the   first  
comprehensive  review  of  relevant  jurisprudence,  academic  commentary  and  
state   practice   from   1945   to   date.   Although   the   operation   of   necessity   and  
proportionality  is  highly  contextual,  the  result  is  a  more  determinate  elaboration  
of   international   law  that  bridges   theory  and  practice.  This  greater  normative  
clarity  strengthens  the  law’s  potential  to  exert  a  pull  towards  compliance.  
Necessity  determines  whether  defensive  force  may  be  used  to  respond  to  an  
armed   attack,   and  where   it   must   be   directed.   Proportionality   governs   how  
much  total  force  is  permissible.  This  thesis  contends  that  the  two  requirements  
are  conceptually  distinct  and  must  be  applied  in  the  foregoing  order  to  avoid  
an  insufficient  ‘catch-­all’  description  of  (il)legality.  It  also  argues  that  necessity  
and  proportionality  must  apply  on  an  ongoing  basis,  throughout  the  duration  of  
an  armed  conflict  prompted  by  self-­defence.  This  ensures  that  the  purposes  of  
self-­defence  are  met,  and  nothing  more,  and  that  defensive  force  is  not  unduly  
disruptive  to  third  party  interests  and  international  peace  and  security.     
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IMPACT  STATEMENT    
As   an   original   contribution   to   existing   scholarship,   this   thesis   constitutes   a  
significant   development   of   the   academic   understanding  of   international   law  
relating  to  self-­defence.  Whilst  confirming  and  updating  the  existing  literature,  
it   also   confronts   a   number   of   conclusions  made   by   authors   in   the   field.   It  
presents   a   coherent   account   of   applicable   theory,   which   includes   a   novel  
taxonomy  that  captures  more  accurately  the  operation  of  international  law  and  
provides   a   clearer   explanation   of   the   differences   between   often   conflated  
concepts.  It  tackles  deficiencies  and  gaps  in  existing  knowledge  and  advances  
the  subject  in  a  methodologically  rigorous  fashion.  
As  well  as  undertaking  a  critical  review  of  relevant  jurisprudence  and  academic  
commentary,   this   thesis   provides   the   first   comprehensive   review   of   state  
practice  since  1945  relating  to  necessity  and  proportionality.  This  developed  
understanding   of   international   law   has   significant   practical   utility   beyond  
academia.   For   example,   the   analytical   framework   set   out   herein   has   the  
potential   to   benefit   future   jurisprudence.   Should   a   claim  of   self-­defence   be  
bought  before  an  international  court  or  tribunal,  it  serves  as  a  judicial  guide  to  
necessity  and  proportionality  and  the  use  of  defensive  force  more  generally.  
Moreover,  this  thesis  constitutes  a  tool  for  states  to  justify  and  legitimate  their  
actions   and   for   other   states  and   international   organizations   to   review  more  
effectively   defensive   action.   It   assists,   therefore,   with   improved   and   more  
transparent  decision-­making,  whilst  operating  to  limit  potential  abuse  by  states  
that  assert  an  overly  broad  right  of  self-­defence.  
This  thesis  also  represents  an  important  academic  resource.  Normatively,  its  
arguments  and  conclusions  provide  a  basis   for  how   jus  ad  bellum   scholars  
should  view  the  right  of  self-­defence  and  can  develop  it  in  the  future.  It  provides  
a  scholastic  tool,  therefore,  for  approaching  some  of  the  long-­standing  debates  
in  the  jus  ad  bellum  relating  to,  inter  alia,  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  non-­
state  actors,   responding   to   imminent  armed  attacks  and  whether   there   is  a  
gravity  threshold  that  triggers  the  right  of  states  to  defend  themselves.  A  more  
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coherent  conception  of  necessity  and  proportionality  allows  for  a  novel  way  to  
tackle  these  controversial  subjects  and  advance  the  literature  on  them.  
This   author   intends   to   disseminate   this   work   via  workshops,   seminars   and  
conferences,  as  well  as  journal  articles  and  blog  posts.  Engaging  with  policy  
makers   and   lawyers   in   governments   and   international   organizations,   in  
addition   to  military   lawyers   and   non-­governmental   organizations,   allows   for  
academia  and  practice   to  be  bridged   in  a  meaningful  and  useful  way.  Such  
engagement  will  be  on  a  national  and  international  basis.  This  thesis  clarifies  
the  scope  and  content  of  a  notoriously  indeterminate  area  of  international  law  
and  strengthens  its  potential  to  regulate  how  states  use  force  in  self-­defence.  
Working  with  these  key  stakeholders  allows  this  potential  to  be  realised.  
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION  
1   Introduction    
1.1   Context  and  provenance  
The  regulation  of  military  force  in  international  relations  remains  at  the  forefront  
of  international  concern  and  academic  debate.  States,  the  International  Court  
of   Justice   (‘ICJ’,   or   the   ‘Court’)   and   academic   commentators   have   long  
ruminated  over  the  meaning  and  scope  of  the  prohibition  of  the  threat  or  use  
of  force  contained  in  Article  2(4)  UN  Charter  and  the  inherent  right  of  individual  
and  collective  self-­defence  recognized  by  Article  51.1  States  almost  invariably  
invoke  self-­defence  to   justify  using   force  extra-­territorially,2  even   in   the  most  
dubious  of  circumstances  when  their  acts  are  subsequently  condemned.  Such  
‘ritual   incantation’ 3   of   the   right   is   nearly   universally   accompanied,   either  
explicitly   or   implicitly,   by   assertions   that   the   purported   defensive   force   is  
necessary  or  proportionate,  or  both.4  Whilst  doubt  will  always  exist  regarding  
the   extent   to   which   international   law   can   limit   states   using   force,   that   they  
habitually  justify  their  actions  in  law  points  to  an  acceptance  that  using  force  is  
subject  to  legal  constraints.5  This  topic  lies,  therefore,  at  the  heart  of  preserving  
international  peace  and  security.  
The  jus  ad  bellum  (‘JAB’)  rules  pertaining  to  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-­
defence   remain   a   controversial   and   intensely   debated   topic   and   are   often  
difficult   to  apply   in  practice.   In  particular,  arguments  persist  over  whether  a  
                                                                                        
1  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  26  June  1945,  892  UNTS  119  (‘UN  Charter’).  Art  2(4)  prohibits  
the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state,  
or   in  any  other  manner   inconsistent  with   the  purposes  of   the  United  Nations   (‘UN’).  Art  51  
affirms  the  inherent  right  of  individual  or  collective  self-­defence  if  an  armed  attack  occurs.  
2  Schmitt  (2002–2003)  543;;  Gray  (2018)  121.  
3  Gray  (2018)  125.  
4  Green  (2009)  108–9,  208.  This  conclusion  will  be  explored   throughout   this   thesis.   Implicit  
reference  means  that  a  state  may  not  have  used  the  words  ‘necessary’  or  ‘proportionate’,  but  
has   nevertheless   referred   to   the   content   of   either,   or   both,   of   these   requirements   when  
justifying  or  responding  to  claims  of  self-­defence.  
5  Sands  (2005)  179–80.    
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threshold  of  violence  is  required  before  a  right  of  self-­defence  arises,  how  the  
right  operates  in  relation  to  armed  attacks  by  non-­state  actors  (‘NSAs’),  and  
temporal   issues  pertaining   to   anticipatory   self-­defence.6  Within   this   context,  
and  as  explored  further  below,  it   is  universally  recognized  that  for  defensive  
force  to  be  lawful,   it  must  be  both  ‘necessary’  and  ‘proportionate’.  Necessity  
and  proportionality  have  been  associated  with  the  use  of  force  long  before  the  
adoption  of  the  UN  Charter  in  1945.  They  formed  part  of  the  just  war  tradition,  
stretching  back  centuries.7  Although  they  are  not  referenced  in  the  UN  Charter  
itself,   they   are   still   recognized   as   ‘essential   components’   of   the   normative  
framework  pertaining  to  the  use  of  defensive  force.8  They  form  the  core  of  the  
contemporary  right  of  self-­defence.9  
The  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality  are   typically  derived   from  
the   Caroline   incident   of   1837.   More   specifically,   their   provenance   is   the  
ensuing   correspondence   between   Mr   Webster,   the   American   Secretary   of  
State,   and   Lord   Ashburton,   the   British   representative   in  Washington.10  The  
incident   stemmed   from   the   rebellion   against   British   rule   in   Canada.   The  
steamboat  Caroline  was  being  used  to  ship  reinforcements  and  supplies  from  
the  USA  to  the  rebels  on  Navy  Island  in  British  controlled  Canada.  To  stop  this,  
                                                                                        
6  These  issues  are  considered  in  the  following  Chapters.  
7  For  an  overview  of  necessity  and  proportionality  in  just  war  theory,  and  more  generally  prior  
to  the  adoption  of  the  UN  Charter,  see  Gardam  (2004)  28–58.  
8   Institut   de   Droit   International,   Tenth   Commission,   Santiago   Session,   27   October   2007,  
<http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2007_san_02_en.pdf>  para  2.  
9  In  Nicaragua,  paras  176,  193,  the  ICJ  confirmed  that  the  UN  Charter  recognizes  a  ‘natural’  
or  ‘inherent’  pre-­existing  customary  right  of  individual  and  collective  self-­defence,  which  has  
been  ‘confirmed  and  influenced  by  the  Charter.’  It  recognized  that  the  UN  Charter  does  not  
regulate  all  aspects  of  the  right,  but  operates  alongside  existing  customary  international  law,  
including  the  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality.  Ibid  176,  194.  Whilst  an  argument  
can  be  made  that  the  UN  Charter  and  customary  rules  on  the  use  of  force  and  self-­defence  
are  not  identical,  the  ICJ’s  approach  in  Nicaragua  shows  that  it  considers  the  two  regimes  to  
be  largely  equivalent.  See  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  568–69.  The  only  difference  that  the  Court  
has  identified  is  the  lack  of  a  customary  duty  to  report  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  
to  the  UNSC.  Nicaragua,  paras  181,  188,  200.  Regarding  the  UN  Charter  requirements,  see  
n  126.  For  a  contrary   judicial  position,   see  Nicaragua,   diss  op  Jennings,  paras  7–15.  This  
thesis  proceeds  on  the  basis,  as  per  the  prevailing  view  amongst  commentators,  that  Art  51  
excludes  any  pre-­UN  Charter  customary  right  that  is  incompatible  with  the  UN  Charter.  
10  See  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  193.  On  this  incident  generally,  
see  Jennings  (1938);;  Kearley  (1999);;  Green  (2006);;  Wood  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  5–14.  
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a  British  force  entered  American  territory,  boarded  the  Caroline,  set  it  on  fire  
and  sent  it  over  Niagara  Falls.  Two  people  were  killed  in  the  process.11  
A  number  of  defences  were  raised  by  the  British  to  justify  their  actions.  It   is  
Webster’s  response  to  such  justifications,  and  to  the  incident  more  generally,  
that  informs  the  present  enquiry.  Regarding  the  necessity  of  a  state’s  ability  to  
act  in  self-­defence,  Webster  famously  proclaimed  that  this  was  limited  to  cases  
in   which   the   ‘necessity   of   that   self-­defense   is   instant,   overwhelming,   and  
leaving  no  choice  of  means  and  no  moment  for  deliberation.’12  Supposing  the  
necessity  of  the  moment  required  action,  Webster  asserted  that  it  would  also  
be  incumbent  on  a  government  purportedly  acting  in  self-­defence  to  show  that  
it   ‘did   nothing   unreasonable   or   excessive;;   since   the   act,   justified   by   the  
necessity  of  self-­defence,  must  be  limited  by  that  necessity,  and  kept  clearly  
within  it.’13  These  pronouncements  are  commonly  referred  to  as  the  ‘Webster  
formula’  or   the   ‘Caroline   formula’.  Lord  Ashburton  disagreed  on   the   facts  at  
issue   but,   in   justifying   the   British   action,   he   agreed   with   Webster’s  
characterisation  of  self-­defence  and  the  applicable  international  law.14  
The  precedential  value  of   the  Caroline   incident   is  questionable.  Well  known  
debates  persist  regarding  the  extent  to  which  Webster’s  formula  informs  the  
application  of  necessity  and  proportionality  to  a  modern,  post  UN  Charter,  right  
of  self-­defence.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  said  that  the  Caroline  incident  changed  
self-­defence   from   a   political   excuse   to   a   legal   doctrine. 15   After   all,   the  
correspondence  between  Webster  and  the  British  ministers  consistently  refers  
to  self-­defence  in  legal  terms.  Ashburton  described  it  as  ‘the  first  law  of  nature’  
                                                                                        
11  Jennings  (1938)  84.  
12  Letter  from  Mr  Webster  to  Lord  Ashburton  (6  August  1842)  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  
1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  201.  Webster  was  referring  to  earlier  correspondence  between  him  and  
Lord  Ashburton’s  predecessor,  Mr  Fox.  See  Letter  from  Mr  Webster  to  Mr  Fox  (24  April  1841)  
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1840–1841,  Vol.  XXIX,  1126.  
13  Ibid,  1138.  
14  Letter  from  Lord  Ashburton  to  Mr  Webster  (28  July  1842)  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  
1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  195.  
15  Jennings  (1938)  82.  
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and  the  ‘great  law  of  self-­defence’.16  Along  these  lines,  certain  commentators  
continue  to  emphasize  the  Caroline’s  influence  on  the  contemporary  JAB.17  
Others  are  more  measured   in   their  views.  Gray  notes  how  the  episode  has  
attained   ‘mythical   authority’.18  Indeed,   the   particular   factual  matrix  might   be  
said   to  narrow   its  precedential  application.  Some  scholars  highlight   that   the  
British  action  was  pre-­emptive  and  that  its  potential  purview  might,  therefore,  
be  limited  to  anticipatory  self-­defence.19  Others  focus  on  the  fact  that  the  British  
were   targeting   rebels   operating   from   American   territory.   As   a   result,   the  
Webster  formula  is  potentially  limited  to  self-­defence  against  NSAs  operating  
from  the  territory  of  another  state  that  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  suppress  them.20  
Combining   these   two   factors  might   further   limit   the  Caroline  precedent   to  a  
right  of  anticipatory  action  of  an  extra-­territorial  nature,  against  NSAs,  both  of  
which  describe  the  incident.21  Moreover,  the  episode  occurred  in  1837,  when  
international  law  did  not  outlaw  the  use  of  force.  Any  invocation  of  self-­defence  
at  that  time  had  little  substantive  legal  meaning.  The  incident  may,  therefore,  
be   described  as  one  of   a   state   of   necessity   rather   than   self-­defence.22  The  
correspondence   further   justifies  a  characterisation  of   the  wider  right  of  self-­
preservation,  or  self-­help.23  
                                                                                        
16  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  196,  201.    
17   E.g.   Gardam   (2004)   31;;   Gill   (2006)   366–8;;   Wilmshurst   (2006)   (‘The   Chatham   House  
Principles’)  965.  
18  Gray  (2008)  149.  
19  E.g.  Bowett  (1958)  188–9.  Gill  (2006)  366,  emphasizes  Caroline’s  particular  relevance  to  
such  debate  and  Judge  Schwebel  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in  Nicaragua  (para  200)  explicitly  
limits   the  Caroline   formula   in   this  manner.  Cf  Dinstein  (2017)  225,  asserting   that   there  was  
nothing  anticipatory  about   the  British  action  against   the  Caroline.  See  also  Gardam  (2004)  
149;;  Schmitt  (2013)  64.  
20  Kearley  (1999)  325,  notes  that  this  was  the  position  taken  by  writers  in  the  pre–UN  Charter  
era   and   describes   this   as   the   proper   context   in   which   to   apply   the  Caroline   formula.   He  
concludes,   however,   that   the   formula   is   commonly,   though   not   universally,   accepted   as  
applying   to   all   forms   of   self-­defence.   See   Section   4.1.2   regarding   the   unwilling   or   unable  
doctrine.  
21  Green  (2006)  444.  
22  Bowett  (1958)  59–60,  although  he  affirms  that  Webster’s  principles  apply  to  both  necessity  
and  self-­defence.  The  International  Law  Commission  (‘ILC’)  also  characterises  the  incident  in  
this  way.  Art  25  ILC  Articles  on  Responsibility  of  States  for  Internationally  Wrongful  Acts,  with  
Commentaries,  UN  Doc  A/56/10  (2001)  (‘ARSIWA’)  Commentary,  para  5.  For  a  critique  of  this  
characterisation,  and  a  conclusion   that  the   incident   is  best  characterised  as  an  example  of  
self-­defence,  see  Paddeu  (2018)  351–7.  
23  See  Jennings  (1938)  91–2.  
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There   is  doubt,   therefore,  whether   the  Webster   formula  represented,  at   the  
time  it  was  expressed,  state  practice  pertaining  to  the  right  of  self-­defence.24  
Moreover,   it   is  questionable  whether   it  describes  custom   today.25  Whilst   the  
ICJ   has   consistently   confirmed   necessity   and   proportionality   as   customary  
requirements,26  at  no  point  has  the  majority  referenced  the  Caroline  incident  or  
Webster’s   formula.27   However,   we   should   not   simply   dismiss   the   Caroline  
incident  as  an  out-­dated  distraction.28  Following  World  War  II,  the  Nuremberg  
Tribunal  cited  Webster’s  formula  with  approval  in  the  context  of  the  necessity  
of   anticipatory   self-­defence. 29   Moreover,   states   occasionally   refer   to   the  
Caroline   incident   as   a   precedent   during   the   discussion,   justification   and  
condemnation  of  particular  claims  of  self-­defence,  as  well  as  when  considering  
the   genesis   and   nature   of   the   right. 30   They   have   relied   on   the   incident  
generally,  and  Webster’s   formula   in  particular,   to  establish   the  conditions  of  
necessity  and  proportionality  in  cases  put  before  the  ICJ.31  Furthermore,  even  
if  not  referenced  explicitly,  states  have  also  employed  the  wording  of  Webster’s  
formula  during  deliberations  of  the  UN  Security  Council  (‘UNSC’).32  
These   state   practice   examples   are   not   all   that   common,   but   the   Caroline  
incident  endures  as  the   locus  classicus  of   international  law  pertaining  to  the  
                                                                                        
24  Gardam  (2004)  42–4.  
25  See  generally  Green  (2006).  
26  See  Section  1.2.1.  
27  The  only  reference  is  found  in  Nicaragua,  diss  op  Schwebel,  para  200.  
28  Green  (2006)  449.  
29   Judgment   of   the   International   Military   Tribunal   for   the   Trial   of   the   German   Major   War  
Criminals,   Nuremberg   1946   (1947)   Vol   I,   205,   referring   to   ‘preventative’   action   in   foreign  
territory.  
30   E.g.   UN   Docs   S/PV.1939   (1976)   para   115   (Israel);;   S/PV.2250   (1980)   para   40   (Iraq);;  
S/PV.2282   (1981)   paras   14–15   (Uganda);;   S/PV.2288   (1981)   para   80   (Israel);;   USA   State  
Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  239;;  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017;;  Australian  
Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
31  E.g.  Nuclear  Weapons,  Note  Verbale   from  the  Embassy  of  Mexico,   together  with  Written  
Statement  of   the  Government  of  Mexico,  19  June  1995   (Nuclear  Weapons,  Mexican  Note  
Verbale),   para   63;;   Nuclear   Weapons,   Note   Verbale   from   the   Embassy   of   New   Zealand,  
together  with  Written  Statement  of  the  Government  of  New  Zealand,  20  June  1995  (Nuclear  
Weapons,  New  Zealand  Note  Verbale),  56;;  Oil  Platforms,  Memorial  Submitted  by  the  Islamic  
Republic  of  Iran,  8  June  1993,  para  4.18;;  Armed  Activities,  Reply  of  the  Democratic  Republic  
of  the  Congo,  29  May  2002,  para  3.159.  
32  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.1024   (1962)   para   110   (Ghana);;  S/PV.2148   (1979)   para   10   (Egypt);;  
S/PV.2283   (1981)  para  148   (Sierra  Leone);;  S/PV.2293   (1981)  para  69   (Egypt);;  S/PV.3653  
(1996)  15  (Egypt).  
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right  of  self-­defence.33  Its  impact  on  the  interpretation  of  the  UN  Charter  and  
the   development   of   customary   international   law,   including   necessity   and  
proportionality,  persists  to  this  day.34  Lex  lata  and  the  original  Webster  formula  
are  not  synonymous,  but  they  have  much  in  common.  Jennings  and  Watts,  for  
example,  conclude  that  the  ‘basic  elements  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  were  
aptly  set  out   in  connection  with   the  Caroline   incident’,35  and  Gardam  agrees  
that   the   Caroline   incident   ‘encapsulates’   the   contemporary   position. 36   In  
Dinstein’s   words,   the   modern   requirements   may   be   ‘distilled’   from   the  
yardsticks   set   by   Webster.37   This   thesis   proceeds   to   employ   the   Webster  
formulation  as  the  starting  point  for  the  examination  and  distillation  of  necessity  
and  proportionality.  
1.2   Purpose  of  this  thesis  
Necessity  and  proportionality  are  fundamental  to  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  
self-­defence.   Yet,   until   now,   they   have   not   received   the   legal   or   normative  
attention   that   they   deserve.   This   surprising   gap   might   be   because   the  
operation  of  both  requirements  is  highly  contingent  on  the  facts  of  each  case,  
and  that  they  are  difficult  to  apply  in  practice.  Also,  proportionality  appears  in  
the   JAB   and   International   Humanitarian   Law   (‘IHL’). 38   The   relationship  
between   the   requirement   in  each   legal   regime   is   complex,   and   states  may  
prefer   to   rely   on   the   clearer   rules   of   IHL   to   explain   and   review   putatively  
defensive  actions.39  Judicial  examination  of  necessity  and  proportionality  has  
been  light,  and  their  meaning  and  importance  as  legal  tools  have  not  been  fully  
explored  in  academic  literature.  As  this  Section  illustrates,  the  focus  of  the  ICJ  
and  scholarship  has   instead  been  on   the   trigger  of   the  right  of  self-­defence  
                                                                                        
33  Jennings  (1938)  92;;  Bowett  (1958)  58.  
34  As   noted,   this   thesis   focuses   on   necessity   and   proportionality   post   adoption   of   the   UN  
Charter.   For   a   review   of   how   these   requirements   were   perceived   following   the   Caroline  
incident  and  up  until  1945,  see  Gardam  (2004)  42–9.  
35  Jennings  and  Watts  (1996)  420.  
36  Gardam  (2004)  148.  
37  Dinstein  (2017)  249.  Green  (2006)  450,  takes  a  similar  view.  
38  IHL  is  also  known  as  the  jus  in  bello  and  the  laws  of  armed  conflict.  IHL  is  adopted  for  the  
purposes  of  this  thesis.  
39   Gardam   (2004)   20–4.   These   factors   are   considered   further   below   and   in   subsequent  
Chapters.  See  in  particular,  Section  3.3.1.  
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under  Article   51  UN  Charter,   being   the  occurrence  of   an   ‘armed  attack’.   In  
contrast,  states  have  placed  great  importance  on  necessity  and  proportionality  
when   justifying   and   reviewing   claims  of   self-­defence,  but   have  not   typically  
clarified  their  understanding  of  them.  
That  the  scope  and  content  of  necessity  and  proportionality  remain  normatively  
undetermined  weakens  the  potential  of  international  law  to  regulate  when  and  
how  states  use  force.  Such  indeterminacy  deprives  states,  courts,  international  
organizations   and   scholars   of   the   tools   to   guide  decision  making   regarding  
constraining  uses  of  force,  to  determine  whether  resort  to  force  is  lawful  in  the  
circumstances,   and   to   guard   against   abuse   of   the   right   of   self-­defence.40  
Necessity  and  proportionality,  more   fully  understood  and  effectively  applied,  
can  be  better  employed  by  such  bodies  to  review  and  regulate  the  exercise  of  
a  state’s  right  of  self-­defence.  Their  application  can  also  help  solve  some  of  
the  long-­standing  controversies  described  at  the  beginning  of  Section  1.1  that  
have  been  traditionally  analysed  within  the  ambit  of  the  armed  attack  trigger.  
The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  address  this  legal  and  normative  gap.  It  seeks  
to  answer  two  principal  questions:  a)  what  is  the  meaning,  in  both  theory  and  
practice,  of  the  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality  as  they  pertain  
to   the  right  of  self-­defence  following   the  adoption  of   the  UN  Charter,  and  b)  
how  can  a  better  understanding  of  these  requirements  be  used  in  the  future?41  
As   an   original   contribution   to   the   field,   this   thesis   provides   an   up-­to-­date  
analytical   framework  of   the  current   law.   It  does   this  by  undertaking   the   first  
comprehensive  review  of  the  applicable  jurisprudence,  academic  commentary  
and,  most  importantly,  relevant  state  practice  from  1945  until  the  present  day.  
It  provides,  therefore,  a  robust  and  contemporary  description  of  the   lex  lata.  
This   enunciation   of   the   law  encompasses  an  exploration   of   the   conceptual  
meaning   of   each   requirement,   explains   the   distinctions   between   them,  
                                                                                        
40  See  generally  Deeks  (2012)  regarding  the  benefits  of  increased  normative  determinacy.  
41  For  an  overview  of  their  applicability  to  collective  security  and  the  powers  of  the  UNSC  under  
Chapter  VII  UN  Charter,  see  e.g.  Gardam  (2004)  188–229.  Responding  in  self-­defence  to  an  
armed  attack  for  the  purposes  of  Article  51  is  the  only  accepted  ground  for  the  lawful  unilateral  
use  of  force  in  international  law.  This  thesis  will  not  consider  the  so  called  right  of  humanitarian  
intervention.  For  this  author’s  views  on  that  topic,  see  O’Meara  (2017)  ICLQ.  
     
     20  
confronts   existing   preconceptions   and   clarifies   areas   of   controversy.   This  
thesis  ultimately  presents  a  detailed  understanding  of  these  two  requirements  
that  bridges  theory  and  practice.  
Sections   1.2.1   to   1.2.3   proceed   to   elaborate   on   how   necessity   and  
proportionality  are  viewed  by  the  ICJ,  scholars  and  states.  It  expands  on  the  
existing  deficiencies  and  gaps  that  this  thesis  seeks  to  redress.  
1.2.1   Jurisprudence  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice    
The   ICJ’s   jurisprudence   on   self-­defence   provides   an   important,   if   limited,  
source   of   guidance   for   the   present   enquiry.   The   vast   majority   of   disputes  
regarding  self-­defence  claims  do  not   reach  the   ICJ  on   the  merits.42  To  date,  
the  Court  has  only  dealt  directly  with  the  substantive  rules  of  self-­defence  in  
five  cases.  Three  were  merits  decisions:  Nicaragua,  Oil  Platforms  and  Armed  
Activities.43  Two  were   advisory   opinions:  Nuclear  Weapons   and  Palestinian  
Wall.44  In  addition,  the  Court  has  touched  upon  claims  pertaining  to  the  use  of  
force   in   a   more   limited   fashion,   the   most   obvious   example   being   Corfu  
Channel,45  where   the  UK   claimed   to   be   acting   pursuant   to   a  more   broadly  
understood  right  of  ‘self-­help’.46  
The  five  core  self-­defence  cases  offer  varying  degrees  of  insight.  Whereas  the  
majority   in  Nicaragua  devoted  much  of   their  opinion   to   the   law  pertaining   to  
self-­defence,   the   Court   in   Palestinian   Wall   dismissed   Israel’s   self-­defence  
claim  in  a  cursory  two  paragraphs.47  The  cases  have  also  tended  to  focus  on  
                                                                                        
42  See  generally  Green  (2009)  165–206.  
43  Military   and   Paramilitary   Activities   in   and   against   Nicaragua   (Nicaragua   v   US)   (Merits)  
[1986]  ICJ  Rep  14  (‘Nicaragua’);;  Case  Concerning  Oil  Platforms  (Iran  v  US)  (Judgment)  [2003]  
ICJ  Rep  161  (‘Oil  Platforms’);;  Case  Concerning  Armed  Activities  on  the  Territory  of  the  Congo  
(Democratic   Republic   of   the   Congo   v   Uganda)   (Judgment)   [2007]   ICJ   Rep   168   (‘Armed  
Activities’).  
44  Legality  of  the  Threat  or  Use  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (Advisory  Opinion)  [1996]  ICJ  Rep  226  
(‘Nuclear  Weapons’);;   Legal   Consequences   of   the   Construction   of   a  Wall   in   the  Occupied  
Palestinian  Territories  (Advisory  Opinion)  [2004]  ICJ  Rep  136  (‘Palestinian  Wall’).  
45  Corfu  Channel  (United  Kingdom  v  Albania)  (Merits)  [1949]  ICJ  Rep  4  (‘Corfu  Channel’).  
46  Corfu  Channel,  Reply  Submitted,  Under  the  Order  of  the  Court  of  26th  March  1948,  by  the  
Government  of  the  UK  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  284.  
47  Paras  138–9.  
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‘armed  attack’,  which  the  ICJ  has  clearly  viewed  as  the  most  important  element  
of   the   right. 48   The   Court   has,   however,   emphasized   the   importance   of  
necessity   and   proportionality   in   four   of   the   five   self-­defence   cases,49   and  
confirmed  that  they  are  rules  of  customary  international  law  in  three.50  It  has  
also   been   clear   that   it   requires   rigid   and   objective   adherence   to   these  
requirements.  Whereas  the  defending  state  forms  an  initial  unilateral  view,  the  
Court  has  strongly  rejected  the  notion  that  the  determination  of  necessity  lies  
within   the  state’s  discretion,  even  where  acting   in  good  faith.   Instead,   it  has  
stipulated  that  the  test  of  necessity  is  ‘strict  and  objective,  leaving  no  room  for  
any  “measure  of  discretion”.’51  
The   Court   has   nevertheless   treated   necessity   and   proportionality   as  
subsidiary,  or  accessory,  criteria.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  limited  amount  
of  space  it  has  devoted  to  them  in  its  judgments.52  Furthermore,  the  Court  has  
not  sought  to  define  necessity  or  proportionality  in  general  or  abstract  terms,  
or   to   place   them   within   a   wider   conceptual   framework.  Whilst   it   has   been  
steadfast   in  affirming   their  application   to  claims  of  self-­defence,   therefore,   it  
has   offered   only   minimal   insight   into   their   content   and   meaning.   This   is  
perhaps  understandable,  given  that  no  case  has  been  determined  on  the  basis  
of  necessity  and  proportionality.  Other  than  Nuclear  Weapons,  the  legality  of  
avowed   acts   of   self-­defence   were   decided   on   the   basis   that   none   of   the  
respondent  states  was  able  to  establish  that  it  had  been  the  victim  of  an  armed  
attack.53    
                                                                                        
48  See  further  Green  (2009)  7,  23–62.  
49  Nicaragua,  paras  176,  194,  237;;  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  30,  41,  48;;  Oil  Platforms,  paras  
43,  51,  73–7;;  Armed  Activities,  paras  147,  304.  
50  Nicaragua,  para  176;;  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  41;;  Oil  Platforms,  paras  73–7.  
51  Oil  Platforms,  para  73.  The  Court  presumably  adopts  the  same  approach  for  proportionality.    
52  This   is   particularly   noticeable   in   the   contentious   cases   involving   specific   claims   of   self-­
defence.   In   Nicaragua,   the   Court   devoted   only   one   paragraph   (para   237)   to   considering  
necessity   and   proportionality.   Its   approach   in  Oil   Platforms   (see   paras   74–7)   and  Armed  
Activities  (see  paras  147,  304)  was  likewise  cursory.  In  the  latter  case,  this  was  so  despite  the  
fact  that  both  parties  claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence.  
53  For  an  overview  of  the  ICJ  jurisprudence  on  the  use  of  force,  see  e.g.  Green  (2009);;  Gray  
in  Tams  and  Sloan  (2013)  237–61;;  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  561–604.  
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This   fact   has   not   prevented   the   Court   from   making   obiter   dicta  
pronouncements  that  have  often  been  confusing.  For  example,  it  has  rightly  
confirmed  an  armed  attack  as  the  condition  sine  qua  non  of  the  right  of  self-­
defence.54  Yet,  it  has  also  noted  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  armed  attack,  strict  
compliance  with  the  canons  of  necessity  and  proportionality  will  not  render  any  
purported   defensive   action   lawful,   and   any   breach   of   these   additional  
prerequisites  will  constitute  additional  grounds  of  wrongfulness.55  It  is  difficult  
to   fathom,   however,   how   these   latter   comments   have  meaning.   Absent   an  
armed  attack,  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  not  triggered,  and  any  use  of  force  
will   be   unlawful.   In   these   circumstances,   necessity   and   proportionality   are  
inapplicable  and  cannot  complied  with,  nor  breached.56  In  addition,  like  states,  
the  Court  has  sometimes  been  remiss  in  identifying  whether  its  observations  
on  necessity  and  proportionality  relate  to  the  JAB  or  to  IHL.57  Certain  judges  
may  even  be  accused  of  conflating  the  two.  In  the  course  of  his  review  of  IHL  
proportionality   in  Nuclear  Weapons,   for  example,  Judge  Schwebel   refers   to  
the  UK’s  oral  arguments.58  However,  in  the  passage  that  he  cites  for  support,  
the  UK  Attorney  General  is  clearly  presenting  his  views  on  JAB  proportionality,  
not  IHL  proportionality.59  
Such  judicial  comments  obscure  the  meaning  and  operation  of  necessity  and  
proportionality.  As  an  armed  attack  was  not  established   in  any  of   the  cases  
referred  to  above,  the  question  of  both  necessity  and  proportionality  was  moot.  
It  is  unclear,  therefore,  why  the  Court  has  chosen  to  comment  on  them  in  the  
manner  referred  to  in  this  and  subsequent  Sections.  The  circumstances  of  the  
cases  might  have  incentivized  the  Court  to  speak  out  on  these  issues,  but  the  
need  for  clarity  in  the  JAB  requires  that  when  it  takes  these  opportunities,   it  
does  so  diligently  and  with  meaningful  sufficiency.60  Its  approach  to  necessity  
and  proportionality  appears  particularly  remiss  given  the  overriding  importance  
                                                                                        
54  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
55  Ibid.  
56  See  Sections  1.3.1  and  1.3.2.    
57  See  Sections  1.2.3  and  3.3.2.  
58  Nuclear  Weapons,  diss  op  Schwebel,  para  25.  
59  Nuclear  Weapons,  Oral  Proceedings,  Verbatim  Record,  CR  95/34,  34.  
60  See  e.g.  Oil  Platforms  diss  op  Simma,  para  6;;  Armed  Activities,  diss  op  Simma,  paras  8–9.    
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that  states  place  on  them.  As  will  be  made  clear,  there  is  enough  state  practice  
for  the  Court  to  draw  upon  in  order  to  clarify  the  content  and  operation  of  these  
requirements,  but  it  has  so  far  avoided  doing  this.  It  is  both  what  the  Court  has  
said  on  necessity  and  proportionality,  and  what  is  has  not  said,  therefore,  that  
is  the  problem.61  This  thesis  seeks  to  address  this  issue  and  provide  a  critical  
and  more  nuanced  review  of  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence.  
The  Court  has  offered  some  guidance,  however,  regarding  how  it  approaches  
necessity   and   proportionality.   In   Nicaragua,   it   clearly   dealt   with   the   two  
requirements  separately,  first  opining  on  the  necessity  of  the  USA’s  actions,  
before   going   on   to   assess   whether   they   were   also   proportionate.62   In   Oil  
Platforms,   the  Court   likewise   treated   the   two  concepts  as   independent,  and  
considered   them   in   the   same   order. 63   In   Armed   Activities,   however,   its  
approach  was  less  structured.64  In  line  with  Nicaragua  and  Oil  Platforms,  this  
thesis   contends   that   necessity   must   be   applied   and   assessed   before  
proportionality.   This   order   is   crucial   so   that   the   true  meaning   and   practical  
application   of   each   requirement   can   be   fully   understood   and   realised   in  
practice.65  On   this   basis,   if   a   putative   act   of   self-­defence   is   unnecessary,   it  
cannot  be  disproportionate  or  proportionate.  It  will  simply  be  an  unlawful  use  
of  force.  If  necessity  is  satisfied,  however,  an  exercise  of  self-­defence  may  be  
proportionate  or  disproportionate.  The  importance  of  the  order  of  consideration  
and  application  of  necessity  and  proportionality  will  be  considered   further   in  
the  Chapters  2  and  3.  
Finally   on   the   ICJ’s   jurisprudence,   and   as   a   general   matter,   the   Court’s  
examination  of  necessity  and  proportionality  must  be  viewed  with  a  degree  of  
circumspection,  and  we  should  not  draw  conclusions  that  are  too  wide  ranging.  
The  small  number  of  propositions  made  by  the  ICJ  must  be  read  in  light  of,  
                                                                                        
61  Ibid.  Green  (2009)  106,  suggests  that,  for  the  most  part,   it   is  what  the  Court  has  not  said  
that  is  the  problem.  
62  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
63  Oil  Platforms,  paras  76–7.  
64  Armed  Activities,  para  147.  
65  This  approach  also  finds  support  in  the  literature.  E.g.  Gardam  (2004)  138–9;;  Green  (2009)  
89.  
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and  confined  to,  the  particular  facts  of  the  case  before  it.  We  should  also  bear  
in  mind   the   time   that   has   passed   since  each   judgment  was   rendered.  The  
principal  self-­defence  case,  Nicaragua,  is  over  30  years  old.  The  most  recent,  
Armed  Activities,  was  delivered  over  12  years  ago.  This  does  not  diminish  the  
importance   of   these   judgments,   but   rather   sets   their   enduring   legacy   into  
context.  These  cases  represent  the  law  as  understood  by  the  majority  of  the  
ICJ  at  the  relevant  time  and  within  the  confines  of  the  factual  context  presented  
to   the   Court.   As   Green   notes,   we   must   be   cautious   when   assessing   the  
jurisprudence   and   bear   in  mind   these   considerations   and   the   fact   that   any  
judgment   represents,   at   best,   a   ‘freeze   frame’   of   international   law   at   a  
particular  juncture.66  
1.2.2   Scholarship  
Academic  commentary  to  date  on  necessity  and  proportionality  has  also  been  
relatively   light.   Scholarship   has   focused   instead   on   the   controversies  
surrounding   the   ratione   materiae,   ratione   temporis   and   ratione   personae  
elements  of  the  armed  attack  trigger.67  With  limited  notable  exceptions,68  to  the  
extent  that  necessity  and  proportionality  have  been  considered,  commentators  
have   been   selective   with   their   analysis.   They   have   tended   to   focus   on  
individual  incidents  of  self-­defence  and  whether,  typically  as  a  matter  of  fact,  
they  satisfy  the  two  criteria.  Whilst  acknowledging  their  central  function  in  the  
right   of   self-­defence,   they   have  not   established  a   comprehensive   analytical  
framework.   Consideration   of   necessity   and   proportionality   is   often   cursory,  
with  a  brief  overview  of  their  content,  or  remarks  that  are  limited  to  noting  the  
lack   of   academic   examination   of   these   requirements,   their   indeterminate  
nature,  or  that  they  require  further  analysis.69  
                                                                                        
66  Green  (2009)  24–5.  
67  These  debates  are  well  known,  and  the  associated  literature  is  vast.  For  an  overview  of  the  
various  issues,  see  e.g.  Ruys  (2010).  
68  E.g.   Gardam   (2004);;   Tams   in   Van   den   Herik   and   Schrijver   (2013)   373–421;;   Kretzmer  
(2013).  
69  E.g.  Brownlie  (1963)  261;;  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  586;;  Gray  (2018)  159.  See  also  Gardam  
(2004)  20.  
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No   previous  work   has   attempted   the   breadth   and   depth   of   review   of   state  
practice   of   the   present   study,   nor   the   conceptual   analysis   set   out   in   the  
following  Chapters.  The  paucity  of  scholarship  on  necessity  and  proportionality  
is  perhaps  a  natural  consequence  of  the  complexities  that  surround  them  and  
the   ICJ’s   focus   on   ‘armed   attack’.   Proportionality   has   posed   particular  
problems  for  scholars.  Gardam  noted  this  phenomenon  back  in  2004,  in  her  
book  that  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  reviews  of  necessity  
and  proportionality.70  Her  work   is  an   important  contribution   to   the   field,  yet   it  
takes  us  only  so  far.  Gardam  devotes  only  one  chapter  of  her  book  to  these  
requirements  as  they  pertain  to  the  right  of  self-­defence,  and  her  analysis  is  in  
need  of  updating,  particularly  in  light  of  more  recent  state  practice.  
This  thesis  references  a  number  of  academics  who  have  since  contributed  to  
a  better  understanding  of  necessity  and  proportionality,  but   there  remains  a  
lack  of  academic  consideration  and  consensus  regarding  their  meaning  and  
application.  The  gap  in  the  literature  detracts  from  the  potential  of  the  JAB  to  
evolve  and  respond  to  the  issues  that  test  it  the  most,  such  as  the  increasing  
militarisation   of   NSAs.   This   thesis   seeks   to   contribute   to   remedying   this  
position  by  bringing  the  scholarship  up-­to-­date  and  offering  a  more  rigorous  
approach  to  the  subject.  It  advances  the  current  theoretical  understanding  of  
necessity   and   proportionality   by   suggesting   how   academics   may   better  
conceive   of   these   requirements,   and   adds   to   the   existing   knowledge   via   a  
comprehensive  examination  of  state  practice.  
1.2.3   State  Practice  
As  noted,  states  invariably  invoke  necessity  and  proportionality  when  seeking  
to   justify   claims   of   self-­defence.   Whilst   occasionally   recognizing   that   the  
concepts   require   further   clarification   and   study,71   states   almost   universally  
accept   that   necessity   and   proportionality   regulate   their   defensive   actions.72  
                                                                                        
70  Gardam  (2004)  155.  
71  E.g.  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.67–78  (1970)  83  (Iraq).  
72  This  is  not  without  exception.  During  the  negotiations  of  UNGA  Res.  3314  (1974)  (‘Definition  
of   Aggression’),   for   example,   the   representative   of   Ghana   argued   that   the   principle   of  
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This  thesis  reviews  over  70  years’  worth  of  state  practice  and  identifies  trends  
and  themes  that  have  not  previously  been  explored.  Whether  in  compliance  or  
breach,   state   practice   reveals   that   necessity   and   proportionality   occupy   a  
central,  and  often  decisive,  role  in  how  states  justify  their  own  uses  of  force  
and  assess  the  military  actions  of  other  states.73  We  will  see  that  states  often  
resort  to  necessity  and  proportionality  as  the  main,  or  only,  factors  to  determine  
the  legality  of  a  particular  action.  In  contrast  to  the  position  taken  by  the  ICJ  
and  scholars,  therefore,  states  tend  to  avoid  doctrinal  debates  over  whether  or  
not  there  has  been  an  armed  attack  and,  instead,  turn  to  these  requirements  
to  regulate  the  exercise  of  self-­defence.74  
That  states  focus  on  necessity  and  proportionality  is  the  principal  reason  why  
this  thesis  is  so  important.  Concentrating  our  attention  on  these  requirements  
better   represents   how   states   view   the   right   of   self-­defence,   explain   their  
actions  and  review  the  acts  of  other  states.  A  more  coherent  and  determinate  
conception  of  necessity  and  proportionality  speaks  directly  to  this  fact  and  the  
practical   operation   of   self-­defence.   As   a   novel   contribution   to   the   field,   the  
current  work  further  develops  an  academic  understanding  of  the  law,  but  in  a  
way   that   is   both   practical   and   useful.   The   following   analysis   can   assist  
defending  states   to   form  policies  and  reach  decisions  regarding  resorting   to  
self-­defence,  and  to  justify  their  actions  to  the  international  community.  This  
thesis  also  operates  to  provide  clearer  restraints  on  that  action  by  providing  
the  means  for  other  states,  international  organizations,  courts  and  academics  
to  monitor  and  appraise  it  more  effectively.  
                                                                                        
proportionality,  as  it  applied  to  self-­defence,  had  ‘no  basis  in  modern  jurisprudence’.  Ibid,  86.  
The  Syrian  delegate  was  equally  dismissive.  Ibid,  87–8.  
73   Examples   where   states   have   expressly   asserted   that   their   actions   are   necessary   and  
proportionate,  as  well  as   incidents  where  such  criteria   form   the  basis  of   reactions  of  other  
states  and  international  organizations  are  referenced  throughout  this  thesis.  
74   See   e.g.   Green   (2009)   9,   108–9;;   Gray   (2018)   163–4;;   Henderson   (2018)   228–9.   For  
example,   in   relation   to   necessity,   the   current   debate   regarding   the   legality   of   particular  
defensive  action  against  NSAs  revolves  around  the  controversial  unwilling  or  unable  doctrine,  
as   well   as   the   notion   of   ‘imminence’.   See,   respectively,   Sections   4.1.2.   and   2.4.1(b).  
Proportionality   is   often   central   in   determining   legality.   Notable   examples   include   Israel’s  
(disproportionate)  intervention  into  Lebanon  2006  and  Turkey’s  (proportionate)  Operation  Sun  
in   2008.   See   in   particular   Section   3.2.5.   Other   examples   are   referenced   in   the   following  
Chapters.  
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1.3   Thesis  structure,  arguments  and  initial  observations  
Before  moving  to  the  detail  of  Chapters  2  to  4,  the  remainder  of  this  Section  
sets  out  some  initial  observations  to  frame  the  analysis  and  emphasize  some  
of  the  further  contributions  that  this  thesis  makes  to  the  existing  literature.  This  
Section  covers  some  substantive  content,  but  it  is  primarily  intended  to  act  as  
an   introductory   guide   for   the   reader   to   understand   the   fundamentals   of  
necessity  and  proportionality  and  why  they  are  so  important  to  the  right  of  self-­
defence  in  international  law.  This  first  foray  into  the  subject  is  developed  in  the  
subsequent   Chapters.   Section   1.4   explains   this   author’s   approach   to  
methodology  and  doctrine.  
Chapter  2  focuses  on  the  meaning  and  content  of  necessity.  It  argues,  for  the  
first   time,   that   there   are   two   different   ‘types’   of   necessity.   In   so   doing,   this  
author   proposes   a   novel   taxonomy   to   distinguish   between   them.   This  
distinction   addresses,   and   better   explains,   the   two   principal   and   distinct  
concerns   of   this   requirement   that   are   reflected   in   state   practice,   ICJ  
jurisprudence   and   scholarship:   a)   is   military   force   required   at   all   in   the  
circumstances  (an  issue  of  ‘general  necessity’);;  and  b)  if  so,  where  must  such  
force  be  directed  (an  issue  of  ‘specific  necessity’)?  Without  general  necessity,  
the  applicability  of  both  specific  necessity  and  proportionality  is  moot.  Drawing  
on  core  principles  of   IHL,  Chapter  2  provides  a  clearer  and  more  workable  
understanding   of   necessity   that   highlights   both   the   weaknesses   in,   and  
opportunities  for,  its  operation.  
Chapter  3  proceeds  to  examine  proportionality.  As  with  Chapter  2,  it  employs  
primary  and  secondary  sources  of  international  law  to  provide  a  coherent  and  
granular   realization   of   this   requirement,   and  how   it   operates   in   practice.   In  
particular,  it  offers  a  more  nuanced  analysis  of  the  various  factors  and  interests  
that  inform  the  review  of  ‘how  much’  force  states  may  use  in  their  defence,  and  
whether  other  states  will  view  such  action  as  excessive.  In  so  doing,  Chapter  
3   draws   on   the   laws   of   state   responsibility   to   consider   how   a   diversity   of  
interests  are  affected  by  the  exercise  of  self-­defence.  It  also  has  recourse  to  
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IHL,  exploring  how  it  interacts  with  the  JAB,  whilst  remaining  a  distinct  regime  
of  international  law.  
Chapter  4  builds  on  the  analysis  of  the  previous  Chapters  by  considering  how  
necessity  and  proportionality  are  adapted  to  apply  to  defensive  action  against  
NSAs.   With   a   particular   focus   on   international   terrorism,   their   utility   and  
limitations  are  brought  to  the  fore.  Chapter  5  completes  this  thesis  by  setting  
out   its   conclusions   and   considerations   for   the   future   development   of  
international  law.  
1.3.1   The  nature  and  function  of  necessity  and  proportionality  
Necessity   and   proportionality   condition   the   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­
defence.75   Necessity   determines   whether   defensive   force   may   be   used   to  
respond  to  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  attack,  and  where  it  must  be  directed.  
Proportionality  governs  how  much  force  is  permissible.  Once  the  availability  of  
the  right  is  triggered  in  response  to  an  armed  attack,  these  two  requirements  
operate  to  restrain  the  scope  of  defensive  action  and  ensure  that  it  remains  
defensive.  As  Ago  notes,   ‘the  objective   to  be  achieved  by   [self-­defence],   its  
raison  d'être,  is  necessarily  that  of  repelling  an  attack  and  preventing  it  from  
succeeding,   and   nothing   else.’ 76   Compliance   with   necessity   and  
proportionality,   therefore,   indicates   that   the   purposes   of   self-­defence   are  
achieved,  and  nothing  beyond  that.77  As  guardians  of   the  parameters  of   the  
right  of  self-­defence,  they  are  the  ‘touchstones’  that  ground  such  action  in  the  
principle  of  legality.78  Absent  a  clearer  and  more  coherent  realization  of  these  
requirements,  states  operate  in  a  grey  area  of  legal  regulation.  
Necessity  and  proportionality  seek  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  rights  and  
interests   of   three   different   groups   of   actors.   The   first   is   the   right   of   the  
                                                                                        
75  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  41.  
76  Ago  (1980)  para  119.  
77  The  purposes  of  self-­defence  are  discussed  further  in  Section  1.3.2.  
78  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
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defending  state  to  defend  itself  in  the  face  of  an  armed  attack.79  Second,  is  the  
right   of   the   attacker   to   be  protected   from  excessive   defensive   responses.80  
Third,  are  the  interests  of  other  states  and  the  wider  international  community.  
These  latter  interests  include  concern  for  civilian  harm  and  the  environment,  
as  well  as  the  operation  of  the  collective  security  system.  In  this  latter  respect,  
necessity  and  proportionality  function  to  contain  the  risk  of  escalating  violence  
and   instability.   They   thereby   contribute   to   international   peace  and   security,  
whilst   reserving   to   the   UNSC   the   primary   responsibility   for   its   long-­term  
maintenance.  These  three  classes  of  rights  and  interests  are  examined  in  the  
following  Chapters.  
As  will  be  made  clear,  necessity  and  proportionality  apply  on  an  ongoing  basis,  
throughout  the  duration  of  an  armed  conflict  prompted  by  self-­defence,  and  not  
just  at  its  commencement.81  This  enduring  obligation  is  often  overlooked  in  the  
literature,   yet   it   is   crucial   to   appreciating   the   potential   of   necessity   and  
proportionality  to  restrain  military  action.  The  JAB  regulates  the  use  of  force  by  
states  as  a  whole  and  its  rules  must  be  continually  monitored  and  reviewed  by  
states.  Put  simply,   if   the  recourse   to   force   is,  or   the  continuing  use  of   force  
becomes,  unnecessary  or  disproportionate,  it  is  not  lawful  self-­defence  and  will  
breach  Article  2(4)  UN  Charter.  Therefore,  either  force  must  not  be  employed  
in  the  first  place,  or  it  must  cease.82  
                                                                                        
79  A  ‘defending  state’  is  a  state  that  is  (or  claims  to  be)  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack  by  another  
state  or  NSAs.  
80  An  ‘attacker’  may  be  a  state  or  NSAs,  in  each  case,  that  have  launched,  or  intend  to  launch,  
an  armed  attack  against  a  defending  state.  See  2.4.1  regarding  the  timing  of  an  armed  attack  
and  Chapter  4  regarding  armed  attacks  by  NSAs.  
81  Greenwood  (1983)  222–5;;  Gardam  (2004)  155-­6;;  Gazzini  (2005)  146–7;;  Ruys  (2010)  124.  
See  in  particular  Sections  3.3.1  and  3.4.  
82  A  distinction  should  be  drawn  between  applying  these  rules  and  assessing  compliance  with  
them.  Whilst  necessity  and  proportionality  apply  to  a  defending  state’s  actions  on  an  enduring  
basis,  and  such  state  must  continually  monitor  its  own  compliance  with  them,  their  ultimate  
review  is  likely  to  occur  on  a  post  facto  basis.  The  full  picture  of  putative  defensive  conduct  is  
only  likely  to  be  available  once  over  and  the  facts  regarding  its  scope  are  made  known  (e.g.  
in  debates  before  the  UNSC  or  arising  out  of  a  fact-­finding  process).  Unless  such  deliberations  
are  during  the  course  of  a  lengthy  ongoing  conflict,  or  set  in  the  context  of  an  enduring  threat,  
therefore,  an  assessment  of  necessity  and  proportionality  will  typically  occur  as  a  retrospective  
exercise.  See  further  Section  3.4.  
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Necessity  and  proportionality  have  been  described  as  two  sides  of  the  same  
coin. 83   This   characterization   emphasizes   that   they   are   closely   linked  
conceptually.   In   recognizing   this   relationship,   Gray   has   suggested   that   an  
unnecessary  use  of  force  cannot  be  proportionate  and  if  it  is  not  proportionate,  
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  can  be  necessary.84  This  statement  oversimplifies  the  
relationship,  yet  exemplifies  how  the  two  requirements  are  sometimes  referred  
to  without  due  distinction.  Their  close  connection  means  that  they  have  often  
been   equated   by   academics, 85   and   states. 86   This   thesis   confronts   this  
approach.  As  will  be  made  clear  in  Chapters  2  and  3,  they  are  in  fact  distinct  
and  separate  requirements  of  customary  international  law  and  must  be  applied  
as  such.87  
Given   their   close   relationship,   occasional   conflation   of   the   two   concepts   is  
perhaps   inevitable.   Yet,   differentiating   between   them,   and   challenging  
assertions  that  seek  to  equate  them,  is  important  and  not  simply  a  question  of  
semantics:  ‘Failure  to  distinguish  between  necessity  and  proportionality  would  
seem  to  be  one  of  the  key  factors  contributing  to  the  uncertainty  surrounding  
both   concepts.’88  The  greater   the   determinacy  of   these   rules,   therefore,   the  
greater   the   potential   for   states   to   comply   with   them.89  This   compels   us   to  
consider   specifically   what   it   is   about   a   use   of   force   that   is   ‘necessary’   or  
‘unnecessary’,   ‘proportionate’   or   ‘disproportionate’   and,   therefore,   lawful   or  
unlawful.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  necessity  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  
proportionality  without  further  justification  or  explanation.  Neither  is  it  sufficient  
to  conclude   that  an  act  satisfies  or  breaches  either  or  both  criteria,  without  
considering   first   how   the   criteria   apply   and,   crucially,   in   what   order.90  This  
                                                                                        
83  Ago  (1980)  para  121.  
84  Gray  (2018)  159.  
85  See  Section  2.2(a).  
86   During   discussions   regarding   the   Definition   of   Aggression,   for   example,   the   USSR  
maintained   that   ‘the   word   “necessary”   contained   the   idea   of   proportionality.’   UN   Doc  
A/AC.134/SR.67–78,  91.  
87  Greenwood  (2011)  para  26.  Gray  (2018)  159,  questions,  however,  how  far  the  two  concepts  
can  operate  separately.  
88  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  377.  
89  Franck  (1988)  713–25.  
90  As   noted   in  Section   1.2.1,   this   author   contends   that   necessity  must   be   considered   and  
applied  before  proportionality.  
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thesis  seeks  a  clearer  normative  structure  of  each  requirement,  marking  these  
distinctions  to  the  fullest  extent  possible  and  applying  them  in  the  correct  order.  
Only  with  such  clarity  can  necessity  and  proportionality  have  proper  meaning  
and  be  applied  effectively  in  practice.  
An  investigation  of  necessity  and  proportionality  has  its  limitations,  however.  
The  two  are  essentially  abstract  and  flexible  concepts   that,  as   the   following  
Chapters   reveal,   often   incorporate   equally   indeterminate   ideas   of  
‘excessiveness’   and   ‘reasonableness’.91  Their   nature   is   also   such   that   their  
potential  to  curb  state  action  is  very  much  context  dependent.  This  means  that  
establishing  general  rules  for  their  application  is  challenging.  Further,  they  are  
creatures  of  custom  that,  by  its  nature,  will  always  be  less  precise  and  detailed  
than  conventional  law.92  These  factors,  together  with  competing  views  on  the  
scope   and   purpose   of   self-­defence,   make   them   difficult   to   apply   to   an  
increasing  diversity  of  situations   in  which   the  right  of  self-­defence  has  been  
invoked.93  
Despite   these   challenges,   a   thorough   review   of   state   practice,   whilst  
demonstrating   that   the   two   requirements   are   applied   flexibly,  provides   their  
core  content  and  outer  limits.  In  addition,  a  better  theoretical  grasp  of  necessity  
and  proportionality  helps  us  to  understand  and  interpret  that  state  practice  and  
provides   guidance   on   identifying   potential   objective   characteristics.  
Compliance  with   necessity   and   proportionality   is   essentially   contextual,   but  
this   thesis   provides   tools   for   states,   scholars   and   courts   to   adopt   a   more  
coherent   approach   to   appraising   defensive   action   and  mitigating   its   abuse.  
This  strengthens  the  potential  for  international  law  to  regulate  when  and  how  
states  resort  to  using  force.  
                                                                                        
91  Green  (2015)  JUFIL  101.  
92  This  may  be  no  bad  thing.  The  necessary  flexibility  that  this  allows  will  also  be  discussed  in  
the  following  Chapters.  
93  Simma  et  al  (2012)  1426.  
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1.3.2   The  purposes  of  the  right  of  self-­defence    
a)   Halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  attack  
Compliance  with  necessity  and  proportionality  guarantees  that  the  purposes  
of  self-­defence  are  achieved,  and  nothing  more.94  The  result  is  a  lawful  use  of  
force.  Such  compliance  in  turn  depends  on  establishing  the  purposes  of  self-­
defence.  These  purposes  provide  the  benchmark  against  which  adherence  to  
the  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality  is  gauged.95  This  benchmark  
defines  their  content  and  scope.  It  answers  the  two  questions  that  govern  the  
present  analysis:  ‘necessary  to  do  what?’  and  ‘proportionate  to  what?’  There  
can   be   no  meaningful   deliberation   of   necessity   and   proportionality   without  
concomitant  consideration  of  these  purposes.  Whether  a  narrow  or  expansive  
view  is  adopted  on  this  issue  delineates  the  conceptual  boundaries  of  these  
requirements.  
The   legitimate   purposes   of   the   right   of   self-­defence   remain   highly  
controversial,  however.96  Disagreements  regarding  how  far  a  state  may  go  to  
defend  itself  risks  making  an  assessment  of  necessity  and  proportionality  an  
overly  subjective  exercise,  beholden   to   the  position  of   the   reviewer,  be   it  a  
state,  international  organization  or  scholar.  Even  if  subject  to  a  later,  objective  
review  by  a  court  (which  is  rare),  continuing  controversies  mean  that  it  may  be  
very  difficult  to  identify  when  the  defensive  purpose  is  fulfilled  and,  as  a  result,  
the   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­defence   is   exhausted.   Many   of   these  
controversies  are  discussed  in  the  following  Chapters.  One  of  the  most  notable  
is  whether  there  exists  the  right  of  some  form  of  anticipatory  self-­defence.  
                                                                                        
94  Proportionality  also  ensures  that  third-­party  interests  are  not  unduly  disrupted.  See  Chapter  
3.  
95  See  Greenwood  (2011)  para  27.  
96  See  e.g.  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  586–7.  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  399–
401,  419,   talks  of  a   ‘normative  drift’  of   the   legitimate  aims  of  self-­defence   in   the  context  of  
combatting  terrorism.  He  notes  that,  in  this  context,  states  are  subsuming  far-­reaching  military  
goals  under  a  broadly  defined  concept  of  self-­defence.  See  Chapter  4.  
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The  ability  to  counter  potential  future  threats  that  have  not  yet  materialized  is  
widely   rejected  by   scholars   and   states  alike,   although   the   right  of   states   to  
respond  to  ‘imminent’  armed  attacks  occupies  a  less  clear  position.97  However,  
there  is  certainly  a  growing  academic  consensus,  particularly  following  the  11  
September  2001  terrorist  attacks  against  the  USA  (‘9/11’),  that  supports  such  
a  right.  State  practice  is  inconclusive,  but  has  followed  this  general  trend.98  If  
one   accepts   a   limited   right   of   pre-­emptive   self-­defence   against   imminent  
armed  attacks,  then  the  purposes  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  are  to  halt,  repel  
or   prevent   an   armed   attack.   However,   such   purposes,   and   the   attendant  
analysis   of   both   necessity   and   proportionality,   change   if   one   rejects   this  
possibility.   For   commentators   and   states   that   deny  any   right   of   anticipatory  
self-­defence,  necessity  and  proportionality  become  much  narrower  concepts.  
This   is   because   the   purposes   of   self-­defence   are   reduced   to   halting   and  
repelling,  and  not  preventing,  an  armed  attack.  As  explored  further  below,  the  
more  limited  the  view  of  self-­defence,  therefore,  the  more  circumscribing  these  
requirements  become.  
Whilst  the  outer  parameters  of  self-­defence  may  be  debated  along  these  lines,  
the  core  purpose  is  not.  A  use  of  force  in  self-­defence  must  be  defensive  in  
nature.  Force  going  beyond  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  attack  
                                                                                        
97  A  distinction  is  to  be  made  here  between  ‘pre-­emptive’  and  ‘preventive’  self-­defence.  See  
Ruys  (2010)  250–4  for  a  general  discussion  of  the  terminology  that  this  thesis  adopts.  ‘Pre-­
emptive’   self-­defence   refers   to   force   employed   to   counter   imminent   armed   attacks   (see  
Section   2.4.1(b)).   In   contrast,   ‘preventive’   self-­defence   refers   to   a   use   of   force   to   counter  
possible  future  attacks  that  are  not  imminent.  Instead,  the  threats  are  conjectural  and  have  not  
yet  materialized.  This  highly  controversial  notion  is  best  represented  by  the  so-­called  ‘Bush  
Doctrine’.  The  National  Security  Strategy  of  the  United  States  of  America,  September  2002,  
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>,15>.   It   is   almost   universally  
rejected  by  scholars  and   is  not  generally  accepted  by  states.  See  e.g.  Ruys  (2010)  322–4;;  
Corten  (2010)  441;;  Gray  (2018)  248–53;;  Henderson  (2018)  285–95.  As  a  point  of  terminology,  
reference  is  sometimes  made  to  ‘pre-­emptive’  rather  than  ‘preventive’  self-­defence.  Whatever  
the  chosen  nomenclature,  the  point  is  that  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  non-­imminent  armed  
attacks  is  generally  regarded  as  unlawful.  
98   See   e.g.   Bowett   (1955-­6)   131;;   Greenwood   (2002)   paras   22–4;;   The   Chatham   House  
Principles   967–9;;  Gill   (2006)   362,   366;;  Ruys   (2010)   324–42;;   Lubell   in  Weller   (2015)   701;;  
Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  105–6;;  Henderson  (2018)  277.  For  recent  explicit  state  assertions  of  this  
right,  see  e.g.  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  239;;  UK  Attorney  General  
Speech  2017;;  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  See  also  UN  Doc  A/59/2005  (2005)  
para  124.  See  further  Section  2.4.1(b).  
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will  be  either  unnecessary  or  disproportionate  and,  ipso  facto,  unlawful.99  Yet,  
the  reality  beyond  the  pages  of  an  academic  text,  or  courtroom  judgment,  may  
not   be   so   clear-­cut.   States   do   not   confine   themselves   to   the   neat   argot   of  
‘halting,   repelling  or  preventing’  when  discussing  defence  and  their  national  
security.  They  may  employ  other  terms,  including  ‘deterring’  or  ‘discouraging’  
armed  attacks.100  This  language  appears  to  take  action  beyond  an  immediate  
defensive  purpose  and  into  a  more  uncertain  and  distant  future  of  possibilities.  
‘Deterrence’,  it  may  be  argued,  is  an  inherent  part  of  punitive  measures  and  
cannot,  therefore,  be  recognized  as  a  legitimate  motive  for  using  force.101  Yet,  
an  element  of  deterrence  might  in  fact  be  considered  by  states  to  be  an  integral  
part  of  a  defensive  response.  Instead  of  focusing  on  the  label  that  might  be  
employed  to  describe  a  particular  act,   the  key   factor   that  will  determine   the  
legality   of   a   putatively   defensive   response   is  whether   there   is   a   continuing  
threat  to  a  defending  state  and  its  actions  are  necessary  and  proportionate  to  
counter   that   threat.102  This   points   to   the   existence  of   a   legitimate   defensive  
purpose.  
b)   An  overriding  defensive  purpose  
The  existence  of  additional  and  even  decisive  motives,  over  and  above  self-­
defence,  does  not  deprive  a  state  of  the  right  to  resort  to  self-­defence,  provided  
the   conditions   for   an   armed   attack   are  met.103  Particular  motives   for   taking  
military   action,  and   the  outcomes  of   such  action   do,   however,   relate   to   the  
issue  of  whether  a  purported  defensive  act   is  necessary  and  proportionate.  
For  example,   the  appropriation  of   resources,  changing  a  border,  destroying  
state  infrastructure,  occupation  and  regime  change  are  all  possible  results  of  
purported   defensive   action.   Whether   these   outcomes   are   a   result   of  
coincidence   or   design,   the   question   is   whether   they   are   necessary   and  
                                                                                        
99  Defensive   force  can  be  necessary  and  proportionate,  or  necessary  and  disproportionate,  
but   it  cannot  be  unnecessary  and  proportionate,  or  unnecessary  and  disproportionate.  See  
Section  3.3.2.  
100  See  further  Section  2.4.2(b).  
101  See  Okimoto  (2012)  64;;  Kretzmer  (2013)  268.  
102  See  Section  2.4.2(b).  The  idea  of  a  continuing  threat  is  explored  in  subsequent  Chapters.  
103  Nicaragua,  para  127.  
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proportionate   to   achieving   a   defensive   purpose   (viz   halting,   repelling   or  
preventing   an   armed   attack),   not   whether   they   are   additional   legitimate  
purposes  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  itself.  
Simma   maintains   that   as   long   as   defensive   action   ‘visibly   and   credibly  
preserve[s]  a  primary  repelling  character  it  is  immaterial  if  [a  defending  state]  
simultaneously  harbours   additional,  but   subordinate   deterrent,   retributive   or  
even  punitive  motives  when  conducting  them.’104  Reference  here  to  retribution  
and  punishment  is  potentially  troubling.  Such  terms  are  at  odds  with  the  notion  
of  defence.  Yet,  as  Dinstein  notes,   ‘the  motives  driving  States   to  action  are  
usually  multifaceted,  and  a  tinge  of  retribution  can  probably  be  traced  in  every  
instance  of  response  to  force.’105  This  issue  goes  to  the  question  of  how  far  a  
state   may   go   to   protect   itself.   Ultimately,   any   motive   or   purpose   beyond  
defence   risks   rendering   ostensibly   defensive   action   an   unlawful   armed  
reprisal.106  
Corten  argues  that  it  is  better  to  think  of  the  ‘main’  or  ‘ultimate  aim’  of  defensive  
action.  Subordinate  aims,  such  as  overthrowing  a  government,  are  permitted,  
provided  they  are  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  an  armed  attack.  Such  approach,  
Corten  argues,  best  accords  with  Ago’s  reference  to  the  ‘raison  d'être’  of  self-­
defence.107  This  account  is  logical.  It  recognizes  that  a  state  may  pursue  other  
subsidiary  aims  in  exercising  its  right  of  self-­defence,  but  requires  such  aims  
to  be  necessary  and  proportionate  to  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  
attack.  Whilst  it  may  not  be  easy  to  establish  clear  lines  of  distinction  on  this  
point,  adding  a  potentially  open-­ended   list  of  extra  possible  defensive  aims  
risks  rendering  self-­defence  meaningless.  The  analytical  framework  set  out  in  
this  thesis  aims  to  assist  with  assessing  adherence  to  an  overriding  defensive  
purpose.  
                                                                                        
104  Simma  et  al  (2012)  1426–7.    
105  Dinstein  (2001)  199.    
106  See  Section  2.4.2.    
107  Corten  (2010)  484–5.  See  n  76.    
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c)   Fulfilling  the  defensive  purpose  
It  is  also  important  to  consider  what  sort  of  action  a  defending  state  might  be  
permitted   to   take   to   fulfil   a   defensive   purpose   that   complies   with   the  
requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality.  As  an  example,  it   is  logical  to  
conclude  that  an  armed  attack  that  has  succeeded  in  capturing  territory  can  
only  be  successfully  defended  against  by  repulsing  the  attacker  and  restoring  
that  territory.  A  return  to  the  territorial  status  quo  ante  bellum  is  the  minimum  
legitimate   defensive   goal   in   such   circumstances.   However,   it   is   clear   that  
states  can  do  more  than  this,  while  remaining  within  the  bounds  of  necessity  
and  proportionality.108  As  Green  notes,  it  may  not  be  enough  simply  to  expel  
the  attacker  from  captured  territory.  A  defending  state’s  troops  are  not  required  
to  stop  at  the  border  and  idly  watch  the  attacker  regroup  and  prepare  a  fresh  
attack.   Steps  may   be   taken   to   ensure   there   is   no   repeat   occurrence.109  An  
example  is  Operation  Desert  Storm,  being  the  coalition  response  in  1991  to  
Iraq’s  invasion  of  Kuwait.  Forcing  Iraq’s  withdrawal  from  Kuwait  meant  that  the  
response  was  not  restricted  to  the  latter’s  territory.110  
In  terms  of  how  much  further  a  state  may  go  beyond  re-­establishing  the  status  
quo  ante  bellum,  therefore,  it  seems  sensible  to  suggest  that  action  taken  that  
‘reasonably  secures  the  state  following  an  armed  attack  will  be  acceptable’.111  
An  example   is   the   ‘protection  zone’  maintained  by   the  British   for   five  years  
around  the  Falkland  Islands  following  the  end  of  active  hostilities  arising  out  of  
Argentina’s   1982   invasion.  Given   that   Argentina   had   refused   to   proclaim   a  
formal  end  to  hostilities,  excluding  Argentine  military  aircraft  and  vessels  from  
this   area   was   probably   a   lawful   defensive   measure. 112   This   ability   to   re-­
establish  and  guarantee   the  security  of   the  defending  state  can  be  sensibly  
interpreted  as  part  of,  or  attendant  to,  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  
                                                                                        
108  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  113.  See  also  Gardam  (2004)  156.    
109  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  114.  See  further  Sections  2.4.1  and  2.4.2.  
110  See  e.g.  Greenwood  (1992);;  Wet  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  456–68.    
111  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  114.  Gardam  (2004)  157,  likewise  acknowledges  a  right  to  ‘restore  
the  security  of  the  State  after  an  armed  attack’,  suggesting  the  international  response  to  9/11  
as  an  example.  
112  Greenwood  (1989)  276;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  114.  See  further  Section  3.2.6(b).  
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attack.  Without  this  ability,  these  purposes  might  not  be  achieved  effectively  
and  the  threat  to  the  defending  state  might  subsist.  
States  are  not  permitted  to  protect  ‘perceived  security  interests’,  however.113  
Any   putative   defensive   action   taken   by   a   defending   state   must,   therefore,  
relate   to   a   distinct   and   identifiable   threat.   Furthermore,   temporal  
considerations  limit  the  extent  to  which  states  may  claim  a  defensive  necessity.  
This  reflects  the  fact  that  self-­defence  is  a  temporary,  emergency  right.  To  be  
considered  necessary,  such  acts  must  be  aimed  at  provisionally  guaranteeing  
the  legitimate  and  immediate  security  of  defending  states.  Once  the  threat  has  
been   successfully   countered,   the   necessity   of   self-­defence   falls   away. 114  
Beyond  the  immediate  security  needs  of  the  defending  state,  ‘the  creation  of  
permanent   conditions   of   security   seem   to   have   been   reserved   by   the  
international  community  as  tasks  to  be  performed  collectively.’115  An  enduring  
solution  to  the  situation  is,  therefore,  to  be  provided  by  the  collective  security  
mechanisms   of   the   UN   Charter,   with   the   UNSC   at   its   head.   These  
considerations  are  explored  further  in  the  following  Chapters.  
1.4   Methodology  and  doctrine  
This   thesis   aims   to   provide   a   comprehensive   review   of   the   customary  
requirements   of   necessity   and   proportionality   by   undertaking   an   audit   of  
relevant  state  practice  and  opinio  juris  since  the  signing  of  the  UN  Charter  in  
1945. 116   The   ‘quest   for   custom’   is   not   an   exact   science,   however, 117   and  
controversies   abound   regarding   the   identification   of   customary   international  
                                                                                        
113  Armed  Activities,  para  148.  See  also  n  97  regarding  preventive  self-­defence.  
114  See  further  Sections  2.4.1,  3.2.2  and  4.1.4.  
115  Cannizzaro  (2006)  782.  
116  As  a  doctrinal  matter,  state  practice  and  opinio  juris  are  determinative  of  the  existence  and  
content  of  rules  of  customary  international  law.  Art  38(1)(b)  Statute  of  the  International  Court  
of  Justice,  26  June  1945,  15  UNCIO  355  (‘SICJ’);;  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  Cases  (Federal  
Republic   of   Germany/Denmark;;   Federal   Republic   of   Germany/Netherlands)   (Judgment)  
[1969]  ICJ  Rep  3,  para  77;;  Nicaragua,  paras  184,  186.  General  consistency  of  state  practice  
is   sufficient.   Ibid,   186.   Regarding   the   requisite   amount,   uniformity,   representativity   and  
duration  of  state  practice,  as  well  as  the  position  of  ‘specially  affected  states’,   in  each  case  
regarding  the  JAB,  see  Ruys  (2010)  44–51.  
117  Ibid,  30.  
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law. 118   Eschewing   a   binary   choice   between   an   ‘extensive’   or   ‘restrictive’  
approach  to  determining  custom,119  a  balanced  methodology  is  adopted  herein  
that   accords   with   the   ICJ’s   jurisprudence   on   the   identification   of   rules   of  
customary   international   law.120  This  approach  examines  both   the  words  and  
deeds   of   states, 121   with   a   focus   on   specific   incidents   where   states   have  
claimed,  or  can  be  taken  to  have  used,  force  in  putative  self-­defence.122  Such  
incidents   have  a   central   practical   importance   in   the   formation  of   customary  
international  law,  including  in  the  area  of  self-­defence.123  This  is  because  they  
give  rise  to  a  form  of  dialogue  comprising  claims  made  by  states  using  force  
in  putative  self-­defence  and  counter-­claims  by  other  states  in  response.  Any  
legal  justifications  embodied  in  these  claims,  together  with  any  legal  positions  
advanced   in  counterclaims,  are  capable  of  contributing   to   the  affirmation  or  
                                                                                        
118  The  identification  of  customary  JAB  is  a  relatively  under-­theorized  topic.  For  an  overview  
of  relevant  issues,  representing  a  range  of  opinion,  see  e.g.  Cannizzaro  and  Palchetti  (2005);;  
Corten   (2010)   4–49;;   Ruys   (2010)   29–52;;   Van   Steenberghe   (2015);;   Talmon   (2015);;   Gray  
(2018)  9–26.  See  further  the  work  of  the  ILC  on  the  identification  of  customary  international  
law,  <http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml>.  
119  See  Corten  (2010)  5–27;;  Ruys  (2010)  31–44.  The  so-­called  ‘extensive  approach’,  inter  alia,  
prioritizes  state  practice  (meaning  the  physical  conduct  of  states  in  this  instance),  in  particular  
that  of  powerful  states.  The  so-­called  ‘restrictive  approach’  focuses  on  opinio  juris.  This  means  
that  states  must  be  convinced  that  their  acts  accord  with  a  legal  rule.  It  posits  that  all  states  
equally   contribute   to   customary   formation.   Whereas   the   former   approach   gives   rise   to  
accounts  of  the   law  that  admit  of  uses  of  force   in  a  wide  range  of  circumstances,  the   latter  
adheres  strictly  to  a  broad  prohibition  on  the  use  of  force.  
120  See  further  Ruys  (2010)  51–2;;  Corten  (2010)  27–49.  
121   A   distinction   between   words   and   deeds   is   semantically   convenient,   but   ontologically  
untenable.  Both  are  acts  of  states.  See  further  Ruys  (2010)  31–44;;  n  129.  
122  The  right  of  self-­defence  may  or  may  not  be  explicitly  claimed  by  a  state.  Where  it  is,  the  
veracity  of  the  facts,  and/or  the  legal  position  claimed,  may  be  in  doubt  or  contested.  Yet,  any  
invocation  of  the  right  and  the  reactions  to  it  of  other  states  furnish  state  practice  and  opinio  
juris.  Whether   or   not   a   putative   defending   state’s   right   of   self-­defence   has   lawfully   been  
triggered,  that  state’s  enunciation  of  the  international  legal  restraints  to  which  it  considers  itself  
subject  when  exercising  that  right,  along  with  other  states’  reactions  to  this,  constitute  state  
practice  and  opinio   juris   relevant   to   the  content  of  the  applicable  customary  rules.  There   is  
also  value  in  examining  cases  where  the  facts  speak  to  a  claim  of  self-­defence  that  could  have  
been  advanced  but  was  not.  Whilst  the  lack  of  an  express  legal  justification  means  that  the  
putative  defending  state’s  opinio   juris  might  be  absent,  ensuing  reactions  from  other  states  
can  be  elucidating.  The  approach  adopted,  therefore,  examines  concrete  examples  where  the  
right  of  self-­defence  is  at  issue  and  states  have  made  their  views  known  on  the  lawfulness  of  
the  purported  exercise  of  that  right.  
123  The   importance  of   the   incident-­based  approach   to   the  examination  of  state  practice  and  
opinio   juris   has   been   highlighted   by   a   number   of   scholars.   See   e.g.   Reisman   (1984);;  
Wedgwood  (2005)  52;;  Green  (2009)  7–9;;  Ruys  (2010)  34,  41.  
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modification   of   the   applicable   rules   of   customary   international   law.124  They  
stand  as  important  precedents,  therefore,  for  its  development.125  
The  following  Chapters  seek  to  establish  the  particular  facts  relating  to  these  
incidents,  the  action  taken  by  the  states  involved,  any  legal  claims  advanced,  
and  the  corresponding  reactions  of  other  states.  Where  available,  letters  sent  
to  or  put  before  the  UNSC,  in  accordance  with  the  reporting  obligation  in  Article  
51  UN  Charter,  by  states  invoking  the  right  of  self-­defence  are  the  starting  point  
in   attempting   to   identify   a   legal   justification   for   a   particular   use   of   force.126  
Thereafter,  the  focus  is  on  state  practice  and  opinio  juris  in  respect  of  specific  
incidents  and  the  consideration  by  states  of  legal  issues  before  the  UNSC  and  
the  UN  General  Assembly  (‘UNGA’).127  Official  statements  made  by,  128  and  to,  
other  international  bodies  (such  as  NATO,  the  EU  and  the  Arab  League)  are  
also   cited,   as   are   those  made   elsewhere,   such   as   to   the   press,   or   before  
national   parliaments.   In   addition,   pleadings   by   states   before   international  
courts   and   tribunals   have  been   a   valuable   source   of  opinio   juris   and   state  
practice.129  These   tend   to  contain  more  clearly  articulated   legal  positions  on  
                                                                                        
124  South  West   Africa   Cases   (Ethiopia   v   South   Africa;;   Liberia   v   South   Africa)   (Judgment)  
[1966]  ICJ  Rep  6,  para  49.  Where  a  state  using  force  has  advanced  no  explicit  legal  claim  to  
justify  its  actions,  a  legal  justification  might  nevertheless  be  implicit  in  official  statements  and  
from  the  particular  context.  Ruys  (2010)  36–7.  
125  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  1–4.  
126  Art  51  UN  Charter  requires  measures  taken  by  states  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-­
defence  to  be  reported  immediately  to  the  UNSC.  
127  Statements  made  by  states  to  the  UNSC  regarding  particular  incidents  are  important  to  the  
identification  of   state  practice  and  opinio   juris   in   the  JAB.   In   respect  of   the  UNSC’s   role   in  
developing  custom,  a  particular  UNSC  Resolution  might   constitute  prima   facie   evidence  of  
legality   or   illegality,   but   caution   is   needed.   Statements  made   by  members   of   the   Council  
concerning  the  adoption  of  a  Resolution,  as  well  as  the  reactions  of  other  states  outside  of  its  
fifteen  members,  must  also  be  accounted  for  when  considering  the  customary  position.  See  
e.g.  Ruys  (2010)  39–41,  49.  See  further  Gray  (2018)  16–26,  regarding  the  relative  importance  
of  the  UNSC  and  the  UNGA  in  developing  the  JAB.  Insight  is  also  gained  by  statements  made  
in  fora,  such  as  the  UNGA,  that  do  not  relate  to  particular  incidents  of  self-­defence,  but  rather  
engage   in   the   abstract   with   legal   issues   relevant   to   the   present   study.   Examples   include  
statements  made  during   the  drafting  of  the  Definition  of  Aggression.  UNGA  Resolutions,   in  
particular  states’  votes  on  them,  may  also  be  used  to  establish  state  practice  and  opinio  juris.  
See  Nicaragua,  para  188.  
128  As   with   the   role   of   the   UNSC   and   UNGA   in   developing   custom,   caution  must   be   had  
regarding  whether  statements  made  by  such  organizations  reflect  the  state  practice  and  opinio  
juris  of  states.  See  n  127.  
129  That  such  pleadings  are  generally  regarded  as  state  practice,  see  e.g.  International  Law  
Association,   ‘Statement   of   Principles   Applicable   to   the   Formation   of   General   Customary  
International   Law’,   Report   of   the   Committee   on   Formation   of   Customary   (General)  
International  Law  (2000)  14.  See  also  Crawford  et  al  (2013)  724.  
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the  part  of  states  than  may  be  provided  to  political  organs  such  as  the  UNSC  
and  in  other  diplomatic  fora,  where  politics  and  law  tend  to  be  intermingled.130  
With  every  declaration   regarding  an   incident,  great  care  has  been   taken   to  
distinguish,  where  possible,  legal  from  political  or  moral  justifications  advanced  
by  the  relevant  state.131  
Potential  incidents  run  into  the  hundreds,  however,  and  are  varied  in  nature.132  
They  comprise  uses  of  force  accompanied  by  explicit  claims  by  states  of  self-­
defence,  as  well  as  uses  of  force  where  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  relied  on  
implicitly   or   is   arguable   on   the   facts.   It   is   simply   not   possible,   however,   to  
identify  each  and  every  invocation  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  advanced  since  
the  signing  of  the  UN  Charter,  let  alone  appraise  them  all,  within  the  word  limits  
of   this   thesis.   States   do   not   always   comply   with   the   Article   51   reporting  
obligation,133  and  there  is  no  official  or  definitive  log  of  claims  of  self-­defence  
that  might  facilitate  this  review.  Furthermore,  not  all  incidents  provide  insight  
into   the   law.   This   is   particularly   so   where   claims   of   self-­defence   illicit   no  
response  from  other  states  and  are  not  debated  in  the  UNSC  or  other  public  
fora.134  
Whilst   it   is   impossible   to   be  exhaustive,   this   author   has   identified   as  many  
examples  of  the  use  of  force  in  putative  self-­defence  since  1945  as  possible,  
in  order  to  provide  as  comprehensive  a  picture  as  is  possible  of  the  current  lex  
lata.  The  focus  is  on  those  incidents  particularly  pertinent  to  and  instructive  for  
this  task.  Examples  that  have  generated  the  most  discussion  between  states,  
particularly   within   the   UNSC,   have   proved   the   most   useful   in   establishing  
                                                                                        
130  Paddeu  (2015)  118–9.  
131  As  such,  whilst  the  UNSC  is  relied  upon  for  the  present  analysis,  caution  has  been  taken  
to  discern  from  debates  and  resolutions  any  legal  claims.  This  author  is  mindful  of  the  need  
not  to  ascribe  legal  views  to  states  that  they  themselves  do  not  advance  (per  Nicaragua,  para  
207).   As   noted,   however,   such   views   might   be   implicit   in   statements   made   or   from   the  
particular  context.  
132  See,  e.g.  Green  (2009)  3.  This  author’s  own  research  has  identified  well  over  two  hundred  
potential  incidents  and  recognizes  that  there  are  many  more.  
133  For  further  details  of  this  phenomenon,  and  on  reporting  more  generally,  see  Green  (2015)  
VJIL.  
134  Gray  (2018)  16,  notes,  for  example,  that  it  used  to  be  common  for  minor  incidents  to  be  
referred  to  the  UNSC  and  debated,  but  that  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  
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states’  positions  on  the  customary  restraints  of  necessity  and  proportionality.  
To  avoid,  as  much  as  possible,  the  inherent  deficiencies  that  selecting  some  
incidents  over  others  necessarily  entails,135  the  incidents  cited  are  intended  to  
be   representative   of   a   breadth   and   diversity   of   practice.   They   have   been  
selected  from  over  the  entire  period  from  1945  to  the  present.  Collectively,  they  
constitute  the  practice  of  states  from  all  continents  and  represent  a  spectrum  
of  political,  economic  and  legal  systems,  of  levels  of  economic  development,  
and  so  on.  Such  practice  also  covers  the  full  range  of  ‘types’  of  self-­defence  
claims,  encompassing  traditional  state-­to-­state  violence,  uses  of  force  against  
NSAs  and  anticipatory  action.  
In  the  course  of  this  review,  legal  significance  must  be  inferred  from  primary  
materials  and  factual  context,  which  necessarily  involves  a  degree  of  personal  
judgement.136  Identifying   relevant   state   practice   and   discerning   opinio   juris  
requires   a  measure   of   subjectivity.137  To   avoid   arbitrariness,   this   subjective  
element  must  be  grounded  in  legal  doctrine  and  theory  and  must  take  account  
of   assessments   of   the   evidence   by   systemically-­recognized   bodies   and  
individuals.  Our  exploration  of  necessity  and  proportionality  must,   therefore,  
include  a  review  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  ICJ,  and  of  the  writings  of  academic  
commentators.  These  constitute  subsidiary  sources   for  determining  rules  of  
international  law,  with  the  former  carrying  particular  authority.138  Both  not  only  
help  to  establish  an  analytical  framework  that  informs  the  author’s  review  of  
the   evidence,   but   also   provide   standards   against  which   the   cogency  of   the  
author’s  assessments  of  this  evidence  can  be  measured.  
                                                                                        
135  This  includes  any  selection  bias  of  the  author.  See  Reisman  (1984)  13–15.  
136  For  example,  states  do  not  always  invoke  necessity  and  proportionality  explicitly,  instead  
alluding  in  more  general  terms  to  the  content  of  these  requirements.  Where  this  is  the  case,  it  
is   indicated.  As  noted   in  Chapter  3,   states  may  also   invoke   ‘proportionality’  without   further  
explanation,  not  making  it  clear  whether  the  reference  is  to  JAB  or  to  IHL,  where  the  term  is  
also  used,  to  different  ends.  
137  See  e.g.  Corten  (2010)  17–20;;  Talmon  (2015).  
138  Art  38(1)(d)  SICJ.  
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CHAPTER  2:  NECESSITY  
2   Introduction  
In  the  JAB,  necessity  acts  as  an  immediate  limitation  on  the  use  of  defensive  
force.  It  is  the  first  requirement  that  operates  to  condition  a  state’s  exercise  of  
its  right  of  self-­defence.1  In  response  to  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  attack,  it  
determines  whether  defensive  force  is  required  at  all  by  way  of  a  response,  or  
whether  peaceful  alternatives  will  suffice.  It  also  restricts  where  defensive  force  
is   to   be   directed.   Only   once   these   requirements   are   established   can   the  
proportionality   of   defensive   action   be   considered.   Necessity   has   been  
described   as   the   more   straightforward,   or   least   problematic,   of   the   two  
requirements.2  It  is  true  that  necessity  is  often  clearly  identifiable  when  states  
justify  acts  of  self-­defence  and  review  force  used  by  other  states.  Green  has  
rightly  noted,  however,  that  it  is  a  notoriously  indeterminate  concept.3  Indeed,  
on  a  conceptual   level,  necessity  raises  challenging  questions   that  go   to   the  
heart   of   the   right   of   self-­defence   and   its   exercise.   These   issues  are   rarely  
explored  in  the  literature  in  a  systematic  and  comprehensive  manner.  As  such,  
it  is  a  mistake  to  dismiss  necessity  as  uncomplicated.  There  is  much  more  to  
be   said   regarding   its   conceptual   scope   and   its   practical   content.   A   clear  
exposition  of  these  elements  enables  a  delimitation  of  its  parameters  and  its  
potential  to  limit  or  bar  the  use  of  military  force.  
In  this  Chapter,  a  distinction  will  first  be  made  between  necessity  in  the  JAB  
and   necessity   in   the   laws   of   state   responsibility   and   IHL.   Highlighting   the  
differences   in   the   operation   of   necessity   within   these   three   regimes   of  
international   law   helps   to   explain   JAB   necessity.   It   will   be   seen   that,  
conceptually,  there  are  in  fact  two  types  of  JAB  necessity.  A  novel  taxonomy  
is,  therefore,  proposed  to  capture  this  separation,  before  moving  on  to  parse  
                                                                                        
1  In  respect  of  the  distinction  between  armed  attack  (as  a  trigger  of  the  right)  and  necessity  
(as  rule  that  conditions  is  exercise),  see  Section  2.2.  
2  Gardam  (2004)  26;;  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  564.  
3  Green  (2006)  450–1.  
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Webster’s  formula  in  detail.  This  investigation  encompasses  consideration  of  
whether  peaceful  alternatives  are  open  to  a  defending  state  when  faced  with  
an   actual   or   imminent   armed   attack.   Temporal   questions   inherent   in   the  
concept  of  necessity  are  then  reviewed,  in  particular  whether  a  state  has  time  
to  consider  such  alternatives.  The  issue  of  targeting  completes  the  analysis.  
2.1   Necessity  in  other  areas  of  international  law  
Necessity  is  only  relevant  where  a  state  has  first  been  the  victim  of  an  armed  
attack.  In  this  respect,  it  may  be  contrasted  with  a  plea  of  necessity  under  the  
laws   of   state   responsibility   that   do   not   require   any   prior   act   (wrongful   or  
otherwise)  on  the  part  of  the  state  against  which  the  act  of  necessity  is  taken.4  
Instead,   pursuant   to   Article   25   ARSIWA,   states   may   invoke   necessity   to  
preclude   the   wrongfulness   of   an   act   if   it   ‘is   the   only   way   for   the   state   to  
safeguard   an  essential   interest  against  a   grave  and   imminent   peril’.5  Some  
scholars  have  suggested,  therefore,  that  a  plea  of  necessity  might  justify  a  use  
of  defensive  force  on  its  own  terms.  They  argue  that,  in  certain  circumstances,  
it  might  be  elevated  to  an  independent  legal  basis  to  use  military  force,  akin  to  
self-­defence.6  
Relying  solely  on  a  plea  of  necessity  to  excuse  an  otherwise  illegal  use  of  force  
faces   significant   problems   however.   Article   25   is   drafted   in   the   negative,  
thereby  restricting  its  invocation  and  emphasising  that  states  may  only  invoke  
it  in  exceptional  circumstances.7  Whilst  the  existence  of  an  armed  attack  might  
                                                                                        
4  As  a  point  of  doctrine,  this  thesis  adopts  the  position  that  self-­defence  is  an  independent  right  
under  the  UN  Charter.  This  means  that  the  right  is  triggered  on  the  terms  of  Art  51  UN  Charter  
by  an  armed  attack.  It  is  not  a  responsive  right  that  requires  a  prior  breach  of  Art  2(4).  A  state  
exercising  its  right  of  self-­defence  recognized  by  Art  51  is  not,  ‘even  potentially’,  in  breach  of  
Art   2(4).   Crawford   (1999)   para   298;;   Art   21   ARSIWA   Commentary,   para   1.   The   Art   2(4)  
prohibition   on   the   use   of   force  must   be   read,   therefore,   as   incorporating   the   self-­defence  
exception  within  its  terms.  Trapp  (2015)  214–20.  See  also  Paddeu  (2015).  Cf  Ago  (1980)  paras  
87–9.  See  further  n  16.  See  also  Chapter  4  regarding  the  ability  of  NSAs  to  carry  out  armed  
attacks  that  are  not  attributable  to  a  state.  
5  Art  25(1)  ARSIWA  and  related  Commentary.  For  further  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  
necessity  and  self-­defence,  see  Ago  (1980)  paras  82–124.  
6  See  e.g.  Laursen   (2004);;  Vidmar   (2017).  For  a  general  discussion   (and   rejection  of)   this  
argument,  see  Corten  in  Weller  (2015)  863–7;;  Tsagourias  (2010).  
7   Gabčíkovo-­Nagymaros   Project   (Hungary/Slovakia)   (Judgment)   [1997]   ICJ   Rep   7  
(‘Gabčíkovo-­Nagymaros’)  para  51;;  Crawford  (2013)  306–7.  
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be  said  to  satisfy  this  requirement,  resorting  to  a  plea  of  necessity  is  disbarred  
if   the   international   obligation   in   question   (being   Article   2(4)   UN   Charter)  
excludes  the  possibility  of  its  invocation.8  Accepting  that  Article  2(4)  constitutes  
an   absolute   prohibition   on   the   use   of   force,   subject   only   to   the   explicit  
exceptions   set   out   in   the   UN   Charter,   on   its   own   terms   Article   2(4)   likely  
prevents  wrongfulness  preclusion  on  the  basis  of  a  separate  plea  of  necessity.  
A  fortiori  if  the  Article  2(4)  prohibition  is  jus  cogens.9  
A   plea   of   necessity   should   not,   therefore,   be   viewed   as   an   independent  
justification   that  allows  for   the  circumvention  of   the  prohibition  of   the  use  of  
force.   JAB   necessity   is   a   customary   requirement   that,   whilst   related   to,   is  
distinct  from  the  laws  of  state  responsibility.  On  this  basis,  a  ‘state  of  necessity’  
is   a   constituent   element  of   the   primary   rule,   being   the   right   of   self-­defence  
recognized  by  Article  51  UN  Charter.  Such  right  accounts   for   the  necessity  
criterion   and,   by   implication,   excludes   the   possibility   of   invoking   a   general  
‘state  of  necessity’  as  a  circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness.10  As  part  of  an  
existing  primary  rule  of  international  law,  therefore,  there  is  no  need  to  rely  on  
a  secondary  rule  of  international  law  as  a  general  excuse  to  use  force.11  
It   could   be  argued,   however,   that   a   plea  of  necessity   and   the   right   of   self-­
defence  affirmed  by  Article  51  UN  Charter  are  not  precisely  co-­extensive   in  
respect  of  their  relationship  with  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force.  Situations  
                                                                                        
8  Art  25(2)(a)  ARSIWA.  
9  Art  26  ARSIWA  denies  a  preclusion  of  wrongfulness  where  a   jus  cogens  norm  is  violated.  
The  Art  2(4)  prohibition  is  often  labelled  by  scholars  as  jus  cogens  (see  e.g.  Simma  (1999)  3),  
although  such  characterisation  is  contested.  In  Nicaragua,  para  190,  the  ICJ  noted  that  the  
ILC  and  the  USA  (in  its  Memorial  on  the  Merits  in  the  case)  characterised  the  prohibition  on  
the  use  of  force  as  jus  cogens,  but  it  has  never  ruled  on  this  point.  Questioning  its  peremptory  
status,  see  Green  (2011).  
10  Art  25  ARSIWA  Commentary,  para  21,  states  that  ‘the  plea  of  necessity  is  not  intended  to  
cover  conduct  which  is  in  principle  regulated  by  the  primary  obligations.’  It  gives  the  example  
of  the  doctrine  of  ‘military  necessity’  in  IHL  as  one  that  already  takes  into  account  the  concept  
of  necessity.  Adopting  this  approach,  Section  2.3  UK  Ministry  of  Defence,  The  Manual  of  the  
Law  of  Armed  Conflict  (2005)  (‘UK  Military  Manual’)  concludes  that  necessity  cannot  be  used  
to  justify  actions  prohibited  by  law.  This  reasoning  directly  translates  to  the  primary  rules  of  
the   JAB.  Note   also   that   Art   55  ARSIWA  expressly   recognizes   the   rule   of   lex   specialis   by  
disapplying  the  ARSIWA  ‘where  and  to  the  extent  that  the  conditions  for  the  existence  of  an  
internationally  wrongful  act  or  the  content  or  implementation  of  the  international  responsibility  
of  a  state  are  governed  by  special  rules  of  international  law.’  This  is  also  the  case  with  the  JAB  
rules  governing  the  right  of  self-­defence.  See  further  Crawford  (2013)  308.  
11  See  further  Tsagourias  (2016)  813–19;;  Paddeau  (2017).  
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might  be  said  to  exist  where  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  not  triggered,  but  a  plea  
of  necessity  may  nevertheless  excuse  a  use  of  force.12  Examples  include  the  
controversial   right   to   employ   putatively   defensive   force   against   NSAs   on  
foreign  territory,  and  anticipatory  action  to  counter  future  armed  attacks.13  On  
this   logic,   Article   25   ARSIWA   has   the   potential   to   operate   beyond   the  
boundaries  of  self-­defence,  and  UNSC  authorisation,  as  an  independent  basis  
for  using   force.  This  position   faces  a  significant  hurdle,  however.  Necessity  
may  not   be   invoked  where   the   actions   taken   ‘seriously   impair   an   essential  
interest  of   the  State  or  States   towards  which   the  obligation  exists,  or  of   the  
international  community  as  a  whole.’14  The  interest  relied  on  (being  the  right  to  
take  defensive  action)  must  outweigh  all  other  considerations,  both  individual  
and  collective.15  
The  essential  interests  of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  would  appear  to  
preclude   the   operation   of   a   plea   of   necessity   in   this   context.   Absent   an  
established  right  of  self-­defence,   these  essential   interests,  which  are   legally  
protected  by  Article  2(4)  UN  Charter,  will  be  violated  by  a  use  of  force  that  is  
deployed  in  or  against  the  territory  of  an  aggressor  state  or,16  in  the  case  of  
armed  attacks  by  NSAs,  a  host  state.17  Using  force  beyond  the  parameters  of  
                                                                                        
12  E.g.  Vidmar  (2017)  305.  
13  Ibid.  
14  Art  25(1)(b)  ARSIWA.  
15  Art  25  ARSIWA  Commentary,  para  17.  
16  In  an   interstate  context,  these  essential   interests  are  not  a  barrier  to  a   lawful  exercise  of  
self-­defence  covered  by  Art  51.  An  exercise  of  lawful  self-­defence  against  an  aggressor  state  
does   not   violate   Art   2(4)   (see   n   4),   and   the   incidental   breaches   of   an   aggressor   state’s  
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  (resulting  from  a  lawful  act  of  self-­defence)  are  excused  by  
operation  of  Art  21  ARSIWA.  See  Crawford  (1999)  para  298–9;;  Art  21  ARSIWA  Commentary,  
para  2;;  Crawford  (2013)  290;;  Paddeau  (2017)  100–5.   In  such  cases,  self-­defence  has   two  
functions.  First,   it   operates  as  a  primary   right  and  as  an  exception   to  Art  2(4)  UN  Charter.  
Second,   in   respect   of   incidental   breaches   of   certain   other   obligations,   it   operates   as   a  
secondary   rule,   precluding   responsibility   for   an   internationally   wrongful   act.   See   generally  
Crawford  (2013)  290–2;;  Paddeu  (2017).  
17  A  ‘host  state’  is  a  state  from  whose  territory  NSAs  launch  an  armed  attack,  and  in  whose  
territory   a   defending   state   uses   force   in   response   to   such   armed   attack.   In   respect   of   an  
exercise  of  self-­defence  against  NSAs  on   the  territory  of  a  host  state,  the  position  of   these  
essential  interests  of  the  host  state  is  more  complicated  and  controversial.  Absent  attribution  
of  the  armed  attack  to  the  host  state,  there  are  various  potential   justifications  that  might  be  
argued  to  excuse  the  temporary  breach  of  a  host  state’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  
Whilst  disputed,  all  of  these  potential  justifications  rely  on  the  lawful  exercise  of  self-­defence,  
rather  than  on  a  plea  of  necessity.  They  include  the  argument  that  lawful  self-­defence  operates  
in  the  same  way  as  the  circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness  of  necessity,  thereby  excusing  
any  breach  of  these  Art  2(4)  protected  rights,  even  if  the  breach  affects  innocent  third-­party  
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Article   51   also   has   wider   negative   implications   for   international   peace   and  
security,   which   is   an   essential   interest   of   the   international   community   as   a  
whole.   As   such,   a   plea   of   necessity   should   not   be   regarded   as   precluding  
wrongfulness  vis-­à-­vis  the  prohibition  on  the  use  of  force  of  contained  in  Article  
2(4).  The  use  of  defensive   force   forms  part  of   that  primary  obligation  and   it  
operates  solely  under  the  auspices  of  the  ‘inherent’  right  recognized  by  Article  
51  UN  Charter.18  
A  distinction  must  also  be  drawn  with  the  role  of  necessity  in  IHL.  Within  this  
legal  regime,  necessity  is  referred  to  as  ‘military  necessity’,  which:  
permits  a  state  engaged  in  an  armed  conflict  to  use  only  that  degree  and  
kind  of  force,  not  otherwise  prohibited  by  the  law  of  armed  conflict,  that  
is   required   in   order   to   achieve   the   legitimate   purpose   of   the   conflict,  
namely   the  complete  or  partial  submission  of   the  enemy  at  the  earliest  
possible  moment  with  the  minimum  expenditure  of  life  and  resources.19  
Throughout  the  rules  of  IHL,  military  necessity  works  in  conjunction  with,  and  
is  balanced  by,  the  principle  of  humanity.20  The  function  of  necessity  within  this  
relationship   is   to   permit   the   attainment   of   military   objectives   and,  
simultaneously,   curb   the   potential   excesses   of   war   in   the   name   of  
                                                                                        
states.  Trapp  (2015)  216–19.  Another  is  where  the  host  state  is  either  unwilling  to  prevent  its  
territory   from  being  used  as  a  base   for  NSAs  or   is  unable   to  do  so  and   is  unwilling   to  co-­
operate  by  accepting  assistance  (thereby  it  is  acquiescing).  This  conduct  is  itself  a  breach  of  
Art  2(4),  meaning  that  the  host  state  cannot  claim  the  protection  of  Art  2(4).  Trapp  (2015)  219–
20,   in   the  context  of  a  responsive  reading  of  Art  51   that   requires  a  prior  breach  of  Art  2(4)  
(although,  as  explained  in  n  4,  this  author  does  not  adopt  such  a  reading).  A  third  is  that  the  
incidental  breaches  of  a  host  state’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  (resulting  from  a  lawful  
act  of  self-­defence)  are  also  excused  by  operation  of  Article  21  ARSIWA.  Tsagourias  (2016)  
819–24;;  Paddeu  (2017)  110–14.  It  is  notable  that  the  ILC  explicitly  leaves  open  the  question  
of  the  effects  of  defensive  force  on  other  states.  ARSIWA  21  Commentary,  para  5.  ‘Lawful’  
self-­defence  requires  compliance  with  the  primary  rules  of  Art  51  and  customary  international  
law,   including   the   existence   of   an   armed   attack   and   adherence   to   the   requirements   of  
necessity  and  proportionality.   It   also   implies  compliance  with  obligations  of   ‘total   restraint’,  
such  as  non-­derogable  human  rights  and   ‘intransgressible’   rules  of   IHL,  breaches  of  which  
may  not  be  justified  by  operation  of  Art  21  ARSIWA.  Art  21  ARSIWA  Commentary,  pars  3–4,  
6;;  Crawford  (2013)  291–2;;  Paddeu  (2017)  104.  See  further  Section  3.2.6  and  Chapter  4.  
18  Crawford  (2013)  290.  
19  Section  2.2  UK  Military  Manual.  
20  ‘Humanity  forbids  the  infliction  of  suffering,  injury,  or  destruction  not  actually  necessary  for  
the  accomplishment  of  legitimate  military  purposes.’  Section  2.4  UK  Military  Manual.  
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humanitarianism.  The  underlying  purpose  of  military  necessity,   therefore,   is  
not  dissimilar  to  the  operation  of  JAB  necessity  and  proportionality.  Both  sets  
of  rules  seek  to  contain  the  use  of  military  force.  However,  IHL  and  the  JAB  
are  separate  and  distinct  regimes,  with  the  former  operating  principally  at  the  
micro  level,  and  the  latter  at  the  macro  level.  These  distinctions  and  overlaps  
are  explored  below  and  in  Chapter  3.21  
2.2   General  and  specific  necessity  
a)   A  novel  taxonomy  
It  was  noted  in  Section  1.3.1  that  necessity  and  proportionality  are  sometimes  
conflated  by  states  and  academics,  and/or  used  interchangeably  in  a  way  that  
does   not   distinguish   between   them.   Gray,   is   but   one   example.22   Corten’s  
explanation  of  exclusive  purpose,  referred  to  in  Section  1.3.2(b)  is  another.  In  
his  analysis,  Corten  asserts   that  necessity  being  said   to  have  an  exclusive  
purpose   ‘amounts   to   the   same   thing’   as   saying   that   a   response   is  
proportionate.23  Other  examples  are  referenced  in  subsequent  Sections.  The  
challenge,  therefore,  is  to  see  whether  it  is  in  fact  possible,  or  even  desirable,  
to   distinguish   clearly   between   necessity   and   proportionality,   rather   than  
employing  them  jointly  or  alternatively  as  a  general  description  of  illegality.  
In  exploring  how  far  a  state  may  go  to  defend  itself,  much  may  be  gained  by  
conceptual   clarity   that   distinguishes   between   the   two   concepts.   Separating  
them,  and   identifying   their  particular  characteristics,   renders   them  easier   to  
apply  in  both  principle  and  practice.  In  approaching  this  question,  this  author  
proposes   that  a  novel   taxonomy  should  be  employed  to  describe  necessity.  
This  taxonomy  is  set  out  in  the  following  paragraphs.  Its  purpose  is  to  aid  with  
constructing  an  analytical  framework  of  necessity,  and  how  such  concept  may  
                                                                                        
21  See  in  particular  Sections  2.5  and  3.3.  
22  Gray  (2018)  159.  
23  Corten  (2010)  484.  In  so  doing,  it  is  notable  that  Corten  refers  to  analysis  by  Gardam  (2004)  
156,  regarding  proportionality  (not  necessity).  
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be  compared  to,  and  contrasted  with,  both  proportionality  and  armed  attack.24  
It  draws  a  clearer  division  between  these  concepts.  Furthermore,  the  proposed  
taxonomy   constitutes   a   tool   to   analyse   and   interpret   state   practice   and  
expressions  of  opinio   juris,  as  well  as  academic  commentary  and   the   ICJ’s  
jurisprudence.25  This  author  uses  it  to  capture  and  clarify  what  already  exists  
in  these  primary  and  secondary  sources  of  international  law.  The  taxonomy  is,  
therefore,   derived   from   such   sources.   It   reflects   how   states,   courts   and  
scholars  refer  to  two  distinct  aspects  of  necessity,  even  if  they  do  not  articulate  
it  in  the  terms  set  out  below.  It  is  submitted  that  this  new  approach  to  necessity  
is  a  lens  through  which  we  can  better  view  the  lex  lata  and  lex  ferenda.  
The   proposed   taxonomy   distinguishes  between   two   ‘types’   of   necessity.   In  
response  to  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  attack,  the  first  type  governs  whether  
there  is  a  necessity  of  some  form  of  defensive  response.  In  conditioning  the  
exercise  of  the  right,  once  triggered,  it  requires  that  i)  there  are  no  reasonable  
alternatives  available  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  that  armed  attack  (i.e.  force  is  
the  only  reasonable  way  to  resolve  the  particular  situation),  and/or  ii)  there  is  
no  time  to  pursue  such  alternatives.26  In  such  circumstances,  we  may  conclude  
that   there   is   a   ‘general   necessity’   of   employing   defensive   force.   Such  
conclusion  is  irrespective,  at  this  point  in  time,  of  the  means  and  methods  of  
effecting   that  defensive   response.   Importantly,  general  necessity  cannot  be  
confused  or  conflated  with  proportionality.  The  two  are  conceptually  distinct.27  
In   response   to   an   actual   or   imminent   armed   attack,   general   necessity   is,  
therefore,  the  first  barrier  that  must  be  passed  before  a  state  may  respond  with  
force.  Its  absence  means  that  there  is  no  necessity  of  self-­defence  (at  all)  and  
any  ensuing  use  of  force  will  be  unlawful.  If,  and  only  if,  general  necessity  is  
established,  the  next  question  to  be  answered  is  whether  the  requirements  of  
the  second   ‘type’  of  necessity  are  also  satisfied.  This  separate  and  distinct  
category  of  necessity   relates   to   the  specific  acts   that  effect   the  right  of  self-­
                                                                                        
24  On  the  distinction  between  necessity  and  armed  attack,  see  Section  2.2(c).  
25  Regarding  this  taxonomy  and  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence,  see  Sections  2.2(b)  and  (c).  
26  These  issues  are  covered  in  Sections  2.3  and  2.4  respectively.  
27  This  point  is  explored  further  in  Section  3.3.2.  
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defence.  This   concept   of   ‘specific   necessity’   requires   a   rational   connection  
between  the   force  used  and  a  defensive  purpose.  The  nature  of  the   targets  
chosen  to  fulfil  such  defensive  purpose  are  determinative  of  this  test.28  
An   example   of   specific   necessity’s   operation   is   evident   when   considering  
deliberately   targeting   civilians.   As   non-­military   targets,   they   can   have   no  
connection   with   the   armed   attack.   Their   neutralisation   or   destruction   can  
achieve  no  defensive  purpose  and  suggests  instead  that  a  use  of  force  has  a  
punitive   and,   therefore,   unlawful   goal.29  Specific   necessity   perhaps  explains  
references   that,   at   first   sight,   sound   like   comments   on   proportionality.   For  
example,  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  size,  duration  and  the  target  of  the  
response  are  all  relevant  to  proportionality.30  Specific  necessity  is  most  closely  
related  to  proportionality,  as  it  acts  to  constrain  the  defensive  response  to  what  
is  necessary  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  an  armed  attack.31  In  contrast,  general  
necessity  conditions  the  prima  facie  right  to  exercise  defensive  force,  once  that  
right  has  been  triggered  by  an  actual  or   imminent  armed  attack.  These  two  
forms  of  necessity  capture,  therefore,  the  two  distinct  questions  that  arise  in  
state  practice,  scholarship  and  ICJ   jurisprudence  that  are  considered  under  
the   generic   umbrella   of   ‘necessity’:   i)   can   a   state   use   force   at   all   in   the  
circumstances,  and  ii)  if  so,  where  must  such  force  be  directed?  
b)   General  and  specific  necessity  and  ICJ  jurisprudence  
The  distinction  between  the  two  types  of  necessity,  although  novel,  is  reflected  
in   the   ICJ’s   jurisprudence,32  and   can  be  employed   to   analyse   its   reasoning  
more   fully.  Oil   Platforms   provides   a   clear   example.   In   this   case,   the   USA  
claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence  in  respect  of  attacks  on  two  vessels,  which  it  
attributed  to  Iran.  The  Court  rejected  this  argument.  It  determined  that  neither  
                                                                                        
28  See  Section  2.5.  
29  See  further  Section  2.5.  The  fact  that  such  targeting  would  breach  IHL  rules  is  a  separate,  
albeit  closely  connected,  issue.  
30  Gray  (2018)  159.  
31  Okimoto   (2012)   65,   notes   that   this   understanding   of   necessity   is   effectively   identical   to  
proportionality.  See  further  Section  3.3.2.  
32  Although,  as  noted,  it  is  not  expressed  in  these  terms.  
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the  missile  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City,  nor  the  mining  of  the  USS  Samuel  B.  
Roberts,  constituted  armed  attacks  imputable  to  Iran.  They  did  not,  therefore,  
give  rise  to  a  right  of  self-­defence  on  the  part  of  the  USA.33  Despite  the  absence  
of   an   armed  attack,   the  Court   nevertheless  went   on   to   consider   necessity,  
concluding  that  the  American  response  to  both  incidents  was  unnecessary.34  
The  distinctions  clarified  by  the  taxonomy  proposed  in  Section  2.2(a)  clearly  
appear  in  the  majority’s  reasoning.  
First,   the  Court   did   not   opine  explicitly   on   the   prior   question   of   the   general  
necessity  of  the  USA  acting  in  self-­defence  in  the  particular  circumstances.  It  
did  not  say  that  the  right  of  self-­defence  was,  or  was  not,  exercisable  in  general  
terms.  It  simply  concluded  that  it  could  not  be  exercised  against  Iran.  The  issue  
of  general  necessity  is  nevertheless  implicit  in  the  judgment.  In  respect  of  its  
consideration   of   the   mining   of   the   USS   Samuel   B.   Roberts,   the   Court  
recognized  that  the  mining  might  be  sufficient  to  ‘bring  into  play’  the  right  of  
self-­defence,  or  at  least  it  could  not  exclude  that  possibility.35  The  basis  for  this  
conclusion  appears   to   be   that   the   act   of  mining  might   constitute   an  armed  
attack,  which  triggers  the  right  of  self-­defence.  However,  also  implicit   in  this  
statement  is  that  general  necessity,  which  conditions  the  exercise  of  the  right  
once   triggered,   might   also   be   satisfied.   This   is   because,   without   general  
necessity,  the  right  cannot  be  ‘brought  into  play’.  
The  proposed  taxonomy  helps  to  draw  out  this  factor  of  general  necessity  from  
the  judgment  and  to  highlight  the  contrast  between  it  and  specific  necessity.  It  
was  specific  necessity  that  was  determinative  of  the  Court’s  finding  of  a  lack  
of  ‘necessity’.  The  Court  concluded  that,  in  the  circumstances,  the  American  
response  against  Iran  was  not  justifiable  in  response  to  an  armed  attack  on  
the  USA  that  could  not  conclusively  be  attributed  to  Iran.36  Moreover,  the  Court  
made  it  clear  that  it  did  not  believe  that  the  oil  platforms  were  military  targets.37  
                                                                                        
33  Oil  Platforms,  paras  61,  64,  72.  
34  Ibid,  para  76.  The  Court  also  considered  proportionality.  See  Section  3.1.1(f).  
35  Ibid,  para  72.  
36  Ibid  (emphasis  added).  See  further  Section  2.5.  
37  Ibid,  para  76.  
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These  are  issues  of  specific  necessity.  The  target  of  the  defensive  response  
is  clearly  distinct  from  whether  there  has  there  been  an  armed  attack  and,  if  
so,   whether   prima   facie   there   is   a   need   to   resort   to   force   under   the  
circumstances.  Whilst   not   expressed   in   these   terms,   these   distinctions   are  
reflected  in  the  Court’s  judgment.  
This   conceptual   separation   of   the   two   constituent   elements   of   necessity  
provides   greater   clarity   regarding   the  Court’s   reasoning  and   conclusions.   It  
sheds   light   on   why   the   Court   deemed   the   exercise   of   self-­defence   to   be  
‘unnecessary’  and  what  it  requires  for  it  to  be  necessary.  It  also  helps  us  to  
interpret  and  critique  the  Court’s  analysis  of  whether  or  not  the  USA  had  first  
been  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack.  The  Court’s  analysis  of  the  armed  attack  
requirement  on  the  one  hand  (being  the  trigger  of  the  right)  and  necessity  on  
the  other  (being  the  requirement  that  conditions  its  exercise)  appear  somewhat  
conflated.  The  Court’s  approach  to  the  legality  of  the  missile  attack  on  the  Sea  
Isle  City  was  that  the  USA  had  to  prove  that  it  was  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack  
by  Iran,  such  as  to  justify  it  using  armed  force  in  self-­defence,  38  and  that  the  
burden   of   proof   had   not   been   discharged.39  It   took   the   same   approach   to  
determining  the  legality  of  the  mining  of  the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts.40  
For  the  majority,  therefore,  the  identity  of  the  attacker  was  an  intrinsic  part  of  
establishing  the  existence  of  an  armed  attack.  Such  an  approach  is  illogical.  
The  fact  of  whether  or  not  a  state  has  been  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack  is  
quite  different  from,  and  separate  to,  the  question  of  identifying  the  attacker.  
The  former  does  not  require  the  latter  to  be  confirmed  for  it  to  have  factually  
occurred.41  For  the  purposes  of  a  defensive  response,  it  is  submitted  that  the  
identity  of  the  attacker  is  an  important  factor,  but  it  relates  to  necessity.  With  
respect  to  general  necessity,  the  identity  of  the  attacker  informs  whether  any  
                                                                                        
38  Ibid,  para  57  (emphasis  added).  
39  Ibid,  para  61.  
40  Ibid,  paras  71–2.  
41  This  author  adopts  the  position  that  the  existence  of  an  armed  attack  is  essentially  a  factual,  
rather   than  normative,  question.  Whilst  potentially  subject   to  a  de  minimis  gravity   threshold  
(see  Nicaragua,  para  191),  the  identity  of  the  attacker,  whether  it  be  a  state  or  group  of  NSAs,  
is  a  separate  question.  See  further  n  57  and  accompanying  text.  Regarding  the  timing  of  an  
armed  attack,  see  Section  2.4.1.  See  further  Chapter  4  regarding  armed  attacks  by  NSAs.  
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sort  of  military  response  is  required,  or  whether  the  putative  defending  state  
can  resolve  the  issue  peacefully  with  the  attacker,  without  resorting  to  force.42  
For  specific  necessity,  the  identity  of  the  attacker  goes  to  the  question  of  to  
what/whom  any  defensive  force  is  to  be  directed.  Following  an  armed  attack,  
it   is  simply  unnecessary  for  a  state   to  defend   itself  against  anything/anyone  
other  than  the  attacker.  
That   the   attack   and   the   identity   of   the   attacker   are   two   separate   factors   is  
apparent   in   the  Court’s   reasoning   in  Oil  Platforms.   In  respect  of   the  missile  
attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City,  the  Court  insisted  that,  in  looking  at  whether  the  
missile  attack  was  grave  enough  (for   the  purposes  of   the  Nicaragua  gravity  
threshold   test),   it  was  setting  aside   the  question  of  attribution   to   Iran  of   the  
attack.43  This  was  also   the   case   for   the   related   incidents   to  which   the  USA  
alleged   it  was   responding.44  In   respect  of   the  mining  of   the  USS  Samuel  B.  
Roberts,  the  Court  did  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  the  mining  of  a  single  
military  vessel  might  be  sufficient  to  give  rise  to  the  right  of  self-­defence,  but  
concluded,  principally  relying  on  the  ‘inconclusiveness  of  the  evidence  of  Iran’s  
responsibility’,  that  there  had  not  been  an  armed  attack.45  
In  principle,   therefore,   the  Court  has  recognized  the  distinction  between  the  
attack  and   its  attribution   to   the  perpetrator.  However,   it  has   treated  both  as  
separate  parts  of  the  armed  attack  trigger.  It  is  submitted  that  the  better  view  
is  that  in  response  to  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  attack  (complying  with  any  
gravity  threshold),  the  next  question  is  whether  there  is  the  necessity  of  some  
form  of  defensive  response  (which   is  an   issue  of  general  necessity).  Only   if  
this   is   satisfied   does   the   question   of   where   the   defensive   force   should   be  
directed  arise  (being  an  issue  of  specific  necessity).  Conceptually  separating  
                                                                                        
42  E.g.  via  diplomatic  resolution.  See  Section  2.3.  
43  Oil  Platforms,  para  64.  
44  Part  of  the  American  case  was  that  it  had  been  the  victim  of  a  number  of  related  attacks,  of  
which  the  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City  had  been  the  latest.  Ibid,  paras  61–4.  
45  Ibid,  para  72.  
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out   the   stages   in   this  manner   leads   to   a  more   accurate   description   of   the  
factual  and  legal  position.  
Had  the  Court  followed  this  approach,  it  might  have  determined  that  the  USA  
had  been  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack.  This  conclusion  reflects  the  facts  of  
the  incident,  namely  the  physical  damage  incurred,  and  the  Court’s  comments  
regarding   the   mining   of   the   USS   Samuel   B.   Roberts.   It   could   then   have  
addressed   the   issue  of  attribution  of   the  attacks   to   Iran  and  considered   the  
availability  of  reasonable  alternatives  to  force  to  resolve  the  dispute.  Finally,  
absent  such  alternatives,  it  was  in  a  position  to  consider  whether  the  USA  had  
properly  directed  its  military  response.  Without  attribution  of  the  armed  attacks  
to   Iran,   a   decision   based   on   specific   necessity   leads   to   the   same   result  
reached  by  the  Court.  However,  the  process  described  here  would  have  led  to  
a  better  reasoned  and  more  transparent  judgment.  It  would  have  enabled  an  
appreciation   of   what   elements   of   an   armed   attack   and/or   necessity   were  
operative  in,  and  determinative  of,  the  Court’s  reasoning.  It  could  have  avoided  
much  of  the  confusion  that  persists  to  this  day  regarding  issues  like  the  gravity  
threshold,  attribution,  and  belligerent  intent,46  and  if  and  how  they  all  relate  to  
an  armed  attack.  Moreover,  following  this  process  would  have  provided  a  clear  
and  predictable  framework  to  be  adopted  for  deciding  future  judgments.  Such  
framework  could  also  have  served  as  a  decision-­making  tool  for  states  when  
considering  whether  or  not  to  resort  to  defensive  force,  how  they  explain  their  
decisions,  and  how  they  review  the  actions  of  other  states.  
                                                                                        
46  The  Court  also  appeared  to  require  belligerent  intent  on  the  part  of  Iran  when  considering  
the  existence  of  an  armed  attack.  Oil  Platforms,  para  64.  Previously  in  Nicaragua,  para  231,  
the  Court  referred  to  ‘possible  motivations’  relating  to  trans-­border  incursions  allegedly  carried  
out  by  Nicaragua.  The  Court  did  not  go  into  any  detail  in  either  case  or  provide  any  support  
for   this   requirement   in   international   law.  Requiring  aggressive   intent   to  establish  an  armed  
attack   is  controversial.  See  e.g.  Taft   (2004)  302–3;;  Green  (2008)  201–6;;  Gray  (2018)  152;;  
Henderson   (2018)  214–16.   It   does,  however,   relate   to   the   issue  of   the  need   to   respond   to  
unintended   attacks,   such   as   accidental   incursions   into   territory,  munitions   going   astray,   or  
military  personnel  acting  in  error  or  beyond  the  scope  of  their  orders.  Requiring  a  hostile  motive  
for   an   armed   attack   to   have   occurred   might   help   to   exclude   forcible   responses   to   such  
incidents  of  error  or  accident.  However,  this  concern  would  be  better  addressed  by  considering  
intent  as  part  of  the  general  necessity  calculus,  rather  than  as  a  constituent  part  of  an  armed  
attack.  This  to  ask  whether  there  is  prima  facie  need  to  resort  to  force  in  response  to  an  attack  
that  appears  to  be  accidental  or  made  in  error,  or  whether  alternative  means  would  suffice  to  
resolve  the  situation.  
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c)   General  necessity,  specific  necessity  and  armed  attack  
As  the  above  example  and  analysis  highlights,  distinguishing  between  specific  
and   general   necessity   also   helps   to   draw   a   line   between   both   types   of  
necessity  and  the  prior  armed  attack  trigger.  This  distinction  requires  further  
elaboration.   Green   suggests   that,   in   the   vast   majority   of   situations,   the  
requirements  of  an  armed  attack  and  of  necessity  are  likely  to  condition  a  use  
of  force  in  the  same  manner.  This  is  because,  it  is  argued,  if  one  applies  the  
Nicaragua  standard  of  ‘armed  attack  as  a  grave  use  of  force’,  only  in  extreme  
cases  (i.e.  grave  uses  of  force)  may  self-­defence  be  exercised.  The  situation  
is   the  same  on  an  understanding  of  necessity   that   limits  defensive   force   to  
extreme  cases,  where  such  action  is  a  last  resort.  The  two  requirements  are,  
therefore,  performing  a  similar  function,  which  raises  the  question:  ‘if  an  armed  
attack   is   established,   does   this   automatically   prove   necessity?’ 47   Green’s  
response  is  that  establishing  an  armed  attack  (amounting  to  a  ‘grave’  use  of  
force)  is  tantamount  to  establishing  necessity  in  virtually  all  cases.48  
It  might  be  true  that  a  state  faced  with  a  grave  use  of  force  easily  establishes  
the  defensive  necessity  that  permits  a  forcible  response.  However,  as  Green  
notes,  the  Court  has  clearly  recognized  that  ‘armed  attack’  and  ‘necessity’  are  
distinct  concepts.49  It  has  set  out  a  two-­stage  test  for  assessing  the  lawfulness  
of  self-­defence,  even  if  confusion  may  arise  from  the  jurisprudence  regarding  
how  they  are  applied.  First  is  the  requirement  of  the  armed  attack.  If  (and  only  
if)   that   triggering   element   is   present   may   we   proceed   to   the   additional  
requirements   that   the  defensive   response   is  necessary  and  proportionate.50  
Yet,  Green  rightly  highlights  that  this  distinction  may  not  be  so  clear  in  state  
practice.   States   do   not   always   employ   this   two-­stage   evaluation   and   may  
instead  present  the  two  concepts  as  part  of  the  same  legal  claim.51  
                                                                                        
47  Green  (2009)  135,  138.  
48  Ibid.  
49  Ibid,  138.  
50  Nicaragua,  para  194;;  Oil  Platforms,  para  51.  
51  Green  (2009)  135–6.  
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Applying   the   concepts   of   general   and   specific   necessity   to   this   issue   of  
coextensive  operation  of  armed  attack  and  necessity  helps  to  draw  a  brighter  
line  between  them.  This  approach  demonstrates  that  it  is  not  just  a  conceptual  
possibility  that  an  armed  attack  may  not,  in  all  cases,  establish  the  necessity  
of  responding  to  a  ‘grave  use  of  force’.52  The  answer,  therefore,  to  the  question  
of  whether  an  established  armed  attack  automatically  proves  necessity,  is  that  
it   does  not.53  First,   we   should   not   over-­emphasize   the   ‘most   grave   uses   of  
force’  description  of  an  armed  attack.  The  gravity  threshold,  to  the  extent  it  is  
accepted,  is  not  generally  regarded  as  being  particularly  high.  As  noted,  the  
ICJ  has  suggested  that  the  mining  of  a  single  military  vessel  might  be  enough  
to  engage  the  right  of  self-­defence.54  Regardless,  whilst  gravity  is  a  factor  that  
might   determine   the   existence  of   an   armed  attack   (if   the  Nicaragua   gravity  
threshold  is  accepted),  it  does  not  inevitably  establish  general  necessity.  
As   addressed   in   detail   in  Section  2.3,   general   necessity   evaluates  whether  
other   reasonable   options   are   open   to   the  defending   state   to   respond   to   an  
armed   attack,   before   resorting   to   defensive   force   as   a   last   resort.   This  
assessment  is  context  dependent  and  draws  upon  a  number  of  factors,  which  
may  or  may  not  include  the  gravity  of  the  armed  attack.  Therefore,  even  if  an  
armed   attack   is   established   (because   a   particular,   undefined,   threshold   of  
violence  has  been  surpassed),  this  does  not  automatically  mean  that  there  are  
no   peaceful   alternatives   available   to   resolve   the   situation.   An   unintentional  
armed   attack   provides   a   cogent   example.   Factually,   although   this   could  
surpass  any  gravity   threshold,  a  peaceful   resolution  might  suffice  to  resolve  
the  issue,  such  as  negotiations  leading  to  reparations.  
Therefore,   considerations   other   than   the   gravity   of   an   armed   attack  might  
determine  whether  there  is  a  general  necessary  to  resort  to  defensive  force.  
One  of  the  principal  factors  is  timing.  With  fully  completed  armed  attacks,  for  
example,  because  they  are   factually  over,   there  may  be  no  need  to  rely  on  
                                                                                        
52  Ibid,  138.  
53  For  possible  conflation  of  general  necessity  and  imminence,  however,  see  Section  2.4.1(b).    
54  Oil  Platforms,  para  72.  
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force  where  the  situation  may  be  resolved  reasonably  by  other  means.55  The  
gravity   of   the   attack   could   be   irrelevant   to   this   determination   of   general  
necessity.   In   situations   where   a   state   is   facing   an   imminent   armed   attack,  
whether   it   has   time   to   pursue   peaceful   alternatives   is   likely   to   govern   the  
general  necessity  question.  Addressing  this  timing  issue  is  required  in  every  
case  of  an  imminent  armed  attack,  regardless  of  its  gravity.56  
The  foregoing  evaluation  offers  a  clearer  conceptual  division  between  armed  
attack  and  general  necessity.  The  gravity  of  an  armed  attack  might  factor  in  
considering   general   necessity,   but   this   calculation   goes   beyond   questions  
relating  purely  to  the  level  of  force  directed  at  a  state  and  addresses  concerns  
that  are  clearly  distinct   from  the  armed  attack   trigger   that  precedes   it.   If   the  
Nicaragua  gravity  threshold  is  accepted,  however,  the  result  is  that  the  severity  
of  the  armed  attack  potentially  features  in  both  the  armed  attack  trigger  and  
considerations   of   general   necessity.   This   is   redundant.   If   the   right   of   self-­
defence   is   not   triggered   until   a   particular   level   of   force   is   surpassed,   it   is  
questionable  whether  a  threshold  requirement  can  also  condition  its  exercise.  
It  is  doing  no  additional  legal  work  in  regulating  the  use  of  defensive  force.    
It   is   submitted,   therefore,   that   an   armed  attack   is   better   conceived  of   as   a  
baseline  factual  trigger  of  a  use,  or  threatened  use,  of  military  force  that  prima  
facie  engages  the  right  of  self-­defence.  This  would  equate   ‘armed  attack’   in  
Article  51  UN  Charter  with  ‘use  of  force’  in  Article  2(4).57  If  accepted,  issues  of  
gravity  are  confined  to  conditioning  the  exercise  of  the  right.  It  determines  if  
the   exercise   of   self-­defence   is   necessary   and   proportionate.   Rather   than  
gravity  factoring  in  an  ill-­defined  manner  as  part  of  the  preceding  armed  attack  
trigger,  it  fits  more  naturally  into  the  overall  contextual  assessment  of  both  of  
                                                                                        
55  See  further  Section  2.4.1(c).  
56  See  further  Section  2.4.1(b).  
57  This   author   has   written   elsewhere   regarding   the   gravity   threshold   controversy,   whether  
there  exists  a  gap  between  Arts  2(4)  and  51,  and  how  this  might  affect  the  rights  of  individual  
military  personnel  and  their  units  to  defend  themselves.  O’Meara  (2017)  JUFIL  289–98.  On  
the   gravity   threshold   issue  more   generally,   see   e.g.  Green   (2009)   111–46,   148–63;;   Ruys  
(2010)  139–57;;  Henderson  (2018)  222–3.  On  how  the  gravity  of  the  armed  attack  informs  the  
proportionality  of  the  response,  see  Chapter  3.  
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these  requirements.  Drawing  a  clear  line  between  armed  attack  and  general  
necessity  emphasizes  this  fact.  
An  even  clearer  distinction  may  be  drawn  between  armed  attack  and  specific  
necessity.  Clearly,  the  latter  concept  is  not  performing  the  same  function  as  
the  armed  attack  trigger,  or  general  necessity.  Specific  necessity  is  not  limiting  
force  to  cases  where  it  is  a  last  resort.  Rather,  once  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  
triggered,  and  established  to  be  prima  facie  necessary,  it  limits  defensive  force  
to   legitimate   targets   that   enable   the   defending   state   to   pursue  a   defensive  
purpose.   It  confines  action  to   the  pursuit  of   that  aim.  Therefore,  parsing   the  
concepts  of  armed  attack  and  the  two  types  of  necessity  helps  to  understand  
the  function  and  content  of  these  distinct  and  separate  requirements.  Even  if  
the   ICJ   is  not  always  so  clear   in  applying  these  criteria,   it   is  entirely  correct  
from  a  conceptual  perspective  for  the  Court  to  have  affirmed  a  two-­stage  test  
that  distinguishes  between  armed  attack  and  necessity.  
In   sum,   following  an  armed  attack,   or   in   response   to  one   that   is   imminent,  
general   necessity   determines  whether   force   is   the   only   way   to   resolve   the  
situation.  If  it  is,  any  force  that  goes  beyond  what  is  required  to  halt,  repel  or  
prevent   that   armed   attack,   is   either   an   issue   regarding   specific   necessity  
(because  of  the  nature  of  the  target)  or  an  issue  of  proportionality  (because  
the   overall   defensive   response   is   excessive). 58   This   proposed   distinction  
between   two   types   of   necessity   identifies   what   is   meant   by   references   to  
‘necessity’.  It  may,  therefore,  be  used  as  a  tool  to  analyse  the  literature,  judicial  
pronouncements,  state  practice  and  expressions  of  opinio  juris.  It  also  helps  
us  to  tease  out  the  conceptual  differences  between  armed  attack,  necessity  
and   proportionality   and   to   draw   a   clearer   dividing   line   between   them.   This  
novel  terminology  and  associated  analytical  approach  are  adopted  throughout  
this  thesis.  
                                                                                        
58  See  Sections  2.5  and  Chapter  3  respectively.  
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2.3   General  necessity  -­  other  options  open  to  a  state  
2.3.1   General  principles  
Assuming  an  armed  attack  has  occurred,  Webster’s  formula  suggests  that  self-­
defence  is  only  available  to  a  defending  state  if  there  is  ‘no  choice  of  means’.  
Today,   the   common   understanding   amongst   scholars   of   this   element   of  
necessity  is  that  resorting  to  defensive  force  is  exceptional.  It  is  a  measure  of  
last   resort, 59   where   the   particular   situation   compelled   a   certain   course   of  
conduct.60  This  means  that   there  must  not  be  any  non-­military  alternative   to  
using   force.61  If   a   state   can   counter   an   actual  or   imminent   armed  attack  by  
measures  not  involving  armed  force,  it  has  no  justification  for  using  it.62  Under  
our  novel  taxonomy,  this  equates  to  the  requirement  of  general  necessity.  
The   general   academic   consensus   is   that   necessity   does   not   require   a  
defending  state  to  consider  all  peaceful  alternatives  open  to  it,  and  to  pursue  
and  exhaust  them  before  acting  with   force   to  end  or  avert  an  armed  attack.  
This  is  despite  the  general  obligation  under  international  law  requiring  peaceful  
settlement  of  disputes  between  nations.63  Whilst  terminology  varies  amongst  
scholars,  there  is  widespread  agreement  that  the  essence  of  necessity  (to  be  
understood  as  general  necessity)  is  that  states  are  only  required  to  consider  
peaceable   options   that   are   practical   and  which   are   likely   to   be   effective   in  
averting  a  threat  or  bringing  an  attack  to  an  end,  or  have  a  reasonable  chance  
of  so  doing.64  This  focus  on  the  lack  of  effective  alternatives  recalls  the  writings  
                                                                                        
59  The  Caroline  incident  occurred  in  a  period  where  emerging  state  practice  already  contained  
the  notion  that  war  was  a  means  of  last  resort.  Brownlie  (1963)  21–2.  Regarding  necessity  as  
a  principle  of  last  resort  in  the  just  war  tradition,  see  Ohlin  and  May  (2016)  15–37.    
60  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  380.  
61  Ago  (1980);;  Schachter  (1984)  1635–7;;  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967;;  Dinstein  (2017)  
250–1;;  Gray  (2018)  159.  See  also  Nicaragua,  diss  op  Schwebel,  201  and  204.  
62  Ago  (1980)  para  120.  
63  Arts   1(1),   2(3)   and   33   UN  Charter.   See   also   the   preamble   to   UNGA  Res.   2625   (1970)  
(‘Friendly  Relations  Declaration’).  
64  The   Chatham  House   Principles,   967.   That   alternative  measures  must   be   effective,   see  
Greenwood  (1986–1987)  945;;  Lubell   (2010)  45;;  Tams  and  Devaney  (2012)  96;;  Bethlehem  
(2012)  775;;  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  380;;  Henderson  (2018)  230.  
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of  just  war  theorists,  such  as  Vattel.65  It  also  echoes  Webster’s  insistence  that  
‘[i]t  must  be  shown  that   that  admonition  or   remonstrance  to   the  persons  on  
board  the  Caroline  was  impracticable,  or  would  have  been  unavailing.’66  
An  alternative  to  reliance  on  ‘effectiveness’  is  a  belief  that  general  necessity  
‘merely   requires   that   non-­forceful   measures   be   insufficient   to   address   the  
situation.’67  The  UK  has  explicitly  adopted  this  view.68  Notions  of  the  feasibility  
and  effectiveness  of  alternative  measures  are  echoed  by  others  who  maintain  
that,  where  peaceful  means  have  been  found  wanting,  or  when  they  clearly  
would  be   futile,   then   force  should  be  considered  necessary.69  Green,  noting  
this   variant   terminology,   concludes   that   the   contemporary   Caroline  
requirement  of  last  resort  will  be  met  where  it  would  have  been  unreasonable  
to  expect  the  defending  state  to  attempt  to  deploy  means  other  than  force  to  
resolve  the  situation.  There  must,  therefore,  be  no  reasonable  choice  of  means  
available  to  the  defending  state  in  the  particular  circumstances.70  Such  a  view  
has  been  expressed  explicitly,  for  example,  by  Australia.71  It  is  also  reflected,  
in  general  terms,  in  state  practice  relating  to  specific  incidents  of  self-­defence.72  
A  conception  of  general  necessity  that  maintains   force  as  a   last  resort,  and  
where  it  is  the  only  reasonable  choice  of  means,  is  also  reflected  in  the  wider  
operation  of  the  collective  security  system.  Under  Article  42  UN  Charter,  the  
UNSC  may  take  forcible  measures  to  maintain  or  restore  international  peace  
and   security   if   it   considers   that   non-­forcible  Article   41  measures   ‘would   be  
                                                                                        
65  ‘Force   (…)   becomes   necessary   (…)  when   every   other   [mode]   proves   ineffectual.’   Vattel  
(1797)  Book  III,  Chapter  III,  para  25.  
66  Letter  from  Mr  Webster  to  Mr  Fox  (24  April  1841)  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1840–
1841,  Vol.  XXIX,  1138.  
67  Schmitt  (2013)  62  (emphasis  added).  Elsewhere  Schmitt  has  argued  that  necessity  requires  
the  absence  of  ‘adequate’  non-­forceful  options.  Schmitt  (2007–2008)  151.  
68  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  10.  
69  Schachter   (1991)  152;;  Dinstein   (2017)  250–1   (citing  Schachter).  Dinstein  also  highlights  
that   alternative  means   of   redress  must   be   ‘practicable’.   Ibid.   Gill   in  Weller   (2015)   743–4,  
acknowledges  that  necessity  usually  refers  to  the  lack  of  ‘feasible  alternatives’.  
70  Green   (2006)   453,   455–6   (emphasis   added).  Focusing   on   the   absence   of   a   reasonable  
alternative,  such  that  force   is   the  only   reasonable  option  of  addressing  an  armed  attack,   is  
supported   by   other   scholars.   See  Rodin   (2002)   111;;   Taft   (2004)   304;;  Gardam   (2004)   26;;  
Schmitt   (2006)  151;;  Chatham  House  Principles,  967;;  Ruys   (2010)  95;;  Tams  and  Devaney  
(2012)  96;;  Henderson  (2018)  230.  
71  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
72  See  Section  2.3.2.  
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inadequate  or  have  proved  to  be  inadequate’.73  For  the  right  of  self-­defence,  
this   premise   requires   that   peaceful   options   are   actually   available   to   the  
defending  state.  Availability  might  be  determined  by  temporal  considerations  
(see  Section  2.4),  as  well  as  more  practical  considerations.  The  latter  include  
whether  diplomatic  channels  are  open  between  an  attacker  and  the  defending  
state.  In  cases  of  armed  attacks  by  states,  it  will  be  diplomacy  (whether  by  the  
defending   state   or   other   members   of   the   international   community)   that  
constitutes   the  primary  alternative  means  of  resolution.74  If   the  attackers  are  
NSAs,  however,  the  option  of  communicating  with  them  in  order  to  pursue  a  
peaceful   resolution   takes   on   additional   complications.   This   is   particularly  
difficult  if  states  consider  the  NSAs  to  be  terrorists.75  In  terms  of  the  availability  
of   dispute   resolution,   this   assumes   consent   by   both   parties.   In   any   event,  
recourse   to   an   international   court   or   tribunal   is   unlikely,   on   its   own,   to   be  
effective  in  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  attack.  One  may  doubt  
whether   this   is   a   viable   and   reasonable   alternative   to   defensive   force,  
particularly  in  response  to  an  ongoing  armed  attack.  
Alternatively,  states  may  look  to  the  UNSC  for  resolution.  Under  Article  51  UN  
Charter,  the  right  of  self-­defence  remains  unimpaired  until  the  UNSC  has  taken  
‘necessary  measures’  to  restore  international  peace  and  security.  As  and  when  
this  happens,   the  necessity  of  self-­defence   is   removed,  and  any  continuing  
use  of   force  by  a  defending   thereafter   risks  being  characterised  as  punitive  
and   unlawful.   ‘Necessary   measures’   are   not   defined   in   the   UN   Charter,  
although   it   is  generally  understood   that   the  UNSC  has   the   final  say  on   this  
point.76  This  Charter  mechanism  recognizes  that  self-­defence  is  an  exceptional  
emergency   action,   pending   resolution   via   the   collective   security   framework  
                                                                                        
73  Whether  necessity  in  this  context  is  legally  justiciable,  is  debatable.  Gardam  (2004)  7,  206.  
Analogies  with   the   operation   of   the   collective   security   system  are   not   straightforward,   and  
more  general  consideration  of  the  application  necessity  and  proportionality  to  Chapter  VII  UN  
Charter  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  work.  See  Gardam  (2004)  188–229.  
74  Lubell  (2010)  45.  
75  See  Chapter  4.  
76  See  e.g.  Gill   in  Weller  (2015)  746–9;;  Gray  (2018)  131–2.  It   is  clear  that  not  all  measures  
taken  by  the  UNSC  will  interfere  with  self-­defence.  UNSC  action  may  be  complimentary  to  its  
exercise,  and  the  UNSC  may  also  choose  to  affirm  the  right.  This  happened,  for  example,  after  
Iraq’s  invasion  of  Kuwait  in  1990  (UNSC  Res  661  (1990))  and  the  9/11  attacks  in  2001  (UNSC  
Res  1368  (2001);;  UNSC  Res  1373  (2001)).  
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with  the  UNSC  at  its  head.  For  the  right  of  self-­defence  to  be  terminated  by  
reason   of   lack   of   necessity,   however,   the   UNSC  must   take   adequate   and  
effective  action  to  restore  international  peace  and  security.77  Where  the  UNSC  
fails  to  act,  or  where  states  fail  to  abide  by  its  resolutions,  the  necessity  of  a  
response  prima  facie  persists.78  
If  the  availability  of  reasonable  alternatives  is  established,  then  the  summation  
of  scholastic  opinion  places  emphasis  on  whether  non-­military  responses  are,  
or  will  be,   feasible  and  effective   to  address   the  situation.  On   this  academic  
evaluation,  therefore,  general  necessity  requires  that  a  defending  state  shows  
that  either  i)  it  has  resorted  to  peaceful  measures  before  using  defensive  force  
(and  they  have  failed),  or  ii)  peaceful  measures  are  unfeasible  and/or,  on  their  
own,  they  will  be  ineffective  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  an  armed  attack.  In  relation  
to   the   latter  point,   it  should  be  stressed  that  general  necessity   requires   that  
force  be  needed  as  a  response,  but  it  does  not  demand  that  force  be  the  only  
response.  Military  action  may  be  combined  with  non-­forceful  measures  such  
as   diplomacy,   economic   sanctions,   or   law   enforcement.79  The   point   is   that  
force  may  only  be  used  either  on  its  own,  or  in  combination  with  non-­forceful  
measures,   if   the   latter   are   unfeasible   and/or   will   be   ineffective   if   used  
exclusively.  The  focus  is,  therefore,  on  the  availability  of  real  alternatives.  
The  existing   literature  sets  out   the  broad  premise  of  general  necessity  and  
alternative  measures,  but  not  the  complete  picture.  For  example,  there  is  no  
consensus,  or  much  discussion,  amongst  scholars  of  how  unlikely  to  succeed  
                                                                                        
77  See  e.g.  Halbertsam  (1996);;  Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  746–9;;  Dinsetin  (2017)  255–8.  The  UNSC  
might,  for  example,  order  a  ceasefire,  a  withdrawal  of  forces,  a  cessation  of  hostilities  and  so  
forth.   Such   binding   decrees   remove   the   necessity   of   self-­defence   where   they   succeed   in  
restoring   international   peace   and   security.   Ibid.   That   the   UNSC   must   take   adequate   and  
effective  action  to  restore  international  peace  and  security  before  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  
terminated  is  confirmed  by  the  drafting  history  of  the  UN  Charter.  Halbertsam  (1996)  240–8.  
78  For  example,  the  UK  explained  the  necessity  of  self-­defence  against  Argentina’s  invasion  
of   the  Falkland   Islands  by   reference   to  Argentina’s   refusal   to  comply  with  UNSC  Res  502  
(1982).  The  Resolution  had  demanded  an  immediate  cessation  of  hostilities  and  an  immediate  
withdrawal  of  all  Argentine   forces  from  the   Islands.  The  UK,  therefore,   justified   its  enduring  
and  unimpaired  right  of  self-­defence  by  the  fact  that  the  Resolution  had  failed  to  be  effective  
in  maintaining  international  peace  and  security.  UN  Doc  S/15025  (1982)  2.  See  further  (1982)  
53  BYIL,  543,  548,  551–2.  
79  Schmitt  (2013)  62.  
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alternative   courses   of   action   need   to   be   before   defensive   armed   force  
becomes  a  permissible  option.  More  fundamentally,  the  summation  set  out  in  
the   preceding  paragraphs  does  not   fully   explain   the   nuances  of   the   role   of  
alternatives   to   force   in  state  practice.  The  review   in   the  next  Section  shows  
that   the   importance   of   peaceful   alternatives   in   determining   the   legality   or  
otherwise  of  purported  defensive  force  is  highly  contextual.  Indeed,  they  may  
not  factor  at  all  in  either  the  justification  for,  or  review  of,  military  action.  
2.3.2   State  practice  
State  practice  affirms  the  aforementioned  presumption   that  self-­defence,  by  
virtue  of  general  necessity,  is  a  measure  of  last  resort.  However,  states  have  
yet  to  provide  a  consistent  approach  to  what  this  means  in  practice,  beyond  a  
general  proposition.  The  following  analysis  shows  that  there  is  no  consistent  
practice  regarding  what  role  alternative  measures  play  in  respect  of  particular  
incidents   involving   claims  of   self-­defence.  Such  practice   is   varied   and   very  
context  specific.  Neither   is   there  consensus  amongst  states   regarding  what  
they   might   require   by   way   of   alternatives,   i.e.   what   constitute   reasonable  
substitutes  to  force.  The  availability  of  peaceful  measures  is  viewed  by  states  
as  evidence  of  whether  the  resort  to  force  is  reasonable  in  the  circumstances  
(i.e.  that  general  necessity  is  satisfied).  Yet,  whether  or  not  such  measures  are  
pursued  or  adopted  does  not  appear  to  be  determinative  of  their  view  of  the  
legality  of  military  action.  There  is  no  requirement  on  states,  therefore,  to  prove  
general  necessity.80  
a)   Defending  states  
States  that  are  the  objects  of  purported  defensive  force  might  highlight,  by  way  
of  protest,  that  alternatives  to  force  were  open  to  the  putative  defending  state.  
The  DRC  adopted  this  approach  when  it  argued  its  case  in  Armed  Activities.81  
Likewise,  in  respect  of  the  1981  Osiraq  incident  discussed  in  detail  below,  Iraq  
                                                                                        
80  Corten  in  Weller  (2015)  872,  argues  that  an  attacked  state  is  not  obliged  to  prove  that  it  has  
exhausted  all  peaceful  means  before  reacting  in  self-­defence.  
81  Armed  Activities,  Memorial  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  July  2000,  para  5.29.  
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argued  that  Israel  had  effective  multilateral  and  bilateral  recourses  available  to  
it  in  order  to  avoid  any  perceived  threat.82  Yet,  such  states  have  a  natural  self-­
interest  in  highlighting  the  existence  of  alternatives  to  the  force  directed  against  
them.  In  contrast  to  references  to  alternatives  made  by  defending  states  (which  
are   self-­limiting   and,   therefore,   carry   particular   evidentiary   weight),   such  
protestations   have   much   less   probative   value   in   determining   what   states  
require  as  a  matter  of  law  when  seeking  to  establish  general  necessity.  
Defending  states  might  vigorously  assert  their  right  of  self-­defence,  yet  they  
accept  that  the  exercise  of  such  right  is  conditioned.  In  seeking  to  justify  their  
defensive  acts,  they  will  often  refer  to  peaceful  alternatives  being  unavailable  
or  futile.  In  the  early  post-­UN  Charter  period,  for  example,  Tunisia  claimed  a  
right   of   self-­defence  against   France  and   attempted   to   expel   French   troops  
stationed  on  its  territory.83  It  stressed  before  the  UNSC  that  it  did  everything  in  
its  power  to  avoid  aggravating  the  situation  and  tried  every  method  of  reaching  
an   amicable   agreement,   before   resorting   to   self-­defence. 84   This   included  
repeatedly  requesting   the  French  government  over  a  period  of   two  years  to  
settle  the  issue  of  their  troops,  direct  negotiation  and  the  use  of  good  offices.85  
Likewise,  during  the  Six  Day  War  in  1967,  Israel  emphasized  how  it  had  waited  
for  a  peaceful  settlement  before  resorting  to  force,  claiming  it  only  resorted  to  
military  means  at  the  point  at  which  there  was  no  alternative.86  
In   1986,   South   Africa   faced   criticism   for   its   armed   intervention   in   Zambia,  
Zimbabwe   and   Botswana,   ostensibly   aimed   at   African   National   Congress  
(‘ANC’)  targets  operating  in  those  countries.87  South  Africa  claimed  a  right  of  
                                                                                        
82  UN  Doc  A/36/PV.52  (1981)  para  24.  
83  UN  Doc  S/3951  (1958).  France  also  claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence,  in  respect  of  alleged  
Algerian  NSA  attacks  against  it  originating  from  Tunisian  territory.  UN  Doc  S/3954  (1958).  See  
further  (1958)  UNYB  77–9.  This   is  an  example,   therefore,  of  both  states  claiming  a  right  of  
self-­defence  on  the  basis  of  disputed  facts.  What  is  instructive  here,  is  Tunisia’s  recourse  to  
the  language  of  alternative  measures  to  justify  its  defensive  action  as  a  ‘no  choice  of  means’  
measure  of  last  resort.  
84  UN  Doc  S/PV.819  (1958)  paras  22,  65.  
85  Ibid,  paras  58,  65.  
86  UN  Doc  S/PV.1348  (1967)  paras  176–8.  On  this   incident  generally,  see  Quigley   in  Ruys  
and  Corten  (2018)  131–42.  
87  See  generally  Kwakwa  (1986).  
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self-­defence,88  emphasising   not   only   that   it  had   repeatedly  warned  Zambia,  
Zimbabwe  and  Botswana   that   the  continued   ‘harbouring  of   terrorists’  would  
result  in  a  response  against  the  threat  emanating  from  their  territory,  but  also  
that  such  states  had  rejected  a  South  African  offer  to  set  up  a  ‘joint  mechanism’  
to  negotiate  an  end  to  cross-­border  incursions  by  the  ANC.89  Its  justification  in  
this   incident   echoed   previous   action   against   the   ANC   operating   in   foreign  
territory.90  The  military  action  was  action  was  broadly  condemned,  however.91  
It  was  deemed   to  be  particularly  objectionable  because   it   took  place  at   the  
same   time   that   mechanisms   were   available,   and   being   used,   to   resolve  
peacefully  the  issues  at  hand.92  These  included  efforts  by  the  Commonwealth  
at   mediations   and   negotiations   between   the   four   states   involved.93  For   all  
sides,   therefore,   the   potential   for   peaceful   resolution   was   a   focal   point   for  
assessing   the   necessity   of   self-­defence,   even   though   there   was   general  
disagreement  that  defensive  force  was  genuinely  being  used  as  a  last  resort.  
When  the  USA  invaded  Panama  in  1989,  it  justified  its  actions,  inter  alia,  by  
claiming  to  act  in  self-­defence  following  aggression  against  American  forces.94  
In   so   doing,   it   referred   to   repeated   prior   attempts   to   deal   with   the  Noriega  
government,   including   diplomacy   and   negotiations,   all   of   which   it   had  
exhausted.95  In   1993,   the  USA  maintained   this   approach  when   it   claimed  a  
right  of  self-­defence  to  justify  its  strikes  against  the  Iraqi  Intelligence  Service’s  
(‘IIS’)   headquarters   in   Baghdad   in   response   to   the   failed   attempt   to  
                                                                                        
88  UN  Doc  S/PV.2684  (1986)  27–30.  
89  Ibid,  22,  24–6.  Warnings  by  defending  states  to  states  supposedly  harbouring  terrorists  is  a  
common  theme  where  self-­defence  is  invoked  to  justify  force  against  NSAs  operating  in  foreign  
territory.  See  Chapter  4.  
90  In   action   taken   the   previous   year   against   the   ANC   in   Angola,   South   Africa   pointed   to  
previous   failed   attempts   at   peaceful   resolution   and   to   Angola’s   persistent   harbouring   of  
terrorists  on  its  territory.  This,  it  said,  justified  the  necessity  of  its  actions.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2597  
(1985)  paras  58–60.  
91  Kwakwa  (1986)  429–32.  
92  Ibid,  432.  
93  See  e.g.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2685  (1986)  5  (Australia);;  7  (USA).  
94  ‘Deployment  of  United  States  Forces  to  Panama’,  Communication  from  the  President  of  the  
United  States,  House  Doc.  101–127,  101st  Congress,  2nd  Session  (1990);;  UN  Doc  S/PV.2899  
(1989)   31.  On   this   incident   generally,   see  Henkin   (1991);;   Tsagourias   in  Ruys   and  Corten  
(2018)  426–38.  
95  UN  Doc  S/PV.2899  (1989)  31,  36.  The  American  action  was  widely  condemned,  however,  
and   its   claim  of   self-­defence   is   controversial.  See  UN  Docs  S/PV.2899   (1989);;  S/PV.2900  
(1989).  See  further  Henkin  (1991)  306;;  Tsagourias  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  429–32.  
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assassinate  former  President  George  HW  Bush  and  Iraq’s  ‘continuing  threat  
to  United  States  nationals.’96  In  so  doing,  the  USA  emphasized  that  there  was  
no   reasonable   prospect   that   diplomatic   initiatives   or   economic   measures  
would  suffice  to  counter  the  threat.  As  a  last  resort,  therefore,  it  used  force  to  
respond  to  the  attempted  attack  and  the  threat  of  further  attacks.97  
The  USA  also  referred  to  the  exhaustion  of  diplomatic  efforts  when  it  carried  
out   strikes   against   Iraq   in   1998,98  and   argued   that   there   were   no   peaceful  
diplomatic  alternatives  to  using  force  when  justifying  the  necessity  of  its  actions  
before   the   ICJ   in  Oil  Platforms.99  These  are  but  a   few  examples  of  practice.  
References  to  a  prior  failure  or  unavailability  of  diplomacy  or  negotiation  are  
fairly   common   in   justifications   of   self-­defence. 100   They   are   often   included  
explicitly  in  reports  to  the  UNSC.101  Most  recently,  in  the  context  of  combatting  
NSAs,   the  USA  has  publicly  affirmed  that   the  necessity  of   resorting   to  self-­
defence  only  arises  when  ‘measures  short  of  force  have  been  exhausted  or  
are  inadequate  to  address  the  threat’.102  In  the  same  context,  the  UK  likewise  
confirmed   that   resort   to   forces   is   always   a   last   resort,   to   be   used   where  
alternatives  are   insufficient  or  unavailable.103  Australia  has  concurred,  noting  
that  necessity  is  satisfied  where  force  is  the  only  reasonable  option.104  
The  above   incidents  and  public  statements  exemplify  how  defending  states  
may   refer   to   alternatives   to   force   when   seeking   to   establish   the   general  
necessity  of  resorting  to  self-­defence  (even  if  not  expressed  in  those  precise  
terms).  Such  states  justify  their  actions  as  a  genuine  need  to  use  force  as  a  
                                                                                        
96  UN  Doc  S/26003  (1993).  On  this  incident  generally,  see  Kritsiotis  (1996);;  Starski  in  in  Ruys  
and  Corten  (2018)  504–26.  
97  UN  Doc  S/26003  (1993).  
98  UN  Doc  S/1998/1181  (1998).  
99  Oil   Platforms,   Counter-­Memorial   and   Counter-­Claim   submitted   by   the   United   States   of  
America,  23  June  1997,  paras  4.23–4.26.  
100  Green  (2006)  454.  
101  E.g.   UN  Docs   S/18728   (1987);;   S/19106   (1987);;   S/1995/87   (1995);;   S/1997/603   (1997);;  
S/1998/827   (1998);;   S/1999/134   (1999);;   S/1999/304   (1999);;   S/2001/472   (2001);;  S/2008/21  
(2008);;  S/2012/252  (2012).  
102  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  241.  The  USA  regards  this  view  as  an  
application  of  the  unwilling  or  unable  doctrine.  See  Section  4.1.2.  
103  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  1,  10,  13.  
104  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
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last  resort.  Whilst  not  always  explicit,  it  seems  inherent  in  these  justifications  
that   the  states  concerned  viewed   their   forceful  acts  as   the  only   reasonable  
option   in   the  circumstances.  Alternatives,  such  as  diplomacy  or  negotiation,  
were   expressed   to   be   exhausted   or   insufficient   to   address   the   situation   at  
hand.  These  assertions  are  made  in  the  course  of  legal  claims  of  self-­defence.  
It  might  be  concluded,  therefore,  that  states  consider  themselves  legally  bound  
to  contemplate,  or  explore,  these  alternatives  before  using  force,  rather  than  
making  such  pronouncements  out  of  political  or  moral  expediency.105  
However,   defending   states   do   not   always   consider   alternatives   before  
resorting  to  force.  Context  is  key.  When  faced  with  an  ongoing  armed  attack,  
for  example,  it  would  be  unreasonable  for  states  to  employ  peaceful  options  
by  way  of  a  response,  instead  of  using  defensive  force.  The  timing  of  the  armed  
attack   is   determinative   of   general   necessity   in   such   cases.106  Furthermore,  
state   practice,   in   particular   since   9/11,   indicates   that   defending   states   are  
much  less  likely  to  explore,  or  have  recourse  to,  peaceful  alternatives  before  
resorting  to  force  against  NSA  armed  attacks  in  the  context  of  transnational  
terrorism.107  The  importance  of  the  particular  circumstances  is  also  highlighted  
by  the  reactions  of  other  states  to  claims  of  self-­defence.  
b)   Reactions  of  other  states  
Other  states,  in  criticising  or  condemning  a  purported  use  of  defensive  force  
by   defending   states,   often   employ   the   medium   of   peaceful   alternatives   to  
comment   upon   the   legality   of   self-­defence.  This  might   be   in   ambiguous   or  
general  terms,  however,  without  detailed  engagement  with  the  facts  or  legal  
                                                                                        
105   Gardam   (2004)   155,   maintains   that   states   regard   themselves   as   under   a   ‘continuing  
obligation’  to  endeavor  to  settle  their  differences  by  peaceful  means’.  Therefore,  ‘[d]epending  
on  the  circumstances,  a  failure  to  acknowledge  peaceful  overtures  could  transform  a  legitimate  
response   in   self-­defence   into   an   aggressive   use   of   force.’   See   also   Gazzini   (2005)   147.  
Whether  or  not  Gardam  considers  this  to  be  a  legal,  as  opposed  to  a  moral,  obligation  based  
on  state  practice   is  unclear.  However,   if   such  overtures  constitute  an  option   to   resolve   the  
situation  in  an  effective  manner  then,  as  a  matter  of  general  principle,  it  would  be  difficult  to  
maintain  that  a  use  of  force  continues  to  be  necessary.  
106  See  further  Sections  2.3.4  and  2.4.1.  
107  Peaceful  alternatives  vis-­à-­vis  the  NSAs  themselves,  as  well  as  the  role  of  the  host  state,  
are  explored  in  Section  4.1.1.  
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justifications  advanced  by  defending  states.  For  example,  in  response  to  the  
American   strikes   in   1993   against   the   IIS   headquarters   in   Baghdad,   China  
simply  maintained  that  disputes  between  countries  should  be  settled  through  
‘peaceful  means  of  dialogue  and  consultation’,  and  that  they  did  not  endorse  
action  that  might  intensify  tension  in  the  region,  including  the  use  of  force.108  
Moreover,  references  to  alternatives  to  force  are  typically  only  one  of  a  number  
of  reasons  for  negative  reactions  by  other  states.  The  context  of  the  particular  
incident  usually  provides  additional  grounds  for  such  responses.    
During   the  1956  Suez  crisis   for   instance,  Yugoslavia  maintained  that   rather  
than  using  military  force  in  Egyptian  territory,  Israel  should  have  availed  itself  
of  the  ‘armistice  machinery’  to  deal  with  the  fedayeen  raids  against  it.109  This  
comment  was  made,  however,  in  the  context  of  general  concern  for  peace  in  
the  Middle  East  and  Israel’s  pattern  of  behaviour.  This  consisted  of  ‘a  policy  of  
largescale  armed   reprisals  against   its  neighbours’,  as  well  as   the  view   that  
Israel  had  flouted  UNSC  Resolutions  and  ignored  its  UN  Charter  obligations.110  
Therefore,   wider   factual   and   political   factors,   beyond   resort   to   peaceful  
alternatives,  informed  the  response  to  Israel’s  action.  
This  trend  continues.  In  respect  of  the  1967  Six  Day  War,  Zambia  proclaimed  
before   the   UNGA   that   Israel   should   have   had   recourse   to   the   UN,   before  
resorting  to  what  it  labelled  as  aggressive  action  against  Egypt.111  The  factual  
and  legal  analysis  relating  to  this  incident  is  debated,  however,  and  concern  
over   preventive   military   action   and   accusations   of   Israeli   aggression  
dominated  the  reactions  of  other  states.112  When  Israel  claimed  a  right  of  self-­
defence  against   terrorist   armed  attacks   in   1972,   resulting   in   incursions   into  
Lebanon,113  Argentina  asserted  that,  as  a  general  matter,  the  principle  of  ‘need’  
meant  that  there  must  be  no  alternative  to  using  force  and  Israel  had  breached  
                                                                                        
108  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  21.  See  the  equally  ambiguous  statement  presented  on  behalf  
of  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement  (‘NAM’)  members  of  the  UNSC  relating  to  the  same  incident.  
Ibid,  16–17  (Cape  Verde).  
109  UN  Doc  S/PV.748  (1956)  para  22.  
110  Ibid  (1956)  para  21.  
111  UN  Doc  A/PV.1538  (1967)  para  84.  
112  See  Quigley  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  131–42.  
113  UN  Doc  S/10550  (1972).  
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this  requirement.114  Argentina’s  negative  reaction  was  also  based,  however,  on  
the  disproportionality  of  the  Israeli  response,  the  view  that  it  was  punitive,  and  
concerns  regarding  stability  in  the  Middle  East.115  
Israel   was   further   criticized   for   acting   during   ongoing,   and   increasingly  
productive,  negotiations  before  its  raid  into  Uganda  over  the  Entebbe  hostage  
crisis  of  1976.116  Yet,  these  concerns  regarding  recourse  to  alternatives  were  
again  comingled  with  doubts  regarding  whether  Israel  had  been  the  subject  of  
an  armed  attack,  controversy  over   the  right   to  protect  nationals  abroad  and  
unease  over  how  best   to  respond  to   international   terrorism  and  hijacking.117  
When  it  launched  air  strikes  on  the  PLO  headquarters  in  Tunis  in  1985,  Israel  
again   faced   criticism   for   not   pursuing   peaceful   settlement.118   Whilst   Israel  
insisted   that   no   other   remedies   were   available   to   combat   the   PLO,   the  
perpetrators  of  the  terrorist  attacks  that  had  prompted  the  raid  had  had  in  fact  
been   arrested. 119   Furthermore,   states   were   generally   scathing   of   Israel’s  
actions,   which   were   condemned   by   the   UNSC   as   an   act   of   ‘armed  
aggression’.120  
Perhaps  the  best-­known  example  involving  Israel,  was  its  airstrike  on  an  Iraqi  
nuclear  facility  in  Osiraq  in  1981.121  Israel  justified  its  actions  as  an  act  of  self-­
defence  in  response  to  a  threat  of  ‘nuclear  obliteration’,  claiming  that  the  facility  
was  designed  to  produce  atomic  bombs  that  Iraq  would  use  to  target  Israel.122  
Israel  argued  that  that  they  were  required  to  strike  the  nuclear  reactor  before  
it  went  ‘hot’.123  In  terms  of  the  necessity  of  that  action  and  peaceful  alternatives,  
Israel  asserted  that  it  had  tried  unsuccessfully  to  have  the  threat  removed  by  
                                                                                        
114  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  paras  25,  28.  The  reference  to  ‘need’  here,  is  understood  as  
referring  to  general  necessity.  
115  Ibid,  paras  28–31.  Regarding  proportionality,  see  section  3.1.1(b).  
116  On  this  incident  generally,  see  Kress  and  Nussberger  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  220–33.    
117  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.1940  (1976)  para  35  (Guinea);;  para  120  (Sweden);;  S/PV.1941  (1976)  
para  102  (Tanzania);;  S/PV.1942  (1976)  paras  144–6  (India);;  S/PV.1943  (1976)  paras  18,  22  
(Libya).  See  further  (1976)  UNYB  315–20.  
118  E.g.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2611  (1985)  38  (Turkey).  
119  UN  Doc  S/PV.2611  (1985)  para  40  (Turkey);;  para  69  (Israel).  
120  UNSC  Res  573  (1985)  para  1.  
121  On  this  incident  generally,  see  Ruys  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  329–41.  
122  UN  Doc  S/14510  (1981);;  UN  Doc  S/PV.2280  (1981)  paras  58–9.  
123  UN  Doc  S/PV.2280  (1981)  para  95.  
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diplomacy,  which  left  it  with  no  choice  but  to  remove  the  ‘mortal  danger’  using  
force.124  It  highlighted  that  Iraq  had  rejected  UN  efforts  at  peaceful  settlement  
and  had   ignored   relevant  UNSC  Resolutions.125  Therefore,   Israel   had  acted  
only  after  ‘the  usual  international  procedures  and  avenues  had  proved  futile’  
and  ‘the  diplomatic  clock  had  run  out’.126  
States,   at   least   implicitly,   universally   rejected   this   no   choice   of   means  
justification.  All  states  intervening  in  the  UNSC  debates  explicitly  condemned  
Israel’s  attack,  with  many  characterising   is  at  as  act  of  aggression.127  Japan  
noted  the  recent  IAEA  inspection  of  the  facility  and  the  assurance  regarding  
applicable   safeguards   given   by   the   IAEA.   In   its   view,   ‘[i]f,   in   spite   of   that  
assurance,   Israel  suspected   that   Iraq   intended   to  produce  atomic  bombs,   it  
should  (…)  have  sought  to  settle  the  matter  by  peaceful  means,  for  example  
by   submitting   it   to   IAEA   for   consideration.’ 128   The   Philippines   likewise  
highlighted   the  availability   to   Israel   of   recourse   to   ‘appropriate   international  
bodies’.129  Sierra  Leone  agreed  with  the  need  to  resort  to  peaceful  alternatives,  
in  particular  by  Israel  seeking  protection  from  the  UNSC.130  
Significantly,   the   USA   stood   with   those   states   condemning   the   Israeli  
airstrikes.131  Its   judgement   that   such   acts   had   violated   the  UN  Charter   was  
‘based   solely   on   the   conviction   that   Israel   had   failed   to   exhaust   peaceful  
means’.132  Given  the  usually  close  relationship  between  Israel  and  the  USA,  
the   negative   American   reaction   to   its   staunch   ally   is   exceptionally   strong  
evidence  of  illegality.133  This  is  further  reflected  in  the  reactions  of  the  UNSC  
and  the  UNGA.  In  the  unanimously  adopted  UNSC  Resolution  487,  the  former  
                                                                                        
124  Ibid,  para  59.  
125  Ibid,  para  67.  
126  Ibid,  para  102.  
127  UN  Docs  S/PV.2280–S/PV.2288  (1981).  
128  UN  Doc  S/PV.2282  (1981)  95.  
129  UN  Doc  S/PV.2284  (1981)  para  26.  
130   UN   Doc   S/PV.2283   (1981)   para   149.   See   also   UN   Doc   S/PV.2281   (1981)   para   70  
(Pakistan).  
131  UN  Doc  S/PV.2288  (1981)  para  27.  
132  (1981)  UNYB  276.  
133  Gray  (2018)  22.  
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condemned   Israel’s  military  action  as  a  clear  violation  of   the  UN  Charter.134  
The  latter  followed  suit  by  condemning  Israel’s  aggression.135  
The  Osiraq  incident  suggests  that  alternative  measures  might  be  placed  at  the  
forefront   of   the  debate   regarding   the   legality   of   purported  defensive  action.  
Their  importance  must  be  viewed  in  light  of  the  particular  context,  however.  It  
is  clear  from  the  UNSC  debates  that  states  were  concerned  by  a  number  of  
factors,  inter  alia,  the  general  impact  of  Israel’s  action  on  regional  instability,  
the   Middle   East   peace   process,   the   issue   of   non-­proliferation   of   nuclear  
weapons  and  the  right  to  develop  nuclear  technology  for  peaceful  purposes.  
Of  central  importance  was  Israel’s  attempt  to  justify  its  actions  on  the  basis  of  
preventive   self-­defence,   rather   than   by   way   of   a   response   to   an   actual   or  
imminent   armed   attack. 136   State   concern   over   such   ‘pre-­emptive’   or  
‘preventive’  action  (both   terms  were  employed)  was  readily  apparent  during  
the  UNSC  consideration  of  the  incident  and  it  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  
censure  of  Israel.137  As  such,  the  focus  on  peaceful  alternatives  and  the  issue  
of  ‘no  choice  of  means’  should  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  broader  discussion  
concerning   a   putative   right   of   anticipatory   self-­defence,   and   the   dangers  
surrounding  the  potential  for  its  abuse.  This  context  strongly  influenced  states’  
assessment  of  this  particular  incident.138  
Israel  should  not  be  singled  out  for  special  criticism,  however.  Its  allies  have  
also  been  censured  for  not  pursing  alternatives  to  force.  For  example,  during  
discussions  in  the  UNSC  that  followed  the  USA’s  claim  of  self-­defence  to  justify  
its  airstrikes  against  Libya  in  1986,139  Ghana  was  trenchant  in  its  criticism  of  
                                                                                        
134  UNSC  Res  487  (1981).  
135  UNGA  Res.  36/27  (1981).  
136  Israel  never  claimed  to  be  responding  to  an  imminent  armed  attack,  but  rather  to  prevent  a  
potential  future  threat  arising  by  virtue  of  Iraq  developing  nuclear  weapons.  See  e.g.  UN  Docs  
S/14510  (1981);;  S/PV.2280  (1981)  92–6;;  S/PV.2288  (1981)  60.  See  further  Sections  1.3.2(a)  
and  2.4.1(b);;  Ruys  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  332–4.  
137  UN  Docs  S/PV.2280  (1981)–S/PV.2288  (1981).  
138  See  Ruys  (2010)  97,  280–7.  The  impact  of  the  timing  of  an  armed  attack  on  the  importance  
of  alterative  measures  is  explored  further  in  Section  2.4.1.  
139  UN  Docs   S/17938   (1986);;   S/17990   (1986).   For   commentary   on   this   controversial,   and  
widely  condemned,  incident,  see  Greenwood  (1986–1987);;  Kamto  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  
408–25.  
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the  American  action,  noting  that  it  ‘did  not  bother  to  exhaust  the  provisions  and  
arrangements  set   forth   in   the  Charter   for  settling  disputes.’140  Yet,   this  came  
after  the  delegate  had  first  expressed  doubt  regarding  whether  the  USA  had  
been  the  victim  of  an  armed  attack  and  over  attribution  to  Libya.141  Whilst  the  
need   to   settle   disputes   peacefully,   therefore,   was   part   of   the   Ghanaian  
denunciation,  the  failure  to  pursue  alternatives  was  not  itself  determinative,  but  
rather  part  of  a  package  of  a  number  of  arguably  more  important  rationales.  
c)   Proving  general  necessity?    
A  review  of  state  practice  provides  a  mixed  account.  States  might  justify  their  
acts  by  reference,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  the  absence  of  reasonable  alternatives  
to  force,  but  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Peaceful  resolution  is  not  invariably  
sought  and  a  failure  to  negotiate  does  not  automatically  lead  to  an  act  being  
condemned  as  unnecessary.142  The  American-­led  action  against  the  Taliban  in  
response  to  9/11  and  Coalition  action  against  Daesh  in  Syria  stand  as  recent  
examples.143   Other   states   may   also   reference   alternative   measures   when  
responding   negatively   to   acts   of   putative   self-­defence,   but   this   is   not   a  
consistent  or  uniform  response.  
Where  they  are  referred  to,  alternatives  are  often  remarked  upon  in  abstract  
terms.   Whereas   defending   states’   justificatory   statements   might   implicitly  
allude  to  force  being  the  only  reasonable  option,  other  states  tend  not  to  touch  
upon  how  effective  or  reasonable  such  alternatives  might  be.  Rather,  general  
concern   is   expressed   that   defending   states   should,   or   could,   have   tried  
peaceful  alternatives.  Moreover,  the  previous  Section  highlights  that  the  role  
and  importance  of  alternatives  is  highly  contextual.  If  they  are  mentioned  by  
other   states,   a   lack   of   recourse   to   them   tends   to   be   one   of   a   number   of  
(potentially  more  important)  reasons  for  criticism  or  condemnation.  It  is  difficult  
to  identify  a  case  where  there  is  a  general  consensus  amongst  states  that  the  
                                                                                        
140  UN  Doc  S/PV.2680  (1986)  33–5.  
141  Ibid,  32–5.  
142  Green  (2009)  81.  
143  See  Section  4.1.1.  
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sole  reason  for  condemnation  was  that  the  necessity  of  using  force  was  absent  
because  reasonable  alternatives  to  force  were  available  to  resolve  a  situation.  
The  American  statement  in  respect  of  the  Osiraq  incident  is  a  rare  exception.  
Furthermore,  in  those  cases  where  alternatives  are  adduced,  either  by  way  of  
justification   (by   defending   states)   or   critique   (by   other   states),   there   is   no  
indication  by  such  states  that  the  need  to  consider  or  pursue  them  stems  from  
a   legal   obligation.   An   exercise   of   good   faith,   political   expediency,   or   a  
combination  of  all  these  things  could  likewise  account  for  such  comments.  The  
firmest  conclusion   that  may,   therefore,  be  drawn   regarding  state  practice   is  
that  the  resort,  or  otherwise,  to  peaceful  alternatives  is  not  determinative  of  the  
legality   of   a   purported   use   of   defensive   force.   Defending   states   are   not  
required  to  prove  that  general  necessity  is  established  because  of  an  absence  
of   a   reasonable   alternative.   Instead,   states   view   the   resort   to   peaceful  
alternatives  as  desirable  and  as  constituting  evidence  of  whether  or  not  there  
was  a   true  necessity   to  employ   force  defensively  and   to  continue   to  do  so.  
Whilst  failing  to  pursue  reasonable  alternatives  to  force  might  point  to  a  lack  of  
general   necessity,   on   its   own,   such   failure   is   unlikely   to   abrogate   a  
determination  of  necessity.  
Ultimately,  general  necessity  will  be  established  where  there  is  a  reasonable  
need  to  respond  with  force.144  How  much  other  states  will  credit  a  defending  
state’s  subjective  evaluation  of  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  force  is  contingent  
on   the   surrounding   circumstances.   It   also   depends   on   what   other   JAB  
considerations   are   pertinent   to   assessing  whether   there   has   been   a   lawful  
recourse   to   self-­defence.  Peaceful   alternatives   are   likely   to   be   the   focus  of  
greater  scrutiny   in  cases   involving  claims  of  anticipatory  self-­defence,  but   it  
might  be  the  more  fundamental  issue  of  the  existence  and  content  of  the  right  
of  such  anticipatory  action  that  is  determinative.  The  Osiraq  incident  serves  as  
a  good  example.  Conversely,  alternatives  will  be  of  less  importance  in  respect  
of  ongoing  armed  attacks,  where   there   is  no  time  to  consider  other  options,  
                                                                                        
144  See  Green  (2016)  456.  
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and  where  the  necessity  of  self-­defence  is  likely  to  be  established  per  se.145  In  
respect   of   action   against   NSAs   in   the   context   of   international   terrorism,  
recourse  to  alternative  means  plays  a  different  role.  As  will  be  seen  in  Chapter  
4,   rather   than  negotiation  or  other  peaceful  dispute  resolution  mechanisms,  
the  focus  is  instead  on  the  primacy  of  host  state  action  to  combat  the  terrorist  
threat.  
2.3.3   ICJ  jurisprudence  and  alternative  measures  
Whilst   the   ICJ’s   consideration   of   necessity   and   proportionality   has   been  
cursory,  guidance  may  be   found   in   its   jurisprudence  regarding   the  need   for  
defending  states  to  pursue  alternative  measures.  Starting  with  Nicaragua,  it  is  
notable  that  the  Court  did  not  require  the  USA  to  have  exhausted  all  peaceful  
means  of  resolution  before  resorting  to  the  use  of  force.  Nor  did  it  censure  the  
USA  for  this  omission.  Instead,  as  discussed  in  Section  2.4.2,  the  Court  went  
directly   to   the   issue   of   the   timing   (or   ‘immediacy’)   of   the   USA’s   putative  
defensive  acts   in  order   to  reach   its  decision  on  necessity.  The  fact   that   the  
majority  preferred  to  focus  on  temporal  considerations  and  avoid  consideration  
of  alternative  measures  is  notable.  It  accords  with  the  state  practice  set  out  in  
the  preceding  Section  that  the  option  of  alternative  measures  is  not  necessarily  
the   determinant   of   legality,  particularly  where   temporal   issues  are   the   focal  
point  of  the  incident.  
In   contrast,   Judge  Schwebel   did   spend   time   in   his   dissent   ruminating   over  
whether  the  USA  should  have  pursued  peaceful  alternatives.  His  comments  
represent   the   most   extensive   judicial   review   of   the   topic   and   raise   some  
interesting   issues   regarding   the   interplay   between   forceful   and  non-­forceful  
responses.  For  Judge  Schwebel,  the  necessity  of  the  USA’s  actions  against  
Nicaragua  turned  on  whether  there  were  available  to  the  USA  ‘peaceful  means  
of  realizing  the  ends  which  it  has  sought  to  achieve  by  forceful  measures.’146  
He  began  his  analysis  with   the  position  of   the  victim  state,  El  Salvador.  He  
                                                                                        
145  See  Sections  2.3.4  and  2.4.1(a).  
146  Nicaragua,  diss  op  Schwebel,  para  201.  
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quickly  accepted  the  necessity  of  El  Salvador’s  recourse  to  defensive  force,  
rather  than  limiting  itself  to  peaceful  negotiations,  given  that  it  faced  an  ongoing  
large-­scale  insurgency.147  
He   proceeded   to   explain   why   the   American   response   in   the   purported  
collective   self-­defence   of   El   Salvador   was  also   necessary.   In   so   doing,   he  
highlighted   how   the  USA   had  mounted   serious   bilateral   efforts   to   settle   its  
dispute   with   Nicaragua   peacefully,   and   only   when   they   had   failed   had   it  
resorted   to   armed   force.148  He   noted   that,   before   employing   such   force,   an  
argument  might  be  maintained  that  the  USA  should  have  first  exhausted  the  
multilateral   means   of   peaceful   settlement   open   to   it,   notably   those   of   the  
Organization  of  American  States  and  the  UN.149  Interestingly,  however,  Judge  
Schwebel   did   not   conclude   that   failure   to   exhaust   these   multilateral  
alternatives  abrogated  the  necessity  of  the  American  action.  Implicitly,  this  was  
because  the  failure  was  mitigated  by  the  peaceful  measures  taken  by  the  USA  
on  both  a  bilateral  and  multilateral  basis  to  try  and  resolve  the  situation,  whilst  
it  was  also  involved  in  its  armed  activities.150  He  thereby  explicitly  recognized  
that  the  USA  was  employing  both  forceful  and  non-­forceful  means  at  the  same  
time.  
We   must   exercise   caution   regarding   how   much   weight   we   give   to   Judge  
Schwebel’s  observations  on  recourse   to  peaceful  measure  of   resolution,  but  
there   are   number   of   observations   to   be  made.151  His   approach   reflects   the  
general  premise  stated  in  Sections  2.3.1  and  2.3.2  that,  where  they  constitute  
a   reasonable   alternative   to   force,   states   are   expected   to   pursue   peaceful  
means  of  resolution,  before  resorting  to  force.  This  is  subject  to  a  number  of  
caveats,  however.  First,  his  comments  might  be  confined  to  states  acting  in  
                                                                                        
147  Ibid,  para  202.  See  further  Section  2.4.1(a).  
148  Ibid,  paras  203,  209.  
149  Ibid,  para  204.  
150  These  included  maintaining  diplomatic  relations  with  Nicaragua  and  showing  a  readiness  
to  negotiate  a  resolution  whilst  its  support  for  the  contras  was  underway.  Ibid,  para  205.  
151  His  conclusions  regarding  alternatives  are  part  of  a  dissenting  opinion.  They  are  also  tightly  
tied  up  with  his  response  to  the  particular  facts  and  his  view  of  the  justifiability  of  necessity  per  
se.  See  ibid,  para  206.  Judge  Schwebel  denied  that  the  necessity  of  the  USA’s  actions  was  
justiciable  but  felt  bound  to  express  a  judgment.  Ibid,  paras  69–77,  201.  
     
     75  
collective  self-­defence  of  an  ally  that  is  the  direct  victim  of  an  armed  attack.  
For   the   victims   of   an   ongoing   armed   attack,   he   waives   this   expectation  
completely,  and   the  necessity   for   them  to  act   in  self-­defence  appears   to  be  
established   per   se.   Arguably,   the   determinative   factor   is   timing,   i.e.   the  
immediate  need  of  the  direct  victim  of  an  armed  attack  to  respond  to  force  with  
force.   Such   need   is   not   shared   by   the   other   state   acting   in   collective   self-­
defence.152  
Second,   resorting   to   force   does   not   require   the   exhaustion   of   peaceful  
alternatives.  He  clearly   recognizes   that  defensive   force  can  be  employed  at  
the  same  time  that  peaceful   resolution   is  sought.  Attempting  negotiation,  or  
seizing   the  UNSC  of   the  matter,   does  not   ipso   facto   deny   the  necessity   of  
exercising   self-­defence.   This   accords   with   the   notion   that   peaceful  
alternatives,   and   action   taken   by   the   UNSC,   must   provide   an   effective  
resolution   (i.e.   force   is   not   the   only   reasonable   option   in   such  
circumstances). 153   Ultimately,   necessity   may   ‘turn   on’   the   availability   of  
reasonable   alternatives   to   the   USA   to   achieve   its   goals,   but   there   is   no  
suggestion  in  Judge  Schwebel’s  opinion  that  positive  international  law  requires  
the  pursuit  or  exhaustion  of  peaceful  means  to  the  exclusion  of  exercising  self-­
defence.  The  implication  is  that  both  individual  and  collective  self-­defence  are  
necessary   in   the   face   of   an   ongoing   armed   attack   until   such   time   as   the  
(concomitant)  resort  to  alternatives,  on  their  own,  are  effective  to  resolve  the  
situation.  On  this  basis,  his  judgment  essentially  boils  down  to  what  action  is  
reasonable  in  the  circumstances.154  This  is  both  logical  and  accords  with  the  
conclusions  set  out  in  Sections  2.3.1  and  2.3.2.  
                                                                                        
152  See  Section   2.4.1(a).   In   addition,   Judge  Schwebel   is   responding   here   to   the  majority’s  
judgment  that  the  actions  of  the  USA  were  unnecessary.  As  such,  it  is  perhaps  understandable  
that   he   goes   into  much   greater   detail   regarding   the   American   response,   given   that   he   is  
attempting  to  justify  that  their  actions  were  necessary.  
153  It  is  clear  from  Judge  Schwebel’s  dissent  that  such  alternatives  would  need  to  be  effective  
in  resolving  the  situation.  Ibid,  paras  203–4.  
154  ‘In  circumstances  where  an  aggressor  State  cannot  be  persuaded  to  cease  its  aggressive  
intervention,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  seek  to  force  the  aggressor  State  to  cease  its  aggressive  
intervention.’  Ibid,  para  203  (emphasis  added).  
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In  Oil   Platforms,   the   ICJ   considered   in   some   detail   the   issue   of   necessity.  
Significantly,   however,   it   did   not   expressly   refer   to   peaceful   alternatives.  
Instead,  rather  than  focusing  on  this  issue  of  general  necessity,  it  devoted  its  
scrutiny   to  specific  necessity.  This  comprised  consideration  of   the  nature  of  
the   targets   chosen   by   the  USA   in   the   course   of   their   putative   acts   of   self-­
defence,  being  a  number  of  Iranian  oil  platforms.  The  Court  did  not  view  these  
as   legitimate   military   targets,   which   rendered   using   force   against   them  
unnecessary.155  The  Court  followed  this  approach  in  Armed  Activities.  In  this  
case,  the  DRC  argued  that  Uganda’s  defensive  action  was  unnecessary.  This  
was  based  on  the  fact  that  the  latter  had  used  force  without  first  resorting  to  
peaceful  means  of  resolution,  even  though  it  had  time  to  do  so.156  The  Court  
did  not  address  this  fact  however.  Instead,  as  with  Oil  Platforms,  it  focused  on  
specific   necessity.   It   based   its   finding   that   the   defensive   force   was  
unnecessary  (and  disproportionate)  on  the  nature  of  the  targets  selected  by  
Uganda.157  
These  three  cases  are   the  only  examples  where   the   ICJ  has  condemned  a  
state  for  an  unnecessary  use  of  force  that  it  attempted  to  justify  by  claiming  
self-­defence. 158   Whilst   not   indisputable,   the   Court’s   approach   to   general  
necessity   suggests   that   it   will   not   require   states   to   prove   that   they   have  
pursued  or  exhausted  alternatives  to  force  in  order  to  establish  such  claim.159  
This  accords  with   the  state  practice  examined   in  Section  2.3.2.  The  Court’s  
examination   of   necessity   has   been   contingent   on   the   facts   surrounding   the  
particular   use   of   force,   however.   The   context   has   determined   if   the   Court  
                                                                                        
155  Oil  Platforms,  paras  74–6.  Targeting  is  covered  in  Sections  2.5  and  3.3.  
156  Armed  Activities,  Memorial  of  The  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  July  2000,  para  5.28;;  
Reply  of  The  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  May  2002,  para  3.159;;  Oral  Arguments  of  
Professor  Pierre  Klein,  CR  2005/3,  12  April  2005,  41–2  (para  4),  43–5  (paras  9–16).  
157  Armed  Activities,  para  147.  This  is  likewise  covered  further  in  Section  2.5.  
158  The  Court  did  not  raise  the  issue  in  Corfu  Channel.  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  whilst  the  Court  
made  general  pronouncements  regarding  the  use  of  force,  necessity  and  alternative  measures  
were  not  part  of  its  reasoning.  In  Palestinian  Wall,  the  ICJ  limited  its  pronouncements  on  the  
right   of   self-­defence   to   one   paragraph   (para   139).   At   no   point   did   it   refer   to   alternative  
measures.  
159  This  point  has  not  been  necessary  to  determine  any  case  to  date,  and  it  is  not  explicit  in  
the  judgments,  but  it  is  clearly  implied  by  the  fact  that  the  majorities  have  never  addressed  this  
factor  when  considering  other  aspects  of  necessity.   It   is  also   implicit   in   Judge  Schwebel’s  
dissent  in  Nicaragua,  which  did  consider  alternatives.  
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focuses   on  whether   the   resort   to   any   form   of   force  was   reasonable   in   the  
circumstances  (viz  Nicaragua,  in  particular,  regarding  the  timing  of  the  USA’s  
actions),  or  whether  such  force  was  appropriately  directed  (viz  Oil  Platforms  
and  Armed  Activities).  Whilst  not  a  picture  of  clarity,  this  broadly  accords  with  
the   taxonomy   adopted   in   this   thesis   of,   respectively,   general   and   specific  
necessity.  Whilst  this  thesis  argues  that  necessity  should  be  considered  strictly  
in  this  order,  the  context  of  the  case  appears  to  have  led  the  Court  to  focus  on  
one  or  the  other,  depending  on  the  most  obvious  or  pertinent  facts.  
2.3.4   A  temporal  distinction  -­  ongoing,  imminent  and  completed  armed  
attacks  
Temporal  considerations  are  central  to  the  question  of  whether  it  is  reasonable  
for  a  defending  state  to  resort  to  other  options  not  involving  the  use  of  force.  
Timing  appears  determinative  to  Webster’s  assertion  that  a  state  must  in  fact  
have  ‘no  choice  of  means’.  He  maintained  that:  
‘[i]t  must  be  shown  that  admonition  or  remonstrance  to  the  persons  on  
board  the  Caroline  was  impracticable,  or  would  have  been  unavailing  (…)  
that  it  would  not  have  been  enough  to  seize  and  detain  the  vessel;;  but  
that  there  was  a  necessity,  present  and  inevitable,  for  attacking  her  in  the  
darkness  of  the  night’.’160  
Webster’s  assertion  that  peaceful  means  must  first  be  explored  is,  therefore,  
based  on  elements  of  i)  reasonableness  (viz  availability  and  effectiveness  of  
alternative   means)   and   ii)   considerations   of   timing   (viz   a   ‘present   and  
inevitable’  necessity).  This  relationship  between  reasonableness  and  timing  is  
best   explored  by   distinguishing  between  ongoing,   imminent   and   completed  
armed  attacks.  This  distinction,  as  a  determinant  of  general  necessity,  will  be  
discussed   in   the   next  Section,   together  with   general   considerations   of   how  
timing  relates  to  the  exercise  of  self-­defence.  
                                                                                        
160  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1840–1841,  Vol.  XXIX,  1138  (emphasis  added).  
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2.4   General  necessity  -­  imminence,  immediacy  and  duration  
Modern  weaponry  and  delivery  systems,  coupled  with  the  rise  of  international  
terrorism  and  attacks  by  NSAs,  have  increasingly  highlighted  the  complexities  
surrounding   the   temporal   element   of   the   right   of   self-­defence.161  Timing   is  
pivotal  to  whether  or  not  a  defensive  riposte  is  necessary.  It  is  the  chronology  
of  events  that  establishes  if  there  is  a  genuine  situation  of  emergency  and  a  
pressing  need  for  a  state  to  resort  to  force  at  the  expense  of  nonviolent  means  
of  settlement.  This  is  a  question  of  general  necessity.  
The  genesis  of  some  form  of  temporal  limitation  on  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  
also   typically   derived   from   Webster’s   assertion   that   the   necessity   of   self-­
defence   must   be   ‘instant,   overwhelming,   and   leaving   (…)   no   moment   for  
deliberation.’162  The  timing  elements  of  Webster’s  formula  elicit  much  debate  
amongst   scholars   and,   seemingly,   great   confusion.   This   is   understandable,  
given  that  Webster’s  statement  can  be  read  as  pertaining  to  the  timing  of  the  
armed   attack,   or   the   defensive   response,   or   both.   In   addition,   temporal  
considerations  are  often  mooted  in  very  broad  terms.  References  to  ‘instancy’,  
‘immediacy’  and   ‘imminence’  are  sometimes  used  without  distinction  and/or  
conflated   with   other   considerations   that   mean   a   clear   view   of   the   timing  
element  is  lost.163  Some  even  question  whether  necessity  places  any  temporal  
restraints  on  the  use  of  defensive  force  at  all.164  
Temporal  issues  should  be  considered  in  relation  to  two  aspects  of  the  right  of  
self-­defence.   The   first   is   the   armed   attack   and   whether   it   is   ongoing,  
completed,  or  will  occur  at  some  point   in   the   future.  Whilst   the   timing  of   the  
armed  attack  is  typically  examined  in  terms  of  when  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  
triggered,   it   also   plays   a   central   role   in   the   factual   context   that   determines  
                                                                                        
161  For  a  general  discussion  of  these  issues  and  the  ratione  temporis  element  of  the  right  of  
self-­defence,  see  Ruys  (2010)  250–367;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL.  
162  Letter   from   Mr  Webster   to   Lord   Ashburton   (6   August   1842)  British   and   Foreign   State  
Papers,  1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  201.  
163  See  e.g.  Gardam  (2004)  148–55.  See  further  below  in  this  Section.  
164  E.g.   Kress   in  Weller   (2015)   587.   Gardam   (2004)   in   contrast   maintains   that,   arguably,  
‘instancy’  (or  immediacy)  is  the  only  element  of  the  Caroline  formula  that  needs  to  be  satisfied.    
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whether  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  exercisable.  As  explored  in  Section  2.4.1,  
this  is  an  issue  of  general  necessity,  which  responds  to  the  timing  of  the  armed  
attack.  Most  controversially,  the  prospect  of  future  armed  attacks  engages  the  
issue   of   anticipatory   self-­defence   and   considerations   of   ‘imminence’.   The  
second  aspect   is   the   timing  of   the  defending  state’s   response   to  an  armed  
attack.  This  factors  in  the  general  necessity  calculus  by  considering  how  long  
it  takes  a  defending  state  to  respond  in  self-­defence.  It  engages  the  notion  of  
‘immediacy’.   Immediacy   is   sometimes   stipulated   as   a   third   precondition,   in  
addition   to   the  requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality.165  However,  as  
will  be  made  clear  in  Section  2.4.2,  immediacy  is  most  naturally  analysed  as  
part   of   general   necessity.   The   ICJ   has   adopted   this   approach,   rather   than  
recognizing  it  as  a  distinct  and  separate  criterion.166  Many  of  the  leading  JAB  
scholars  also  contemplate  necessity  along  these  lines.167  As  such,  the  issue  of  
timing  of  both  the  armed  attack  and  the  defensive  response  is  essential  to  our  
understanding  of  general  necessity.  
2.4.1   The  timing  of  the  armed  attack  
As  noted  in  the  preceding  Section,  the  timing  of  an  armed  attack  bears  heavily  
on   whether   it   is   reasonable   for   a   putative   defending   state   to   pursue   other  
options  not  involving  the  use  of  force.  In  order  to  explain  this  relationship,  and  
how   it   alters   with   the   time   available,   the   following   analysis   distinguishes  
between  ongoing,  imminent  and  completed  armed  attacks.  
a)   Ongoing  armed  attacks  
Ongoing  armed  attacks  pose  few  conceptual  complexities  regarding  recourse  
to   alternative   measures.   This   author   adopts   Schachter’s   contention   that,  
where  a  state  is  under  current  armed  attack,  the  necessity  of  self-­defence  is  
established   per   se,   irrespective   of   probabilities   as   to   the   effectiveness   of  
                                                                                        
165  E.g.  Ago  (1980)  para  122;;  Dinstein  (2017)  252,  287–8;;  Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  743–5.  
166  Nicaragua,  para  237.  The  ICJ  adopted  the  same  approach  in  the  context  of  necessity  as  a  
circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness.  Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros,   para  54.  This   is  discussed  
further  in  Section  2.4.1(b).  
167  E.g.  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967;;  Ruys  (2010)  99–108;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  108.  
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peaceful  settlement.168  This  is  to  be  read  as  satisfying  general  necessity  under  
this  thesis’  adopted  taxonomy.  Along  similar  lines,  other  authors  maintain  that  
necessity   will   usually   be   satisfied   in   such   circumstances,   or   there   exists   a  
strong  presumption  of  necessity.169  That  the  general  necessity  of  using  armed  
force   to   repel   an   ongoing  attack   is   automatically   established   is   reflected   in  
state   practice. 170   Examples   include   the   UK’s   response   to   the   Argentinian  
invasion   of   the   Falklands   Islands   in   1982, 171   and   Israel’s   intervention   in  
Lebanon  in  2006.172  A  more  recent  case,  in  the  context  of  combatting  NSAs,  is  
the  ongoing  Coalition  action  in  Syria.173  
The  presumption  in  favour  of  general  necessity  being  established  in  the  case  
of  ongoing  armed  attacks  is  entirely  logical.  In  such  instances,  there  exists  a  
present  and  exigent  need  for  a  state  to  protect  itself  and  its  citizens  by  using  
force,  without   time  to  consider  other  options.   It   is  unreasonable   to  expect  a  
state  to  forego  its  right  of  forcible  response  in  favour  of  a  peaceful  alternative,  
and  there  is  nothing  in  the  UN  Charter  or  state  practice  to  suggest  otherwise.174  
International  law  does  not  oblige  a  state  to  turn  the  other  cheek  when  it  is  faced  
with  continuing  military  violence.  Until  the  UNSC  acts  effectively,  or  a  peaceful  
resolution  is  otherwise  found,  defending  states  retain  the  option  to  respond  to  
current   force   with   force.   Whether   or   not   the   defending   state   chooses   to  
exercise  that  option  is  a  separate  question.  Yet,  to  require  a  state  to  attempt  
                                                                                        
168  Schachter  (1991)  152.  See  further  Section  2.3.3  and  consideration  of  Judge  Schwebel’s  
dissent  in  Nicaragua.  
169  E.g.  Dinstein  (2005)  237;;  Green  (2006)  455;;  Lubell  (2010)  43,  45;;  Akande  and  Liefländer  
(2013)  564;;  Tams   in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver   (2013)  417;;  Henderson   (2018)  230.  For  
further  consideration  by  this  author  of  this  issue  and  related  academic  opinion,  see  O’Meara  
(2017)  JUFIL,  in  particular  301–4.  
170  This  general  proposition  is  subject  to  satisfaction  of  any  required  gravity  threshold.    
171  See  Section  2.4.2(b).  
172  See  in  particular  Section  3.2.5.  
173  This  latter  example  is  more  controversial,  however.  See  Section  4.1.  
174  This  conclusion  mirrors   the  operation  of   the  collective  security   system.  The  UN  Charter  
does  not  require  the  UNSC  to  exhaust  peaceful  means  before  relying  on  force  to  maintain  or  
restore  international  peace  and  security.  Art  42  allows  the  UNSC  to  deploy  force  where  non-­
forcible  Art  41  measures  would  be  inadequate  or  have  proved  to  be  inadequate.  It  explicitly  
recognizes,   therefore,   that   force   might   be   the   appropriate   response,   even   if   viewed   as   a  
measure  of  last  resort.  
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peaceful  methods  of  resolution,  instead  of  using  defensive  force,  is  to  abrogate  
the  right  of  self-­defence.175  
b)   Imminent  armed  attacks  
As  noted   in  Section  1.3.2(a),   the  right   to  respond  to  armed  attacks   that  are  
imminent   is   disputed,   but   is   assumed   for   present   purposes.   Undoubtedly,  
general  necessity  takes  on  additional  significance  regarding  state  responses  
to  such  armed  attacks.176  The  fact  that  they  occur  in  the  future  places  emphasis  
on  peaceful  alternatives  to  force  and  whether  resorting  to  them  is  reasonable  
in  the  circumstances.  As  the  Chatham  House  Principles  explain  it:  
[n]ecessity  is  a  threshold  and  the  criterion  of  imminence  can  be  seen  to  
be  an  aspect  of  it,  inasmuch  as  it  requires  that  there  be  no  time  to  pursue  
non-­forcible  measures  with  a  reasonable  chance  of  averting  or  stopping  
the  attack.177  
The  analysis  set  out  in  Section  2.3.2  and  in  this  Section  suggests  that  states  
will   consider  peaceful  ways   to   resolve  a  situation  up  until   the  point   that   the  
opportunity   to   defend   themselves   effectively   is   lost.   Ultimately,   general  
necessity  will  be  determined  by  whether,  in  the  particular  circumstances,  self-­
defence  was  a  reasonable  choice  to  counter  the  future  threat.  This  raises  the  
further  question  of  whether  the  trigger  for  the  right  of  self-­defence  (being  armed  
attacks  that  are  ‘imminent’)  and  the  conditioning  of  its  exercise  (being  general  
necessity)  are  equated  in  this  context.  This  potential  is  explored  further  below.  
Aside   from   the   issue   of   recognizing,   or   not,   a   general   right   to   respond   to  
imminent  armed  attacks,  the  greater  difficulty  with  considering  whether  states  
have  the  time  to  consider  or  resort  to  other  options  when  faced  with  such  a  
                                                                                        
175  There   is  nothing   to  prevent  a  defending  state  pursuing  peaceful  means  of  settlement   in  
addition   to  using   force   to  respond  to  an  ongoing  armed  attack.  See  generally  Ruys  (2010)  
250–367.  
176  Ago  (1980)  para  120.  Ago’s  reference  to  ‘preventative’  self-­defence  is  expressed  by  him  to  
include  self-­defence  in  relation  to  imminent  attacks.  
177   The   Chatham   House   Principles,   967.   This   is   understood   as   a   reference   to   general  
necessity.  
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threat  is  the  lack  of  consensus  regarding  the  meaning  of  imminence.  The  ICJ  
has   not   expressed   its   view   on   this   topic,178  and   there   has   been   a   relative  
paucity  of  consideration  by  scholars.179  In  recent  years,  the  USA,  the  UK  and  
Australia   have   set   out   their   understandings   of   imminence.   Their   positions  
remain  open  to  varying  interpretations  and  have  raised  as  many  questions  as  
answers.180  However,   as   rare   and   explicit   examples   of   state   practice,   they  
serve  as  important  indicators  of  the  possible  meanings  of  imminence  and  the  
relationship  such  concept  has  with  general  necessity  and   the   trigger  of   the  
right  of  self-­defence.181  
Each  of  these  three  states  explicitly  adopted  Bethlehem’s  ‘Principle  8’  amongst  
the  factors  that  they  take  into  account  when  considering  imminence:  
Whether  an  armed  attack  may  be  regarded  as  “imminent”  will  fall  to  be  
assessed  by   reference   to   all   relevant   circumstances,   including   (a)   the  
nature  and  immediacy  of  the  threat,  (b)  the  probability  of  an  attack,  (c)  
whether  the  anticipated  attack  is  part  of  a  concerted  pattern  of  continuing  
armed  activity,   (d)   the   likely  scale  of   the  attack  and  the   injury,   loss,  or  
damage  likely  to  result  therefrom  in  the  absence  of  mitigating  action,  and  
(e)   the   likelihood   that   there   will   be   other   opportunities   to   undertake  
effective   action   in   self-­defense   that   may   be   expected   to   cause   less  
serious  collateral  injury,  loss,  or  damage.182  
                                                                                        
178  In  Nicaragua,  para  194,  as  the  parties  did  not  raise  the  issue  of  ‘the  imminent  threat  of  an  
armed  attack’,  the  Court  declined  to  express  a  view  on  the  issue.  This  approach  was  followed  
in  Armed  Activities,  para  143.  
179  Notable  exceptions  include  Bethlehem  (2012)  and  Lubell   in  Weller  (2015)  697–719.  See  
also  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  564–5.  
180  For  comments  representing  a  variety  of  views  on  these  examples  of  state  practice,  see  e.g.  
Lederman   (4   and   11  April   2016);;  Deeks   (2016);;  Hakimi   (2017);;  Haque   (January   and  May  
2017);;  Milanovic  (2017);;  Green  (2017);;  Henderson  (2018)  297–307.  
181  States  seldom  make  such  general  statements  about   their  understanding  of   international  
law.  It  potentially  limits  their  right  of  action.  The  examples  set  out  in  this  Section  are,  therefore,  
valuable  (if  not  entirely  coherent)  examples  of  state  practice.  
182  Bethlehem   (2012)   775–6,   Principle   8.   Bethlehem’s   Principle   8   is   formed   from   detailed  
discussions  with  a  number  of  state  representatives  with  relevant  operational  experience.  He  
describes  these  factors  as  indicative,  rather  than  exhaustive,  of  imminence.  Ibid,  773-­4.  
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It   is  not  clear  how   these   factors  relate   to  each  other,  or  whether   they  carry  
equal  or  differing  weights.183  Yet,  this  formulation,  and  its  adoption  by  the  three  
states  concerned,  reflects  the  commonly  held  understanding  that  a  temporal  
element  is  inherent  in  imminence.  Bethlehem’s  characterisation  encapsulates  
this  by  reference  to  the  ‘immediacy  of  the  threat’  and  the  ‘other  opportunities  
to  undertake  effective  action’.  Caution  must  be  taken  in  approaching  the  issue  
of   timing,   however.   The   UK   Attorney   General,   for   instance,   considers   that  
‘[i]mminence  was  described  in  the  Caroline  case  as  a  threatened  attack  which  
was  ‘instant,  overwhelming,  leaving  no  choice  of  means,  and  no  moment  of  
deliberation.’’ 184   This   is   incorrect.   Imminence   is   not   referred   to   at   all   in  
Webster’s  formula.  Moreover,  Webster  refers  to  the  necessity  of  self-­defence  
being  instant  and  overwhelming,  not  the  armed  attack.185  On  both  conceptions,  
however,  timing  plays  a  central  role  in  determining  imminence.  
Focusing   solely   on   the   temporal   element   of  Webster’s   formulation   and   his  
requirement   that   there  be   ‘no  moment   for  deliberation’  suggests   that,   to  be  
imminent,  an  armed  attack  must  be  just  about  to  happen.  Lubell  emphasizes  
this   temporal   aspect,   arguing   that   an   imminent   armed   attack   ‘must   be   an  
impending  attack  over  which  there  is  a  reasonable  level  of  certainty  that  it  will  
occur   in   the   foreseeable   future’,   and   the   threat   must   be   ‘specific   and  
identifiable’.186  This  latter  requirement  rightly  draws  a  line  between  (potentially  
lawful)   pre-­emptive   self-­defence   and   (almost   certainly)   unlawful   preventive  
self-­defence.187  On  the  temporal  aspect,  Lubell  notes  that  an  armed  attack  may  
be  imminent,  but  self-­defence  is  not  necessary  where  non-­forcible  alternatives  
are   available,   or   where   the   action   by   the   UNSC   precludes   the   need   for  
defensive  action.188  This  logic  reduces  imminence  to  a  question  of  the  timing  
                                                                                        
183  Hakimi  (2017).  
184  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  8.  
185  Letter   from   Mr  Webster   to   Lord   Ashburton   (6   August   1842)  British   and   Foreign   State  
Papers,  1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  201.  
186  Lubell  in  Weller  (2015)  702–5,  718.  Whilst  offering  one  of  the  few  comprehensive  reviews  
of   imminence,  Lubell  describes   it  as  a  separate,  third  requirement   for  measuring  defensive  
action,   in   addition   to   necessity   and   proportionality.   This   minority   position   is   not   generally  
shared  by  scholars,  nor  in  the  state  practice  referred  to  herein  from  the  USA,  UK  and  Australia.  
This  Section  explains  why  imminence  is  better  understood  as  part  of  general  necessity.  
187  See  Section  1.3.2(a).  
188  Lubell  in  Weller  (2015)  699–700.  
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of   a   specifically   identified   future   attack.   Yet,   imminence   is   commonly  
understood  to  involve  additional  components.  As  will  be  made  clear,  it  is  the  
interrelationship   between   a   number   of   factors   that   blurs   the   line   between  
imminence  forming  part  of  the  armed  attack  trigger,  and  imminence  inhering  
in  the  contextual  determination  of  general  necessity.  
Bethlehem’s  Principle  8,  the  positions  of  the  USA,  the  UK  and  Australia,  and  
a  weight  of  academic  opinion  all  indicate  that  the  timing  of  the  armed  attack  is  
important,  but  imminence  also  depends  on  other  factors  that  relate  to  the  wider  
circumstances  of   the   threat.  Henderson   calls   this   ‘contextual   imminence’.189  
Ago  believed  that  ‘a  State  acting  in  self-­defence  (…)  acts  in  response  to  an  
imminent  danger  -­  which  must   (…)  be  serious,   immediate  and   incapable  of  
being  countered  by  other  means.’190  On  the  account  of   imminence  endorsed  
by   these   scholars  and   states,  whilst   the   temporal   proximity  of   the   attack   is  
highly   relevant,   the   nature   of   the   threat   and   the   prospect   of   nonviolent  
alternatives   also   feature.   If   this   account   is   accepted,   contrary   to   Lubell’s  
position,   where   alternative   measures   are   available   and,   on   their   own,   are  
effective  to  prevent  the  attack  from  happening  then,  ipso  facto,  such  attack  is  
not  truly  imminent.  The  general  necessity  of  self-­defence  will  also  be  absent.  
To  develop   this  proposition   further,  Akande  and  Liefländer   likewise  suggest  
that  imminence  ‘describes  a  certain  pressing  quality  that  a  threat  must  have  
for  anticipatory  self-­defense  to  be  lawful’.  This  involves  an  assessment  of  the  
type  of  attack  threatened,  its  likelihood  of  occurring,  its  gravity  and  timing.191  
                                                                                        
189  Henderson  (2018)  297–307.  See  also  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967;;  Schrijver  and  
Van  den  Herik  (2010)  (‘The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations’)  543.  On  the  UK’s  position,  see  
further   House   of   Commons,   House   of   Lords,   Joint   Committee   on   Human   Rights,   ‘The  
Government’s  Policy  on  the  Use  of  Drones  for  Targeted  Killing:  Government  Response  to  the  
Committee’s  Second  Report  of  Session  2015–16’,  Fourth  Report  of  Session  2016–17,  HC  
747,  HL  Paper  49,  para  14.  
190  Ago  (1980)  para  88.  
191  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  564–5.  The  authors  highlight,  however,  that  it  is  unclear  how  
these  four  elements  of  imminence  interrelate  or  whether  they  are  independent.  For  example,  
is  a  low  probability  of  threat  permissible  where  the  gravity  of  the  threat  is  severe?  Conversely,  
where  a  threat  is  mild,  is  there  a  requirement  of  a  higher  probability  that  the  attack  will  occur?  
The  position   is  unsettled.   Ibid  565.  See  further  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  543.  
See   also  Milanovic   (2017),   concluding   that   imminence   in   the   JAB   is   not   really   a   temporal  
criterion,  but  a  certainty/likelihood  criterion.  
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Most   noteworthy,   is   the   fact   that   they   deny   that   imminence   contains   an  
independent   temporal   requirement.192   Positing   that   the   temporal   aspect   of  
imminence  acts  on  its  own  to  bar  self-­defence  is  to  potentially  deny  a  right  of  
self-­defence   in   the   face   of   a   highly   probable   and   severe   threat,   whose  
realization   may   be   temporally   remote,   but   where   there   will   be   no   future  
opportunity  to  eliminate  the  threat.193  The  ICJ  adopted  this  approach  to  timing  
in  the  context  of  necessity  as  a  circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness.194  The  
Court  recognized  that  whilst  imminence  is  traditionally  understood  as  temporal  
immediacy   or   proximity,   it   does   not   establish   an   independent   temporal  
requirement.  Following  this  reasoning,  manifest  peril  more  distant  in  time  may  
still  be  deemed  to  be  imminent,  allowing  for  a  response.195  
This   general   approach   accords   with   the   idea,   presented   by   a   number   of  
scholars,   of   a   last   ‘window   of   opportunity’   to   respond   effectively   to   an  
anticipated   armed   attack.   It   also   reflects   imminence   as   espoused   in  
Bethlehem’s  Principle  8  and  the  positions  of  the  USA,  the  UK  and  Australia.  
By  this  standard:  
a  State  may  act  in  anticipatory  self-­defence  against  an  armed  attack  (…)  
when  the  attacker  is  clearly  committed  to  launching  an  armed  attack  and  
the  victim  State  will  lose  its  opportunity  to  effectively  defend  itself  unless  
it  acts.  In  other  words,  it  may  act  anticipatorily  only  during  the  last  window  
of   opportunity   to   defend   itself   against   an   armed   attack   that   is  
forthcoming.196  
On  this  construction  of  imminence,  temporal  considerations  are  important,  but  
they  do  not  act  as  an  independent  injunction  against  defensive  action  where  
                                                                                        
192  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  565;;  Lederman  (11  April  2016).  
193  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  565.  
194  Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros,  para  51.  
195  Lubell  in  Weller  (2015)  703,  cautions  against  transposing  this  precedent  from  the  laws  of  
state  responsibility  into  the  JAB  and  delinking  immediacy  from  imminence.  The  analysis  in  this  
Section  suggests,  however,  that  the  JAB  position  may  not  be  so  different.  
196  Schmitt  (2013)  64.  See  also  Lowe  (2005)  192;;  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967–8;;  The  
Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  543;;  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  710–13.  
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the  threat  is  sufficiently  probable  and  severe.197  Rather,  timing  constitutes  one  
of   a   number   of   contextual   indicators.   It   interacts  with   considerations   of   the  
likelihood   of   a   specifically   identified   future   attack,   its   nature   and   gravity   to  
determine  how  long  a  state  has  to  respond  to  defend  itself  effectively  before  it  
is  too  late.  
Controversially,   it   is   suggested   that   the  window  of  opportunity  may  present  
itself  immediately  before  the  attack  in  question  or,  in  some  cases,  long  before  
it   occurs.198  A   right   to   resort   to   a  military   response   well   in   advance   of   the  
anticipated   attack   is   potentially   problematic.   The   potential   risk   of   states  
abusing  the  right  of  self-­defence  in  such  circumstances  is  obvious.  Timing  is  
not   to  be   ignored,  however.  Temporal   factors  have  a   ‘heavy   impact’  on   the  
possibility  of  making  accurate  predictions  pertaining  to  the  future  threat.199  The  
further  into  the  future  the  timeline  goes,  the  harder  it  will  be  for  states  to  justify  
that  an  attack  is  identifiable  and/or  probable  and  that  there  exists  a  genuine  
state   of   ‘irreversible   emergency’   that   necessitates   the   resort   to   defensive  
military   force   at   a   particular   point   in   time.200  This   hurdle   tempers   the   risk   of  
abuse.  More  time  means  that  more  variables  will  need  to  factor  in  a  defending  
state’s  decision  making.  These  include  the  possibility  of  the  attacker  reversing  
its   course  of   action   (such  as   delaying   the   attack   or   not   launching   it   at   all),  
alternative  peaceful  measures  being  effective   to   resolve   the  dispute,  or   the  
UNSC  taking  action  to  render  the  resort  to  defensive  force  unnecessary.  The  
longer  the  period  between  the  imminent  armed  attack  and  the  response,  the  
                                                                                        
197  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  565.  Regarding  the  level  of  certainty  that  should  be  required  
before  states  may  respond  to   imminent  armed  attacks,  Green  argues   that   it   is   illogical  and  
impossible  to  require  absolute  certainty  of  the  attack,  but  the  degree  of  uncertainty  can  only  
increase   the   further   into   the   future  a  state   is   looking   to  assess  a   threat   to   it.  Green  (2015)  
JUFIL,  105.  Lubell  in  Weller  (2015)  713–16,  718,  concludes  that  a  reasonable  level  of  certainty  
is  required.  As  with  all  claims  of  self-­defence,  lawfulness  relies  on  a  good  faith  assessment  of  
all   the  circumstances,  based  on  credible   information  and  capable  of  objective  assessment.  
The  Chatham  House  Principles  970.  See  also  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  
2016,  239;;  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  17;;  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
In  respect  of  imminent  armed  attacks,  the  need  for  the  defending  state  to  articulate  clearly  its  
justifications   for   taking   defensive   action   is   particularly   important   given   the   uncertainties  
inherent  in  responding  to  a  future  armed  attack.  
198  Schmitt  (2013)  64.  
199  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  565.  
200  The  authors  of  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967–8,  maintain  that   there   ‘must  exist  a  
circumstance   of   irreversible   emergency’   to   be   able   to   respond   to   an   armed   attack   that   is  
imminent.  
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more  pressure  there  will  be  on  the  potential  victim  state  to  resolve  the  matter  
peacefully.201  
The  window  of  opportunity  is  not,  therefore,  thrown  wide  open  to  countering  
non-­specific   perceived   threats,   taking   states   towards   an   unlawful   right   of  
preventive  self-­defence.202  The  UK  Attorney  General   in  particular  appears  to  
recognize   this   fact.   He   made   it   clear   that   the   UK’s   position   regarding  
imminence  relates  to  an  identified  and  direct  threat  to  the  UK,  and  does  not  
countenance   a   right   to   respond   to   remote   threats   that   have   not   yet  
materialized.203   He   likewise   accepted   in   respect   of   each   exercise   of   self-­
defence  that  it  is  crucial  for  the  UK  to  ask  whether  there  is  anything  else  it  can  
credibly  do  to  prevent  an  attack.204  The  Australian  Attorney  General  expressly  
agrees   with   the   UK   position, 205   and   the   USA   appears   to   take   a   similar  
approach.206  These  states  ostensibly  acknowledge   the  dangers  of  an  overly  
broad  interpretation  of  self-­defence  and,  at  least  verbally,  have  responded  to  
that  danger  by  recognizing  the  limitations  on  anticipatory  responses.    
If   the   preceding   analysis   rightly   characterizes   how   states   and   scholars  
conceive   of   imminence,   a   circularity   between   imminence   and   general  
necessity  is  revealed.  A  summation  of  the  UK’s  understanding  of  imminence  
clearly  reveals  this  overlap:  is  action  against  an  identifiable  threat  necessary  
now,207  before   the   last   clear   opportunity   to   take  action   disappears,208  or   are  
effective  alternatives   to   force  available?209  Imminence  and  general  necessity  
are,  accordingly,  conflated.210  This  blurs  the  bright  line  previously  emphasized  
                                                                                        
201  Gardam  (2004)  150–1.  See  also  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  967;;  Dinstein  (2017)  252.  
202  See  Section  1.3.2(a).  
203  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  13,  19.  
204  Ibid,  16.  
205  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
206  The  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  references  actual  or   imminent  armed  
attacks,   as   opposed   to   less   certain   threats   that   have   not   materialized,   and   which   are  
characteristic  of  preventive  self-­defence.  Bethlehem  (2016)  certainly  understands  this  to  be  
the  USA’s  position  and  a  departure  from  the  previous  ‘Bush  doctrine’.  See  Section  1.3.2(a).    
207  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017,  16.  
208  Ibid,  7,  8.  
209  Ibid,  10,  13,  16,  20.  This  is  stated  to  include  potential  action  against  NSAs  by  a  host  state.  
See  Section  4.1.1.  
210   Haque   (January   2017),   reaching   the   same   conclusion.   See   also   the   UK’s   All   Party  
Parliamentary  Group  on  Drones  Inquiry  Report  (2018)  36–7.  
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in   this   thesis  between   the   trigger   for   the   right  of  self-­defence  (being  armed  
attacks,  in  this  case  that  that  are  imminent)  and  the  conditioning  of  its  exercise  
(being  general  necessity).211  
On  the  one  hand,  this  conclusion  emphasizes  the  ambiguities  of  Bethlehem’s  
Principle  8  and  the  three  states’  expositions  of  necessity,  imminence  and  self-­
defence   more   broadly.   States   should   further   clarify   their   understanding   of  
these   concepts.   On   the   other   hand,   whilst   rendering   the   term   essentially  
nugatory,   the   forgoing   account   of   imminence   captures   the   substance   of  
general  necessity  and  how  states  conceive  of  the  need  to  respond  to  future  
armed   attacks   based   on   the   particular   circumstances.   It   reveals   how  
contextually   sensitive   general   necessity   is,   with   temporal   considerations  
representing   but   one   factor   in   its   determination.   Akande   and   Liefländer  
describe   the  bottom  line  of   imminence:   ‘[w]hat   is   really  at  stake  us  whether  
some   sort   of   self-­defence   action   is   demonstrably   necessary’. 212   It   is   not,  
therefore,  that  the  armed  attack  must  be  ‘imminent’   in  any  legally  significant  
and   independent   sense   but,   as   per   Webster’s   formula,   there   must   be   a  
pressing  need  to  resort  to  self-­defence  in  the  particular  circumstances.213  
If   states   have   indeed   adopted   this   position,   the   term   ‘imminence’   simply  
describes   the   type   of   future   armed   attack   that   triggers   a   lawful   defensive  
response  today.214  In  response  to  such  attacks,  Bethlehem’s  Principle  8  and  
the  last  window  of  opportunity  construction  of  imminence  allow  for  defensive  
force  to  meet  offensive  force,  based  on  context.  On  the  account  set  out  in  the  
preceding  Sections  of  this  Chapter,  it  is  the  satisfaction  of  general  necessity  
that  gives  rise  to  this  ability.  On  these  terms,  general  necessity  provides  the  
defending   state  with   a   degree   of   flexibility   and   the  means   to   protect   itself,  
                                                                                        
211  See  Section  2.2(c).  
212  Akande  and  Liefländer  (2013)  565  (emphasis  added).  
213  This  general  position  is  likewise  reflected  in  the  timing  of  the  defending  state’s  response  to  
an  armed  attack.  See  Section  2.4.2.  
214  Milanovic  (2017),  also  concluding   that   the  approach   to   imminence  described  here   looks  
very   much   like   necessity.   See   also   Lederman’s   comments   in   the   same   blog   post.   The  
Chatham  House  Principles,  967–8,  also  recognize  this  close,  if  not  fully  conflated,  relationship.  
The  authors  maintain  that  ‘[t]he  criterion  of  imminence  is  closely  related  to  the  requirement  of  
necessity’,  and  necessity  may  ‘determine  imminence’.  
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rather  than  having  to  sit  idly  by  and  suffer  an  attack.  It  takes  into  account  the  
wider  circumstances,  but  also  requires  that  the  defending  state  is  suffering  a  
situation  of  genuine  irreversible  emergency,  consisting  of  a  need  to  respond  
forcibly  at  a  particular  time  to  an  identifiable  future  armed  attack.  If  a  defending  
state  can  demonstrate  that  it  used  force  when  it  did,  because  failure  to  do  so  
would  have  deprived  it  of  the  ability  to  defend  itself  effectively,  on  the  preceding  
analysis,  general  necessity  will  be  satisfied.  
c)   Completed  armed  attacks  
Completed  armed  attacks  raise  their  own  complexities.  Factually,  determining  
if   and   when   an   armed   attack   has   ended   might   prove   difficult   in   the  
circumstances.   Conceptually,   it   helps   to   make   a   distinction   between   three  
types   of   completed   armed   attacks:   i)   fully   completed   armed   attacks,   ii)  
completed  armed  attacks  resulting  in  occupation,  and  ii)  self-­contained  armed  
attacks,  where  further  armed  attacks  are  imminent.  In  the  first  case,  where  the  
attack  is  a  one-­off,  the  lack  of  emergency  negates  the  ‘present  and  inevitable’  
necessity  of  using  defensive  force  that  Webster  required.  There  is  no  pressing  
need  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  an  armed  attack,  meaning  there  is  no  general  
necessity   of   self-­defence.   Rather,   the   emphasis   switches   to   non-­forcible  
options  to  resolve  the  issue  and  seek  redress.  Any  force  used  to  respond  to  
such  armed  attacks   that  are   fully  complete   risks  being  characterised  as  an  
unlawful  armed  reprisal.215    
Where  completed  armed  attacks  result  in  the  occupation  of  territory,  the  legal  
analysis  is  more  nuanced.  Arguably,  occupation  equates  to  an  ongoing  armed  
attack,  thereby  retaining  the  general  necessity  of  defensive  force  to  recapture  
it.216  It  would  be  unrealistic  in  such  circumstances  for  a  defending  state,  faced  
with  continuing  hostility  (as  evidenced  by  the  factor  of  occupation),  to  forego  
its  right  of  self-­defence  in  favour  of  negotiation.  The  threat  to  it  subsists.  In  Oil  
                                                                                        
215  See  Section  2.4.2.  
216  See  e.g.  Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  745;;  Corten  (2012)  486.  Aust  (2010)  229,  agrees  that  using  
force   to   retake   unlawfully   captured   territory   is   a   lawful   exercise   of   self-­defence.   See   also  
Dinstein  (2017)  230;;  Kretzmer  (2013)  250.  
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Platforms,   Iran   emphasized   this   distinction   between   fully   completed   armed  
attacks,   and   those   that   continue   by   virtue   of   occupation. 217   On   this  
understanding,  a  use  of  force  by  the  defending  state  amounts  to  repelling  an  
armed  attack  and  is,  therefore,  in  keeping  with  the  purposes  of  self-­defence.218  
Finally,   there   are   armed   attacks   that   might   appear   completed   and   self-­
contained  but  are  in  fact  part  of  a  series  of  armed  attacks.  In  such  instances,  
the   defending   state   also   faces   a   current   threat. 219   The   general   necessity  
analysis  is  largely  one  of  anticipatory  self-­defence,  however,  as  discussed  in  
Section   2.4.1(b).   The   operative   question   is  whether   or   not   a   new   attack   is  
imminent.  If  not,  then  the  armed  attack  is  fully  completed.  Where  the  current  
threat,   comprising  past  and   imminent  armed  attacks,   is  no  more,   the  prima  
facie  general  necessity  of  self-­defence   is  also  absent.  The  focus  must   then  
switch  to  peaceful  options  of  resolution.  
2.4.2   The  timing  of  the  defending  state’s  response  to  an  armed  attack  
a)   An  immediate  need  to  respond  
General  necessity  not  only  takes  account  of  the  timing  of  the  armed  attack,  but  
also  the  timing  of  the  defensive  response  to  such  attack.  Like  imminence,  this  
element   of   necessity   is   traditionally   derived   from  Webster’s   insistence   that  
defensive  force  must  be  shown  to  be  ‘instant,  overwhelming,  leaving  (…)  no  
moment  for  deliberation.’220  This  temporal  element  is,  therefore,  often  referred  
to   as   the   ‘immediacy’   requirement.   Before   we   look   at   ‘how   immediate’   a  
response  must  be,  it  is  important  to  appreciate  the  function  of  a  temporal  link  
between   attack   and   defence   in   determining   the   legality   of   the   latter.  
                                                                                        
217  ‘In  the  case  of  the  invasion  of  another  State's  territory,  in  principle  an  attack  still  exists  as  
long  as  the  occupation  continues.  But  in  cases  of  single  armed  attacks  (as  distinguished  from  
a  general  situation  of  armed  conflict),  the  attack  is  terminated  when  the  incident  is  over.’  Oil  
Platforms,  Reply  and  Defence  to  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  10  
March  1999,  para  7.47.  
218  See  further  Section  2.4.2(b).    
219  Ibid.  
220  Letter   from   Mr  Webster   to   Lord   Ashburton   (6   August   1842)  British   and   Foreign   State  
Papers,  1841–1842,  Vol.  XXX,  201.  
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Understanding  the  theory  informs  how  we  view  the  relevant  state  practice  and  
jurisprudence  on  this  point.  
Establishing  a  temporal   limitation  on  a  state’s  defensive  reaction  retains  the  
principle   that  self-­defence   is  an  emergency  response.  Therefore,  any  act  of  
self-­defence  should,  in  principle,  be  temporally  proximate  to  the  peril  faced.  As  
with  imminence,  if  there  is  no  genuine  irreversible  emergency,  there  may  be  a  
‘moment   for   deliberation’   and   no   ‘instant’   and   ‘overwhelming’   need   for   a  
response.  Absent  a  new  casus  belli,  an  undue  delay  in  responding  to  an  armed  
attack  indicates  that,  in  the  circumstances,  there  was  no  general  necessity  of  
self-­defence.  A  temporal  link,  therefore,  avoids  the  right  of  self-­defence  being  
used  to  respond  to  attacks  long  passed.  It  seeks  to  counter  concerns  that  the  
response   was   in   fact   in   retaliation   or   punishment.   Accordingly,   this   timing  
element  is  crucial  to  distinguish  lawful  acts  of  self-­defence  from  unlawful  armed  
reprisals.  
Armed  reprisals  are  punitive  rather  than  protective  in  nature.  ‘[T]hey  seek  to  
impose  reparation  for  the  harm  done,  or  to  compel  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  
the  dispute  created  by  the  initial  illegal  act,  or  to  compel  the  delinquent  state  
to  abide  by  the  law  in  the  future.’221  The  ICJ  has  confirmed  that  international  
law   prohibits   armed   reprisals. 222   This   is   likewise   reflected   in   the   Friendly  
Relations  Declaration.223  A  defining  feature  of  reprisals  is  that  they  take  place  
after  the  armed  attack.  Those  commentators  that  reject  their   legality  rely  on  
this  fact  to  highlight  that,  by  their  nature,  they  can  only  ever  be  punitive,  rather  
than  defensive  or  protective.224  However,  depending  on  the  particular  facts  and  
timing  of  the  response,  the  dividing  line  between  acts  that  seek  to  protect  and  
                                                                                        
221  Bowett  (1972)  3.  For  further  analysis  of  the  timing  of  defensive  action  and  the  controversies  
that  surround  the  distinction  between  defensive  acts  and  reprisals,  see  e.g.  Schachter  (1984)  
1638;;  Dinstein  (2017)  264–75;;  Corten  (2010)  485–7;;  Gardam  (2004)  148–55;;  Darcy  in  Weller  
(2015)  Chapter  40;;  Henderson  (2018)  240–7.  
222  Corfu  Channel,  para  38;;  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  46.  
223  Friendly  Relations  Declaration,  para  1.  
224  Bowett  (1972)  3.  
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those  that  punish  may  be  hard  to  draw.  Defending  states  may  be  faced  with  a  
real  challenge  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  such  distinction.  
Nevertheless,   the   need   for   a   defending   state   to   respond   within   a   certain  
timeframe   is   clearly   reflected   in   the   ICJ’s   jurisprudence.   In  Nicaragua,   the  
Court’s  determination   that  purported  defensive  measures   taken  by   the  USA  
were  unnecessary  was  primarily  determined  by  the  fact  that  such  measures  
were  taken  several  months  after  the  major  offensive  of  the  armed  opposition  
against  the  Government  of  El  Salvador  had  been  completely  repulsed.225  The  
extent  of  the  time  lag  between  the  purported  armed  attack  and  the  claimed  act  
of   self-­defence   was,   therefore,   determinative   of   the   majority’s   opinion.  
Possible  permissible  time  limits  for  defensive  responses  were  not  indicated  in  
the  judgment,  however.  Where  the  Court  draws  the  line  between  lawful  self-­
defence  and  unlawful  reprisal  remains  unclear.  
Returning  to  Webster’s  formula  for  possible  answers,  on  one  interpretation  it  
appears  to  require  that  military  resistance  to  an  armed  attack  should  take  place  
immediately,  i.e.  while  the  attack  is  still  in  process,  and  not  after  it  has  ended.226  
Such  a  strict  view  of  immediacy  does  find  limited  support  in  state  practice.  For  
example,   in   responding   to   Israel’s   claimed   acts   of   self-­defence   against  
terrorists  acting  from  Lebanese  territory  in  1972,227  Argentina  was  forthright  in  
stating:  
It   is   necessary   that   such   [defensive]  measures   be   indispensable   and  
immediate;;   there   must   be   no   alternative   and   no   time   must   pass   in  
deliberating  or  reflecting  on  the  desirability  of  a  reaction.  This  means  that  
the  reaction  must  immediately  follow  the  illegal  attack.228  
                                                                                        
225  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
226  Ago  (1980)  para  122.  
227  UN  Doc  S/10550  (1972).  
228  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  25.  
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However,  whilst  ‘immediacy’  may  be  a  convenient  label,  taking  this  as  a  literal  
requirement  for  a  defending  state’s  response  is  revealed  in  state  practice  to  
be  too  narrow  and  inflexible.  
Whilst  general  necessity  requires  that  the  defensive  response  be  made  close  
in  time  to  the  armed  attack,  this  temporal  link  is  to  be  interpreted  reasonably.  
No   precise   limit   can   be   fixed. 229   The   best   contemporary   understanding  
amongst  academics  of  immediacy  is  that  a  state  acting  in  self-­defence  must  
do  so  within  a  reasonable  timeframe,  without  unduly  postponing  the  taking  of  
measures.230  This  understanding  of  immediacy  is  reflected  in  state  practice.  It  
reveals  that  the  particular  context  will  determine  how  quickly  a  defending  state  
is   in   a   position   to   respond.   Relevant   factors   include   the   need   to   gather  
intelligence,   the   geographical   locale   of   an   attack,   the   level   of   military  
preparedness   of   the   defending   state,   the   need   for   internal   constitutional  
permissions  to  use  force  and  to  consult  and  engage  allies,  and  so  forth.  Many  
of   these   elements   are   necessary   to   ensure   an   adequate   defence  may   be  
mounted   and  may   therefore   militate   against   an   instantaneous   response.   It  
shows  that  states  may  need  to  prepare,  before  taking  defensive  action.  
In   response   to   the   UK   raid   on   the   Harib   Fort   in   1964,   for   example,   Iraq  
condemned  the  UK’s  acts  based,  in  part,  on  the  fact  that  a  day  had  passed  
before   the   UK   responded   to   the   alleged   attacks   against   the   Federation   of  
South  Arabia.231  The  UK   justified   its   actions,   inter   alia,   on   the   basis   that   its  
attack  on  Harib  Fort  was  carefully  planned  and  required  approved  at  a  high  
level  by  the  British  Government.  Such  approval  and  planning  ensured  that  only  
those  responsible  for  the  alleged  terror  campaign  were  involved  in  the  attack,  
and  that  civilians  were  not  affected.232  Iraq’s  criticism  was  but  one  of  a  number  
of  reasons  for  the  widespread  negative  reaction  to  the  British  raid,233  but  the  
                                                                                        
229  Ruys  (2010)  99.  
230  Schachter  (1985)  292;;  Gardam  (2004)  150;;  Dinstein  (2017)  252;;  Schmitt  (2013)  65;;  Gill  in  
Weller  (2015)  745.  Franck  (2001)  840,  argues  that  ‘[t]he  assertion  that  self-­defense  requires  
"immediate"  action  comes  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Caroline  decision,  which  deals  only  
with  anticipatory  self-­defense.’  
231  UN  Doc  S/PV.1107  (1964)  17.  
232  UN  Doc  S/PV.1109  (1964)  paras  23–4.  
233  See  e.g.  Sections  2.5(b)  and  3.1.1(c)  and  (d).  
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UK’s  stance  exemplifies  the  fact  that  states  may  assert  that  they  may  not  be  
in  a  position  to  respond  ‘immediately’  in  any  strict  sense  of  the  word,  and  may  
assert  justifiable  reasons  for  the  delay  (even  if  not  accepted  by  other  states).  
Other   state   practice   more   clearly   demonstrates   that   the   immediacy  
requirement  must  be  viewed  flexibly.  In  1993,  America  took  over  two  months  
to   respond   to   the   attempted  assassination  of   former  President  George  HW  
Bush  and  what  it  described  as  an  enduring  threat  to  the  USA.234  It  justified  such  
delay  on  the  need  to  confirm  responsibility  for  the  attempt  before  a  response  
was  made.   This   included   a  meticulous   and   exhaustive   investigation   of   the  
incident   to   establish   the   facts,   thereby   ensuring   that   there   was   no   rush   to  
judgement  before  action  was  taken.235  The  delay  was  not  noted  by  any  state  
during   consideration   of   the   incident   by   the  UNSC.236  Indeed,   the   American  
action,  justified  as  a  lawful  act  of  self-­defence,  was  broadly  supported.237  New  
Zealand  went  so  far  as  expressing  its  appreciation  for  the  fact  that  the  USA  
promptly  informed  the  Security  Council  of  the  action  it  had  taken.238  Likewise,  
a   delay   of   two  weeks  between  attack   and  defence  was  not   a   factor   in   the  
review   by   states   of   the   USA’s   strikes   against   Afghanistan   and   Sudan   in  
response  to  the  1998  African  embassy  bombings,  attributed  by  the  USA  to  Al-­
Qaeda.239  
The  insistence  that  states  have  a  right  to  reflect,  investigate  and  confirm  both  
that   they   have   been   attacked   and   by   whom,   before   responding   against  
carefully  selected  targets,  was  reiterated  again  by  the  USA  before  the  ICJ  in  
Oil  Platforms.240  It   saw   the  need   to   take   care  over   ensuring   an  appropriate  
                                                                                        
234  See  Section  2.3.2(a).  
235  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  3.  
236  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993).  
237  Ibid,  13  (France);;  16  (Japan);;  18  (Hungary);;  19–20  (UK);;  21-­2  (Russia);;  23  (New  Zealand);;  
24   (Spain).   This   incident   comprised   a   completed   armed   attack   that   was   unlikely   to   be  
repeated.  The  claim  of  self-­defence  is  questionable,  therefore.  It  might  be  better  characterised  
as  a  reprisal,  being  punitive  rather  than  defensive   in  nature.  See  e.g.  Kritsiotis   (1996)  175;;  
Ruys  (2010)  107–8;;  Gray  (2018)  205;;  Starski  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  523–6.  
238  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  23.  
239  UN  Doc  S/1998/780.  On   this   incident   generally,   see  Cannizzaro   and  Rasi   in  Ruys   and  
Corten  (2018)  541–51.  
240  Counter-­Memorial  and  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by  the  United  States  of  America,  23  June  
1997,  paras  4.37–4.39.  
     
     95  
response,   rather   than   using   force   instantly   and   without   reflection,   to   be  
paramount,   as   requiring   an   ‘instantaneous   response   could   dramatically  
increase  the  risk  of  disproportionate  damage.’241  Given  the  analysis  set  out  in  
the  rest  of  thesis,  including  the  purposes  of  self-­defence  and  the  requirements  
related  to  targeting  and  proportionality  generally,  this  conclusion  and  approach  
to   immediacy   is  entirely  proper.  Rash  defensive  action  risks  breaching  both  
necessity  and  proportionality.  
In  his  dissent  in  Nicaragua,  Judge  Schwebel  appeared  to  take  judicial  note  of  
this  fact.  He  emphasized  the  efforts  that  the  USA  had  made  for  more  than  a  
year  in  assisting  El  Salvador  to  suppress  the  insurgency  within  its  own  borders  
and  by  diplomatic   representations   to   the   government   of  Nicaragua,   both   of  
which   had   proved   to   be   insufficient   to   quell   the   insurgency.   Under   these  
circumstances,  Judge  Schwebel  concluded  that   it  was  not  unreasonable   for  
the  USA  to  decide  that  the  exertion  of  armed  force  was  necessary.242  Whilst  
the  majority  in  Nicaragua  decided  the  case  on  a  different  appreciation  of  the  
facts,   Judge   Schwebel’s   views   highlight   the   importance   of   assessing   the  
temporal   element   of   immediacy   in   conjunction   with   other   relevant   factors.  
Together,  they  will  determine  whether  the  purpose  of  the  response  is  indeed  
defensive.   His   dissent   also   exemplifies   how   alternative   measures   to   force  
factor  into  an  appreciation  of  reasonableness.  The  longer  the  period  between  
attack  and  response,  the  greater  the  pressure  there  will  be  on  the  defending  
state   to   resolve   the   issue   by   peaceful  means,243  but   pursuing   such  means  
should   not,   ipso   facto,  defeat   the   right  of   self-­defence.   If  a   defending   state  
makes   genuine   attempts   to   settle   the   dispute   amicably,   but   such   attempts  
prove   unproductive,   it   should   not   be   faulted   for   losing   time   unduly   before  
employing  its  armed  forces  in  a  defensive  response.244  
As  a  general  proposition,  therefore,  the  greater  the  time-­lapse  between  attack  
and  riposte,  the  higher  the  likelihood  that  the  latter  will  be  characterised  as  an  
                                                                                        
241  Ibid,  paras  4.37,  4.39.  
242  Nicaragua,  diss  op,  para  203.  
243  Gardam  (2004)  150–1.  
244  Dinstein  (2017)  252.  See  also  Ruys  (2010)  100.  
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unlawful  reprisal.  However,  assessing  the  reasonableness  of  the  time  period  
and  determining  where  to  draw  the  line  between  necessary  and  unnecessary  
defensive  responses  is  not  governed  solely  by  how  many  days  or  months  have  
elapsed  since  the  attack.  As  with  determining  imminence,  establishing  what  is  
a  sufficiently  proximate  timeframe  in  the  circumstances  is  highly  contextual.  A  
reasonable   conclusion   on   the   basis   of   the   preceding   analysis   and   state  
practice  is  that,  so  long  as  the  defending  state  takes  action  to  defend  itself  in  
a  reasonable  timeframe  and  without  undue  delay,  the  right  of  self-­defence  will  
not  be  forfeited.245  Immediacy  is  a  flexible  concept  such  that  there  must  be  an  
immediate   need   to   respond,   but   not   that   there   must   necessarily   be   an  
immediate   response. 246   Such   an   approach   to   self-­defence   is   particularly  
persuasive  when  we  consider  whether  a  state  is  facing  an  ongoing  threat  when  
it  responds  to  an  armed  attack  militarily.  
b)   An  ongoing  threat  
Whether  general  necessity  is  satisfied  is  ultimately  determined  by  whether  a  
defending  state  is  facing  an  ongoing  threat  when  it  resorts  to  self-­defence.  This  
is   best   explained   if   we   again   consider   the   distinction   between   ongoing,  
completed  and  imminent  armed  attacks  referred  to  in  Section  2.4.1.  The  risk  
that   a   response   might   be   characterised   as   an   unlawful   armed   reprisal  
principally   arises   in   respect   of   armed   attacks   that   appear   to   be   fully  
complete.247  In  such  cases,  even  if  a  response  might  be  viewed  as  ‘immediate’,  
it  is  likely  to  be  unnecessary,  given  the  absence  of  a  current  threat.  Completed  
armed  attacks  resulting  in  occupation  or  the  capture  of  (parts  of)  territory  are  
different,  however.  In  this  instance,  as  explored  in  2.4.2(a)  in  general  terms,  it  
                                                                                        
245  Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  745.  
246  Green   (2006)   471.  See   also   Ruys   (2010)   100.   This   conclusion   was   also   reflected,   for  
example,   by  Mexico   in   its   pleading   before   the   ICJ   in  Nuclear  Weapons.   ‘The   right   of   self-­
defense   is   actualized   only   when   the   need   for   defense   is   immediate   and   overwhelming’  
(emphasis  added).  Nuclear  Weapons,  Note  Verbale   from  the  Embassy  of  Mexico,   together  
with  Written  Statement  of  the  Government  of  Mexico,  19  June  1995,  57.  
247  For  imminent  armed  attacks,  as  they  have  not  yet  happened,  the  question  of  immediacy  
and  the  fear  of  armed  reprisals  are  not  relevant.  Unless  imminent  armed  attacks  form  part  of  
a  series  of  armed  attacks  (see  below),  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  response  to  a  future  attack  
could  be  characterised  as  a  reprisal.  The  timing  of  the  response  to  imminent  armed  attacks  
instead  forms  part  of  the  window  of  opportunity  discussed  in  Section  2.4.1(b).  
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may  not   always  possible   for   a   defending   state   to   take   immediate   action   to  
defend   itself   and   recover   that   territory.   Where   a   state   is   not   in   a   position  
promptly  to  resist  invasion,  provided  that  it  does  act  to  repel  it  as  soon  as  it  is  
able,  or  as  soon  as  all  attempts  to  secure  a  peaceful  withdrawal  have  failed,  
such  action  will  still  be  considered  lawful  self-­defence.248  This  is  because  the  
factor  of  occupied  territory  allows  a  state  to  treat  such  situation  as  an  ongoing  
armed  attack,  which  maintains  the  general  necessity  of  defensive  action.249  
The   most   obvious   example   is   the   1982   Falkland   Islands   conflict.   In   this  
incident,  a  delay  of  approximately  three  weeks  between  the  Argentine  invasion  
and   the   commencement   of   active   military   operations   by   the   UK   against  
Argentina  was  widely  seen  as  an  acceptable  time  delay.250  For  some,  the  factor  
of   continuing  occupation   of   the   Islands  by  Argentina  accounts   for   the  UK’s  
continuing  right  of  self-­defence.251  Also  relevant   to  when  the  response  could  
be  mounted  is  the  geographical  location  of  the  Islands,  and  the  time  needed  
to  assemble  and  put  in  place  an  adequate  military  force  to  mount  an  effective  
response.  252  That  the  British  Cabinet  met  on  the  same  day  as  the  invasion  to  
agree  to  dispatch  a  task  force  to  regain  the  Islands  might,  by  itself,  constitute  
an  immediate  response.253  
Whatever   the  particular   reason,  a   lack  of   ‘immediate’  action  was  not   raised  
during   the  UNSC  debates  and   it  was   relatively   uncontroversial   that   the  UK  
retained   its   right   of   self-­defence   for   some   time   after   the   initial   attack   and  
occupation.254  Also  notable  from  this  incident  is  that  the  British  did  not  consider  
themselves  under  a   legal  obligation  to  pursue  peaceable  alternatives  during  
this   period,   even   if   attempts   for   a   peaceful   settlement   were   in   fact   made.  
Instead,  they  felt  their  right  to  act  in  self-­defence  would  have  justified  a  ‘purely  
                                                                                        
248  Higgins  (1994)  241.  
249  See  Section  2.4.1(c).  
250  Levitin  (1986)  638;;  Ruys  (2010)  102;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  109;;  Henderson  (2018)  231.  For  
an  overview  of  the  conflict,  including  timing  and  the  reactions  of  the  international  community,  
see  (1982)  UNYB  1320–47.  See  also  Henry  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  361–78.  
251  Myer  and  White  (2002)  8.  See  also  Section  2.4.1(c).  
252  Higgins  (1994)  241;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  109;;  Henderson  (2018)  231.  
253  Levitin  (1986)  638.  
254  Gardam  (2004)  151.  
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military  policy’.255  The  fact  of  continuing  occupation  may  account  for  this  belief.  
The   British   state   practice,   and   widespread   acceptance   of   it,   indicates   that  
where   there   is   an   ongoing   armed   attack,   whilst   aiming   for   a   peaceful  
settlement  might  be  desirable  as  an  additional  policy  option,  it  does  not  deny  
a  military  response.  The  1990-­1  Gulf  War  might  also  point  to  the  acceptability  
of   a   delayed   response   to   an   armed   attack.   A   period   of   approximately   five  
months  elapsed  between  the  invasion  by  Iraq  of  Kuwait   in  August  1990  and  
the  commencement  of  Operation  Desert  Storm  in  January  1991.256  
Turning   to   self-­contained   armed   attacks,   where   further   armed   attacks   are  
imminent,  different  considerations  apply.  Where  a  defending  state  is  subjected  
to  a  series  of  armed  attacks,  Ago  argues   that   the   immediacy  of  a  response  
should   be   judged   against   the   threat   considered   as   a   whole.257  It   would   be  
inimical  to  the  purpose  of  self-­defence  to  require  that  a  state  waits  for  the  next  
armed  attack  before  reacting,258  or  to  require  that  it  react  immediately  to  each  
armed  attack.259  Ultimately,  immediacy  requires  that  the  defensive  riposte  be  
aimed  at  behaviour  that  is  still  current,  even  if  the  material  effects  of  its  latest  
manifestation   have   already   disappeared. 260 This   logic   encompasses   the  
prospective  element  of  general  necessity,  whilst  at  the  same  time  recognizing  
that   a   state  may  go  no   further   than   responding   to   an   immediate  protective  
need.  
Self-­defence  is  only  permissible  to  prevent  further  armed  attacks  on  this  basis  
when  a  state  has  good  reason  to  expect  a  series  of  armed  attacks  from  the  
same  source  and  retaliation  serves  as  a  deterrent  or  protective  action  against  
                                                                                        
255  ‘Falkland  Islands:  Negotiations  for  a  Peaceful  Settlement’  White  Paper,  London,  21  May  
1982,  para  3.  
256  This  incident  might  be  cited  in  support  of  the  flexibility  of  the  immediacy  criterion  in  the  case  
of   self-­defence   against   ongoing   armed   attacks   constituted   by   the   occupation   of   territory  
(Kuwait   was   continually   occupied   during   this   period).   However,   its   precedential   value   is  
obscured.  This  is  because  of  the  controversy  over  whether  the  incident  stands  as  an  example  
of  self-­defence  and/or  UNSC  authorisation  to  use  force.  See  Section  3.1.1(d).  
257  Ago  (1980)  para  122.  
258  Argued  by  the  US  in  Oil  Platforms.  Rejoinder  of  the  United  States,  para  5.33.  
259  Corten  (2010)  486.  See  more  generally  Gardam  (2004)  148–55.  
260  Corten  (2010)  487.  
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those  armed  attacks.261  References  to  an  ongoing  or  persisting  ‘threat’  should,  
therefore,  be  understood  on  this  basis.  In  such  cases,  however,  the  purpose  
of  self-­defence  must  remain  clearly  apparent  at  all  times.  In  terms  of  looking  
at  events  cumulatively,  the  need  to  respond  to  the  prospect  of  imminent  armed  
attacks   makes   the   purpose   preventative.   Force   against   a   new   attack   is  
permissible,  however,  provided  that  it  remains  defensive  rather  than  punitive  
in  nature  and  is  not  a  reprisal  for  revenge  or  as  a  penalty  or  a  ‘lesson’.262  
For  Ruys,   there  must   be   ‘convincing  proof’  of   further   attacks,   after   the   last  
attack  has  factually  ended.  Only  in  such  cases  may  self-­defence  be  relied  upon  
to  ‘impede’  further  attacks.263  Where  this  conclusion  regarding  a  campaign  or  
series   of   attacks   is   not   reasonable,   however,   in   light   of   the   circumstances  
prevailing  at  the  time,  any  further  use  of  force  is  liable  to  be  characterised  as  
mere  retaliation  rather  than  self-­defence.264  In  addition,  such  a  right  should  not  
be  understood  as  stretching  to  counter  unspecified  future  attacks.  This  would  
indicate  an  unlawful  exercise  of  preventive  self-­defence.265  
Looking  at  a  series  of  attacks  as  a  whole  and  combining  completed  armed  
attacks  with  imminent  armed  attacks  so  as  to  collectively  amount  to  an  ongoing  
threat   is   interesting   conceptually.   It   is   sometimes   referred   to   as   the  
accumulation   of   events   theory   of   self-­defence,   and  may   be   equated   to   an  
ongoing  armed  attack.266  Ago’s  view  that  the  immediacy  of  a  response  should  
be   judged   against   the   ‘threat   considered   as   a   whole’   is   based   on   the  
                                                                                        
261  Schachter  (1991)  154.  Greenwood  (2002)  para  26,  likewise  recognizes  that  necessary  and  
proportionate  force  extends  to  preventing  the  reoccurrence  of  a  threat.  Taft  (2004)  295,  argues  
that  the  right  of  self-­defence  ‘allows  States  to  deter  armed  attacks  that  would  otherwise  occur  
and   to   discourage   further   armed   attacks.’   Ruys   (2010)   123   argues   that,   in   ‘exceptional  
circumstances’,  necessity  and  proportionality  allow  for  the  halting  and  repelling  of  ‘successive  
and  interlinked  armed  attacks’  and  the  preventing  of  their  reoccurrence.  
262  Schachter  (1991)  154.  See  also  Corten  in  Weller  (2015)  873.  
263  Ruys  (2010)  102.  
264  Schmitt  (2013)  66.  
265  See  Section  1.3.2(a).  
266  See  e.g.  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  588;;  Gray  (2018)  164–5.  The  ICJ  has,  in  principle,  accepted  
that  a  number  of  small-­scale  uses  off   force,   individually   falling  below  the   level  of  an  armed  
attack,  may  be  accrued  such  that,  collectively,  they  amount  to  an  armed  attack.  This  is  most  
clearly   seen   in  Oil  Platforms,   para  64.  See  also   the   implicit   acceptance  of   this  principle   in  
Nicaragua,  para  231;;  Armed  Activities  para  146.  For  further  analysis  and  examples  of  state  
practice  see,  e.g.  Green  (2009)  42–4;;  Ruys  (2010)  168–75;;  Henderson  (2018)  224–6.  
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assumption  that  an  armed  attack  has  already  occurred.  As  such,  it  has  been  
argued  that  it  should  be  distinguished  from  a  purely  pre-­emptive  or  preventive  
justification  of  action.267  Claims  of  ‘pure’  anticipatory  self-­defence  are,  in  any  
event,   rare.   In  practice,  states   tend  to   invoke  the  need  to  respond  to   future  
armed  attacks  when  they  have  already  been  the  victim  of  a  previous  one.268  
This  point  is  also  reflected  in  Bethlehem’s  Principle  8,  which  considers  whether  
the   anticipated   imminent   armed   attack   is   part   of   a   ‘concerted   pattern   of  
continuing  armed  activity’.269  
In  such  circumstances,  absent  ongoing  hostilities,  it  is  only  the  prospect  of  an  
imminent  armed  attack  that  keeps  the  threat  current,  thereby  maintaining  the  
general   necessity   of   self-­defence.   This   is   logically   assumed,   given   the  
widespread   rejection   of   any   right   of   preventive   self-­defence.270  Without   the  
threat  of  an  imminent  armed  attack,  any  prior  armed  attack  would  simply  be  
complete,  and  the  general  necessity  of  self-­defence  would  come  to  an  end.  
With  a  series  of  armed  attacks,  therefore,  the  analysis  largely  depends  on  that  
related  to  imminent  armed  attacks.  This  fact  should  help  to  assuage  the  fear  
that   adoption   of   the   accumulation   of   events   theory   does   away   with   the  
immediacy   requirement   and   risks   becoming   an   open-­ended   licence   to   use  
force.271  In  such  cases,  the  real  relevance  of  the  prior  armed  attack  is  that  it  
might  be  strongly  indicative  of  further  attacks  in  the  near  future.  As  a  matter  of  
principle,  therefore,  this  links  imminence  with  immediacy  and  returns  us  to  the  
window  of  opportunity  analysis  referred  to  in  Section  2.4.1(b).  
This  analysis  is  reflected,  for  example,  in  Iran’s  arguments  before  the  ICJ  in  
Oil  Platforms.  Iran  recognized  that  self-­defence  may  be  required  in  response  
to  previous  armed  attacks  where  ‘the  victim  State  has  experienced  a  series  of  
attacks,  and  apprehends  further  attacks,  so  that  the  measures  taken,  although  
taken   after   the   last   actual   attack   are   designed   to   protect   the   State   against  
                                                                                        
267  Ruys  (2010)  102.  
268  See  ibid,  342–3;;  Lederman  (4  and  11  April  2016);;  Milanovic  (2017).  
269  See  Section  2.4.1(b).  
270  See  Section  1.3.2(a).  See  also  Greenwood  (1986–1987)  946.  
271  Tams  (2009)  389–90.  
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future  attacks.’272  It  went  on  to  stress  that  such  a  view  of  self-­defence  had  been  
rightly  rejected  in  the  UNSC,  because:  
the  apprehended  future  attacks,  if  not  imminent,  are  hypothetical;;  and  in  
any  event  the  measures  tend  to  be  designed  to  "teach  a  lesson",  to  inflict  
retribution  and  to  deter  only  by  demonstrating  that  aggression  does  not  
pay.273  
The   ICJ  determined   that   the  American  attacks  were  unnecessary,274  but  did  
not   offer   a   view   on   the   issue   of   immediacy,   or   the   right   to   respond   to   a  
continuing  threat.  Rather,  the  Court’s  verdict  was  based  largely  on  the  lack  of  
a   proven   armed   attack   and   the   nature   of   the   USA’s   choice   of   targets. 275  
However,   Iran’s   stance   on   the   right   to   respond   to   a   series   of   attacks   is  
interesting. 276   First,   it   encapsulates   the   belief   that   future   threats   must   be  
imminent,  which  accords  with  this  author’s  analysis  above.  In  addition,  Iran’s  
view  is  consistent  with  the  proposition  that  a  clear  defensive  purpose  must  be  
apparent   in   the   response.   This   reflects   the   aforementioned   position   that  
retributive  acts  will  be  viewed  as  unlawful  acts  of  reprisal.  
Other  state  practice  provides  support  for  the  notion  that,  once  an  armed  attack  
has  occurred,  further  anticipated  attacks  may  be  prevented.  During  the  Gulf  of  
Tonkin  incident  in  1964,  the  USA  claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence  to  ‘deter  future  
aggression’  by  North  Vietnam  against  its  naval  units  following  previous  alleged  
                                                                                        
272  Oil  Platforms,  Memorial  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  8  June  1993,  para  4.33.  
273  Ibid.   It   should  also  be  noted   that   it   took  a  strict   review  on   the  question  of   immediacy   in  
relation  to  completed  armed  attacks:  ‘But  in  cases  of  single  armed  attacks  (…)  the  attack  is  
terminated  when   the   incident   is  over.   In  such  a  case   the  subsequent  use  of   counter-­force  
constitutes  a  reprisal  and  not  an  exercise  of  self-­defence.’  Oil  Platforms,  Reply  and  Defence  
to  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  10  March  1999,  para  7.47.  The  
USA,   in   response,  argued  that  this  position  rendered   the  right  of  self-­defence   ‘illusory’  and  
insisted   that   it   had   the   right   to   respond   to   remove   continuing   threats   to   its   security.  Oil  
Platforms,  Counter-­Memorial  and  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by  the  United  States  of  America,  
23  June  1997,  paras  4.27–4.29.  
274  Oil  Platforms,  para  76.    
275  Ruys  (2010)  106.  See  Section  2.5.  
276  As  the  object  of  force,  however,  Iran’s  views  on  self-­defence  have  less  probative  value  and  
should  be  approached  with  caution.  See  Section  2.3.2(a).  
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attacks  whilst  operating  in  international  waters.277  In  support  of  the  American  
action,   the   UK   stated   that   the   repeated   nature   of   the   attacks,   and   their  
mounting  scale,  permitted  the  USA  to  take  action  to  prevent  their  recurrence.278  
Preventive  action,   in   these  circumstances,  was  viewed  by   the  UK  as  being  
essential  to  the  right  of  self-­defence.279  The  general  principle  that  self-­defence  
was  allowed  to  ‘discourage  and  prevent  further  violence’  was  repeated  by  the  
UK  in  supporting  the  USA’s  claim  of  self-­defence  against  an  ‘ongoing  pattern’  
of  Libyan-­sponsored  terrorist  attacks  in  1986.280  Similar  support  was  given  to  
the  USA  when  it  targeted  the  IIS  headquarters  in  1993,  with  the  stated  aim  of  
deterring  further  acts  of  aggression.281  
The   right   to   prevent   and/or   deter   the   continuation   of   further   attacks   has,  
therefore,  often  been  claimed  by  states.  Other  examples  include  Israel’s  action  
in   Lebanon   in   1975,282  South  Africa’   incursions   into   Lesotho   in   1982,283  and  
Iran’s  claim  of  self-­defence  against  terrorists  operating  from  Iraq.284  As  Ruys  
notes,  whilst   several   of   these   cited   interventions   received   criticism  or   even  
condemnation  by  states,  ‘negative  reactions  were  generally  related  to  factual  
circumstances   and   other   aspects   of   the   incidents   concerned   and   should  
therefore   not   be   read   as   a   principled   rejection   of   post   facto   defensive  
measures.’285  
More   recent   state   practice,  most   notably   in   the   context   of   the   response   to  
transnational  terrorism,  points  to  an  increased  willingness  of  states  to  accept  
more   expansive   defensive   action   to   counter   further   threats   from   the   same  
source.  Israel,  in  defending  its  action  against  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  in  2006,  
                                                                                        
277  UN  Doc  S/PV.1140   (1964)   44–5.  On   this   incident   generally,   see  Guilfoyle   in  Ruys   and  
Corten  (2018)  108–17.  
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281  E.g.   UN  Doc   S/PV.3245   (1993)   6;;   17   (Brazil);;   19–20   (Hungary);;   21–2   (UK).   The   USA  
repeated  this  aim  following  the  1998  African  embassy  bombings.  UN  Doc  S/1998/780  (1998).  
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referred   to   the   necessity   of   removing   the   ‘overall   threat’   faced   by   a   state,  
meaning  that  ‘the  right  of  self-­defense  includes  not  only  acts  taken  to  prevent  
the   immediate   threat,  but  also   to  prevent  subsequent  attacks.’286  In  2008,   in  
response  to  repeated  violence  from  the  PKK,   the  Turkish  military  explained  
that   their   resulting  Operation   Sun  was   to   ‘prevent   the   region   from   being   a  
permanent  and  safe  base  for  the  terrorists.’287  A  clearer  example  occurred  after  
9/11.288  In  justifying  its  actions,  the  USA  referred  to  the  ‘ongoing  threat’  against  
it.  It  maintained  that  their  actions,  which  were  designed  to  prevent  and  deter  
further  attacks,  were   in  accordance  with   the   inherent   right  of   individual  and  
collective   self-­defence. 289   The   UK,   along   similar   lines,   asserted   that   their  
defensive   response   to   9/11  was  designed   ‘to   avert   the   continuing   threat   of  
attacks  from  the  same  source.’290  
It   is   noteworthy   that   the   British   opinion   regarding   this   incident   is   that   the  
combination  of  past  attacks,  current  capabilities  and  ongoing  and  future  aims  
amounted  to  a  current  threat  that  gave  rise  to  a  right  of  self-­defence.  That  the  
9/11  attacks  were  factually  complete,  and  the  defensive  response  did  not  occur  
until   several  weeks  afterwards,   appeared   irrelevant   to   this   determination.   It  
also  seemed  to  play  no  part  in  the  wider  assessment  of  the  general  necessity  
of  the  response.  The  UNSC  recognized  and  reaffirmed  the  right  to  self-­defence  
in  the  circumstances,291  and  the  characterisation  of  lawful  self-­defence  was  not  
generally   questioned   by   states.   To   the   contrary,   the   ensuing   Operation  
                                                                                        
286  ‘Responding  to  Hizbullah  attacks  from  Lebanon:  Issues  of  proportionality’,  Israel  Ministry  
of   Foreign   Affairs,   25   July   2006,  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Law/Pages/Responding%20to%20Hizbullah%
20attacks%20from%20Lebanon-­
%20Issues%20of%20proportionality%20July%202006.aspx>.   Israel’s   actions   were  
nevertheless  deemed  to  be  disproportionate.  See  Section  3.2.5.  
287  ‘Turkey  Says   t  Has  Sent  Ground  Troops   Into   Iraq’,  New  York  Times,  22  February  2008,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html>.   On   this   incident  
generally,  see  Ruys  (2008);;  Trapp  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  689–701.  Whilst  Turkey  did  not  
report   its   actions   to   the   UNSC   as   self-­defence   under   Art   51   UN   Charter,   Prime   Minister  
Erdogan  publicly  justified  Turkish  action  on  this  basis.  ‘Iraq  Moves  to  Dissuade  Turkey  from  
Raids’   The   New   York   Times,   17   October   2007,  
<www.nytimes.com/2007/10/17/world/europe/17turkey.html>.  
288  On   this   incident   generally,   see   Byers   in   Ruys   and   Corten   (2018)   625–38.   See   further  
Section  4.1.3(a).  
289  UN  Doc  S/2001/946  (2001).  
290  UN  Doc  S/2001/947  (2001).  
291  UNSC  Res  1368  (2001);;  1373  (2001).  
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Enduring  Freedom  received  almost   universal   support   from   the   international  
community.292  
Ruys  concludes  on  the  basis  of  state  practice  up  to  2010  that  if  a  state  has  
been   subject   to   a   series   of   armed   attacks,   and   if   there   is   a   considerable  
likelihood   that  more   attacks  will   imminently   follow,   then   self-­defence   is   not  
automatically   excluded.   This,   he   argues,   is   logical,   since   otherwise   states  
‘would   have   little   defence   against   consecutive   pin-­prick   attacks   whereby  
opposing   forces  withdraw   immediately  after  having  carried  out  an  attack.’293  
This   logic   is   inescapable,   and   remains   applicable   today,   especially   in   the  
context  of  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  deemed  to  be   terrorists  (see  Chapter  4).  
Sporadic,   but   often   devastating,   attacks,   possibly   across   a   number   of  
geographical  locales,  may  well  occur  under  the  umbrella  of  a  continuing  threat  
comprised  of  past  and  imminent  armed  attacks.  The  most  recent  state  practice  
relating   to   the   international   community’s   response   to   Daesh   reinforces   the  
proposition   that   states   have   a   lawful   right   to   respond   to   such  a   continuing  
threat.294  The  issue,  however,   in  this  context  is  the  risk  of  states  abusing  the  
right  of  self-­defence.  Section  4.1.4(b)  examines   the  worrying  prospect  of  an  
enduring  defensive   response  based  on  a  notion  of   ‘permanent   imminence’,  
which  keeps  the  general  necessity  of  self-­defence  rolling  on  indefinitely.295  
                                                                                        
292  The   reports   to   the   UNSC   by   the   US   and   the   UK   of   their   actions   in   self-­defence   were  
followed  by  others:  UN  Docs  S/2001/1005   (2001)   (Canada);;  S/2001/1103   (2001)   (France);;  
S/2001/1104   (2001)   (Australia);;   S/2001/1127   (2001)   (Germany);;  S/2001/1171   (2001)   (The  
Netherlands);;   S/2001/1193   (2001)   (New   Zealand);;   S/2002/275   (2002)   (Poland).   The  
European   Union   declared   ‘its   full   solidarity   with   the   United   States   of   America   and   its  
wholehearted  support  for  the  action  that  is  being  taken  in  self-­defence  and  in  conformity  with  
the  Charter   of   the  United  Nations’.  UN  Doc  S/2001/967   (2001).  NATO  also   offered   its   full  
support,  invoking  the  right  of  collective  self-­defence  pursuant  to  Art  5  Washington  Treaty  for  
the  first  time  in  its  history.  (2001)  41  ILM  1267,  1268.  The  Organization  of  American  States  
followed  suit,  also  invoking  collective  self-­defence.  (2001)  41  ILM  1270,  1273.  Support  was  
furthermore   expressed   by   Russia,   China,   Norway,  Mexico,   Egypt   and   others.   See   further  
Murphy  (2002)  244–6,  248;;  Ruys  (2010)  436–7;;  Byers  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  628–31.  
293  Ruys  (2010)  106.  
294  Daesh  is  known  by  a  number  of  names,  including  ‘the  so-­called  Islamic  State’,  ‘ISIL’  and  
‘ISIS’.  This  thesis  adopts  the  former  nomenclature.  
295  See   also   Tams   in   Van   den   Herik   and   Schrijver   (2013)   399–401,   suggesting   that   state  
practice  might  point  to  a  right  of  states  to  respond  to  non-­imminent  attacks,  in  cases  where  
the  ‘fear  of  future  attacks’  seems  genuine.  
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2.5   Specific  necessity  -­  targeting  
Necessity   also   relates   to   the   target   of   defensive   action.   In   the   review   that  
follows,  it  will  be  seen  that  states,  scholars  and  the  ICJ  typically  treat  targeting  
as  a  distinct  element  of  the  necessity  calculus.  This  issue  of  where  defensive  
force  must  be  directed  is  considered  separately  to  the  prior  general  necessity  
question  of  whether  there  is  a  prima  facie  need  for  a  putative  defending  state  
to  resort  to  force  at  all.  To  reflect  this  distinction,  this  thesis  refers  to  targeting  
as  an  issue  of  specific  necessity.296  However,  it  is  also  true  that  states,  scholars  
and  the  ICJ  sometimes  consider  targeting  alternatively,  or  cumulatively,  within  
the   rubric   of   proportionality.297  This   inconsistent   narrative   provides   a   mixed  
doctrinal  picture.  The  following  analysis  seeks   to  provide,   therefore,  greater  
conceptual   clarity   to   avoid   a   catch-­all   depiction   of   unlawfulness.   Further  
analytical   work   distinguishes   between   general   necessity,   specific   necessity  
and  proportionality,  and  explains  where  the  issue  of  targeting  is  best  situated.  
a)   A  JAB  military  target    
Oil   Platforms   is   the   case   in   which,   relatively   speaking,   the   ICJ   has   most  
carefully   and   explicitly   considered   the   application   of   necessity   and  
proportionality   to   issues   of   targeting.298  In   it,   the  Court   stated   that   the  USA  
‘must  also  show  that  its  actions  were  necessary  and  proportional  to  the  armed  
attack  made  on  it,  and  that  the  platforms  were  a  legitimate  military  target  open  
to  attack  in  the  exercise  of  self-­defence.’299  This  language  might  suggest  that  
the  Court  considers  the  nature  of  the  target  to  stand  alongside  necessity  and  
proportionality  as  an  additional  determinant  of   legality.  Later  in  its  judgment,  
however,  the  Court  rejected  the  USA’s  assertions  that  the  oil  platforms  they  
attacked  in  purported  self-­defence  performed  a  military  function.  On  the  basis  
of  that  determination,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  American  attacks  were  not  
                                                                                        
296  See  Section  2.2.  
297  E.g.  In  the  context  of  the  Iran/Iraq  War  1980–88,  Iraq  appeared  to  link  not  targeting  civilians  
to  the  requirements  of  proportionality.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2250  (1980)  para  40.  Other  examples  are  
referenced  in  this  Section.  
298  See  Sections  3.1.1(f)  and  3.3.2(b)  for  further  analysis.  
299  Oil  Platforms,  para  51  (emphasis  added).  
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necessary  to  respond  to  either  the  missile  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City  or  the  
mining  of   the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts.300  As  such,   the  Court’s  view  that   the  
nature   of   the   target  must   be  military   appears   to   form   part   of   the   necessity  
analysis,  rather  than  being  an  independent  requirement.  
The   Court   has   been   less   explicit   in   its   other   relevant   jurisprudence.   In  
Nicaragua,  it  concluded  that  the  American  attacks  on  Nicaraguan  ports  and  oil  
installations  were  not  proportionate.301  This  statement  might  implicitly  refer  to  
the  nature  of  the  target,  or  not.  The  Court  does  not  go  into  any  details,  and  its  
account  of  proportionality   is  unclear.302  In  Nuclear  Weapons,   the  Court  held  
that   ‘States   must   take   environmental   considerations   into   account   when  
assessing   what   is   necessary   and   proportionate   in   the   pursuit   of   legitimate  
military  objectives.’303  Again,  it  provided  no  detail.  In  Armed  Activities,  the  Court  
simply   observed   that   the   taking   of   airports   and   towns   many   hundreds   of  
kilometres   from   Uganda's   border   was   not   necessary   or   proportionate.304  It  
provided  no  breakdown  of  this  conclusion.  
Other  than  Oil  Platforms,  the  ICJ  did  not  explain  in  any  of  these  cases  how  or  
why   the   issue   of   targeting   was   (or   could   be)   relevant   to   either   (or   both)  
necessity   or   proportionality.   Perhaps   the   Nuclear   Weapons   and   Armed  
Activities  recourse  to  ‘necessity  and/or  proportionality’  is  the  ICJ’s  own  ‘ritual  
incantation’305  that  generally  denotes  illegality.  States  and  scholars  sometimes  
follow  this  approach.  Under  the  taxonomy  adopted  in  this  thesis,  it  is  submitted  
that  targeting  is  better  understood  as  an  element  of  specific  necessity  rather  
than  proportionality.  There  are  three  main  reasons  for  this  conclusion.    
First,   as   noted   in   Section   1.3.1,   necessity   must   be   addressed   before  
proportionality   can   be   considered.   Second,   it   is   difficult   to   argue   from   the  
                                                                                        
300  Ibid,  paras  74–7.  
301  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
302  See  Section  3.1.1(f).  
303Nuclear  Weapons,  para  30.  Whilst  the  Court’s  reference  to  ‘legitimate  military  objectives’  
could  be   interpreted  as  an   IHL   issue,  the  Court   is  clearly   referring  here   to  the  right  of  self-­
defence  and  JAB  necessity  and  proportionality.  Regarding  proportionality,  see  Section  3.2.7.  
304  Armed  Activities,  para  147.  
305  Gray  (2018)  125.  
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position  of  principle  or  state  practice  that  deliberately  targeting  a  non-­military  
target   can  be  necessary   to  halt,   repel   or   prevent   an   armed  attack.306  Using  
force   against   a   civilian   target   might   also   be   regarded   as   excessive   and,  
therefore,  disproportionate,307  but   this  conclusion   is  essentially  meaningless.  
This  is  because  the  necessity  hurdle  must  be  overcome  before  proportionality  
can  be  considered,  and  specific  necessity  incorporates  the  issue  of  targeting  
(as  per  Oil  Platforms  and  the  state  practice  referred  to  below).  Therefore,  also  
considering  targeting  within  a  proportionality  assessment  serves  no  additional  
legal   function.   Third,   as   explored   in   Chapter   3,   the   approach   of   the   ICJ,  
scholars  and  states  to  proportionality  reveals  that  proportionality  is  concerned  
with   whether   a   defending   state’s   overall   defensive   response   is   excessive.  
Proportionality  looks  at  outcomes.  These  comprise  the  cumulative  effects  of  
self-­defence,   not   each   individual   targeting   decision. 308   Proportionality,  
therefore,   plays   a   very   different   role   to   specific   necessity,   and   the   two  are  
conceptually  distinct.  
The   consequence   of   this   analysis   is   that   where   specific   necessity   is   not  
satisfied,   an   act   of   targeting   will   be   unlawful.   It   cannot,   therefore,   also   be  
disproportionate.   Where   targeting   does   satisfy   specific   necessity,   it   may  
nevertheless  breach  JAB  proportionality.309  This  latter  conclusion  is  not  due  to  
the   nature   of   the   target,   however,   but   the   consequential   effects   of   the  
defensive  conduct.  An  example   that  helps   to  reveal   this  distinction  between  
specific  necessity  and  proportionality  on  the  issue  of  targeting,  is  the  sinking  
of  the  Argentine  cruiser  General  Belgrano  by  a  British  submarine  during  the  
1982  Falklands  War.  Gardam  suggests  it  as  an  instance  of  state  practice  that  
                                                                                        
306  In  terms  of  state  practice  in  support,  see  e.g.  Sections  2.5(b)  and  the  concern  regarding  
civilian  harm  reflected  in  state  practice  in  Section  3.2.5.  This  assumes  that  civilians  are  not  
directly  participating  in  hostilities  (‘DPIH’)  for  the  purposes  of  IHL,  and  that  civilian  objects  are  
not  being  used  for  military  purposes.  Where  a  civilian  is  DPIH  and/or  where  a  civilian  object  is  
being  used  for  military  purposes  they  are  potentially  targetable  under  the  rules  of  IHL.  Where,  
in  each  case,   there   is  also  a  connection  with  the  armed  attack,   it  would  be  also  potentially  
possible  to  establish  the  JAB  specific  necessity  of  targeting  them.  See  further  Sections  2.5(b)  
and  3.3.2(b).  
307  Green  and  Waters  (2015)  12,  for  example,  suggest  that  it  is  unlikely  that  a  direct  attack  on  
a  civilian   target  will   be  anything  other   than  excessive  when  measured  against  a  defensive  
need.  
308  See  in  particular  Sections  3.3.1  and  3.3.2.  
309  This  may  be  the  case  even  if  such  acts  are  IHL  compliant.  See  Section  3.3.1.  
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supports   the   notion   that   proportionally   may   act   to   limit   attacks   on   military  
targets.310  Her   analysis   can   also   be   read,   however,   as   referring   to   specific  
necessity.311  The  key   factor   to  note   in   this   incident  was   the   loss  of   life:  over  
three  hundred  men  were  killed,  far  exceeding  the  total  casualties  on  both  sides  
up   to   that   date. 312   The   act   resulted   in   much   international   criticism,   and  
reasonable   arguments   may   be   presented   on   either   side   regarding   its  
proportionality.313  Crucially,  however,   the   review  of   the  proportionality  of   this  
episode  is  framed  in  terms  of  whether  the  British  action  was  an  unjustifiable  
escalation  of  the  conflict.314  It  is  tied  to  the  effect  on  the  wider  context  and  the  
overall   defensive   response.315   It   is   submitted,   therefore,   that   the   issue   for  
proportionality  is  whether  damaging  or  destroying  a  legitimate  military  target  
(for  the  purposes  of  both  IHL  and  JAB  specific  necessity)  takes  a  defending  
state’s  conduct,  to  be  viewed  as  a  whole,  beyond  a  defensive  purpose.  Is  it  
‘excessive’  (to  quote  Webster)?316  
Distinguishing   between   necessity   and   proportionality   when   considering  
targeting,  including  the  need  to  apply  the  former  first,  is  prima  facie  reflected  
in  Oil  Platforms.  The  Court  first  considered  whether  targeting  the  oil  platforms  
was  a  necessary  act  of  self-­defence.  Focusing  on  the  non-­military  nature  of  
the  oil  platforms,  it  concluded  that  it  was  not.317  The  Court,  therefore,  expressly  
connects   the   nature   of   target   to   the   necessity   of   the   response.   It   then  
                                                                                        
310  Gardam  (2005)  171–2.  
311  ‘At   the  time  of  the  attack,  the  General  Belgrano  was  outside  of   the   total  exclusion  zone  
declared  by   the  UK  and  appeared  to  pose  no   immediate   threat.’   Ibid,  171.  This  suggests  a  
lack  of   connection  with   the  ongoing  armed  attack  and,   therefore,  an  absence  of  defensive  
purpose  in  targeting  it.  See  further  Section  2.5(b).  
312  See  Greenwood  (1989)  279.  
313  Greenwood  (1989)  279,  concludes:  ‘On  balance,  it  is  thought  that  the  sinking  was  lawful,  
but  the  terms  in  which  it  is  debated,  and  the  intensity  of  that  debate,  show  that  the  concept  of  
self-­defence  may  impose  serious  restrictions  upon  the  right  of  a  State  to  attack  what,  in  terms  
of   the   jus   in   bello,   is   a   legitimate   military   target’.   Gardam   (2005)   172,   notes   that   the  
international  criticism  was  not  so  much  based  on  legal  criteria,  but  rather  that  the  British  attack  
was  somehow  dishonourable.  
314  Greenwood  (1989)  279.  Gardam  (2005)  171,  also  recognizes  the  issue  of  escalation  in  her  
comments  on  proportionality.  
315  Escalation  may  affect  other   interests,  e.g.   international  peace  and  security,   the  rights  of  
other  states,  the  environment  and  so  forth,  that  factor  in  whether  self-­defence  is  proportionate.  
See  Section  3.2.  
316  See  generally  Chapter  3.  
317  Oil  Platforms,  para  76.  
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proceeded  to  consider  proportionality  as  a  subsequent,  and  separate,  issue.318  
In  so  doing,  it  stated  that  the  American  response  to  the  attack  on  Sea  Isle  City  
might,  ‘had  the  Court  found  that  it  was  necessary  in  response  to  (…)  an  armed  
attack   committed   by   Iran,   have   been   considered   proportionate’ 319   This  
approach   reflects   the   logic   that   a   finding   of   proportionality   (and  
disproportionality)  can  only  flow  from  a  conclusion  that  a  use  of  defensive  force  
is  first  necessary.  It  also  confirms  that  the  operation  of  both  requirements  relies  
on   the   existence   of   a   defensive   purpose.   Without   necessity,   there   is   no  
defensive  purpose  against  which  proportionality  can  be  gauged.  There  is  only  
an  unlawful  use  of  force.  
The  Court  proceeded  to  muddy  the  conceptual  waters,  however.  Despite,  and  
contrary   to,   the  aforementioned   logic  and   its  approach  to   the  attack  on  Sea  
Isle  City,   the  Court   adopted  a   different   approach   to   proportionality   and   the  
mining  of  the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts.  The  Court  concluded  that  the  American  
response   in   this   case,   despite   being   unnecessary,   was   also  
disproportionate.320  Given  the  foregoing  analysis,  in  the  absence  of  necessity,  
it  is  not  clear  why  the  Court  chose  to  opine  on  proportionality.  The  propriety  of  
such  comments  is  questionable.  Furthermore,  they  are  insufficient  in  setting  
out   the   basis   on  which   the  Court   held   that   proportionality  might   have  been  
satisfied   in   the   former   case   and   not   the   latter.   However,   its   finding   of  
disproportionality  of  the  response  to  the  mining  of  the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts  
does   provide   some   clues   to   how   it   distinguishes   between   necessity   and  
proportionality.   Its   view   is   clearly   coloured   by   the   effects   of   the   overall  
American  response,  which  consisted  of  a  wider  campaign  that  went  beyond  
the   reaction   to   the   mining   alone. 321   This   focus   on   the   overall   defensive  
response  reflects  the  analysis  referred  to  above  regarding  how  proportionality  
operates,  in  contrast  to  specific  necessity.  
                                                                                        
318  Ibid,  paras  76–7.  
319  Ibid,  para  77  (emphasis  added).  
320  Ibid.  
321  Ibid.   For   further   details   of   the   response   and   the   ensuing   proportionality   analysis,   see  
Section  3.1.1(f).    
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The  general  rule  that  self-­defence  is  limited  to  military  targets  finds  support  in  
state   practice,   where   claims   of   self-­defence   and   responses   thereto   have  
focused  on  this  issue.322  An  example  includes  the  Israeli  strike  on  the  Osiraq  
reactor  in  1981.  In  justifying  its  claim  of  self-­defence,  Israel   insisted  that  the  
nuclear   reactor   was   a   legitimate   military   target.   This   characterization   was  
greeted  with  scepticism   in   the  UNSC,  however.  The  fact   that  states   instead  
regarded   the   reactor   as   civilian   in   nature   provided  one  of   the   basis   for   the  
widespread  condemnation  of   the   Israeli  action.323  Another   instance   is  South  
Africa’s  justification  of  its  purported  defensive  action  in  Zambia,  Zimbabwe  and  
Botswana  in  1986  on  the  basis  that  it  was  limited  to  ANC  targets,  with  great  
care  taken  not  to  involve  local  civilians.324  Similar  claims  appear  consistently  in  
the   context   of   fighting   international   terrorism. 325   One   of   the   bases   for  
condemnation  of  this  particular  action,  however,  was  that  the  targets  chosen  
were  not  connected   to  hostile  acts,  despite  South  Africa’s  assertions   to   the  
contrary.326  Tanzania  specifically  referred  to  this  fact  in  rejecting  the  claim  of  
self-­defence.327  Under  this  thesis’  proposed  taxonomy,  this  is  interpreted  as  a  
lack  of  JAB  specific  necessity.328  The  following  Section  develops  this  analysis.  
b)   IHL  and  a  JAB  connection  with  the  armed  attack  
In   IHL,   it   has   long   been   established   that   targeting   is   limited   to   ‘military  
objectives’,  with  the  corollary  being  that  civilians  and  civilian  objects  must  not  
be  the  object  of  attack.329  These  targeting  rules  impose  a  continuous  obligation  
on   those   who   plan   or   decide   upon   an   attack   to   evaluate   whether   or   not  
                                                                                        
322  Section  2.5(b)  provides  examples  of  state  practice  that  both  confirm,  and  go  beyond  this  
general  premise,  suggesting  a  need  for  a  connection  between  a  military  target  and  an  armed  
attack.  
323  E.g.   UN   Docs   S/PV.2280   (1981)   paras   71–92   (Israel);;   para   147   (Algeria);;   S/PV.2284  
(1981)  77  (Syria);;  S/PV.2285  (1981)  para  29  (Cuba).  See  further  Section  2.3.2(b).  
324  UN  Doc  S/PV.2684  (1986)  26–7.  
325  See  Sections  2.5(b),  4.1,  4.2.3.  
326  See  e.g.  Kwakwa  (1987)  440.  
327  UN  Doc  S/PV.2684  (1986)  44–5.  Green  (2006)  478,  describes  the  military  target  issue  as  
determinative  of  Tanzania’s  conclusion.  
328   Green   and   Waters   (2015)   13,   interpret   Tanzania’s   words   as   a   lack   of   necessity   and  
proportionality  under  the  JAB.  
329  Arts  48,  51(2)  and  52(2)  AP1.  This  prohibition  is  an  uncontroversial  principle  of  customary  
international  law.  Rule  1  of  The  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (‘ICRC’)  Study  on  
Customary  IHL,  <https://ihl–databases.icrc.org/customary–ihl/eng/docs/home>.  
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something   is  a  military  objective,  and   to  cancel  or  suspend  such  attack   if   it  
becomes  apparent  that  the  objective  is  not  military,  if  it  is  protected,  or  it  would  
violate  the  IHL  rules  of  proportionality.330  How,  and  to  what  extent,  IHL  and  the  
JAB   interrelate   on   this   topic   is,   therefore,   directly   relevant   to   the   present  
enquiry.  
Green  and  Waters  rightly  note  that  IHL  has  primacy  in  the  area  of  targeting  
and  will  generally  be  the  ‘first  point  of  call’  in  relation  to  such  decisions.  They  
argue,  however,  that  limitations  on  targeting  also  form  part  of  the  customary  
rules  of  necessity  and  proportionality  in  the  JAB.  On  their  view,  therefore,  IHL  
and  the  JAB  impose  broadly  equivalent  parallel,  but  cumulative,  obligations.331  
The  ensuing  review  reflects  this  general  premise.  There  is  also  wider  academic  
support  for  the  idea  that  non-­military  targeting  will  fall  foul  of  JAB  necessity,  in  
addition   to   IHL. 332   The   Council   of   the   European   Union’s   Independent  
International   Fact-­Finding   Mission   on   the   Conflict   in   Georgia   (‘IIFFMCG’)  
likewise  adopted  this  position  in  its  review  of  the  2008  conflict   in  Georgia.333  
This   point   also   seems   to   have   been   recognized,   at   least   to   a   degree,   by  
Webster  who  took  the  view  that  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  there  had  been  an  
attempt  to  discriminate  between  the  innocent  and  the  guilty.334  
                                                                                        
330  Arts  52(2)  and  57(2)(b)  Protocol  Additional  to  the  Geneva  Conventions,  12  August  1949,  
and  Relating  to  the  Protection  of  Victims  of  International  Armed  Conflicts,  8  June  1977,  1125  
UNTS  3  (‘API’).  
331  Green  and  Waters  (2015)  6–7,  9–11,  13–25.  In  so  doing,  Green  and  Waters  do  not  argue  
that  custom  contains  specific  stand-­alone  targeting  limitations,  but  that  the  restrictions  inherent  
in  JAB  necessity  and  proportionality  regulate  the  choice  of  targets.  They  accept  that,   in  the  
majority  of  cases  the  targeting  rules  will  apply  in  tandem  and  will  be  substantively  identical,  
with  certain  limited  exceptions.  Such  concurrent  application  principle  is  in  line  with  the  ICJ’s  
decision  in  Nuclear  Weapons,  which  is  discussed  in  Section  3.3.1.  See  generally  Section  3.3  
for  further  discussion  of  proportionality  and  targeting.  
332  Greenwood  (1989)  278-­9;;  Gardam  (2004)  171–2;;  Corten  (2010)  488;;  Ruys  (2010)  108–10.  
These  commentators  also  maintain  that  targeting  is  limited  by  proportionality.  
333   IIFFMCG   Report,   Vol   II,   September   2009   (‘IIFFMCG   Report’),  
<http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf>,   272.   The   IIFFMCG’s   adopted  
methodology  vis-­à-­vis  the  JAB  has  been  criticised,  however.  See  e.g.  Henderson  and  Green  
(2010).  On  this  incident  generally,  see  Gray  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  712–28.  
334  Letter  from  Mr  Webster  to  Mr  Fox  (24  April  1841)  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1840–
1841,  Vol.  XXIX,  1138.  Although,  Green  and  Waters  (2015)  10,  note  that  Webster  did  not  go  
so  far  as  to  claim  that  actions  taken  in  self-­defence  must  always  be  directed  against  military  
targets.  
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This   dual   application   of   IHL   and   the   JAB   raises   the   question   of   whether   a  
‘military  target’  under  the  JAB  is  identical  to  a  ‘military  objective’  under  IHL.  For  
the  present  consideration  of  JAB  necessity,  there  are  clear  distinctions  to  be  
drawn.  As  noted,  the  generalities  of  the  JAB,  based  on  the  principles  set  out  
in  this  Section,  should  not  be  directly  equated  with  the  specific  provisions  of  
IHL.  Yet,  drawing  on  the  principles  of  IHL  helps  to  explore  what  the  ICJ  and  
states   (for   which,   see   further   below)   consider   is   targetable   under   the   JAB.  
Under  IHL,  to  constitute  a  targetable  ‘military  objective’,  objects  by  their  nature,  
location,  purpose  or  use  must  make  an  effective  contribution  to  military  action.  
In  addition,   their   total  or  partial  destruction,  capture  or  neutralization,   in   the  
circumstances  ruling  at  the  time,  must  offer  a  definite  ‘military  advantage’.335  
This   definition   provides   a   logical   starting   point   regarding   how   we   might  
conceive  of   the  military  activities   that   the  Court   in  Oil  Platforms   considered  
necessary  for  targeting  purposes.336  Like  the  IHL  position  on  targeting,  this  JAB  
approach  requires  a  connection  with  hostile  activities.  
Yet,   whilst   compliance   (in   broad   terms   at   least)   with   this   IHL   definition   of  
‘military  objective’  might  be  necessary   to  constitute  a   ‘military   target’   for   the  
purposes  of   the  JAB,   it   is  not  sufficient   to  establish   legality  under   the   latter  
regime.  There   is  an  obvious  additional  JAB   requirement   for   targeting   in   the  
context   of   defensive   action.  Whereas   the   target   of   self-­defence  must   have  
some  military  connection,  whether  or  not  precisely  equating  to  an  IHL  ‘military  
objective’,   not   any   military   target   will   suffice.   Its   destruction,   capture   or  
neutralization  must  also  be  connected  with  the  force  to  be  repelled.  There  must  
be   a   defensive   purpose   to   the   act.  For   the  JAB,   therefore,  defensive   force  
should  in  principle  be  directed  against  the  source  of  the  armed  attack(s).337  
A  general  JAB  targeting  precept  that  requires  a  connection  between  attack  and  
defence  is  entirely  logical  and  is  in  keeping  with  the  approach  taken  by  the  ICJ  
                                                                                        
335  Art  52(2)  AP1.  See  generally  Oeter  in  Fleck  (2013)  166–87.  
336  Oil  Platforms,  para  76.  
337  Ruys  (2010)  108–9.  Cannizzaro   in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  346,  notes  along  similar  
lines   that  necessity   secures   the  existence  of  a   ‘functional   link’  between  military  action  and  
defensive  purpose.  
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in  Oil  Platforms.338  Destroying,  capturing  or  neutralizing  military  objectives  (for  
the   purposes   of   IHL)   connected   with   the   armed   attack   (making   them   JAB  
military  targets)  clearly  points  to  a  prima  facie  defensive  purpose.  Conversely,  
other   states   may   rightly   question   the   JAB   necessity   of   a   defending   state  
targeting  IHL-­compliant  military  objectives  of  the  attacker  that  are  not  related  
directly  to  the  current  threat  that  it  faces.  Depending  on  the  circumstances,  it  
would   be   difficult   for   a   defending   state   to   establish   that   destroying   or  
neutralizing  such  military  objectives  carries  with   it  a  defensive  purpose.339  In  
this   respect,   we   should   recall   that   self-­defence   is   a   temporary   right   that  
enables  a  defending  state  to  counter  a  situation  of  emergency  and  address  its  
immediate  defensive  needs.  It  is  not  designed  to  address  longer-­term  security  
issues,  which  are  reserved  for  the  collective  security  mechanisms  of  the  UN  
Charter.340  The  JAB  therefore  overlays  an  additional  and  concurrent  obligation  
on   defending   states   when   selecting   targets.   IHL   and   the   JAB   operate  
separately,  but  in  tandem,  to  regulate  targeting.  The  rules  of  both  regimes  must  
be   complied  with   on   a   continuous   basis   to   ensure   that   defensive   action   is  
lawful.341  
State   practice   ostensibly   reflects   the   dual   application   of   IHL  and   JAB.  The  
difficulty,  however,  in  assessing  this  practice  is  that  states  do  not  tend  to  refer  
to  the  source  of  the  targeting  obligations  incumbent  upon  them.  For  instance,  
Iran   argued   before   the   ICJ   in   Oil   Platforms   that   ‘self-­defence   must   be  
addressed  to  the  right  target  -­  to  the  source  of  the  threat’.342  Whether  or  not  
                                                                                        
338  Specific  necessity  requires  that  the  defending  state  only  targets  the  attacker.  See  Section  
2.2.  The  analysis  in  this  Section  takes  that  general  proposition  one  step  further.  The  Court  in  
Oil  Platforms,   para  77,  also  criticized   the  USA   for  attacking  a   ‘target  of  opportunity’,  which  
might  suggest  that  it  requires  a  connection  between  the  target  and  the  purported  threat  to  the  
state  taking  military  action  against  it.  
339  From  an  IHL  perspective,  destroying,  capturing  or  neutralizing  a  military  objective  during  a  
defensive  operation  that  is  not  connected  with  an  armed  attack  is  unlikely  to  offer  a  ‘military  
advantage’.  Whilst  the  application  of  IHL  does  not  rely  on  the  lawfulness  under  the  JAB  of  a  
state  resorting  to  armed  force  (thereby  ensuring  equal  application  of  IHL  to  belligerents),  it  is  
influenced   by   its   reasons   for   doing   so.   The   overall   (defensive)   purpose   of   the   action   will,  
therefore,  define   the  military  advantage.  Absent  such  advantage,  a  military  objective   is  not  
targetable  under  IHL.  See  further  Oeter  in  Fleck  (2013)  175–7;;  Section  3.3.1.  
340  See  Section  1.3.2(c)  and  also  Section  2.4.2  regarding  deterring  future  threats.  
341  The  joint  and  separate  application  of  the  JAB  and  IHL  is  discussed  further  in  Sections  3.3  
and  3.4.  
342  Oil  Platforms,  Memorial  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  8  June  1993,  para  4.25.  
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Iran  clearly  identified  such  requirement  as  forming  part  of  the  proportionality  or  
necessity  requirement,  or  both,  is  not  clear,  however.343  What  is  clear,  is  that  it  
viewed  force  used  against  targets  that  had  no  direct  connection  with  the  armed  
attacks  as  being  punitive  or   retaliatory  acts,   thereby  constituting  reprisals.344  
This   logic   is  compelling  and  Iran’s  comments  clearly   relate   to   the  JAB.  The  
following   incidents   of   practice   likewise   comprise   claims  of   self-­defence  and  
also  indicate  that  targeting  obligations  fall  under  the  purview  of  the  JAB.  
For   example,   the   UK   defended   its   targeting   of   the   Harib   Fort   in   1964   by  
reference  to  its  military  nature  and  the  fact  that  it  was  a  centre  for  subversion  
and   aggression   against   the   South   Arabian   Federation. 345   Czechoslovakia  
rejected  the  British  claim  of  self-­defence.  Yet,  by  pointing  to  the  object  of   its  
response   as   having   no   connection   with   the   alleged   raids   to   which   the   UK  
claimed  to  be  responding,  it  appeared  nevertheless  to  confirm  the  requirement  
of  a  nexus.346  Iraq  also  adopted  this  position.  It  noted  that  the  destruction  of  
the  Harib  Fort,  which  was  a  military  barracks  for  ground  forces,  provided  no  
protection  against  the  aerial  attacks  that  had  prompted  the  British  raid.347  The  
UK’s  position  is  more  recently  reflected  in  the  UK  Military  Manual,  which  not  
only  recognizes  that  the  JAB  may  limit  the  choice  of  targets,  but  also  suggests  
that   such   target   must   have   a   connection   to   the   armed   attack,   or   risk  
unjustifiably  escalating  the  conflict.348  
                                                                                        
343  Iran  purported  to  argue  this  point  under  the  rubric  of  proportionality,  making  reference  to  
the  ICJ’s  dictum  in  Nicaragua  regarding  the  American  mining  of  the  Nicaraguan  ports  and  the  
attacks  on  ports,  oil  installations,  etc.  Ibid,  paras  4.22–5.  However,  its  reasoning  also  reflects  
an   appreciation   of   specific   necessity   and/or   conflates   the   two.   This   is   apparent   in   Iran’s  
statement  that  ‘[t]he  Court  [in  Nicaragua]  regarded  such  attacks  as  unable  to  meet  the  criterion  
of   necessity   because   they   could   not   be   proportionate   to   the   aid   provided   to   the   armed  
opposition  inside  El  Salvador  by  Nicaragua.  In  other  words,  the  mining,  attacks  on  ports  and  
selected   installations   were   the   wrong   target.   The   measures   could   not   therefore   be  
proportionate  and  limited  to  the  necessities  of  the  case.’  Ibid,  para  4.25.  
344  Ibid,  para  4.38.  
345  UN  Docs  S/PV.1106  (1964)  paras  54–5;;  S/PV.1108  (1964)  para  112;;  S/PV.1109  (1964)  
para  30.  
346  UN  Doc  S/PV.1110  (1964)  para  24.  
347  UN  Doc  S/PV.1109  (1964)  para  57.  
348  Section  2.8.1  UK  Military  Manual.  It   is  interesting  that  the  UK’s  position  that  self-­defence  
might  limit  the  choice  of  targets  and  weaponry  is  linked  with  the  risk  of  conflict  escalation.  It  is,  
perhaps,  for  this  reason  that  the  UK’s  position  on  these  issues  is  placed  in  a  section  dealing  
with  JAB  proportionality,  rather  than  necessity.  See  further  Section  3.3.2.  
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Likewise   in   1964,   the  USA   defended   its   actions   against   North   Vietnamese  
torpedo  boats  and  support  facilities  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin,  on  the  basis  that  such  
action  was   limited   to   targets  against  which   they  had  been   forced   to  defend  
themselves.349  It  provided  a  similar  justification  for  it  acts  during  the  Vietnam  
War  in  1972,350  and  when  it  bombed  Libya  in  1986.351  In  1993,  the  USA  also  
justified   its  targeting  of   the   IIS  headquarters   in  Baghdad  on   the  basis   that   it  
was  ‘a  target  directly  linked  to  the  operation  against  President  Bush.’352  When  
targeting   NSAs   operating   in   foreign   territory,   defending   states,   in   justifying  
claims  of   self-­defence,  will   typically   assert   that   their   action   is   limited   to   the  
terrorists  responsible  for  the  armed  attacks  and  to  military  targets.  At  the  same  
time,  they  maintain  that  they  are  not  targeting  civilians  or  the  host  state.  This  
was   the  case   for  Operation  Sun   in  2008,353  Operation  Enduring  Freedom   in  
9/11,354  Coalition  action  in  Syria,355  and  is  a  general  theme  within  state  practice  
pertaining  to  the  so-­called  ‘unwilling  or  unable’  debate.356  
Other  state  reactions   to  purported  acts  of  self-­defence   likewise  support   the  
premise  that  targets  should  be  military  and  connected  with  the  armed  attack.  
For  example,  in  respect  of  Turkey’s  Operation  Sun  in  2008,  states  emphasized  
the  need  for  Turkey  to  limit  its  action  to  PKK  targets.357  Israeli  interventions  in  
and   against   Lebanon   over   the   years   are   similarly   expositive.   In   1968   the  
UNSC’s  condemnation  of  Israel’s  attack  on  Beirut  airport  was  largely  based  on  
the  lack  of  any  connection  between  the  airport  and  the  prior  attack  on  an  Israeli  
aircraft.358   In   1972,   the   UNSC   condemned   ‘the   repeated   attacks   of   Israeli  
                                                                                        
349  UN  Doc  S/PV.1140  (1964)  para  44.  
350  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser  (1972)  837.  
351  UN  Doc  S/PV.2674  (1986)  13,  14–15.  
352  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  6.  As  noted,  whilst  this  claim  of  self-­defence  is  contestable,  the  
fact  that  the  defending  state  felt  bound  to  justify  it  actions  by  pointing  to  the  nexus  between  
attack  and  defence  is  instructive.  
353  UN  Doc  A/HRC/7/G/15  (2008)  1.  
354  E.g.  UN  Docs  A/56/PV.44  (2001)  9,  11,  27;;  S/2001/94  (2001).  
355  See  Sections  4.1.3(b),  4.2.3.  
356  See  Section  4.1.2.  
357   E.g.   ‘EU   Presidency   Statement   on   the   Military   Action   Undertaken   by   Turkey   in   Iraqi  
Territory’,   25   February   2008,  
<www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/CFSP_Statements/February/0225MZZturkey.ht
ml>;;  Ruys  (2008)  362–3.  
358  UNSC  Res  262  (1968);;  (1968)  UNYB  228–232.  See  further  Gray  (2018)  203.  
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forces  on  Lebanese  territory  and  population’.359  In  1982,  it  condemned  ‘Israeli  
incursions   into  Beirut’,   reaffirming   ‘the  rights  of   the  civilian  populations’  and  
repudiating  ‘all  acts  of  violence  against  those  populations’.360  Israel’s  operation  
against  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  in  2006  is  also  elucidating  on  this  point.  Israel  
attempted   to   vindicate   its   action   on   the   basis   that   it   was   concentrating   its  
response  on  Hezbollah  strongholds,  positions  and  infrastructure.361  Whilst  this  
was   regarded   with   general   scepticism,   it   is   another   example   of   a   state  
attempting   to   establish   a   claim   of   self-­defence   by   justifying   its   targeting  
decisions  by  reference  to  their  connection  with  the  armed  attacks.362  
2.6   Conclusions  
Although  not  expressed  using  the  taxonomy  proposed  in  this  Chapter,  general  
and  specific  necessity  are  clearly  reflected  in  state  practice,  ICJ  jurisprudence  
and  scholarship.  A  review  of  these  sources  reveals  that  necessity  relates  to  
two  distinct  questions.  The  first  is  whether,  following  an  armed  attack,  any  form  
of  military  force  is  required  to  resolve  the  issue,  or  peaceful  alternatives  suffice  
(general   necessity).   If   force   is   the   only   reasonable   response   in   the  
circumstances,  the  subsequent  question  is  where  such  force  must  be  aimed  
so  as   to   be   capable   of   achieving  a   defensive   purpose   (specific   necessity).  
Proportionality  assesses  the  overall  outcomes  of  the  decision  to  use  force  in  
self-­defence.  
States  undoubtedly  consider  an  exercise  of  self-­defence  to  be  a  measure  of  
last   resort.   Yet,   general   necessity   is   revealed   to   be   highly   contextually  
sensitive.   A   putative   defending   state   might   seek   to   justify   a   claim   of   self-­
defence  by  pointing  to  the  lack  of  reasonable  alternatives  to  force  to  establish  
                                                                                        
359  UNSC  Res  316  (1972).  
360  UNSC  Res  520  (1982).  
361  UN  Doc  S/PV.5489  (2006)  6.  
362  The  principle  source  of  state  criticism  and  condemnation  of  this  action  was  not  based  on  
explicit   pronouncements   that  might   be   regarded   as   pertaining   to   specific   necessity.  Whilst  
great  concern  was  expressed  by  states  and  international  organizations  regarding  the  nature  
of  Israel’s  targeting  of  civilian  infrastructure,  states  focused  on  the  cumulative  consequences  
of  such  actions.  It  was  the  overall  effect  of  the  Israeli  response,  therefore,  that  led  to  a  general  
consensus  that  it  was  disproportionate.  See  Section  3.2.5.  
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general   necessity.   However,   the   specific   facts   of   the   case   will   ultimately  
determine   whether   other   states   deem   the   resort   to   self-­defence   to   be  
reasonable   in   the   circumstances.   The   availability   and   pursuit   of   peaceful  
alternatives  might  feature  in  this  this  review  and  count  as  evidence  of  general  
necessity.  However,  they  might  not  appear  at  all   in  either  the  justification  or  
review  of  claims  of  self-­defence.  Where  they  are  noted,  the  issue  of  peaceful  
alternatives  is  unlikely  to  be  the  sole  determinant  of  legality.  Other  factors  will  
tend  to  govern  the  final  conclusion,  such  as  the  timing  of  the  armed  attack,  its  
likelihood  and  gravity,   the  nature  of   the   relationship  between   the  defending  
state  and  the  aggressor,  the  relevant  history  between  the  two  and  whether  the  
threat  is  current  and  likely  to  persist.  Additional  factors  pertain  to  armed  attacks  
by  terrorist  NSAs.363  
State  practice,  ICJ  jurisprudence  and  scholarship  suggest  that  a  review  of  the  
legality  of  self-­defence  will  ultimately  rest  on  whether  it  was  reasonable  for  a  
state  to  resort  to  self-­defence  in  the  circumstances.  This  raises  questions  over  
the  ability  of  general  necessity  to  restrain  the  use  of  defensive  force,  especially  
in   the   context   of   armed   attacks   against   terrorist   NSAs.   In   such   cases   in  
particular,  general  necessity  is  revealed  to  be  a  weak  limitation  on  state  action.  
In  contrast,  specific  necessity  operates  as  a  clear  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  
the   right   of   self-­defence.   Requiring   that   force   is   limited   to   military   targets  
connected   with   the   actual   or   imminent   armed   attack,   it   ensures   that   their  
neutralisation  or  destruction  is  confined  to  a  defensive  purpose.  A  lack  of  this  
nexus  suggests  that  a  use  of  force  is  punitive  and,  therefore,  unlawful.  In  this  
way,   the   JAB   overlays   onto   IHL   additional   targeting   rules   that   determine  
whether  the  exercise  of  self-­defence  is  lawful.  
  
                                                                                        
363  See  Chapter  4.    
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CHAPTER  3:  PROPORTIONALITY  
3   Introduction  
At   its   core,   proportionality   is   a   relatively   straightforward   concept:   it   is   a  
prohibition  against  excess.1  Its  role  is  to  limit  permitted  harm  done  to  others.2  
Yet,   identifying   its   content   and   outer   conceptual   boundaries,   and   applying  
them   to   specific   incidents   of   self-­defence,   is   more   complex   than   with  
necessity. 3   Flexibility   is   required.   This   is   partly   due   to   debates   amongst  
scholars   and   states   regarding   the   scope   of   self-­defence.  Most   importantly,  
however,   identifying   from   state   practice   the   elements   that   make   up   the  
proportionality   calculus   is   challenging.   States’   views   on   proportionality   are  
frequently   hard   to   interpret   and   may   be   too   closely   tied   up   with   political  
considerations  to  permit  a  clear  distillation  of  firm  legal  principles.  States  or  UN  
bodies  ‘tend  to  use  the  phrase  ‘proportionality’  indiscriminately,  basing  it  on  a  
gut   feeling   of   when   something   was   ‘over   the   top’’, 4   or   ‘excessive’. 5  
Furthermore,  proportionality  is  a  limiting  factor  in  both  the  JAB  and  IHL,  and  it  
is  often  unclear  whether  states  are  referring  to  either,  or  both,  regimes  when  
commenting  on  specific  incidents.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  the  meanings  
and  purposes  of  proportionality  are  markedly  different  in  each  of  these  bodies  
of  law.6  
This  latter  uncertainty  might  be  due  to  states  relying  on  IHL,  rather  than  the  
JAB,   to   regulate   the   use   of   defensive   force,   once   necessity   has   been  
established.7  The   concern   might   also   be   that   fully   engaging   with   the   JAB  
                                                                                        
1  Tams  and  Devaney  (2012)  106.  See  also  Schmitt   in  Breau  and  Jachec-­Neale  (2006)  293,  
making  the  same  argument  for  IHL  proportionality.  
2  Higgins  (1994)  230.  
3  This  is  particularly  so  with  respect  to  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  in  the  context  of  international  
terrorism.  See  Section  4.2.  
4  Lubell  (2013)  3.  
5  States  and  scholars  often  refer  to   ‘excessive’  when  considering  proportionality.  Examples  
are  referred  to  throughout  this  Chapter.  
6  See  Section  3.3.1.  
7  See  Section  3.4.  Regarding  the  interaction  between  the  two  regimes,  see  Sections  2.5  and  
3.3.  
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requirements  puts  defending  states  at  a  disadvantage  vis-­à-­vis   the  attacker  
because  of  the  potential  limitation  the  JAB  imposes  on  the  former’s  acts  of  self-­
defence.8  The  position  has  not  been  helped  by  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence.  As  this  
Chapter  explains,  the  Court  has  provided  confused  and  contradictory  guidance  
regarding  both  the  standard  against  which  proportionality  is  to  be  measured  
and  how   the   requirement   is   to   be  applied   to   specific   cases.9  Despite   these  
difficulties,   an   analysis   of   proportionality   involving   a   critical   review   of   state  
practice,   case   law   and   theory   does   bear   fruit.   The   requirement’s   specific  
limitations  remain  to  be  developed  through  further  state  practice,  but  its  core  
meaning   is   readily   identifiable   and   meaningful   conclusions   regarding   its  
content  may  be  drawn.  
As  with  necessity,  the  natural  starting  point  for  a  review  of  proportionality  is  the  
Caroline  incident.10  Supposing  the  necessity  of  the  moment  requires  defensive  
action,  Webster  asserted   that   it  would  also  be   incumbent  on  a  government  
purportedly  acting  in  self-­defence  to  show  that  it  ‘did  nothing  unreasonable  or  
excessive;;  since   the  act,   justified  by   the  necessity  of  self-­defence,  must  be  
limited  by  that  necessity,  and  kept  clearly  within  it.’11  This  is  the  genesis  of  the  
modern   requirement   that,   following   an   armed   attack,   and   where   necessity  
(both  general  and  specific)  is  established,  the  use  of  defensive  force  must  also  
be  proportionate.  Whilst  necessity  determines  whether  force  may  be  used  to  
respond  to  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  attack,  and  where  it  must  be  directed,  
proportionality   governs  how  much   force   is   permissible.   It   is   proportionality,  
therefore,   that   seeks   to   prevent   a   state   from   acting   excessively,   beyond   a  
                                                                                        
8  Gardam   (2004)  23–4;;  Green   (2006)  457.  The  argument   is   that   the  defending  state   is  put  
under  an  unfair  burden  by  its  obligation  to  comply  with  the  JAB,  which  the  attacker  (if  it  is  a  
state)   has   already   breached   and   may,   therefore,   be   disinclined   to   follow.   During   the  
negotiations   on   the   Definition   of   Aggression,   for   example,   a   number   of   states   expressed  
reservations  that  the  inclusion  of  proportionality  in  the  definition  would  put  the  defender  at  a  
disadvantage  to  the  benefit  of  the  attacker.  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.67–78  (1970)  85–6  (USSR);;  
86–7   (Ghana);;   87   (Syria).   Regardless   of   whether   this   is   true   empirically,   this   theoretical  
imbalance  of  obligations  is  countered  by  a  better  understanding  of  proportionality  as  set  out  in  
this  Chapter.  As  will  be  seen,  states  have  leeway  to  defend  themselves  effectively,  provided  
that  they  do  not  act  excessively.  
9  See  in  particular  Sections  3.1.1(f)  and  3.3.2(b).  
10  See  Section  1.1.  
11  Letter  from  Mr  Webster  to  Mr  Fox  (24  April  1841)  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1840–
1841,  Vol.  XXIX,  1138.  
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defensive  purpose.12  It  restricts  conflict  from  escalating  in  an  ever-­increasing  
cycle  of  violence  and  minimizes  disruption  to  third  parties  and  the  international  
community.13  How  proportionality  is  applied  to  achieve  these  aims,  and  what  
may  count  as  ‘excessive’,  is  explored  in  the  following  Sections.  
Proportionality’s  role  is  not  universally  viewed  in  this  manner,  however.  Certain  
academics  propose  that  proportionality  forms  part  of  the  trigger  of  the  right  of  
self-­defence,   rather   than   conditioning   the   exercise   of   the   right   once   it   is  
triggered. 14   Such   an   approach   harkens   back   to   just   war   theory,   whereby  
proportionality  was  part  of  determining  whether  force  was  initially  warranted.15  
This   minority   view   is   difficult   to   reconcile   with   the   ICJ’s   jurisprudence   and  
principle.   In  Nicaragua,   the  Court  clearly  associates  proportionality  with   the  
exercise  of  the  right  once  it  has  arisen,  rather  than  whether  or  not  the  right  is  
available  in  the  first  place.16  The  sine  qua  non  for  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  an  
armed  attack.17  To  assert  that  proportionality  also  relates  to  whether  the  right  
is   triggered,   rather   than   conditioning   the   response,   unnecessarily   conflates  
proportionality  with  an  armed  attack.  
Adopting  the  ICJ’s  approach,  it  remains  the  case  that  Webster’s  exposition  of  
proportionality  should  be  taken  as  a  starting,  rather  than  an  end  point.  On  its  
own  terms,  it  does  not  fully  represent  the  complexities  of  how  proportionality  
operates  to  moderate  a  defensive  military  response.  Most  importantly,  as  set  
out   in   the   next   Section,   proportionality   requires   that   defensive   force   is  
evaluated  in  relation  to,  or  balanced  against,  a  particular  standard.  What  this  
standard  should  be,  whilst  perhaps  implicit  in  Webster’s  formulation,  requires  
much   greater   explicit   elaboration.   Therefore,   the   first   part   of   this   Chapter  
considers  how  proportionality  applies  to  the  right  of  self-­defence,  providing  an  
answer  to  the  operative  question:  ‘proportionate  to  what?’  The  examination  will  
                                                                                        
12  Greenwood  (1989)  274.  
13  Greenwood,   ibid,   278,   argues   that   proportionality   is   concerned   with   the   preservation   of  
international  order  and  the  minimization  of  the  use  of  force.  See  also  Blank  (2017)  14.  
14   E.g.   Wedgwood   (1992)   59–61,   suggesting   that   proportionality   is   a   strategic   doctrine  
governing  not  only  how  a  state  employs  force,  but  also  whether  it  may  do  so.  
15  See  e.g.  Gardam  (2004)  35–6.  
16  Nicaragua,  paras  194,  237.  
17  Ibid,  para  237.  
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continue  to  how  proportionality  operates  in  practice  and  what  factors  indicate  
whether  or  not  states  acting  in  purported  self-­defence  have  complied  with  the  
requirement.  
As  will  be  seen,  the  devil  is  in  the  detail.  Assessing  proportionality  is  even  more  
context  dependant  than  necessity.  This  is  due  to  the  nature  and  number  of  the  
variables   inherent   in  a  conceptual  understanding  of  proportionality  and   that  
relate  to  its  application  to  specific  incidents.  Establishing  a  ‘magical  template’  
that   is   applicable   to   all   defensive   action   is   not   possible.18  Yet,   just   because  
something   cannot   be   defined   with   absolute   precision   does   not   mean   that  
‘anything  goes’.  States  do  employ  proportionality  as  a  marker  of  legality,  and  
its   use   should   be  more   coherent   in   the   future,   once  proportionality   is  more  
clearly   understood.   As   with   necessity,   much   more   can   be   said   about   this  
requirement  than  is  currently  available  in  the  literature  and  jurisprudence.  
3.1   Proportionate  to  what?    
Proportionality   is   often   understood   as   balancing   two   principal   variables,  
although   the   reality   is   more   complex. 19   The   first   variable   relates   to   the  
defending  state’s  response  to  an  armed  attack.  This  might  be  described  as  the  
defensive   ‘action’   or   ‘act’, 20   the   defensive   ‘force’, 21   or   the   defensive  
‘operation’.22  The  ICJ  has  likewise  referred  to  purported  defensive  ‘measures’,  
‘activities’,  ‘actions’  and  ‘operations’.23  Such  references  prima  facie  pertain  to  
the  defending  state’s  physical  response,  i.e.  what  the  defending  state  is  doing  
in  pursuit  of  its  defensive  right.  More  accurately,  however,  it  is  better  to  view  
this  variable  as  also  including  the  effect  of  such  defensive  response.24  
                                                                                        
18  Ruys  (2010)  110;;  Gardam  (2004)  21–2.  
19  Section   3.2   sets   out   how   this   balancing   act,   rather   than   being   a   purely   binary   exercise,  
accounts  for  a  number  of  additional  factors  that  go  to  whether  a  defensive  act  is  excessive.    
20  E.g.  Lubell  (2010)  64.  
21  E.g.  Green  (2006)  45;;  Trapp  (2007)  146.  
22  E.g.  Steenberghe  (2012)  115.  
23  E.g.  Nicaragua,  paras  176,  237;;  Oil  Platforms,  paras  43,  51,  77;;  Armed  Activities,  paras  
112,  118,  120.  
24  Proportionality   constrains   the   ‘scale   and   effects   of   defensive   action.’   Ruys   (2010)   110;;  
Henderson  (2018)  234.  These  are  in  fact  two  distinct  variables.  Whilst  the  scale  of  the  force  
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That   the   defensive   action,   and   its   consequences,   together   form   the   first  
variable  is  clear  from  state  practice.  As  explored  below,  states  tend  to  focus  
on   (dis)proportionality   in   terms   of   the   consequences   of   self-­defence,   most  
notably   collateral   civilian   harm.   The   ICJ   also   considers   the   consequential  
harm,  rather  than  just  the  defensive  acts  themselves.  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  the  
Court  noted  the  potential  environmental  damage  caused  by  the  use  of  nuclear  
weapons  when  considering  necessity  and  proportionality.25  In  Oil  Platforms,  it  
concluded  that  the  American  response  to  the  mining  of  a  single  military  vessel,  
the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts,  was  disproportionate.  This  was  framed  in  terms  
of   the  overall  effect  of   the  American  response  on   Iran’s  military  and  civilian  
infrastructure  and  apparatus.26  Therefore,  whilst   the   first   variable   comprises  
the  defensive  acts  and  their  outcomes,  identifying  the  second  variable  is  more  
complicated.  The  standard  against  which  defensive  force  and  its  effects  are  to  
be  measured   (i.e.   answering   the   question:   ‘proportionate   to  what?’),   is   the  
focus  of  the  debate.  
3.1.1   Quantitative  or  teleological  proportionality?  
There  are  two  principal  analytical  approaches  that  are  proposed  by  academics  
to   identify   the   second   variable.   They   can   also   be   discerned   in   the   ICJ’s  
reasoning   and   state   practice.   This   Section   begins   by   reviewing   these   two  
alternatives   and   the   related   scholarship  and   ICJ   jurisprudence.  A   review  of  
specific  incidents  of  self-­defence  reveals  a  mixed  approach  in  the  practice  of  
states.  
                                                                                        
may   well   be   related   to   its   effects,   this   will   not   always   be   so.   For   example,   an   intense  
bombardment   of   one   isolated   target   may   result   in   its   destruction   but   have   little   other  
consequential  effects.  Likewise,  a   targeted  use  of   limited   force  may   result   in  much  greater  
harm  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  target  (e.g.  targeting  an  arms  depot,  resulting  in  a  larger  
blast  radius,  or  if  a  large  number  of  civilians  were  in  or  nearby  the  target).  
25  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  30–1.  See  further  Section  3.2.7.  The  effects  of  nuclear  weapons  
more  generally  were  the  focus  of  great  attention  in  the  separate  and  dissenting  opinions.  See  
especially  the  dissent  of  Judge  Weeramantry,  paras  102–72.  
26  Oil  Platforms,  para  77.  See  Section  3.1.1(f).  
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a)   Alternative  models  and  academic  opinion  
The  first  option  is  a  quantitative  understanding  of  proportionality  that  focuses  
on  the  relationship  between  the  armed  attack  and  the  defensive  response.  A  
purely  quantitative  approach  requires  an  equivalence  or  parity  of  scale  and/or  
means  between  attack  and  defence,  i.e.  the  response  must  be  proportionate  
to  the  act  that  provoked  it.27  This  ‘tit  for  tat’  or  ‘eye  for  an  eye’  conception  of  
proportionality   might   better   be   described   as   ‘armed   attack   proportionality’,  
given   that   this   is   the   variable   against   which   the   defensive   force   is   being  
measured.  However,  it  is  generally  referred  to  as  ‘quantitative  proportionality’,  
as   it  also  seeks   to  balance   the  amount  of  harm  suffered,  or  anticipated,  by  
each  side  to  the  conflict.  It  dictates  that  the  armed  attack  and  the  defence  be  
commensurate   in   terms   of   relative   injury,   i.e.   casualties   and   damaged  
incurred.28  
The   quantitative   model   therefore   balances   offensive   kinetic   force   (and   its  
outcomes)  against  defensive  kinetic   force  (and   its  outcomes).29  A  distinction  
should,  however,  be  made  between   the   ‘quantitative  model’  described  here  
and   ‘material   factors’   that   form   part   of   establishing   a   quantitative   balance.  
Material  factors  typically  include  harm  to  civilians  and  civilian  objects,  as  well  
as  other  material  damage  arising  from  uses  of  force.  The  subsequent  analysis  
reveals  that  material  factors  are  often  referenced  by  states  when  considering  
proportionality.  However,   it  does  not  necessarily   follow   that   the  quantitative  
model  as  a  whole  is  being  relied  upon  as  the  determinant  of  legality  in  such  
cases.  This  distinction  between  ‘material  factors’  and  the  ‘quantitative  model’  
is  explored  further  in  the  following  Sections.  
                                                                                        
27  Kretzmer  (2013)  238.  See  also  Dinstein  (211)  262,  who  asserts  that,  in  the  case  of  ‘on–the-­
spot   reactions’   and   ‘defensive   armed   reprisals,’   proportionality   points   at   a   symmetry   or  
approximation  of  scale  and  effects  between  the  armed  attack  and  defensive  response.  See  
Section  3.4,  however,  regarding  his  approach  to  ‘defensive  wars’.  
28  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  389,  argues  that  proportionality  is  ‘a  prohibition  
against  measures  that  are  excessive  in  relation  to  the  injury  expected  from  the  attack.’  
29  This   assumes   that   the   force   involved   is   physical.   Self-­defence   against   cyber   attacks   is  
beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  enquiry.  
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The  second  option  is  a  teleological  interpretation  of  proportionality.  This  model  
adopts   a   functional   approach   that   is   tied   to   the   defensive   needs   of   the  
defending  state.  30  It  may  also  be  described  as  the  ‘means-­end’  test,  measuring  
as  it  does  the  defensive  force  (the  means)  against  the  legitimate  ends  of  using  
that   force   (being   the   purposes   of   self-­defence).31   Ago,   in   an   often-­quoted  
passage,  explains  teleological  proportionality  as  follows:  
The  requirement  of  the  proportionality  of  the  action  taken  in  self-­defence  
(…)   concerns   the   relationship   between   that   action   and   its   purpose,  
namely  -­  and  this  can  never  be  repeated  too  often  -­  that  of  halting  and  
repelling   the   attack   or   even,   in   so   far   as   preventive   self-­defence   is  
recognized,   of   preventing   it   from   occurring.   It   would   be   mistaken,  
however,  to  think  that  there  must  be  proportionality  between  the  conduct  
constituting   the   armed   attack   and   the   opposing   conduct.   The   action  
needed   to   halt   and   repulse   the   attack   may   well   have   to   assume  
dimensions  disproportionate  to  those  of  the  attack  suffered.  What  matters  
in  this  respect  is  the  result  to  be  achieved  by  the  "defensive"  action,  and  
not  the  forms,  substance  and  strength  of  the  action  itself.32  
The  majority  of  academic  opinion  favours  this  teleological  model,  requiring  as  
it  does  a  balance  between  the  defensive  responsive  and  a  defensive  purpose  
or  necessity,  i.e.  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  attack.33  This  model  
                                                                                        
30  Ruys  (2010)  112.  
31  Kretzmer  (2013)  239.  
32  Ago  (1980)  para  121.  See  also  Lauterpacht  (1968)  64.  
33  Waldock   (1951)   464;;  Brownlie   (1963)   434;;  Higgins   (1994)   231–2   (subject   to   the   caveat  
noted  above);;  Alexandrov  (1996)  167;;  Akande  (1998)  191;;  Taft  (2004)  305;;  Gardam  (2004)  
142,   156–62;;   Cassese,   La   Charte   des   Nations   Unies   (2005)   1333;;   The   Chatham   House  
Principles,  969;;  Zimmermann  (2007)  117,  123;;  Corten  (2010)  470,  488–91;;  Ruys  (2010)  94–
5;;   Lubell   (2010)   65–6;;   Greenwood   (2011)   para   27;;   Van   Steenberghe   (2012),   113,   115;;  
Okimoto  (2012)  64;;  Schmitt  (2013)  62;;  Nolte  (2013)  284;;  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  
(2013)  388–9;;  Cannizzaro   in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  345–6;;  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  101;;  
Gill   in   Weller   (2015)   744;;   Gray   (2018)   159.   Not   all   scholars   cited   here   accept   a   right   of  
anticipatory  self-­defence.  Whilst  ‘halting’  and  ‘repelling’  are  generally  accepted  as  legitimate  
goals  of  self-­defence,  these  commentators  do  not  necessarily  subscribe  to  the  notion  that  a  
future   armed   attack   may   be   ‘prevented’.   However,   all   the   scholars   referred   to   adopt   a  
teleological  understanding  of  proportionality,  i.e.  the  notion  that  self-­defence  is  limited  by  what  
is  proportionate  to  the  defensive  objective  and  not  by  the  requirement  of  strict  equivalence  of  
scale  and/or  means  between  the  armed  attack  and  resulting  defence.  See  also  Rodin  (2002)  
114–15;;  Taft  (2004)  305;;  Simma  et  al  (2012)  1426.  
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encapsulates   Webster’s   assertion   that   defensive   acts   must   not   be  
‘unreasonable  or  excessive’  and  must  be   limited  by   the  necessity   that  gave  
rise  to  them.34  As  such,  defensive  kinetic  force  (and  its  outcomes)  is  balanced  
against  a  defensive  purpose,  not  only  against  offensive  kinetic  force  (and  its  
outcomes),  as  per  the  quantitative  model.  
Some  commentators,  in  referencing  this  teleological  model,  paraphrase  it  as  
measuring  proportionality  against  the  ‘threat’  posed  to  the  defending  state.  For  
example,  Greenwood  asserted  in  the  lead  up  to  the  second  Iraq  war  that:  
‘[i]f  Iraq  did  pose  such  an  immediate  threat  then,  in  my  opinion,  military  
action  against  Iraq  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  that  threat  would  be  
lawful.  The  degree  of  force  used  would  have  to  be  proportionate  to  the  
threat   and   no  more   than  necessary   to   deal  with   that   threat   (including  
preventing  a  recurrence  of  the  threat).35  
This   reference   to   ‘threat’   indicates  one  of   the   immediate  advantages  of   the  
teleological   model,   which   is   its   flexibility.   This   model   avoids   a   purely  
retrospective   view   of   proportionality   that   focuses   solely   on   the   completed  
armed  attack.  Rather   than   the  only  benchmark   for  proportionality  being   the  
harm   already   inflicted,   a   teleological   appreciation   of   proportionality   also  
accounts   for   the   potential   need   to   counter   ongoing   and   imminent   armed  
attacks.36  By  encapsulating  the  total  threat  to  the  defending  state  comprising  
past,   present   and   (potentially)   future   armed  attacks,37  this  model   accepts   a  
possible   quantitative   imbalance   between   the   defensive   response   and   the  
armed  attack  that  immediately  prompted  such  response.  Without  this  ability,  
states  would  be  limited  to  only  responding  to  past  events,  rather  than  having  
                                                                                        
34  See  Section  1.1.  
35  Greenwood  (2002)  para  26.  Whilst  Greenwood’s  position  on  legality  in  this  particular  case  
is  questionable,  his  statement  of  the  law  pertaining  to  self-­defence  more  generally  is  widely  
supported.  In  terms  of  ‘preventing  a  recurrence  of  the  threat’,  see  Section  2.4.2(b).  Brownlie  
(1963)   261,   264,   likewise   discusses   proportionality   in   relation   to   the   ‘threat’   faced.   Such  
formulation  still  assesses  proportionality  by  reference  to  the  goal  that  the  defending  state  is  
entitled   to   seek   to   achieve.   Greenwood   (2011)   26–7.   Greenwood   states   these   goals   as  
including  halting  and  repelling  an  armed  attack  and  recovering  occupied  territory.  
36  This  is  the  position,  for  example,  of  the  UK.  See  Section  3.1.1(b).  
37  See  Section  2.4.2(b)  regarding  the  ‘accumulation  of  events’  theory.  
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the   flexibility   to   counter   threats   that   are   both   current   and   which   may   be  
reasonably   anticipated.   A   teleological   approach   takes   ‘due   account   of   the  
future-­looking  character  of  self-­defence  measures  and  of  the  characterization,  
in  Article  51,  of  self-­defence  as  an  ‘inherent  right’.’38  
These  two  models  might  be  presented  as  alternatives,  although  a  review  of  
state   practice   and   opinio   juris   reveals   a   mixed   picture.   Depending   on   the  
context,  states  variously  refer  to  the  quantitative  and/or  teleological  models  of  
proportionality,  as  well  material  factors  such  as  civilian  harm  that  may  speak  
to  both.  
b)   State  practice  -­  consideration  in  abstract  terms  
When  states  reference  proportionality  in  abstract  terms,  the  variable  against  
which   they  measure   this   requirement   is   sometimes  unclear.   In   response   to  
Israeli   incursions   into  Lebanon   in  1972,39  for  example,   the  representative  of  
Argentina  offered  their  view  on  the  general  meaning  of  proportionality:  
the  measures   adopted   in   self-­defence  must   be   of   a   similar   nature   or  
reasonably  in  keeping  with  the  means  used  in  the  illegal  act  against  which  
action  is  being  taken.  Any  use  of  force  on  a  considerably  larger  scale  or  
on   a   scale   which   goes   beyond   the   events   or   the   provocative  
circumstances  obviously  exceeds  the  general  framework  of  self-­defence  
and  is  considered  illegal  in  accordance  with  the  uses  and  practices  of  the  
law.40  
This   comment,  which   refers   to   commensurability   of   the   nature,  means  and  
scale  of   the  attack  and  response,  offers   little   insight   into  how  this  approach  
operates  in  practice.  The  reference  to  the  ‘general  framework  of  self-­defence’  
might  also  be  interpreted  as  a  reference  to  the  overall  governing  principle  that  
force  must   be   defensive   in   nature.   This   might   suggest   that   any   finding   of  
                                                                                        
38  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  388.  
39  See  Section  3.1.1(c).  
40  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  26.  
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unlawfulness  of  a  use  of   force   is  ultimately   tied   to   the  purpose  of   the   right.  
Argentina’s  statement  can  be  read,   therefore,  as  supporting  either  model  of  
proportionality,  or  both.  
During   the   UNGA’s   deliberations   over   the   Definition   of   Aggression,   the  
proportionality  of  self-­defence  was  also  referenced  by  a  number  of  delegates.  
Discussing  the  right  in  abstract  terms,  some  states  noted  that  an  exercise  of  
self-­defence   should   be   proportionate   to   the   armed   attack.41  Others   clearly  
rejected  the  need  for  an  exact  balance  between  the  two.42  Whilst  there  was  no  
detailed   discussion,   a   number   of   states   did   express   concern   regarding  
incorporating   proportionality   into   the   Definition   of   Aggression   because   of  
perceived  benefits  this  would  offer  to  the  attacking  state.  In  particular,  on  what  
appears   to  be  a   reference   to   the  quantitative  model,   the  view  was   that   this  
would  unduly  restrict  the  victim  state’s  choice  of  weapons  and  the  scale  of  the  
defensive  response.43  
The   DRC   representative   initially   expressed   the   view   that   ‘the   act   of   self-­
defence  must   be   proportionate   to   the   armed  attack  which  gave   rise   to   it’,44  
again   alluding   to   the   quantitative  model.  He  went   on   to   say,   however,   that  
proportionality   ‘required   the   victim   State   to   use   only   that   amount   of   force  
necessary  to  halt  the  armed  attack’  and  only  when  the  defensive  objective  had  
been   achieved  would   the   right   of   self-­defence   end.45  Other   representatives  
adopted  this  ultimately  teleological  model,  albeit  that  there  was  no  extended  
consideration   of   its   content. 46   These   debates   represent,   therefore,   an  
inconsistency   among   states   in   characterising   a   proportionate   defensive  
response  in  broad  conceptual  terms.  
                                                                                        
41  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.52–66   (1970)   43   (Turkey);;   61   (Yugoslavia);;   88   (Madagascar);;   91  
(Cyprus).  
42  E.g.  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.67–78  (1970)  83  (Iraq);;  88  (Guyana).  
43  Ibid,  85  (USSR);;  86  (Ghana);;  87  (Syria).  
44  Ibid,  81.  
45  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.67–78  (1970)  81,  90.  
46  Ibid,  83  (Iraq);;  84,  117  (UK);;  89  (Italy).  See  also  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.52–66  (1970)  53  
(Ecuador).  
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The  DRC’s  comments  referred  to  in  the  preceding  paragraph  exemplify  how  a  
state  might  set  out  both  alternative  models  of  proportionality,  whilst  ultimately  
tying  proportionality  to  the  defensive  needs  of  the  state.  This  is  not  uncommon.  
When   states   combine   models,   however,   difficulties   arise   as   to   the   proper  
meaning   and   application   of   proportionality.   In   2004,   for   example,   the   UK  
Attorney  General  offered  his  thoughts  on  proportionality.  On  the  topic  of  self-­
defence   in  response  to   imminent  armed  attacks,  Lord  Goldsmith  stated   that  
‘the  force  used  must  be  proportionate  to  the  threat  faced  and  must  be  limited  
to  what  is  necessary  to  deal  with  the  threat.’47  Prima  facie,  therefore,  the  UK’s  
position   on   proportionality   refers   to   both   the   quantitative   and   teleological  
models.  
The   first   thing   to   note   is   that   the   reference   to   ‘threat’   could   be   interpreted  
narrowly,   i.e.   equating   it   to   an   individual   armed   attack   that   has   already  
occurred.   Alternatively,   it   could   be   interpreted   broadly,   such   that   ‘threat’  
encompasses  the  wider  circumstances,  potentially  including  past,  ongoing  and  
imminent  armed  attacks.48  The  latter  option  appears  to  be  the  understanding  
of  the  current  UK  Attorney  General.49  Whether  we  interpret  ‘threat’  narrowly  or  
broadly,  however,   there  arises  a  possible  dichotomy.  This   is  where   it   is  not  
possible   for   a   defensive   response   to   be   proportionate   to   both   the   armed  
attacks(s)  and  the  defensive  necessity,  as  this  formulation  appears  to  require.  
As  noted  above,  achieving  a  defensive  aim  (i.e.   removing   the   totality  of   the  
threat   posed   by   accumulating   past,   ongoing   and   imminent   armed   attacks)  
might   necessarily   require   an   amount   of   defensive   force   that   exceeds   the  
armed  attack  that  prompted  it.    
                                                                                        
47  Hansard,  HL  Deb  21  April   2004,   vol  660  col  370   (emphasis  added).  Along  similar   lines,  
Cassese,   International   Law   (2005)   355,   suggests   that   the   defending   state   ‘must   use   an  
amount  of  force  strictly  necessary  to  repel  the  attack  and  proportional  to  the  force  used  by  the  
aggressor.’   Elsewhere,   however,   Cassese   links   the   lawfulness   of   self-­defence   solely   to  
achieving  the  defensive  necessity.  Cassese,  La  Charte  des  Nations  Unies  (2005)  1333.  
48  Given  that  Lord  Goldsmith  clearly  refers  to  ‘armed  attack’  and  ‘attack’  as  distinct  concepts  
throughout  his  speech,  the  broad  interpretation  of  ‘threat’  is  the  most  likely  option.  Ibid.  
49  UK  Attorney  General   Speech   2017,   7,   19–20,   clearly   setting   out   a   view   of   self-­defence  
where  proportionality  is  measured  against  a  ‘threat’  that  includes  imminent  armed  attacks.  
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Reading   Lord   Goldsmith’s   opinion   as   being   cumulative   of   quantitative   and  
teleological   proportionality   should   be   avoided.   Understanding   it   this   way  
effectively   renders   the   purposive   element   irrelevant   and   makes   the  
requirement   of   quantitative   equivalence  determinative.   His   reference   to   the  
defensive  necessity  suggests  that  this  is  not  his  intention.  To  the  contrary,  his  
(and  his  current  successor’s)   reference  to   the  need   to   ‘deal  with   the   threat’  
suggests  that  the  purposive  element  is  the  overriding  concern.  This  conclusion  
is  also  reflected  in  the  UK  Military  Manual,50  and  the  UK  practice  referred  to  in  
the  following  Sections.  
A   more   recent   example   of   such   ‘dual   reference’   in   the   context   of   general  
considerations   of   proportionality   is   found   in   the   2017   Australian   Attorney’s  
speech  regarding  imminent  armed  attacks.  In  it,  he  initially  appears  to  adopt  
the  quantitative  model:  ‘Proportionality  (…)  acts  as  a  restraint  to  ensure  that  
any  use  of   force   in  self-­defence  corresponds   to   the  gravity  of   the   imminent  
attack   sought   to   be   repelled.’ 51   He   goes   on   to   explain,   however,   that  
proportionality  is  designed  to  ensure  that  ‘an  imminent  armed  attack  cannot  be  
used  as  a  pretext  to  engage  in  a  wider  act  of  aggression’,  before  proceeding  
to   quote   Webster   that   defending   states   must   do   ‘nothing   unreasonable   or  
excessive,   since   the   act   justified   by   the   necessity   of   self-­defense,  must   be  
limited  by  that  necessity,  and  kept  clearly  within  it.’52  The  latter  two  references,  
whilst   not   unequivocal,   appear   to   relate   to   a   defensive   purpose.   This  
interpretation  is  supported  by  references  in  his  speech  to  self-­defence  serving  
a  protective  function.53  These  examples  demonstrate  that  states  may  generally  
adopt  either,  or  both,  models  of  proportionality.   In  order   to  avoid  confusion,  
however,  states  should  be  careful  in  how  they  express  their  understanding  of  
this  requirement.54  
                                                                                        
50  Sections  2.8,  13.2  UK  Military  Manual.  
51  Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
52  Ibid.  
53  Ibid.  
54   As   noted   in   Section   2.4.1(b),   states   rarely   make   such   general   statements   about   their  
understanding  of  international  law.  The  examples  set  out  in  this  Section  are,  therefore,  also  
valuable  (if  not  entirely  coherent)  examples  of  state  practice.  
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c)   State  practice  -­  specific  incidents  and  the  quantitative  model  
State  practice  and  opinio  juris  in  the  context  of  specific  incidents  of  purported  
self-­defence  also  reference  both  models  of  proportionality,  as  well  as  material  
factors.  Starting  with  examples  of  allusions   to   the  quantitative  model,  China  
labelled  Israeli  action  during  the  1956  Suez  crisis  as  disproportionate  to  the  
‘wrongs’  suffered  by  Israel,  without  elaborating  further.55  This  was  presumably  
a   reference   to  attacks  by   the  Egyptian  Fedayeen,  however,   to  which   Israel  
claimed  to  be  acting  in  self-­defence.56  A  number  of  states  also  concluded  that  
the  British  raid  on  the  Harib  Fort  in  Yemen  in  1964  was  out  of  proportion  to  the  
acts  that  provoked  it.  The  Ivory  Coast  pointed  to  the  fact  that  British  action  had  
resulted  in  the  loss  of  twenty-­five  lives  and  caused  extensive  material  damage,  
which  was  not  in  any  way  commensurate  with  the  death  of  two  camels,  which  
had   supposedly   prompted   the   British   raid. 57   These   references   could   be  
characterised  as   reliance  on   the   quantitative  model.  Notably,   however,   this  
appears   to   be   a   case   of   marked   asymmetry   between   attack   and   defence,  
based  on  both  the  scale  and  effects  of  the  British  action.  Other  states  based  
their  criticism  on  a  lack  of  defensive  purpose,  however.58  
In  1968,  the  USA  decried  Israel’s  attack  on  Beirut  airport  in  response  to  prior  
attacks  against  Israeli  civilian  aircraft  as  entirely  disproportionate  in  magnitude  
to   the  act   that  preceded   it.59  The  Americans  understood  disproportionality   to  
be  based  on  the  degree  of  the  destruction  involved,  and  on  the  nature  of  the  
attack  as  compared  to  the  purported  act  of  self-­defence.  Whereas  the  former  
comprised   acts   of   two   individual   terrorists,   the   latter   was   carried   out   by   a  
                                                                                        
55  UN  Doc  S/PV.749  (1956)  para  133.  
56  Ibid,  para  33.  
57  UN  Doc  S/PV.1108  (1964)  paras  32,  35  (Morocco);;  paras  48–50  (Ivory  Coast).  This  was  
denied  by  the  British,  who  insisted  that  they  were  responding  in  defence  of  the  South  Arabia  
Federation  to  a  series  of  attacks  from  Yemeni  territory  and  were  also  acting  to  prevent  further  
attacks  from  the  same  source.  UN  Doc  S/PV.1109  (1964)  paras  2–45.  
58  See  Section  3.1.1(d).  
59  UN  Doc  S/PV.1460  (1968)  para  73.  The  US  employed  the  same  language  in  the  same  year  
regarding  Israeli  anti-­terrorist  action  in  Jordan.  UN  Docs  S/PV.1402  (1968)  para  5;;  S/PV.1407  
(1968)  para  7.  In  the  same  incident,  Senegal  expressed  the  view  that  self-­defence  had  to  be  
‘by  means  proportionate  to  those  used  by  the  aggressor  [in  its  attack]’.  UN  Doc  S/PV.1436  
(1968)  para  132.  
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sizeable  military  force  operating  under  government  orders.  Regardless  of  this  
disparity,  however,  it  is  clear  that  the  Americans  viewed  such  action  as  being  
devoid   of   any   justification  whatsoever,   disproportionate   or   not.60  The  British  
concern  meanwhile   was   over   the   ‘scale   and   intensity’   of   the   Israeli   action,  
without  referencing  the  particular  nature  of  it.61  
Prima   facie,   the   reference   by   both   states   to   such   material   factors   as  
comparative  harm  and  the  nature,  scale  and  intensity  of  the  force  deployed  by  
Israel  may  indicate  reliance  on  the  quantitative  model  of  proportionality.  They  
highlight   the   disparity   between   attack   and   defence.   Likewise,   American  
concern  over  Israeli  action  against  NSAs  in  Lebanon  in  1970  appeared  to  rest  
on   the   scale   and   effects   of   the   Israeli   actions,   the   latter   constituting   the  
accompanying  loss  of  life  and  destruction  of  property.62  However,  it  is  not  clear  
that  the  quantitative  model  was  determinative  in  these  incidents.  The  disparity  
in   material   factors   could   likewise   speak   to   a   lack   of   a   defensive   purpose.  
Moreover,  states  are  not  necessarily  consistent  over   time   in  how   they  view  
proportionality.  Even  if  the  quantitative  model  informed  the  American  response  
to  these  latter  incidents,  the  USA  has  also  explicitly  adopted  the  teleological  
model  of  proportionality.  This  is  evident  in  its  claim  of  self-­defence  during  the  
Vietnam  War,63  in  its  pleadings  before  the  ICJ,64  and  to  justify  its  most  recent  
actions   against  Daesh   in  Syria.65  The  UK  has  also   adopted   the   teleological  
model  to  justify  its  own  actions.66  
In   1972   Israel   claimed   a   right   of   self-­defence   to   justify   its   incursions   into  
Lebanon  in  response  to  purported  terrorist  attacks  by  the  PLO.67  The  attacks  
had   been   on   a   relatively   small   scale,   resulting   in   eight   injuries   and   three  
deaths.   In   contrast,   the   Israeli   response   constituted   a   large-­scale   military  
                                                                                        
60  UN  Doc  S/PV.1460  (1968)  para  73.  
61  Ibid,  para  81.  The  UK  did  not  specifically  refer  to  proportionality,  although  such  comments  
clearly  indicate  concerns  regarding  this  requirement.  
62  UN  Doc  S/PV.1460  (1968)  para  91.  
63  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser  (1972)  837.  
64  See  Section  3.1.1(e).  
65  UN  Doc  S/2014/695  (2014).  
66  See  Sections  3.1.1(b),  (d)  and  (e).  
67  UN  Doc  S/10550  (1972).  
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operation  comprising  ground  troops,  tanks,  aerial  bombardments  and  artillery  
fire.   It   caused   a   number   of   deaths   and   substantial   material   harm.68  In   the  
ensuing  UNSC  debates,  states  condemned  Israel’s  action  as  disproportionate  
to  the  alleged  terrorist  acts  that  preceded  them.69  Sudan  labelled  them  unequal  
and  disproportionate.70  The  UK  confined  itself  to  expressing  concern  over  the  
unjustifiable  scale  of  Israel’s  military  response.71  The  means  and  scale  of  the  
Israeli   action,   and   its   effects   were   the   focus   of   discontent,   suggesting   a  
reliance  on  the  quantitative  model.  Yet,  this  is  again  an  example  of  manifest  
asymmetry   between   attack   and   defence.   Furthermore,   reference   to   these  
material  factors  were  clearly  combined  with  wider  concerns  over  peace  in  the  
Middle  East.  
In   respect   of   Israel’s   strike   on   the   PLO   headquarters   in   Tunis   in   1985,72  
Thailand’s  conclusion  that  it  was  disproportionate  rested  on  the  disparity  in  the  
numbers  of  casualties  on  both  sides.73  However,  whilst  this  factor  was  raised,  
it  is  clear  that  Thailand  would  have  condemned  Israel’s  actions  in  any  event,  
based   on   the   unjustified   violation   of   Tunisia’s   sovereignty   and   territorial  
integrity. 74   This   was   reflective   of   the   general   scepticism   levied   at   Israel’s  
response.   The   striking   disparity   between   (high)   Palestinian   casualties   and  
(low)   Israeli   casualties,   coupled   with   widespread   damage   to   civilian  
infrastructure  and  a  dire  humanitarian  situation,   is  also  a   feature  of  concern  
regarding  Israel’s  interventions  in  Gaza  in  2008–9  and  2014.  These  material  
factors   featured   in   a   number   of   states’   conclusions   that   such   action   was  
                                                                                        
68  Ibid;;  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  paras  8–14  (Lebanon);;  19–22  (Argentina).  
69  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.1643  (1972)  para  20  (Lebanon);;  para  166  (Belgium);;  S/PV.1644  (1972)  
para  142  (Italy).  See  also  UN  Doc  S/PV.1650  (1972)  para  10  (France).  
70  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  210.  
71  UN  Doc  S/PV.1643  (1972)  para  134.  The  UK  likewise  referred  to  the  ‘scale’  of  Israeli  action,  
highlighting  concern  over  civilian  casualties,  when  denouncing  as  unjustified   Israeli  against  
PLO  targets  in  Lebanon  in  1981.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2293  (1981)  paras  47,  49.  
72  On  this  incident  generally,  see  Pobjie  et  al  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  395–402.  
73  UN  Doc  S/PV.2611  (1985)  para  44.  They  noted  that  whilst  15  Israelis  were  killed,  over  60  
lives  were   lost   in  Tunisia  as  a   result  of   the   Israeli   response.  The  UK   (ibid,   para  111)  also  
concluded  that  the  raid  was  disproportionate.  Again,  however,  this  was  within  the  context  of  a  
general  rejection  of  the  necessity  of  the  Israeli  action.  Indonesia  (UN  Doc  S/PV.2615  (1985)  
para  60)  took  a  similar  position.  Israel,  in  defence  of  its  actions,  stated  that  it  was  necessary  
not  only  to  count  past  victims  in  the  proportionality  calculus,  but  also  potential  future  victims  if  
‘this  nerve-­centre  of  terror  is  allowed  to  operate  undisturbed.’  Ibid,  para  194.  
74  UN  Doc  S/PV.2611  (1985)  para  44.  
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disproportionate.75  The  relative  scale  of  the  military  action  and  resulting  civilian  
harm  were  also  apparent  in  the  general  condemnation  of  Israeli’s  incursions  
into   Lebanon   in   1982,76   and   2006.77   Material   factors,   in   particular   relative  
civilian  harm,  are  clearly  present  in  each  of  these  examples  as  indicators  of  
disproportionality.  However,   this  does  not  equate   to  states   requiring  a  strict  
adherence   to   the   quantitative   model,   meaning   parity   between   attack   and  
defence.  In  respect  of  the  2006  invasion,  for  example,  states  tended  to  view  
material  harm   to  Lebanon  as   indicative  of   Israel  acting  beyond  a  defensive  
purpose,  thereby  pointing  to  an  overriding  reliance  on  the  teleological  model.78    
Other   incidents   might   serve   as   precedents   for   recourse   to   the   quantitative  
model  of  proportionality,  at  least  in  part.  In  support  of  the  American  strike  on  
the   IIS   headquarters   in   Baghdad   in   1993,   France   noted   that   it   was  
‘proportionate  to  the  action  of  the  Iraqi  secret  service.’79  The  facts  of  the  case  
do  not  support  a  conclusion  of  equivalence,  however.  In  terms  of  methods,  the  
foiled   attempt   on   President   Bush’s   life   consisted   of   a   car-­bomb   and   other  
explosives,  whereas   the  American  response  was  the   launch  of   twenty-­three  
Tomahawk   cruise  missiles.80  On   relative   scale   and   casualties,   this   is  much  
more  difficult.  The  American  President  was  not  killed,  although  the  potential  
damage  that  could  have  been  caused  by  the  bomb  was  considerable.81  The  
American  response,  however,  resulted  in  the  almost  complete  destruction  of  
the   IIS   headquarters,   at   least   three   civilian   deaths,   civilian   injury   and   the  
destruction  of  property.82  It  is  notable,  therefore,  that  France’s  approval  of  the  
                                                                                        
75  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.6060  (2009)  3  (UN  Secretary  General);;  9  (South  Africa);;  9  (France);;  10  
(Indonesia);;  13–14  (Vietnam);;  15  (Burkina  Faso);;  16  (Costa  Rica);;  17  (Belgium);;  18  (Egypt);;  
S/PV.6061  (2009)  10  (Turkey);;  14  (Austria);;  15  (Vietnam).  Regarding  the  2014  Israeli  action,  
deemed  by  most  states  to  be  disproportionate  for  the  same  reasons,  see  generally  UN  Doc  
S/PV.7222  (2014).  See  further  Gray  (2018)  230–1.  
76  E.g.  UN  Doc  S/PV.2374  (1982)  paras  35–6  (Ireland).  
77  See  Sections  3.1.1(d)  and  3.2.5.  
78  See  Section  3.2.5.  
79  E.g.,  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  13.  
80   Ibid,   3–9;;   ‘U.S.   Strikes   Iraq   for   Plot   to   Kill   Bush’,   Washington   Post,   217   June   1993,  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/timeline/062793.htm>.  
81  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  5.  
82 ‘U.S.   Strikes   Iraq   for   Plot   to   Kill   Bush’,   Washington   Post,   217   June   1993,  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/timeline/062793.htm>.   The  
numbers  and  details  of  civilian  harm  very.  See  e.g.  Starski  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  504,  
522–3.  
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American  action  was  also  closely  tied  to  the  need  to  combat  terrorism  and  was  
set   against   a   background   of   the   desire   by   the   international   community   to  
moderate  Iraq’s  behaviour  and  to  induce  it  to  fulfil  its  international  obligations.83  
State   practice   reveals   that  material   factors,  most   notably   civilian   harm,  will  
influence  conclusions  regarding  the  (dis)proportionality  of  self-­defence.  States  
do  focus  on  quantitative  balance  or  imbalance,  and  may  refer  specifically  to  
the  nature,  means  and/or  scale  of  the  attack  and  response,  in  addition  to  the  
outcomes  (i.e.   relative  harm).  Such  references  are  not  consistent,  however,  
and  may  be  oblique.  They  also  tend  to  factor  most  clearly  in  cases  of  clear  and  
manifest   asymmetry.   This   naturally   raises   questions   regarding  whether   the  
forcible  action  has  a  defensive  purpose.  In  any  event,  and  as  a  general  rule,  
states   have   approached   the   issue   of   equivalence   flexibly   and   have   not  
required   an   exact   balance   between   attack   and   defence.84  They   may   have  
assessed  proportionality  by  reference  to  a  series  of  attacks  and  not  just  the  
armed   attack   that   immediately   preceded   the   defensive   response, 85   and  
material  factors  may  constitute  one  of  several  justifications  for  determining  the  
lawfulness  of  a  particular  act.  As  discussed  further  below,  whilst  states  may  
point  to  equivalence,  or  lack  thereof,  between  attack  and  defence,  it  is  rarely  
the  sole,  or  even  primary,  determinant  of   legality.  Moreover,  as  will  become  
clear  in  the  next  Section,  pursuing  a  defensive  aim  may  take  precedence  over  
considerations   of   quantitative   equivalence,   particularly   in   the   context   of  
combatting  NSAs.  
d)   State  practice  -­  specific  incidents  and  the  teleological  model  
Reference   to   the   teleological   model   of   proportionality   is   also   found   in   the  
practice   and   opinio   juris   of   states.   During   the   conflict   between   India   and  
Pakistan  over  Kashmir  in  1947-­1948,  Pakistan  asserted  that  it  did  not  do  more  
than  the   ‘very   least’   to   ‘hold   the   line’  and  protect   its  security  against   India.86  
                                                                                        
83  UN  Doc  S/PV.3245  (1993)  13–14.  
84  Ruys  (2010)  116.  
85  Ibid.  
86  UN  Doc  S/PV.464  (1950)  29.  
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Whist  not  expressed  in  clear  legal  terms,  its  position  appears  to  be  that  it  was  
responding  with  a  degree  of  force  required  to  defend  itself,  and  nothing  beyond  
that.87  In  the  same  conflict,  sporadic  activities  of  Pathan  tribesmen  (allegedly  
directed  by  Pakistan)  resulted  in  a  full-­scale  response  by  India’s  regular  army,  
denoting   quantitate   imbalance,   but   appearing   to   advance   a   defensive  
purpose.88  The  UNSC  implicitly  accepted  India’s  action.89  
The  UK  has  also  shown  preference  for  the  teleological  mode.  It  defended  its  
raid  on   the  Harib  Fort   in  Yemen   in  1964,   inter  alia,  on   the  basis   that   it  was  
proportionate   to   a  defensive   aim.90  The  UK’s   acts  were  widely   condemned,  
however,  and  were  deplored  by  the  UNSC.91  During  the  1982  Falkland  Islands  
conflict,  the  UK  Prime  Minister  did  not  refer  specifically  to  the  requirements  of  
necessity   and   proportionality,   but   was   nevertheless   clear   in   describing   the  
UK’s   response   pursuant   to   Article   51  UN  Charter   as   being   ‘measured  and  
controlled’   and   ‘consistent  with   achieving  our   objective’.92  The  objectives,   in  
line  with  demands  from  the  UNSC,  were  ending  the  occupation  and  withdrawal  
of  all  Argentine  troops  from  the  Islands.93  Despite  a  number  of  controversies  
pertaining   to   the   British   response,  most   notably   the   sinking   of   the  General  
Belgrano,94  it   is   noteworthy   when   considering   the   UK’s   ‘objective’   that   the  
British  military  action  was  generally  regarded  as  proportionate  to  securing  its  
defensive  goal,  and  was  regarded  as  an  incident  of  lawful  self-­defence.95  The  
UK’s   approach  was   repeated   in   relation   to   the   first  Gulf   conflict   of   1991.   It  
defended   the   proportionality   of   coalition   measures   taken   in   collective   self-­
defence  of  Kuwait  under   the  auspices  of  UNSC  authority,   insisting   that   the  
                                                                                        
87  Green  (2006)  458.  Caution  should  be  taken  with  examining  this  incident.  Pakistan  did  not  
invoke  self-­defence  to  the  UNSC  until  two  years  after  the  conflict  began  and  was  criticized  by  
India  for  this  omission.  UN  Doc  S/PV.466  (1950)  4.  Self-­defence  is,  nevertheless,  the  most  
obvious  implication  of  Pakistan’s  position.  See  also  Green  (2005)  VJIL,  597–8.  
88  Green  (2006)  458.  
89  UNSC  Res  47  (1948),  requiring  a  Pakistani  withdrawal  from  Kashmir,  whilst  allowing  India  
to  remain.  Green  (2006)  458.  
90  UN  Doc  S/PV.1109  (1964)  30–1.  
91  UNSC  Res  5650  (1964).  
92  Hansard,  HC  Deb  29  April  1982,  vol  22  col  980.  
93  UNSC  Res  502  (1982).  See  further   (1982)  53  BYIL,  538–40.  See  also  Section  2.8.2  UK  
Military  Manual  noting  the  same  under  the  heading  of  JAB  proportionality.  
94  See  Section  2.5(a).  
95  E.g.  Levitin  (1986)  638;;  Green  (2006)  459.  
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force   used   corresponded   to   the   aim   of   liberating   Kuwait.96   This   view   was  
generally   consistent   with   the   forceful   response   taken   by   the   coalition   to  
achieve   compliance   with   the   UNSC   resolutions   that   preceded   it. 97  
Proportionality  was,  therefore,  tied  to  the  purpose  of  repelling  the  Iraqi  attack  
and  securing  the  withdrawal  of  Iraqi  forces  from  Kuwait.  
In   contrast,   but   likewise   adopting   a   teleological   model   of   proportionality,  
Panama  condemned  Russia’s  intervention  in  Georgia  in  2008.  This  was  also  
on  the  basis  that  it  exceeded  the  stated  defensive  aim  (of  protecting  Russian  
citizens   and   peacekeeping   forces)   and   was,   therefore,   disproportionate. 98  
France  meanwhile,  appeared  to  focus  simply  on  the  civilian  harm  in  Georgia  
in   reaching   its   conclusion   that   Russian   actions   were   ‘brutal   and  
disproportionate’. 99   The   IIFFMCG,   however,   also   adopted   the   teleological  
approach  in  reviewing  the  conflict,  with  civilian  harm  acting  as  an  indicator  of  
whether  or  not  a  defensive  purpose  was  exceeded.  It  concluded  that  Russia’s  
actions  were  neither  necessary  nor  proportionate.100  
State   action   against   NSAs   often   favours   a   teleological   approach   to  
proportionately.   For   example,   Egypt   linked   proportionality   to   a   defensive  
purpose  to  support  its  view  that  Israel’s  intervention  in  Lebanon  in  1996  was  
an  act  of  aggression.101  Iran’s  claim  to  be  operating  against  terrorist  bases  in  
Iraq  in  1999  has  already  been  noted.  In  its  report  to  the  UNSC,  Iran  explicitly  
                                                                                        
96  UN  Doc  S/PV.2977   (Part   II)   (1991)  73.  The  UK  also  stated   that  achieving   this  aim   took  
account  of  the  military  capacity  of  Iraq.  See  further  Section  3.2.1.  
97  Gardam  (2004)  159.  Whether   this  case  should  be  rightly  characterised  as  an   incident  of  
self-­defence  and/or  UNSC  authorisation  to  use  force,  however,  is  debatable.  Its  precedential  
value  is,  therefore,  obscured.  The  USA  claimed  a  right  of  individual  and  collective  self-­defence,  
which   it   reported   to   the   UNSC.   UN   Doc   S/21492   (1990).   The   UK   followed   suit.   UN   Doc  
S/21501  (1990).  This  right  was  affirmed  by  the  UNSC.  UNSC  Res  661  (1990).  The  UNSC  later  
authorised  ‘all  necessary  means’  to  respond  to  the  invasion.  UNSC  Res  678  (1990).  See  e.g.  
Gardam  (2004)  151;;  Ruys  (2010)  101;;  Dinstein  (2017)  323–7;;  de  Wet   in  Ruys  and  Corten  
456–68.  
98  UN  Doc  S/PV.5953  (2008)  15.  Russia  meanwhile  offered  a  quantitative  understanding  of  
proportionality   to   justify   its  actions,   coupled  with  a   teleological  elaboration  of   it:   ‘the  use  of  
force  by  the  Russian  side  is  strictly  proportionate  to  the  scale  of  the  attack  and  pursues  no  
other  goal  but  to  protect  the  Russian  [peacekeepers  and  citizens]  and  to  prevent  future  armed  
attacks  against  them.’  UN  Doc  S/2008/545  (2008).  
99  UN  Doc  S/PV.5961  (2008)  6.  
100  IIFFMCG  Report,  248–9,  272–5.  
101  UN  Doc  S/PV.3653  (1996)  14.  
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defended  the  proportionality  of  its  actions  by  reference  to  the  defensive  aim  of  
responding  to  past  armed  attacks  and  preventing  repetition.102  It  adopted  the  
same  approach  in  2001.103  
Israel’s  attacks  on  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  in  2006  also  constitute  an  important  
case   study   of   proportionality,   both   in   terms   of   how   states   conceive   of   its  
general   conceptual   meaning   and   its   granular   content.   This   incident   is  
discussed   in  detail   in  Section  3.2.5.  For  present  purposes,   it   is  notable   that  
Russia’s  concern  was  framed  in  the  following  terms:  ‘the  scale  of  [Israel’s]  use  
of  force,  the  casualties  and  the  destruction  demonstrate  that  the  actions  stated  
for  achieving  this  purpose  go  far  beyond  a  counterterrorist  operation.’104  Whilst  
proportionality  was  not  specifically  referenced,  this  statement  implicitly  reflects  
Russia’s  teleological  conception  of  this  requirement,  with  material  quantitative  
imbalance   indicating   a   lack   of   defensive   purpose.  Qatar’s   attitude  was   the  
same.  It  remarked  on  the  extent  of  civilian  targets  in  reaching  its  conclusion  
that  Israel’s  action  had  gone  beyond  a  stated  defensive  objective.105  Although  
differing  on  the  proportionality  of   its  actions  on  the  facts,  Israel  adopted  this  
model  to  defend  its  actions:  ‘the  proportionality  of  a  response  to  an  attack  is  to  
be  measured  not   in   regard   to   the   specific   attack   suffered  by   a   state   but   in  
regard  to  what  is  necessary  to  remove  the  overall  threat.’106  This  reflected  its  
prior  justification  when  it  acted  to  rescue  its  nationals  in  Uganda  in  1976.  The  
Israeli   representative   insisted   that   ‘[t]he   means   used   were   the   minimum  
necessary  to  fulfil  that  purpose,  as  is  laid  down  in  international  law.’107  
                                                                                        
102  UN  Doc  S/1999/781(1999)  2.  
103  UN  Doc  S/2001/381  (2001)  1.  
104  UN  Doc  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  1)  (2006)  2.  
105  UN  Doc  S/PV.5493  (2006)  14.  
106  ‘Responding  to  Hizbullah  attacks  from  Lebanon:  Issues  of  proportionality’,  Israel  Ministry  




107  UN  Doc  S/PV.1939  (1976)  121.  Israel  did  not  explicitly  reference  proportionality,  but  this  is  
implicit  in  the  statement  and  from  the  context.  This  claim  of  self-­defence  is  dubious  (see  e.g.  
Gray  (2018)  39),  but   the  putative  defending  state  expresses   its  actions  to  be  bound  by   the  
requirement  of  a  defensive  purpose.  
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The  scale  of  the  2006  Israel  invasion,  and  its  effect  on  the  civilian  population,  
meant   that   the  quantitative   imbalance  between   the  attack  and  defence   (i.e.  
civilian  harm  on  both  sides)  was  particularly  stark.  States  emphasized  these  
material  factors,  although  the  general  consensus  amongst  them  was  that  the  
Israeli  action  went  well  beyond  the  defensive  purpose  of  countering  Hezbollah.  
It   was   regarded   as   excessive   and   punitive. 108   In   contrast,   in   response   to  
Turkey’s   2008   Operation   Sun,   the   EU   warned   against   a   disproportionate  
military  response.  It  called  upon  Turkey  ‘to  limit  its  military  activities  to  those  
which  are  absolutely  necessary  for  achieving  its  main  purpose  -­  the  protection  
of   the   Turkish   population   from   terrorism.’109  The   statement   is   ambiguous.   It  
talks  of   ‘protection’  rather   than   ‘self-­defence’  and  does  not  explicitly  engage  
with  legality.  Yet,  the  clear  implication  is  that  the  lawfulness  (or,  at  least,  the  
acceptability)   of   the   Turkish   operation   was   conditioned   on   Turkey   not  
exceeding  a  defensive  purpose.  Moreover,  whilst  the  Turkish  intervention  was  
quantitatively   greatly   in   excess   of   the   PKK   attacks   that   preceded   it,   the  
international   community   did   not   condemn   it. 110   Instead,   an   overarching  
teleological  approach  appears   to   lead   to  a  conclusion   that  Turkey’s  actions  
were  an  act  of  proportionate  self-­defence.111  
The   most   recent   state   practice   in   response   to   international   terrorism   also  
reveals   a   clear   overarching   teleological   approach   to   proportionality.   In   this  
context,  purported  defensive  action  taken  by  states  against  NSAs  labelled  as  
terrorists  will  often  be  greatly  in  excess  of  the  armed  attack(s)  that  preceded  
it.  Such  a  response  may  contain  far-­reaching  aims  over  and  above  repulsing  
ongoing   armed   attacks   or   preventing   imminent   ones.   This   may   stretch   to  
removing  a  de  facto  government  such  as  the  Taliban,  or  the  total  destruction  
                                                                                        
108  See  Section  3.2.5.  
109  ‘EU  Presidency  Statement  on  the  Military  Action  Undertaken  by  Turkey  in  Iraqi  Territory’,  
25   February   2008,  
<www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/CFSP_Statements/February/0225MZZturkey.ht
ml>.  
110  The  PKK’s  cross-­border  raids  were  on  a  small  scale,  albeit  resulting  in  Turkish  casualties.  
The  eventual  Turkish  response,  in  contrast,  consisted  of  the  deployment  of  several  thousand  
troops,  aerial  assaults  and  artillery  support.  For  details,  see  Ruys  (2008)  334–5,  362.  
111  Ibid,  especially  362–3;;  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  396.  See  also  Trapp  in  
Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  700.  
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of   NSA   terrorist   organizations   like   Al-­Qaeda   and   Daesh.   Such   action  may  
constitute  manifest  quantitative  imbalance  between  attack  and  defence.  Yet,  it  
is   accepted   by   a   large   number   of   states.   That   such   action   might   be  
proportionate  to  a  defensive  purpose  has  also  received  implicit  support  from  
the  UNSC  (e.g.  in  the  form  of  UNSC  Resolution  2249).  These  conclusions,  and  
the  applicable  state  practice  are  covered  in  detail  in  Chapter  4.  
e)   State  practice  -­  pleadings  before  the  ICJ    
States  have  referred  to  both  models  of  proportionality  in  their  pleadings  before  
the  ICJ,  whilst  expressing  a  preference  for  the  teleological  model.  In  Nuclear  
Weapons,  France  explicitly  relied  on  Ago’s  teleological  characterisation  set  out  
in   Section   3.1.1(a),   stating   that   necessity   and   proportionality   required   that  
measures  of  response  to  an  attack  be  adjusted  to  the  defensive  aim.112  In  line  
with  the  practice  referred  to  in  the  previous  Sections,  the  UK’s  position  in  this  
case  was   that   a   proportionate   response   related   to   the   ‘threat   posed   to   the  
victim  State’,  referring  to  the  need  for  the  victim  to  be  able  to  ‘defend  himself  
and   reverse   the   aggression’.   It   insisted   that   ‘[a]   decision   to   use   nuclear  
weapons  would  only  be  taken  in  extreme  cases  and  on  the  basis  of  the  ultimate  
duty  of  a  State  to  defend  its  people  and  their  homeland.’113  Proportionality  was  
to   be   judged,   therefore,   by   balancing   it   against   a   defensive   purpose.   New  
Zealand,  implicitly,  took  the  same  approach.  It  insisted  that  defensive  acts  be  
proportionate   to   the   ‘danger’   that   they  are  designed  to  meet.114  San  Marino,  
meanwhile,  argued  that  self-­defence  must  be  proportionate  to  the  ‘provocation’  
or  the  ‘offence’,115  which  might  be  understood  as  the  preceding  armed  attack.  
Mexico  also  asserted  an  apparently  quantitative  understanding  to  ensure  that  
defensive  acts  are  not   ‘excessive’.116  However,   it  drew  on  the   ILC’s  work  on  
                                                                                        
112  Nuclear  Weapons,  Oral  Proceedings,  Verbatim  Record,  CR  95/23,  66.  
113  Nuclear  Weapons,  Oral  Proceedings,  Verbatim  Record,  CR  95/34,  34.  
114  Nuclear  Weapons,  New  Zealand  Note  Verbale,  55.  Such   ‘danger’  appears   to  consist  of  
both  actual  and   imminent  armed  attacks,  and  a  right  of  self-­defence   to  prevent   the   latter   is  
explicitly   asserted.   Ibid,   para   56.   Ipso   facto,   a   response   to   the   cumulative   ‘danger’   might  
include  a  quantitatively  greater  amount  of  force  than  the  immediately  preceding  armed  attack.  
This  suggests  a  teleological  approach.  
115  Nuclear  Weapons,  Oral  Proceedings,  Verbatim  Record,  CR  95/31,  20–1.  
116  ‘The  right  of  self-­defense   is   (…)  considered   legal  when  proportional   to  the  armed  attack  
that  gave  rise  to  such  defense.’  Nuclear  Weapons,  Mexican  Note  Verbale,  paras  57–8.  
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state  responsibility  to  justify  this  position,  rather  than  the  JAB,  which  obscures  
its   analysis. 117   India   referenced   both   models   of   proportionality   in   the  
alternative.118  
In  Oil   Platforms,   Iran   also   implicitly   relied   on   Ago,   appearing   to   accept   a  
teleological  model   of   proportionality   that   related   to   ‘the   needs  of   protection  
rather   than   the   scale   of   the   attack’.119  This   understanding   was  made  more  
explicit  when   it  drew  a  distinction  between   lawful  self-­defence  and  unlawful  
reprisals.  The  difference,  it  was  stated,  was  a  disproportionate  use  of  force,  
being  excessive  in  relation  to  a  protective  need.120  Intriguingly,  however,  Iran  
later  relied  on  the  quantitative  standard  in  its  Reply:  
It   is   an   uncontroversial   requirement   of   self-­defence   that   counter-­force  
must  not  be  excessive  in  relation  to  the  first  use  of  force.  This  means  that  
the  damage  done  by   the  counter-­force  must  be  commensurate  with  or  
generally  comparable  to  that  caused  by  the  first  use  of  force.121  
It  is  not  clear  from  the  pleadings  why  it  switched  models.  It  might  have  been  to  
highlight   the   ‘gross   lack   of   balance’   between   the   damage   caused   by   the  
alleged  attacks  on  the  USA  and  the  harm  that  the  USA  inflicted  in  response.122  
The   scale   of   the   imbalance   was   reflected   in   the   Court’s   observations   on  
proportionality.123  It  perhaps  refers,  therefore,  to  a  belief  that  a  manifest  lack  of  
symmetry   between   attack   and   defence   is   indicative   of   teleological  
disproportionality.   The   USA   certainly   understood   Iran’s   position   on  
                                                                                        
117  Ibid,  para  58.  The  ICJ  has  also  adopted  this  approach.  See  Section  3.1.1(f).  
118  [A]ny  use  of  force  in  self-­defence  has  to  be  proportional  to  the  means  and  ends  involved  or  
to  the  original  wrongful  use  of  force.’  Nuclear  Weapons,  Letter  from  the  Ambassador  of  India,  
together  with  Written  Statement  of  the  Government  of  India,  20  June  1995,  3.  
119  Oil  Platforms,  Memorial  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  8  June  1993,  paras  4.21–
3.  
120  Ibid,  para  4.34.  
121  Oil  Platforms,  Reply  and  Defence  to  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  
Iran,  10  March  1999,  para  7.62.  
122  Ibid,  para  7.63.  
123  See  Section  3.1.1(f).  
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proportionality  to  be  teleological,  and  explicitly  agreed  with  this  approach  by,  
inter  alia,  also  citing  Ago’s  formulation.124  
In  Palestinian  Wall,  whilst  many  states  were  as  dismissive  of  Israel’s  claim  of  
self-­defence  as  the  Court,  some  did  engage  with  necessity  and  proportionality.  
Palestine,  for  example,  in  asserting  that  defensive  force  must  be  ‘proportional  
to   the  actual  or   imminent  harm’,125  appeared  to  adopt  a  mixed  model,  going  
beyond  equivalence  of  attack  and  defence  to  encompassing  the  prospective  
need   to   avoid   future   harm.   Indonesia,   Malaysia,   South   Africa   and   Cuba,  
meanwhile,  all  clearly  presented  an  understanding  of  proportionality  linked  to  
a  defensive  purpose.126  Lastly,  in  Armed  Activities,  the  DRC  was  another  state  
to   expressly   rely   on  Ago’s   teleological  model.127  Uganda  disagreed  with   the  
DRC’s  conclusions  on  the  facts,  although  it  likewise  adopted  this  approach  to  
proportionality,  insisting  that  its  actions  were  ‘directly  related  to  [its]  defensive  
objectives’.128  
f)   ICJ  jurisprudence  
The  quantitative  model  of  proportionality  prima  facie  dominates  the  reasoning  
of  the  ICJ.  However,  it  goes  too  far  to  represent  this  as  the  Court’s  definitive  
approach  to  this  issue.  A  firm  and  coherent  line  of  reasoning  is  not  reflected  in  
the   jurisprudence.   In  Nicaragua,   the   Court   stated   that   ‘self-­defence   would  
warrant   only   measures   which   are   proportional   to   the   armed   attack   and  
                                                                                        
124  Oil   Platforms,   Counter-­Memorial   and   Counter-­Claim   submitted   by   the   United   States   of  
America,  23  June  1997,  para  4.32;;  Oil  Platforms,  Rejoinder  submitted  by  the  United  States  of  
America,  23  March  2001,  paras  5.48–5.51.  The  USA  reported  to  the  UNSC  that  its  defensive  
response  was  ‘necessary  and  proportionate  to  the  threat  posed  by  (…)  hostile  Iranian  actions’  
(emphasis  added).  UN  Doc  S/19791  (1988).  
125  Palestinian  Wall,  Written  Statement  Submitted  by  Palestine,  29  January  2004,  paras  530,  
533.  
126  Palestinian   Wall,   Written   Statement   submitted   by   the   Government   of   the   Republic   of  
Indonesia,   30   January   2004,   para   5;;  Palestinian  Wall,  Written   Statement   of   Malaysia,   30  
January  2004,  para  151;;  Palestinian  Wall,  Written  Statement  Submitted  by  the  Government  
of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  30  January  2004,  paras  36,  38,  59;;  Palestinian  Wall,  Written  
Statement  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  30  January  2004,  6.  
127  Armed  Activities,  Memorial   of   the  Democratic  Republic   of   the  Congo,  July   2000,   paras  
5.26–5.31;;  Armed  Activities,  Reply  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  29  May  2002,  
paras  3.159–3.160.  
128  Armed  Activities,  Rejoinder  submitted  by  the  Republic  of  Uganda,  6  December  2002,  paras  
289–90.  
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necessary   to   respond   to   it’.129  The  majorities   adopted   this   approach   in  Oil  
Platforms  and  Armed  Activities,  although  they  did  not  go  into  further  detail  in  
either   case. 130   A   further   examination   of   Nicaragua   demonstrates   that   the  
Court’s  understanding  of  proportionality  is  not  so  straightforwardly  quantitative.  
Whilst  the  issue  of  proportionality  was  moot  in  this  case,131  the  Court  opined  
that:  
Whatever  uncertainty  may  exist  as  to  the  exact  scale  of  the  aid  received  
by  the  Salvadorian  armed  opposition  from  Nicaragua,  it  is  clear  that  [the  
United   States’   purported   defensive   conduct]   could   not   have   been  
proportionate  to  that  aid.132  
The  balance  the  Court  is  striking  in  this  paragraph  is  not  between  the  armed  
attack  and  the  purported  defensive  force,  including  their  respective  outcomes.  
Instead,  it  is  between  wrongful  conduct  (being  action  not  sufficient  to  reach  the  
scale   of   gravity   required   by   the   Court   for   an   armed   attack)   and   purported  
defensive  force.  There  is,  therefore,  a  disconnect  between  what  the  Court  says  
it  is  doing  and  what  it  is  actually  doing.  
Balancing  wrongful  conduct  against  measures  adopted  by  a  state  in  response  
to  such  conduct,  and  requiring  a  degree  of  equivalence,  points  more  clearly  to  
the  operation  of  countermeasures  than  to  claims  of  self-­defence.  It  is  generally  
accepted  that  countermeasure  must  be  proportionate  to  the  act  that  provoked  
them,133  an  approach  clearly  followed  by  the  ICJ  in  Gabčíkovo-­Nagymaros.134  
Whilst  the  Court  stipulates  in  Nicaragua  that  it  is  balancing  attack  and  defence,  
therefore,   this   is   not   so.   By   balancing   instead   wrongful   conduct   against  
                                                                                        
129  Nicaragua,  para  176  (emphasis  added).  
130  Oil  Platforms,  para  77;;  Armed  Activities,  para  147.  
131  The  Court  had  decided  that  the  provision  of  any  aid  by  Nicaragua  to  the  insurgents  in  El  
Salvador  could  not  constitute  an  armed  attack,  thereby   justifying  an   invocation  of  collective  
self-­defence.  Nicaragua,  para  230.  
132  Ibid,   para   237   (emphasis   added).   For   the   Court’s   summary   of   the   American’s   putative  
defensive  conduct,  see  paras  80,  81  and  86.  
133  See  Art  51  ARSIWA  and  related  Commentary.  
134  Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros,  para  85.  
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defensive   force,   it  adopts  an  approach  to  proportionality   that  conflates  self-­
defence  with  countermeasures.  
To  add  to   this  confusion,   it   is  possible   to   interpret   the  Court’s   focus  on   this  
issue  as  pertaining   to   the  provision  of   the  aid,   rather   than   the  aid   in  and  of  
itself.   On   this   basis,   the   majority   may   be   understood   as   referring   not   to  
equivalence   between   the   aid   given   and   the  American   response,   but   rather  
whether   the   action   taken   by   the   USA   was   commensurate   to   the   goal   of  
stopping  that  aid.135  If  so,  this  is  a  teleological  appreciation  of  proportionality,  
not  a  quantitative  one.  It  suggests  that  the  Court  is  measuring  the  application  
of  purported  defensive  force  against  a  particular  purpose  
It  is  notable  that  Judge  Higgins,  in  her  separate  opinion  in  Nuclear  Weapons,  
offered  the  following  interpretation  of  the  majority’s  opinion  in  Nicaragua:  
the  Court  already  made  clear  that  the  concept  of  proportionality  in  self-­
defence  limits  a  response  to  what  is  needed  to  reply  to  an  attack.  This  is  
consistent  with   the  approach  of  Professor  Ago  (…)   that   the  concept  of  
proportionality  referred  to  was  that  which  was  proportionate  to  repelling  
the  attack,  and  not  a  requirement  of  symmetry  between  the  mode  of  the  
initial  attack  and  the  mode  of  response.136  
In   endorsing   Ago’s   position,137   Judge   Higgins   rejects   reliance   on   a   purely  
quantitative  model  of  proportionality.  In  so  doing,  she  espouses  a  reading  of  
the  Nicaragua  judgment  that  is  unsupportive  of  the  notion  that  proportionality  
requires  equivalence  between  attack  and  defence.  This  reading  of  the  majority  
opinion  follows  Judge  Schwebel’s  approach  in  his  dissent  in  Nicaragua,  where  
he  also  quoted  Ago.138  The  ICJ’s  approach  in  Nicaragua  is  not,  therefore,  as  
clear-­cut   as   it   may   initially   seem.   In   addition   to   the   confusion   as   to   which  
variables  the  Court   is  balancing  (in  contrast  to  those  it  says  it   is  balancing),  
                                                                                        
135  Gardam  (2004)  158;;  Green  (2009)  92.  
136  Nuclear  Weapons,  diss  op  Higgins,  para  5.  
137  See  Section  3.1.1(a).  
138  Nicaragua,  diss  op  Schwebel,  para  212.  
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there  is  scope  to  interpret  its  view  of  proportionality  as  one  that  is  not  reflective  
of   a   purely   quantitative   model.   The   jurisprudence   also   potentially   takes  
account  of  the  need  to  pursue  a  defensive  purpose.  
Judge  Higgins’  reading  of  Nicaragua  is  also  implicit  in  the  majority’s  opinion  in  
Nuclear   Weapons.   Following   an   expansive   review   of   international   law,  
including  consideration  of  necessity  and  proportionality,   the  Court  could  not  
reach  a  ‘definitive  conclusion  as  to  the  legality  or  illegality  of  the  use  of  nuclear  
weapons  by  a  State  in  an  extreme  circumstance  of  self-­defence,  in  which  its  
very   survival   would   be   at   stake.’ 139   The   Court’s   view,   therefore,   that   the  
‘proportionality   principle   may   thus   not   in   itself   exclude   the   use   of   nuclear  
weapons  in  self-­defence  in  all  circumstances’140  is  expressed  in  relation  to  the  
defensive  need  of  the  state,  i.e.  countering  an  existential  threat.  That  survival  
is   the  overarching  purpose  of   self-­defence  was  explicitly   recognized  by   the  
Court  as  a   ‘fundamental   right  of  every  State’,141  thereby   tying   the  right  more  
generally   to   its  purpose.   It  was   this  purpose   that  appeared   to  be  ultimately  
decisive   in   respect   of   the   question   put   to   the   Court.   Judge   Weeramantry  
adopted   the   same   approach   in   his   dissent.   He   likewise   quoted   Ago’s  
teleological   appreciation   of   proportionality,   by   implication   endorsing   it.142  In  
terms  of  the  ICJ’s  more  recent  jurisprudence,  Judge  Kooijmans  also  chose  to  
measure  proportionality  against  a  defensive  purpose  in  his  separate  opinion  in  
Armed  Activities.143  
Oil  Platforms  exemplifies   the  uncertainties   regarding   the  Court’s  account  of  
proportionality.  Putting  aside  once  again  the  general  propriety  of  the  Court’s  
                                                                                        
139  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  41–4,  97,  105(E).  The  latter  paragraph,  being  the  operative  part  
of  the  dispositif,  was  passed  seven  votes  to  seven,  with  the  President’s  casting  vote.  This  fact,  
and  the  number  of  separate  and  dissenting  opinions,  demonstrate  the  deep  division  within  the  
Court  on  this  highly  controversial  issue.  
140  Ibid,  para  42.  
141  Ibid,  para  96.  
142  Ibid,  diss  op  Weeramantry,  paras  392–3.  
143   ‘[Uganda’s]   actions   moreover   were   grossly   disproportionate   to   the   professed   aim   of  
securing  Uganda's   border   from  armed   attacks   by   anti-­Ugandan   rebel  movements.’  Armed  
Activities,  sep  op  Kooijmans,  para  34.  
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observations  on  this  issue,144  its  application  of  the  requirement  leaves  much  to  
be  desired.  The  majority  distinguished  between  the  American  response  to  the  
missile  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City,145  and  its  response  to  the  mining  of  the  USS  
Samuel  B.  Roberts.146  In  respect  of  the  former,  the  Court  concluded  that,  had  
it  found  the  American  attack  to  be  necessary,  it  could  potentially  have  been  
proportionate.147  In  contrast,   the   response   to   the   latter   incident  could  not  be  
proportionate.148  The  result  is  that  the  damage  or  destruction  of  oil  platforms  in  
response   to   a   missile   attack   on   a   single   merchant   vessel  may   have   been  
proportionate,  whilst  the  damage  and  destruction  of  oil  platforms  in  response  
to  the  mining  of  a  single  military  vessel  was  disproportionate.  The  Court  offered  
no  reasons  for  this  distinction.  
Given   that   the   USA’s   actions   in   each   case   were   essentially   of   the   same  
character,  and  both  were  responses  to  an  attack  on  a  single  vessel,  it  is  difficult  
to  see  why  the  Court  viewed  only  one  as  potentially  proportionate.149  Material  
factors   alone   (i.e.   focusing   solely   on   relative   harm)   appear   not   to   be   the  
reason.  The  Court  accepted  that  the  missile  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City  caused  
damage  to  the  ship  and  injury  to  six  crewmembers.150  The  mining  of  the  USS  
Samuel  B.  Roberts  resulted  in  the  injury  to  ten  American  sailors,  one  seriously,  
and  the  ship  was  severely  damaged.151  Prima  facie,  therefore,  the  harm  to  the  
                                                                                        
144  As  noted,  in  addition  to  finding  an  absence  of  an  armed  attack,  the  Court  considered  both  
responses  by  the  USA  to  be  unnecessary.  Oil  Platforms,  paras  61,  64,  72,  76.  Proportionality  
is,  therefore,  irrelevant.  
145  The   USA   attacked   the   Reshadat   offshore   oil   production   installation.   One   platform  was  
almost  completely  destroyed  and  another  severely  damaged.  Ibid,  para  47.  
146  The  USA  attacked  the  Nasr  and  Salman  oil  complexes.  The  former  was  nearly  destroyed  
and   the   latter   severely   damaged.   Ibid,   paras   65–6.   These   attacks   were   part   of   the   wider  
American  response,  codenamed  Operation  Praying  Mantis,  which  was  not  at  issue  before  the  
Court.  This  operation  involved,  inter  alia,  the  destruction  of  two  Iranian  frigates  and  a  number  
of  other  naval  vessels  and  aircraft,  in  addition  to  the  destruction  of  the  two  oil  complexes  that  
were  the  subject  of  the  dispute.  Ibid,  paras  68,  77.  
147  Ibid,  para  77.  
148  Ibid.  Whilst   the   Court   was   clearly   concerned   with   the   overall   reaction   of   the   USA,   this  
conclusion   regarding   disproportionality  was   expressed   to   be   so   regardless   of  whether   the  
attacks  on  the  Salman  and  Nasr  platforms  were  considered  in  isolation,  or  as  part  of  Operation  
Praying  Mantis.  
149  Green  (2009)  87.  
150  Oil  Platforms,  para  52.  For  further  details  of  the  alleged  damage  caused,  see  Oil  Platforms,  
Counter-­Memorial  and  Counter-­Claim  submitted  by   the  United  States  of  America,  23  June  
1997,  para  1.65.  
151  UN  Doc  S/19791(1988).  These  facts  appear  to  be  accepted  by  the  Court.  Oil  Platforms,  
para  67.  The  Court,  at  para  77,  later  characterised  the  damage  as  severe.  For  further  details  
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military  vessel  seems  to  be  greater  than  that  of  the  civilian  vessel.  Despite  this  
disparity,  the  Court  downplayed  the  damage  to  the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts.  
In   commentating   on   the   disproportionality   of   the  USA’s   actions   against   the  
Iranian  oil  platforms,   the  Court  places   importance  on   the   fact   that   the  USS  
Samuel  B.  Roberts  was  ‘a  single  United  States  warship,  which  was  severely  
damaged   but   not   sunk,   and   without   loss   of   life’. 152   This   appears   to   be   a  
comment  on  the  marked  asymmetry  between  attack  and  defence  and  the  fact  
that   the   American   response   had   a   punitive   feel   to   it.   This   points   to   an  
overarching  teleological  approach  to  proportionality.153  
The  difference  in  treatment  by  the  Court  of  the  two  incidents  might  relate  to  the  
means  of  attack,  i.e.  by  a  missile  or  mine.154  This  would  make  the  governing  
factor  the  nature  of  the  weapon  used  in  the  armed  attack  that,  as  explored  in  
Section  3.2.1,  should  not  of  itself  be  viewed  as  determinative  of  proportionality.  
If   the  Court’s   reasoning  pertaining   to  weapons   is   that  mines  are   inherently  
indiscriminate,  meaning  that  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts  could  not  have  been  the  
intended  target,155  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  pertains  to  proportionality.  
Logically,  this  pertains  to  general  and  specific  necessity,  i.e.  did  the  USA  need  
to  respond  at  all   if   it  was  not  the  intended  victim  and,  if  so,  to  where  should  
that   response   be   directed?   Alternatively,   the   Court   might   have   made   the  
distinction  it  did  based  on  the  nature  of  the  object  of  the  attack.  In  this  case,  
an  attack  on  a  merchant  vessel,  being  a  civilian  object,  might  be  deemed  by  
the  Court  to  be  qualitatively  different  to  an  attack  on  a  military  vessel.156  Yet,  it  
was  the  attack  on  the  USS  Samuel  B.  Roberts,  and  the  not  the  Sea  Isle  City,  
that  was  treated  by  the  Court  as  being  the  most  grave,  with  the  potential  of  
                                                                                        
of   the   alleged   damage   caused,   see  Oil   Platforms,   Counter-­Memorial   and   Counter-­Claim  
submitted  by  the  United  States  of  America,  23  June  1997,  para  1.105.  
152  Oil  Platforms,  para  77.  
153  Simple  asymmetry  on  its  own  would  suggest  a  conclusion  on  proportionality  based  solely  
on  the  quantitative  model.  It  is  the  factor  of  marked  asymmetry  in  this  incident  that  emphasizes  
the  purpose  element.  
154  Laursen  (2004)  152–3,  for  example,  appears  to  assume  that  the  means  of  attack  plays  a  
role  in  distinguishing  the  two  approaches.  
155  This   is  perhaps  discernable   in   the  Court’s  determination   that  the  USA  had  not  been  the  
victim  of  an  armed  attack  by  Iran.  Oil  Platforms,  para  61.  
156  See  Green  (2009)  87–8.  
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constituting   an   armed   attack. 157   Whether   the   distinction   regarding  
proportionality  is  justifiable,  therefore,  is  arguable.  The  Court  may  be  criticized  
for  not  setting  out  the  basis  on  which  it  makes  it.158  
Reaching   firm   inferences   from   the   jurisprudence   is,   therefore,   problematic.  
The   ICJ’s   reasoning   lacks   clarity   and   consistency   as   to  whether   it   regards  
proportionality  as  a  quantitative  and/or  teleological  exercise.  The  relationship  
between  the  armed  attack  and  the  defensive  response  certainly  forms  part  of  
the  limited  commentary  in  the  cases  that  have  come  before  the  Court.  To  what  
extent   asymmetry   between   material   factors   will   be   determinative   in   future  
cases,   and   what   other   elements   might   be   relevant   to   an   assessment   of  
proportionality,  is  uncertain.    
It   is  also  worth  noting   that   the  Court  has  so   far  adopted  an  analysis   that   is  
purely   retrospective,   focusing  on   the  harm  already   inflicted.   In  contrast,   the  
state  practice  discussed  throughout  this  thesis  is  generally  not  confined  to  a  
purely  retrospective  view.  Instead,  states  tend  to  adopt  instead  a  prospective  
approach  that  accounts  for  the  overall  threat  it  is  facing.  The  ICJ’s  approach  
reflects,   therefore,   the  specific   facts  of   the  cases  put  before   it.  The  result   is  
that   there   is   no   evident   judicial   framework   or   abstract   realisation   of  
proportionality  that  might  be  readily  applied  to  other  cases  with  different  facts.  
Perhaps   all   that   may   be   said   regarding   the   Court’s   general   approach   to  
proportionality  thus  far  is  that  it   is  inclined  to  recognize  the  possibility  that  a  
defensive  response  is  disproportionate  if  its  intensity  is  in  excess  of  the  gravity  
of  the  armed  attack.159  
                                                                                        
157  The  attack  on  the  Sea  Isle  City,  even  taken  together  with  other  incidents  cited  by  the  USA,  
did  not  constitute  an  armed  attack.  Oil  Platforms,  para  64.  In  contrast,  with  regards  to  the  USS  
Samuel  B.  Roberts,  the  Court  accepted  that  mining  a  single  military  vessel  may  be  sufficient  
to  constitute  an  armed  attack.  Ibid,  72.  
158  Green  (2009)  88.  
159  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  590.  
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3.1.2   A  mixed  model  of  proportionality  
The  foregoing  analysis  shows  that  understanding  proportionality  is  not  simply  
a  matter  of  adopting  one  model  to   the  complete  exclusion  of   the  other.  The  
quantitative  and  teleological  models  both  appear,  in  a  somewhat  inconsistent  
narrative,   in  state  practice,   ICJ   jurisprudence  and  scholarship.  This  has   led  
some   commentators   to   conclude   that   there   is   a   dual   aspect   to  
proportionality.160  Whilst   there   is   debate   regarding   which  model   dominates,  
some  also  conclude  that  state  practice  suggests  that  the  primary  determinant  
of   legality   is   the  defensive  purpose   to  be  achieved.161  This   latter  conclusion  
certainly  reflects  the  dominant  feature  of  state  practice,  but  the  final  picture  is  
more  nuanced.  As  the  next  Section  shows,  proportionality  operates  in  a  way  
that  goes  beyond  consideration  of  just  the  quantitative  and  teleological  models.  
There  is  more  than  a  dual  aspect  to  its  operation.  
It  is  clear,  however,  that  states  do  not  commonly  rely  on  a  purely  quantitative  
model.  They  do  not  require  precise  equivalence  between  an  armed  attack  and  
self-­defence  in  terms  of  the  nature,  scale  or  means  of  the  action  taken,  or  their  
respective   outcomes.162  Material   factors   such   as   civilian   harm   are   typically  
referenced,  but  this  does  not  equate  to  the  adoption  of  the  quantitative  model  
to   the   exclusion   of   other   considerations,   such   as   achieving   a   defensive  
purpose.  This  is  entirely  logical.  An  approach  to  proportionality  that  measures  
it   exclusively   on   the   basis   of   quantitative   equivalence   faces   significant  
limitations.  
The  deficiencies  are  largely  practical  and  relate  to  what  degree  of  equivalence  
is  required  and  how  it   is  to  be  evaluated.  One  might  argue  that,   in  cases  of  
minor,   one-­off   skirmishes,   the   quantitative   model   is   simple   and   intuitively  
                                                                                        
160  E.g.  Green  (2009)  95;;  Cannizzaro  (2006)  784;;  Ruys  (2010)  116;;  Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  744.  
See  also  Arts  4–5  San  Remo  Manual  on  International  Law  Applicable  to  Armed  Conflicts  at  
Sea,   12   June   1994,   <https://ihl-­databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/560?OpenDocument>   (‘San  
Remo  Manual’).  
161  E.g.  Green  (2009)  95;;  Van  Steenberghe  (2010)  205–7.  See  also  Cannizzaro  (2006)  784;;  
Gill  in  Weller  (2015)  744.  Cf  Ruys  (2010)  117.  
162  See  further  Section  3.2.1.  Even  the  state  practice  referred  to  in  Section  3.1.1(c)  does  not  
point  to  such  equivalence.  
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logical.  Higgins  notes,  for  example,  that  in  respect  of  such  incidents  ‘it  is  easy  
to  see  that  the  response  must  be  proportionate  to  the  harm  inflicted.’163  On  this  
basis,  deploying  a  nuclear  weapon  in  response  to  a  raid  across  a  border  would  
be   disproportionate. 164   That   much   seems   obvious.   Yet,   absent   extreme  
asymmetry,  it  is  not  clear  how  quantitative  equivalence  should  be  measured,  
particularly  in  terms  of  effects.  Whether  it  comes  down  to  tallying  up  harm  on  
either   side   in   a   mathematical   fashion   or   involves   another   more   complex  
quantification  of  injury  is  uncertain.  How  is  one  to  place  a  value  on  dissimilar  
entities  that  have  been  damaged  or  destroyed  on  either  side,  and  at  what  point  
does   approximate   equivalence   turn   into   disproportionality?   It   seems  
impossible  to  draw  a  line  that  is  conceptually  meaningful.  
Employing  only  a  quantitative  model  to  establish  if  and  when  force  becomes  
unacceptable  points  to  arbitrariness.  It  also  potentially  deprives  the  state  of  the  
means  to  pursue  to  conclusion  the  goal  of  its  inherent  right.165  In  fact,  limiting  
a   defensive   response   to   quantitative   equivalence  might   give   rise   to   further  
armed   attacks.   This   is   because   the   danger   posed   by   the   attacker   is   not  
necessarily   countered   in   a   way   that   ensures   enduring   peace.   Ultimately,  
Higgins  does  accept  that  pursuing  a  legitimate  defensive  objective  may  mean  
that  force  is  proportionate  ‘even  though  it  is  a  more  severe  use  of  force  than  
any   single   prior   incident   might   have   seemed   to   have   warranted   it.’166  This  
reflects  the  fact  that  states  tend  to  be  more  flexible  in  their  appraisals,  often  
including  a  retrospective  and  prospective  appreciation  that  encompasses  past,  
ongoing   and   (potentially)   imminent   armed   attacks. 167   This   approach   is  
particularly   notable   in   state   practice   relating   to   self-­defence   against   NSAs,  
where  defending  states  do  not  limit  their  defence  quantitatively  to  completed  
armed  attack(s)  and  the  resulting  harm.  Their  defensive  responses  invariably  
                                                                                        
163  Higgins  (1994)  231.  
164  Ibid.  
165  See  further  Cannizzaro  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  345–6.  
166   Higgins   (1994)   232.   See   further   Schmitt   in   Breau   and   Jachec-­Neale   (2006)   293,  
highlighting  similar  issues  in  assessing  IHL  proportionality.  
167  Ruys  (2010)  116.  
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encompass  a  prospective  element  and  are  calibrated  to  counter  the  entirety  of  
the  perceived  threat.168  
When  defending  states  face  a  continuing  threat  over  a  period  of  time  from  the  
same  source,  greater  flexibility  is  required  for  assessing  the  proportionality  of  
defensive   responses,   potentially   allowing   for   the   deployment   of   force   on   a  
larger  scale  to  the  immediately  preceding  armed  attack.  This  is  reflected  in  the  
state   practice   referred   to   in   Section   3.1.1   and   Chapter   4.   In   such  
circumstances,  there  is  potentially  a  greater  need  to  tackle  the  source  of  the  
attacks  itself.    In  extreme  cases,  the  result  might  be  the  total  military  defeat  of  
the   attacking   state,   or   the   removal   of   its   governing   regime. 169   Assessing  
proportionality  in  such  cases  will  naturally  involve  a  greater  number  of  factors,  
even  if  the  armed  attack  and  its  effects  are  the  starting  point.170  
The   state  practice   reviewed   in  Section   3.1.1   suggests,   however,   that   there  
must  be  a   rational  connection  between   the  outcomes  of   the  attack  and   the  
defence.171  Manifest  asymmetry  may   indicate  an  excessive  reaction.  Civilian  
harm  appears  from  state  practice  to  be  the  most  important  indicator  of  such  
excessiveness.172  Yet,  whilst  marked  quantitative  asymmetry   in  civilian  harm  
might,  as  an  independent  factor,  constitute  disproportionality  for  some  states,  
there   is   no   significant   body   of   practice   where   such   quantitative   imbalance  
alone  has  led  to  a  determination  of  illegality.173  As  noted  above,  such  material  
factors,  in  and  of  themselves,  cannot  be  tallied  up  in  any  meaningful  manner  
so   as   to   be   determinative   of   proportionality.   Rather,   marked   quantitative  
asymmetry  will  tend  to  act  as  an  indicator  of  a  lack  of  a  defensive  purpose  (e.g.  
                                                                                        
168  See  Chapter  4.  
169  Ruys  (2010)  116–17.  Overthrowing  a  government  would  only  be  considered  proportionate  
in  those  extreme  and  very  rare  cases  where  this  was  the  only  way  to  achieve  the  defensive  
aim.  Corten  (2010)  285.  See  further  Section  4.1.3  regarding  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  and  
the  removal  of  the  Taliban.  This  controversial  prospect  is  also  embodied,  for  example,  in  the  
contrasting  opinions  over  whether   the  removal  of  Cambodia’s  Khmer  Rouge  by  Vietnam  in  
1978  was  a  proportionate  act  of  self-­defence.  See  e.g.  Franck  (2001)  150;;  Fox  in  Ruys  and  
Corten  (2018)  251.  
170  See  Section  3.2.  
171  This  is  to  be  contrasted  to  the  connection  between  the  armed  attack  and  the  target  of  the  
defensive  response,  which  is  an  issue  for  specific  necessity.  See  Sections  2.5  and  3.3.2.  
172  See  Sections  3.2.5  and  4.2.3.  
173  See  Section  3.1.1(c).  
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Israel’s   invasion  of  Lebanon   in  2006).  Such  material   factors,   therefore,  also  
speak   to   the   teleological  model  of  proportionality.  When  defensive  action   is  
greatly   in   excess   of   the   armed   attack   and   harm   caused   by   it,   absent   a  
satisfactory  justification,  it  risks  being  characterised  as  punitive  and  unlawful.  
Likewise,  and  conversely,  states,  courts  and  international  bodies  may  point  to  
quantitative   equivalence   in   order   to   assist   with   establishing   a   defensive  
purpose.174  Material  factors  are,  therefore,  clearly  important  to  appraising  self-­
defence,   but   the   ultimate   governing   factor   is   typically   whether   or   not   a  
defensive  purpose  is  objectively  identifiable.  
It   is   this   overriding   teleological   approach   to   proportionality   that   is   the  
predominant  feature  of  the  scholarship,  jurisprudence  and,  most  importantly,  
state  practice  analysed  in  Section  3.1.1.  Adherence  to  this  model,  may  even  
excuse  manifest  asymmetry  between  attack  and  defence  (e.g.  Operation  Sun  
in  2008  and  the  ongoing  Coalition  action  against  Daesh  in  Syria).175  The  injury  
incurred,  or  expected,  from  an  armed  attack  is  certainly  an  important  part  of  
the  equation,  but   it   is  best   thought  of  as  offering  a  prima   facie  guideline   to  
establishing  a  proportionate  defensive  response.  Therefore,  whilst  it  might  be  
true  that  a  response  that  is  disproportionate  in  scale  to  the  initial  attack  is  likely  
to  be  disproportionate  to  the  goal  of  abating  that  attack,176  this  will  not  always  
be  so.  Proportionality  should  not  be  thought  of  as  limiting  defensive  action  to  
that  which  is  less  than  necessary  to  remove  the  threat.177  We  must,  therefore,  
be  careful  in  assuming  that  the  ‘primary  determinant’  of  proportionality  is  the  
                                                                                        
174   In   Oil   Platforms,   for   example,   whilst   the   USA   favoured   the   teleological   model,   the  
summation   of   its   position   was   that   ‘it   is   clear   that   the   U.S.   actions   were   proportionate  
responses  in  self-­defense  to  the  Iranian  armed  attacks  and  continuing  threat  of  hostile  action.’  
Oil  Platforms,  Rejoinder  submitted  by  the  United  States  of  America,  23  March  2001,  para  5.51.  
175  That  other  states  largely  appear  to  accept  quantitative  asymmetry  in  these  incidents,  see  
Sections  3.1.1(d)  and  4.1.3(b).  
176  Green  (2009)  94–5.    
177  Greenwood   (2011)  para  28,  gives  an  example  of   territory  captured  by  a  surprise  attack  
employing  a   limited  use   of   force.  Where   the  attacker  goes  on   to   reinforce   its  position,   the  
defending  state  will  be  required  to  employ  a  far  greater  degree  of  force  to  reverse  the  situation.  
To  prohibit  it  from  doing  so  would  be  to  reward  the  attacker  and  place  the  victim  state  in  an  
unreasonable  disadvantage.  Greenwood  asserts  that  there  is  no  indication  that  international  
law   requires  such  an  unjust   conclusion.  Proportionality  must   therefore  allow   the  defending  
state  to  reverse  the  effects  of  the  armed  attack.  
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nature  and  gravity  of  the  armed  attack.178  This  approach  risks  placing  undue  
emphasis  on  this  particular  aspect  of  the  quantitative  model  at  the  expense  of  
pursuing   the   defensive   right   to  which   proportionality   speaks.  Doing   so  may  
lead   to   hasty   conclusions   regarding   the   proportionate   or   disproportionate  
nature  of  a  particular  act.  
Assessing   proportionality   primarily   by   reference   to   the   defensive   need   but  
taking  full  account  of  relevant  material  factors  (including  relative  harm),  offers  
the  best  general   theoretical  model  of  proportionality.  This  approach  accords  
more  readily  with  the  genesis  and  purpose  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  and  the  
need   for   states   to   respond   flexibly   to   protect   themselves   in   cases   of  
emergency.   States   may   respond   legitimately   on   a   retrospective   and  
prospective  basis  and  account  for  the  wider  threat  comprising  past,  ongoing  
and  imminent  armed  attacks.  At  the  same  time,  this  mixed  model  calls  for  a  
balance  to  be  struck  such  that  defensive  military  action  does  not  result  in  harm  
that  is  completely  out  of  proportion  to  the  attack(s)  that  prompted  it.  Going  one  
step   further,  however,   it   is  clear   that  proportionality  also  accounts   for  wider  
interests   that   go   beyond   both   the   quantitative   and   teleological   models   of  
proportionality.  These  interests  are  considered  in  the  next  Section.  
3.2   Applying  proportionality  and  identifying  ‘excessiveness’  
The  balancing  exercise   described   in  Section   3.1   is   not   the   end  of   how  we  
should  understand  proportionality.  States  tend  to  justify  the  proportionality  of  
their  putatively  defensive  acts  primarily  by  reference  to  a  defensive  purpose,  
and  other  states  focus  on  such  purpose  when  reviewing  the  legality  of  such  
acts.  Yet,  it  is  also  clear  that  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  not  absolute,  and  the  
review  of  defensive  actions  does  not  operate  in  a  vacuum.  Despite  what  some  
may   regard   as   the   ‘superior   right’   of   the   defending   state   vis-­à-­vis   the  
attacker,179  other  states  do  not  regard  the  right  of  self-­defence  as  a  licence  to  
                                                                                        
178  As  suggested  by  Ruys  (2010)  117  (emphasis  added).  On  the  nature  of  an  armed  attack,  
however,  see  Section  3.2.1.  
179  Cannizzaro  (2006)  785.  
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harm  others,  especially  civilians.180  More  generally,  when  other  states,  courts  
and   scholars   review   proportionality   and   whether   or   not   it   is   ‘excessive’   (to  
quote  Webster),  they  consider  a  range  of  issues.    
This  Section  reviews,  therefore,  factors  that  are  regarded  as  either  permitted,  
or   proscribed,   by   proportionality.   The  analysis   includes   factors   that   are  not  
relevant   to   proportionality   by   way   of   additional   clarification   of   how  
proportionality   operates   in   practice   and,   in   certain   cases,   to   confront  
conclusions   made   by   certain   scholars   regarding   what   is   relevant   to   the  
proportionality  calculus.  Where  this  is  so,  it  is  highlighted.  These  factors,  inter  
alia,  account  for  the  needs  and  rights  of  the  defending  state,  as  well  as  those  
of  the  attacker.181  They  ensure  that  the  purposes  of  self-­defence  are  achieved,  
and  nothing  more.  In  addition,  they  restrict  the  exercise  of  self-­defence  so  that  
it  does  not  impinge  unduly  on  the  interests  of  the  wider  international  community  
and   cause   excessive   harm   to   those   not   participating   in   the   conflict.   The  
relevance  and  relative   importance  of  each  factor  will  vary  depending  on   the  
circumstances,  and  they  may  overlap  and  interrelate  in  a  manner  that  is  not  so  
neatly  delineated  as  set  out  below.  The  subheadings  are  employed,  however,  
for  ease  of  analysis.182  
The   following   review   reveals   that   the   pursuit   of   defensive   purpose,   whilst  
operating   as   the   overarching   consideration,   is   not   unfettered.   Even   if   a  
defending   state   may   be   regarded   as   employing   no   more   force   than   is  
necessary   to  achieve  a  defensive  purpose,   it  may  nevertheless  be  deemed  
disproportionate  if  it  causes  undue  harm  to  other  interests,  including  third-­party  
interests.  A  defending  state  cannot  prioritise  its  right  of  self-­defence  over  the  
concerns  of   the   international  community  and  pursue  such   right  at  any  cost.  
These  other  interests  act  as  a  check  on  the  pursuit  of  a  defensive  purpose.  
                                                                                        
180  Tams  and  Bruckner  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  686.  See  Section  3.2.5.  
181  That   the  attacker  has  rights  under   the  JAB   is,  perhaps,  controversial.  Yet,   the   following  
analysis  shows  that  even  if   it   is  in  breach  of  Art  2(4)  UN  Charter,  it  does  not  follow  that  it   is  
subject   to   unchecked   violence   in   response.   In   particular,   excessive   harm   to   its   civilian  
population  risks  being  regarded  as  an  unlawful  act  of  self-­defence.  
182  The  way  in  which  these  different  interests  relate  with  each  other  in  the  context  of  armed  
attacks  by  NSAs  is  very  different.  This  is  discussed  further  in  Section  4.2.  
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They   constitute   additional   limitations   on   the   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­
defence,  acting  to  guard  against  excessive  defensive  responses.  The  result  is  
an   overriding   teleological   approach   that   balances   defences   force   and   its  
outcomes  against  a  defensive  purpose  and  against  these  other  interests.  
3.2.1   Scale,  nature,  methods  and  means  
Section  3.1.1  shows  that,  on  the  whole,  states  do  not  regard  proportionality  as  
confining  the  amount  of  defensive  force  to  that  employed  in  the  armed  attack  
that   provoked   it.   There   is   no   requirement   of   parity, 183   albeit   that   marked  
asymmetry   might   be   indicative   of   disproportionality.   State   practice   against  
armed   attacks   by   NSAs   referred   to   in   Sections   3.1.1   and   Chapter   4   most  
clearly  reflects  this  general  premise.  Defending  states  do  not  match  the  scale  
of  their  defence  to  those  of  NSA  attacks.  This  is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  
teleological   model   acting   as   the   primary   determinant   of   proportionality.  
Proportionality  operates  to  restrain  excess  and  mitigate  harm,  but  it  would  be  
illogical  that  the  defending  state’s  ability  to  protect  itself  is  strictly  limited  by  the  
capabilities  of  the  attacker  and  the  means  and  methods  the  latter  adopts  in  its  
armed  attack.  The  former  should  not  be  required  to  mirror  the  latter.  This  is  
particularly   the  case  where  a  series  of  attacks  are  expected   from  the  same  
source.   In   such   cases,   as   noted,   the  defensive   response  needs   to   take  on  
greater  proportions  to  the  armed  attack  that  immediately  prompted  it  in  order  
to  counter   the   threat   taken  as  a  whole.184  Unreasonable  confinement  of   the  
defending   state,   in   favour   of   the  attacker,   serves   only   to  encourage   further  
violence  and  prolong  conflict.185  
                                                                                        
183  E.g.  O’Connell  (1975)  64;;  Ago  (1980)  para  121;;  Gardam  (2005)  13;;  The  Chatham  House  
Principles,  969;;  Schmitt  (2007–2008)  153;;  Greenwood  (2011)  para  28;;  Gray  (2018)  159–60.  
184  See  Section  3.1.1(a).  
185  The  military  capacity  of  the  attacker,  including  the  nature  and  make-­up  of  its  armed  forces,  
is  not  irrelevant  to  determining  what  a  proportionate  self-­defence  looks  like  however.  This  fact  
was  highlighted,  for  example,  in  the  UK’s  justification  of  the  calibration  of  its  role  in  liberating  
Kuwait   from  Iraqi  occupation   in  1991.  The  size,  nature  and  make-­up  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  
‘military  machine’  helped   to  determine  what   force  was  needed   to   liberate  Kuwait.  UN  Doc  
S/PV.2977  (Part  II)  (1991)  72.  The  capabilities  of  the  attacker,  therefore,  might  constitute  one  
of  the  factors  that  go  to  calculating  what  is  required  to  achieve  a  defensive  purpose.  This  is  a  
practical  consideration  for  those  planning  military  strategy.  Legally,  however,  such  capabilities  
should  not  be  thought  of  as  an  overarching  limitation.  
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In  keeping  with  this  logic,  it  is  further  asserted  that  there  is  no  requirement  that  
the   defensive   force   be  of   the   same   nature   as   the   armed   attack,186  and   the  
defender  is  not  obliged  to  use  the  same,  or  even  similar,  weapons  as  used  in  
that   attack.187  Ground   attacks   employing   one   type   of   weapon,   for   example,  
may  be  met  with  an  aerial  response  using  another,  and  vice  versa.188  Judge  
Schwebel  adopted   this  general  position   in  his  dissent   in  Nicaragua,189  and   it  
has  occasionally  been  expressly  asserted  by  states.  The  Congo,  for  instance,  
asserts  that  ‘all  means  of  armed  force  a  victim  state  had  available  were  lawful,  
provided  they  were  used  only  for  defence.’190  The  UK  has  been  emphatic  on  
this  point:  
[The  UN  Charter]  says  nothing  whatever  about  any  particular  weapon  or  
method   which   may   be   used   for   self-­defence.   Those   who   wrote   the  
Charter  expected  victims  of  aggression  to  react  as  necessary  to  protect  
their   territorial   integrity  and  political   independence,  and  they  were  very  
careful  not  to  say  how  self-­defence  could  be  carried  out.191  
The  USA,  in  quoting  this  passage  in  its  pleadings  before  the  ICJ  in  Nuclear  
Weapons,  appears  to  endorse  this  approach,192  and  state  practice  responding  
to  acts  of  terrorism  clearly  reflects  it.193  Asymmetric  conflicts  of  this  kind  exhibit  
                                                                                        
186  Schmitt   (2013)   62–3.   One   exception   to   this   general   principle  might   be   the   first   use   of  
nuclear   weapons   in   response   to   a   conventional   armed   attack.   Given   the   likely   effects   of  
nuclear  weapons  on  other  states  and  the  environment  and  the  fact  that  a  first  use  of  nuclear  
weapons  risks  a  response  in  kind  (thereby  escalating  the  conflict),  such  first  use  is  only  likely  
to   be   proportionate   in   the   most   extreme   cases,   where   the   very   survival   of   the   state   is  
threatened  (see  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  96–7).  See  further  Greenwood  (1989)  280–1.  
187  Ruys   (2010)  123;;  Gray   (2018)  159–60.  See  also   IIFFMCG  Report,  272.  Cf  Greenwood  
(1989)  279–81;;  Gardam  (2004)  171–2.  
188  E.g.   respectively,   the   American   strike   on   the   IIS   headquarters   in   1993,   where   cruise  
missiles   were   used   to   respond   to   an   attack   employing   a   car   bomb;;   Operation   Enduring  
Freedom,  whereby  Al-­Qaeda’s  attacks  on  9/11  using  hijacked  aircraft  were  met  with  aerial  
attacks  and  the  eventual  ground  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  
189  Nicaragua,  diss  op  Schwebel,  paras  212,  237.  
190  UN  Doc  A/AC.134/SR.67–78  (1970)  90  (Congo).  
191  UN  Doc  A/PV.1063  (1961)  para  20.  
192   Nuclear   Weapons,   Letter   from   the   Acting   Legal   Adviser   to   the   Department   of   State,  
together  with  Written  Statement  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  20  June  
1995,   19.   The   USA   has   also   reserved   the   right   to   respond   to   cyber   armed   attacks   with  
conventional  means.  Speech  delivered  by  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  William  J.  Lynn,  III,  
National   Defense   University,   Washington,   D.C.,   14   July   2011,  
<http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593>.  
193  See  Chapter  4.  
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how  the  methods  and  means  of  attack  employed  by  NSAs  are  not  adopted  by  
states  in  their  defensive  responses.  No  state  fighting  against  Daesh  would  (or  
should)  see  itself  bound  to  responding  to  acts  of  terror  in  kind.  The  methods  of  
defence  are  therefore  incomparable  to  the  modes  of  attack.  
Proportionality,  and   the  JAB  more  generally,  do  not  prohibit,  nor  permit,   the  
use   of   any   particular   weapon,   including   nuclear   weapons.194   A   distinction  
should,  therefore,  be  drawn  between  whether  a  weapon  might  be  said  to  be  
inherently  disproportionate  from  a  JAB  perspective,  and  the  manner  in  which  
it   is  used.  On  the  first  point,   it   is  difficult  to  argue  that  any  weapon  might  be  
deemed  disproportionate  per  se  under  the  JAB.195  Such  proposition  is  clearly  
supported  by  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence.  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  France  maintained  
that  neither  necessity  nor  proportionality  could  preclude,  in  abstracto,  the  use  
of  nuclear  weapons   in  self-­defence.196  The  ICJ  accepted   this  view,  adopting  
the  position  that  even  nuclear  weapons  are  not  inherently  disproportionate.197  
If   the   most   devastating   weapon   of   all   does   not   automatically   breach   this  
requirement,   then   it   is  difficult   to  see  why  any  other  weapon,  by   its  nature,  
would   do   so.   It   cannot   be   the   nature   of   the   weapon,   therefore,   that   is  
determinative  of  proportionality.  
The  regulation  of  weapons  used  in  self-­defence  (or  otherwise)  is  primarily  and  
better   dealt   with   by   the   tailored   provisions   of   IHL   and   those   conventions  
relating  to  the  use  of  particular  weapons.198  A  summary  of  the  position  may  be  
stated  as  follows:  
It  is  necessary  to  reiterate  here  the  undoubted  right  of  the  State  that  is  
attacked   to   use   all   the   weaponry   available   to   it   for   the   purpose   of  
repulsing   the   aggressor.  Yet   this   principle   holds   only  so   long  as   such  
                                                                                        
194  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  39,  42,  105.  
195  Gardam  (2005)  19.  
196  Nuclear  Weapons,  CR  95/23,  66.  
197  ‘The  proportionality  principle  may  thus  not  in  itself  exclude  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  in  
self-­defence  in  all  circumstances.’  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  42.  
198  Certain  weapons,  such  as  chemical  and  biological  weapons,  are  absolutely  prohibited  by  
the   operation   of   IHL   and   specific   weapon   conventions.   See   e.g.   ‘Use   of  Weapons’   ICRC  
website,  <https://www.icrc.org/en/war-­and-­law/weapons>.  
     
     157  
weapons  do  not  violate   the   fundamental   rules  of  warfare  embodied   in  
those  rules.  Within  these  constraints,  and  for  the  purpose  of  repulsing  the  
enemy,   the   full   military   power   of   the   State   that   is   attacked   can   be  
unleashed  upon  the  aggressor.199  
JAB   proportionality   instead   considers   the   resulting   harm   caused   by   those  
weapons  (and  weighs   it,  primarily,  against  a  defensive  purpose).  As  will  be  
made  clear,   its   remit   is   the  overall  defensive   response  and   its  outcomes.200  
Self-­defence,  as  a  whole,  must  be  scaled  to  effect  that  purpose.  The  key  point  
when   looking  at   the  methods  of   defence,   therefore,   is  whether   a  weapon’s  
deployment   was   restricted   to   a   defensive   purpose.   Where   the   use   of   a  
particular  weapon,  or  mode  of  response,  significantly  escalates  hostilities,  this  
serves   to   counter   such   conclusion   and   points   to   a   disproportionate   use   of  
force.201  
Therefore,  subject  to  adhering  to  the  requirements  of  IHL  and  international  law  
relating  to  the  use  of  particular  weapons,  a  state  may  use  whatever  force  is  
required,  including  of  scale  and/or  means  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  an  armed  
attack,  but   no  more.202  In   fact,   depending  on   the   circumstances,   using   less  
force  than  the  armed  attack  may  be  sufficient  to  achieve  such  aim.203  The  latter  
point  is  crucial.  If  it  is  clear  in  the  circumstances  that  ‘less  force’  (in  terms  of  
the  nature  or  scale  of   the  response  and/or  methods  and  means  of  warfare)  
could  have  been  used  to  achieve  the  same  result,  this  suggests  that  the  force  
used  was  more  than  was  necessary  to  achieve  the  defensive  aim.204  
                                                                                        
199  Nuclear  Weapons,  diss  op  Weeramantry,  para  367  (emphasis  added).  
200  See,  in  particular,  Section  3.3.2.  
201  See  O’Connell   (1975)   64–5;;   Ruys   (2010)   123;;   Gardam   (2004)   171.   Section   2.8.1   UK  
Military  Manual  also  appears  to  take  this  approach.  In  such  cases,  it  is  not  the  nature  of  the  
weapon  or  mode  or  response,  per  se,  that  results  in  escalation.  It  is  how  the  weapon  is  used,  
or  the  results  of  the  mode  adopted,  that  may  take  a  response  beyond  a  defensive  purpose.  
See  e.g.  the  analysis  in  Section  2.5(a)  regarding  the  sinking  of  the  General  Belgrano.  
202  Green  (2015)  JUFIL,  101.  
203  Ago  (1980)  para  121;;  Gardam  (2005)  12.  
204  In  this  regard,  Kretzmer  (2013)  277,  asks  whether  it  was  ‘necessary  in  the  sense  that  no  
less  drastic  means  were  available  for  achieving  the  same  ends?’.  
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3.2.2   Timing  -­  a  distinct  element  of  proportionality?  
Once   a   defensive   response   has   achieved   the   purpose  of   self-­defence   (i.e.  
halting,   repelling   or   preventing   an   armed   attack),   or   the   UNSC   has   taken  
effective   action,   or   the   situation   has   otherwise   been   resolved   peaceably,  
defensive   force   will   no   longer   be   necessary.   Whilst   it   is   not   this   author’s  
position,   it  might  be   tempting   to  say   that  a  use  of   force  beyond  this  point   in  
time  is  also  disproportionate.  That  proportionality  might  impose  a  time  limit  on  
self-­defence  is  suggested  in  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence.  In  Nicaragua,  the  Court  
noted,  in  commenting  on  proportionality,  that  the  American  reaction  ‘continued  
long  after  the  period  in  which  any  presumed  armed  attack  by  Nicaragua  could  
reasonably   be   contemplated.’205  The  purported  defensive   response  endured  
after  the  point  in  time  that  the  defensive  necessity  had  fallen  away.  The  Court  
also  appeared  to  view  force  beyond  this  point  as  disproportionate.  
Yet,  the  Court’s  position  on  how  the  timing  of  a  defensive  response  relates  to  
proportionality   is   ambiguous.   As   set   out   in  Section   2.4.2,   it   considered   the  
timing  of  the  American  response  principally  on  the  basis  of  necessity.  Having  
found  a  lack  of  necessity,   it   is  unclear  why  it  offered  further  observations  on  
proportionality  or  considered  temporal  factors  to  be  part  of  this  requirement.  
Even   assuming   that   there   had   been   an   armed   attack,   the   fact   that   the  
American  action  continued   ‘long  after’   is   irrelevant   if   the  response   to   it  was  
unnecessary   and,   on   that   basis   alone,   unlawful.   As   such,   the   weight   that  
should  be  placed  on  this  observation  on  proportionality  is  questionable.  
A  number  of  commentators  also  adopt  the  view  that  temporal  elements  may  
form  part  of  both  necessity  and  proportionally.206  Yet,  identifying  a  clear  body  
of   state   practice   to   support   such   conclusion   is   difficult.   Examples   include  
Argentina’s  condemnation  of  Israel’s  ‘punitive  expedition’  in  Lebanon  in  1972.  
This  conclusion  was  reached,  inter  alia,  on  the  basis  that  proportion  had  not  
                                                                                        
205  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
206  E.g.  Gardam   (2004)  167;;  Ruys   (2010)  119;;  Green   (2015)  JUFIL,  112–13;;  Gill   in  Weller  
(2015)  745–6.  
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been  respected  in  terms  of  the  scale  of  the  action  or  its  duration.207  Argentina  
adopted   a   very   strict   understanding   of   proportionality   in   respect   of   Israel’s  
action   on   this   occasion.   In   addition   to   recognizing   a   temporal   element   in  
proportionality,  it  also  tied  its  operation  largely  to  the  quantitative  model.208  Its  
view   on   immediacy   is   likewise   strict:   ‘no   time  must   pass   in   deliberating   or  
reflecting  on  the  desirability  of  a  reaction.  This  means  that  the  reaction  must  
immediately   follow   the   illegal   attack.’ 209   This   displays   a   rigid,   and   overly  
simplistic,  understanding  of  both   requirements  and  might  be  a   result  of   the  
circumstances  of   the  particular   incident.  As  explored   throughout   this   thesis,  
states   and   scholars   do   not   generally   share   such   a   narrow   view   of   either  
necessity  or  proportionality.  
In  Armed  Activities,  the  DRC  likewise  argued  that  the  excessive  duration  of  the  
Ugandan  intervention  was  indicative  of  its  disproportionate  nature.210  However,  
the  intervention  consisted  of  Uganda’s  occupation  of  Congolese  territory.  As  
such,  it  is  the  specific  factor  of  enduring  occupation  that  might  best  explain  this  
negative  reaction.  A  further  example,  in  response  to  Israel’s  action  in  Lebanon  
against  Hezbollah  in  1996,  is  Egypt’s  insistence  that  ‘[t]he  scale,  duration  and  
objective   of   military   activity   must   be   proportionate   to   the   reason   for   [self-­
defence].’211  No  elaboration  was  offered,  however.  
We  should  not  dismiss  this  state  practice,  although  these  incidents  highlight  
how  difficult  it  is  to  discern  analytical  clarity  regarding  the  importance  (or  not)  
of   temporal  considerations   from   the  particular  context.  More  often   than  not,  
states   refer   vaguely   to   the   duration   of   a   defensive   response,   without  
specifically   identifying   whether   such   factor   pertains   to   necessity,  
proportionality,  or  any  other  legally  pertinent  requirement.  For  example,  Ruys  
proposes  the  American  intervention  in  the  Dominican  Republic  in  1965  as  a  
                                                                                        
207  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  29.  
208  ‘[T]he   measures   adopted   in   self-­defence  must   be   of   a   similar   nature   or   reasonably   in  
keeping  with  the  means  used  in  the  illegal  act  against  which  action  is  being  taken.’  UN  Doc  
S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  26.  
209  UN  Doc  S/PV.1644  (1972)  para  25.  
210  Armed   Activities,   Reply   of   the   Democratic   Republic   of   the   Congo,   29  May   2002,   para  
3.173–3.177.  
211  UN  Doc  S/PV.3653  (1996)  14.  
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candidate   in   support   of   the   contention   that   proportionality   encompasses   a  
temporal  element.  In  such  case,  France  insisted  that  any  operation  to  evacuate  
citizens  ‘should  be  limited  in  objective,  duration  and  scale’.212  Whilst  this  is  a  
classical   formulation   adopted   by   states   when   referring   to   defensive   force,  
France  does  not  specifically  mention  either  necessity  or  proportionality  when  
noting  this  as  a  requirement.  Likewise,  states  may  tie  the  duration  of  armed  
conflict  explicitly   to  a  defensive  necessity.  This  was   the  case  with   the  USA  
during   the   Vietnam   War,   for   example. 213   Commentators   may,   therefore,  
overstate   the  case,  providing  only  scant  state  practice   to  support   the  notion  
that  states  view  timing  as  a  clear  and  distinct  element  of  proportionality.214  The  
ICJ  and  states  undoubtedly  view  the  duration  of  self-­defence  as  relevant  to  its  
legality,  but  it  is  not  so  clear  if  and  how  it  operates  as  an  independent  indicator  
of  (dis)proportionality.  
This   blurring   of   the   line   between   the   requirements   of   necessity   and  
proportionality  should  be  resisted.  They  should  not  be  used  interchangeably,  
or  jointly,  as  an  all-­inclusive  statement  of  illegality.  Necessity  must  be  applied  
before  proportionality,  and  proportionality  is  only  meaningful  where  defensive  
force  is  and  remains  necessary.  Unnecessary  force  cannot  conceptually  also  
be   disproportionate.   There   is   no   defensive   purpose   against   which   such  
measure  might  be  made.  It  is  submitted,  therefore,  that  whilst  the  ICJ,  certain  
commentators   and   states   might   refer   (or   be   understood   as   referring)   to  
proportionality   in   terms   of   the   temporal   duration   of   a   particular   act,   in   the  
pursuit   of   conceptual   clarity,   this   is   misleading.215  It   is   not   clear   from   state  
practice  that  proportionality,  rather  than  general  necessity,  imposes  a  time  limit  
on  a  defensive  response.  
                                                                                        
212  Ruys  (2010)  119–20,  citing  (1965)  UNYB  142  (emphasis  added).  
213  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser  (1972)  837.  
214  Likewise,  Gardam  (2004)  167,  references  the  American  intervention  in  Grenada  in  1983  in  
support   of   the   same   contention,   citing   to   Levitin   (1986).   Yet,   Levitin’s   comments   on   the  
proportionality  of  the  action  appear  to  pertain  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Grenadian  government,  
not  the  duration  of  the  American  response.  Ibid,  650.  It   is  unclear,  therefore,  on  what  basis  
Gardam  interprets  this  state  practice.  
215  The  need  to  assess  proportionality  throughout  the  duration  of  a  defensive  act  is  separate  
to  this  issue  and  is  discussed  in  Section  3.4.  
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3.2.3   Geography  
It  is  often  stated  that  proportionality  also  imposes  a  geographical  limitation  on  
self-­defence,  meaning  that  defensive  force  ‘must  generally  be  confined  to  the  
area  of  the  threat  which  it  is  designed  to  meet.’216  However,  whether  and  how  
geography   factors   into   the   review   of   the   proportionality   of   self-­defence   is  
unclear,  particularly  in  light  of  recent  state  practice  against  NSAs  in  the  context  
of  transnational  terrorism.  Moreover,  where  a  defensive  response  is  directed  
might  be  better  thought  as  pertaining  to  specific  necessity,  as  proposed  in  this  
thesis,  rather  than  proportionality.  This  is  explored  further  below.  
a)   ICJ  jurisprudence  
In  Nicaragua,  the  Court  held  that  the  USA’s  mining  of  Nicaraguan  ports  and  
attacks   on   oil   installations,   in   response   to   Nicaragua’s   alleged   support   of  
Salvadorian   rebels   who   were   operating   along   El   Salvador’s   border,   was  
disproportionate.217  Implicit   in   this   determination   is   a   geographical   limitation,  
namely  that  proportionality  takes  account  of  the  distance  between  the  target  
of   defensive   force   and   the   source   of   the   armed   attack.   Indeed,   the   Court  
questioned   whether   a   strong   patrol   along   the   border   of   El   Salvador   and  
Honduras  might   have   been   the   best   way   to   respond   to   the   attacks   by   the  
Salvadorian  rebels.218  However,  it  is  unclear  how  this  distance  factored  in  the  
majority’s  view  on  proportionality.  
As   noted,   to   the   extent   that   the   Court   considered   the   necessity   and  
proportionality  of  the  USA’s  response  in  Nicaragua,  it  clearly  focused  on  the  
former  requirement.  In  fact,  the  mention  of  a  border  patrol  as  an  appropriate  
response  to  rebel  activity  in  that  area  can  clearly  be  interpreted  as  a  reference  
to  the  specific  necessity  of  the  American  action.  This  is  to  say  that  the  focus  of  
the  Court’s  concern  was  the  lack  of  a  nexus  between  the  target  of  the  American  
                                                                                        
216  Greenwood  (1989)  277.  See  also  O’Connell  (1975)  65;;  Schachter  (1991)  153–4;;  Gardam  
(2005)  14,  163;;  Ruys  (2010).  
217  Nicaragua,  para  237.  
218  Ibid,  para  156.  
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response  and  the  source  of  the  purported  armed  attack.219  This  is  not  simply  a  
question   of   geographical   proximity.   As   such,   distilling   a   firm   view   from  
Nicaragua  on  the  ICJ’s  view  of  any  geographical  element  of  proportionality  is  
not  straightforward.  
At  first  glance,  Armed  Activities  presents  a  clearer  jurisprudential  position  on  
this   issue.   In   this  case,   the  Court  observed  that  Uganda’s   taking  of  airports  
and   towns   many   hundreds   of   kilometres   from   its   border   would   not   seem  
proportionate  to  the  series  of  transborder  attacks  Uganda  claimed  had  given  
rise   to   the   right   to   use   force   in   self-­defence.220  The   geographical   distance  
between  attack  and  defence  appears   to   form  part  of   the  Court’s  position  on  
proportionality.  Yet,  putting  aside  the  fact  that  the  Court  found  that  the  right  of  
self-­defence  had  not  arisen,  vague  comments  contained  in  three  lines  of  the  
Court’s  judgment  do  not  provide  a  firm  and  reasoned  position  on  this  point.  
It  is  not  apparent  that  distance  was  the  principal  factor  that  led  to  the  Court’s  
conclusion.  The  nature  of   the   target,   i.e.   towns  and  airports,  seems  equally  
important.  As  in  Nicaragua,  the  lack  of  a  nexus  between  attack  and  defence  is  
readily  apparent.  Perhaps  it  was  a  combination  of  both  factors  that  informed  
the  Court’s   decision,   but   there   is   insufficient   detail   to   tell.   Furthermore,   the  
Court  rendered  a  view  on  proportionality  before  necessity,  which  is  contrary  to  
the   logical   application   of   these   criteria   and   its   other   self-­defence  
jurisprudence.221  It  is  unclear  why  it  did  this.  Given  that  it  held  that  the  taking  of  
the  airports  and  towns  was  unnecessary  (understood  as  specific  necessity),  
its   views   on   proportionality   are   rendered   nugatory.222   If   the   targets   of   the  
defensive  response  were  unnecessary,  for  whatever  reason,  any  force  used  
against   them  was  unlawful.  Whilst   the  Court  appears  to   link  geography  and  
proportionality,  therefore,  its  position  on  this  relationship  remains  unsettled.  
                                                                                        
219  See  Section  2.5.  
220  Armed  Activities,  para  147.  
221  See  Section  1.2.1.  
222   Judge   Kooijmans   in   his   dissent   also   appears   to   characterise   such   actions   as   both  
unnecessary   and   disproportionate,   but   it   is   also   unclear   how   geography   factors   in   his  
conclusions.  Armed  Activities,  sep  op  Kooijmans,  para  34.  
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Nicaragua   and  Armed  Activities   provide   only   hints   as   to  whether   and   how  
geography   relates   to   proportionality.   Moreover,   both   cases   can   also   be  
explained  on  the  basis  of  specific  necessity:  the  object  of  defensive  action  was  
not  connected  to  the  armed  attacks.  Perhaps  the  best  that  can  be  said  from  
this   jurisprudence   is   that   geography   has   featured   in   the   Court’s   reasoning  
regarding  proportionality  on  the  facts  of  the  cases  before  it.  The  pertinent  facts,  
in  each  case,  were  purported  acts  of  self-­defence  against  a  state  in  response  
to,  and  far  from,  cross  border  armed  attacks  by  NSAs.  Future  jurisprudence  is  
required   to   elaborate   on   how   important   this   geographical   element   is   more  
generally  to  the  requirement  of  proportionality.  
b)   State  practice  
State  practice  also  indicates  a  possible  requirement  of  a  geographical  nexus  
between   attack   and   defence.   When   justifying   self-­defence,   states   will  
sometimes   emphasize   that   a   defensive   action   was   limited   geographically,  
often   in  addition   to  other   limitations,  such  as  scope  and  duration.  Examples  
include  Turkey’s  vindication  of  Operation  Sun  in  2008.  It  asserted  that  it  was  
confined  to  the  border  region  where  the  attacks  were  occurring.223  In  a  similar  
incident  regarding  cross-­border  raids  from  Jordan  into  Israel  in  1968,  Senegal  
expressed   the   view   that   self-­defence  was  exercisable   at   the   ‘actual   site   of  
aggression’.224  As  with  the  ICJ’s  jurisprudence,  such  pronouncements  serve  to  
highlight  the  contextual  importance.  In  these  cross-­border  incidents,  states  are  
keen  to  ensure  that  self-­defence  is  exercised,  and  seen  to  be  exercised,  within  
the  locality  of  the  armed  attack(s)  that  gave  rise  to  the  claim  of  self-­defence.  
Yet,  it  is  unclear  whether  these  states  view  this  fact  as  essential  to  ensure  that  
self-­defence   is   proportionate,   or   simply   as   relating   to  what   is   necessary   to  
achieve  a  defensive  purpose.225  
                                                                                        
223  UN  Doc  A/HRC/7/G/15  (2008).  See  further  Ruys  (2010)  119,  460–1.  
224  UN  Doc  S/PV.1436  (1968)  para  132.  
225  O’Connell  and  Greenwood  note,  for  example,  that  Portugal  did  not  react  to  India’s  seizure  
of  Goa  in  1961  by  seizing  Indian  shipping  in  European  waters  where  Portugal  enjoyed  naval  
superiority.  O’Connell  (1975)  65;;  Greenwood  (1989)  277.  This  example  of  state  practice  might,  
however,   be   better   interpreted   on   the   basis   of   specific   necessity:   reacting   in   self-­defence  
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This  distinction  is  evident  in  Jordan’s  pleadings  before  the  ICJ  in  Palestinian  
Wall.  Jordan  concluded  that  the  wall  was  unnecessary  for  the  purposes  of  self-­
defence  on  the  basis  that,  geographically,  it  went  far  beyond  Israel’s  territory,  
which   it   was   designed   to   protect.   Its   conclusion   that   the   wall   was   also  
disproportionate,  was  formed  on  the  basis,  not  of  its  geographical  location,  but  
on  the  ‘consequences  and  implications’  of  its  construction.  Such  effects  took  
the   wall   beyond   a   defensive   purpose   and   assumed   characteristics   of  
punishment,  humiliation  and  conquest.226  Uganda  likewise  justified  its  actions,  
which  extended  well  inside  the  DRC,  on  the  basis  of  necessity  (understood  as  
specific  necessity),  rather  than  proportionality.227  
Another  classic  example  that  is  often  suggested  as  supporting  the  requirement  
of  a  geographical  nexus  within  the  proportionality  assessment  is  that,  during  
the  Falklands  War,   the  UK  did   not   engage  Argentine  warships   in   areas   far  
removed   from   the   Falkland   Islands   and,   more   significantly,   did   not   extend  
military  operations  against  the  Argentine  mainland.228  Higgins  concludes  that  
British  bombing  of  the  Argentinian  navy  or  air  force  while  in  Argentina  or  in  port  
would  have  been  regarded  as  disproportionate.229  The  same  conclusion  would  
apply  had  Argentina  attacked  the  British  mainland.230  Such  scholarly  views  on  
the  Falklands   incident  appear  prima   facie   to  be   reflected   in   the  UK  Military  
Manual.  In  accepting  that  a  use  of  force  must  be  proportionate  to  the  overall  
objective   of   self-­defence,   it   gives   the   following   example:   ‘In   the   Falklands  
conflict   (…)   there   were   defined   and   limited   goals:   to   re-­take   the   occupied  
                                                                                        
against  targets  not  connected  to  the  armed  attack  is  unnecessary.  In  a  similar  vein,  see  Office  
of  the  Legal  Adviser  (1972)  837,  pertaining  to  the  USA’s  actions  during  the  Vietnam  War.  See  
further  Ruys   in  Ruys  and  Corten   (2018)  91–4,   regarding  whether   the  Goa   incident   should  
rightly  be  characterized  as  an  incident  of  self-­defence.  
226  Palestinian  Wall,  Written  Statement  of  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan,  30  January  2004,  
para  5.275.  
227  Armed  Activities,  Rejoinder  submitted  by  the  Republic  of  Uganda,  6  December  2002,  para  
289.  
228  Greenwood  notes  that  it  is  unclear  whether  the  latter  policy  was  determined  by  a  conclusion  
that   such   extension   would   be   disproportionate,   or   merely   reflected   political   and   military  
considerations.  Nevertheless,  he  concludes  that  the  decision  taken  by  the  British  not  to  extend  
the   conflict   beyond   the   Islands   and   surrounding   waters   undoubtedly   assisted   the   UK   in  
portraying  its  actions  as  being  within  the  boundaries  of  self-­defence.  Greenwood  (1989)  277.  
229  Higgins  (1994)  232.  
230  Ruys  (2010)  119.  
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territories,   not   to   pursue   a   war   of   conquest   against   Argentina’. 231   Whilst  
expressed   in   the   context   of   proportionality,   by   assessing   the   necessity   of  
military   action   against   the   mainland   first,   which   is   the   proper   order   of  
application,   it   could   equally   be   concluded   that   specific   necessity   would   be  
absent.  State  practice,  therefore,  does  not  provide  a  clear  account  regarding  
the  importance,  or  otherwise,  of  geography  to  considerations  of  proportionality.  
c)   Principle  and  general  application    
The   above   analysis   reveals   an   inconclusive   picture   regarding   whether  
geographical  considerations  sit  firmly  within  the  purview  of  proportionality,  as  
some  scholars  maintain.  There  is  a  lack  of  clarity  and  consistency  on  this  point.  
Even  if  geography  is  regarded  as  an  element  of  proportionality,  the  required  
proximity  between   the  armed  attack  and   the  corresponding  defensive   force  
remains  unclear.  State  practice  and  the  ICJ  jurisprudence  suggests,  however,  
that  a  geographical  connection  will  be  most  relevant   to  border  disputes  and  
localised   incidents   of   hostility.  Any  geographical   nexus  between  attack   and  
defence  must,  therefore,  be  considered  in  light  of  the  specific  facts.  
Schachter   suggests   that   where   a   series   of   attacks   in   one   area   requires   a  
defensive  response  on  a  larger  scale  to  counter  the  source  of  an  attack  then  it  
does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  allow  a  state  to  retaliate  beyond  the  immediate  
area  of   the  attack.232  Greenwood,  along  similar   lines,  notes   that   force  falling  
short  of   ‘total  war’  will  generally   incur  a  geographical  restriction,  although   in  
the  cases  of  ‘total  war’  the  proportionality  requirement  would  no  longer  confine  
defensive  measures  to  a  restricted  geographical  area.233  Zimmermann  likewise  
maintains   that  proportionality  might  allow   for   the   targeting  of  command  and  
control   centres   well   away   from   a   trans-­border   attack. 234   Again,   absent   a  
conclusive  position  based  on  state  practice,  such  conclusions  might  also  be  
                                                                                        
231  Sections  2.8–2.8.2  UK  Military  Manual.  
232  Schachter  (1991)  153–4.  
233  Greenwood  (1989)  278.  See  also  Ruys  (2010)  119.  See  Section  3.2.6,  however,  regarding  
the  effect  on  other  states.  
234  Zimmermann  (2007)  123.  
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better  understood  as  issues  of  specific  necessity,  rather  than  proportionality.  
Repeated,   or   large-­scale   attacks,  may   simply   require   targeting   on   a   larger  
scale  to  ensure  an  effective  defensive  response.  
In  any  event,  a  requirement  of  confining  a  response  to  a  particular  locale  must  
be  viewed  reasonably.  It  is  contingent  on  context  and  flexibility  is  required.  It  
seems  sensible  to  conclude  that  any  geographical   limitation  would  gradually  
lose  its  restraining  influence  in  the  case  of  repeated  and/or  large-­scale  attacks  
that  threaten  the  existence  of  the  state,  or  where  there  is  reciprocal  escalation  
of   an   armed   conflict.235  It   is   also   reasonable   to   assume   that,   in   an   era   of  
advanced  weaponry,   where   intercontinental   ballistic  missiles   can   cross   the  
globe,  countering  the  source  of  an  armed  attack  may  require  covering  great  
distances.  A  nuclear  missile  launched  from  North  Korea  against  the  USA  might  
justify  a  response  in  kind.  In  such  circumstances,  it  would  be  nonsensical  to  
suggest   that   geography,   as   an   element   of   proportionality,   acts   as   an  
independent  limitation  on  action.  Specific  necessity,  however,  would  confine  
the  defensive  response  to  the  source  of  the  armed  attacks,  i.e.  the  launch  sites  
and  related  infrastructure,  rather  than  anywhere  in  North  Korean  territory.  
In  the  context  of  self-­defence  against  armed  attacks  by  terrorist  NSAs,  state  
practice  pertaining  to  combatting  organizations  such  as  Al-­Qaeda  and  Daesh  
suggests   that   geography,   as   an   element   of   proportionality   or   otherwise,  
constitutes  little  or  no  meaningful  restraint  on  state  responses.  Instead,  specific  
necessity   assumes   the   burden. 236   Confining   a   defensive   response  
geographically   may,   therefore,   be   increasingly   difficult   as   customary  
international   law   adapts   to   an   ever-­changing   world.   The   importance   of  
geography  is  being  placed  under  ever-­greater  strain.237    
                                                                                        
235  Ruys  (2010)  119.  
236  See  Section  4.2.2.  
237  For  an  interesting  review  of  a  number  of  ‘geography-­defying’  challenges  for  international  
law,  see  Bethlehem  (2014).  
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3.2.4   Effect  of  the  use  of  force  on  the  defending  and  attacking  states  -­
general  considerations  
The   importance   of   the   armed   attack   and   its   effects   on   the   proportionality  
equation  is  discussed  extensively  in  Section  3.1.1(c).  Whilst  strict  quantitative  
equivalence  between  attack  and  defence  (and  their   respective  outcomes)   is  
not  required,  state  practice  shows  that  defending  states  and  other  states  may  
nevertheless  refer  to  the  armed  attack  when  considering  the  proportionality  of  
a  defensive  response.  
a)   The  defending  state  
The  scale  and  gravity  of  the  actual  or  anticipated  armed  attack  (including  its  
actual  or  anticipated  effects)  on  the  defending  state  is  a  prima  facie  starting  
point   when   considering   a   proportionate   defensive   response. 238   This   will  
involve,   as   applicable,   an   evaluation   of   the   overall   damage,   death   and/or  
destruction  to  the  defending  state’s  military  apparatus,  combatants,  civilians,  
territory,   infrastructure   and   other   property.239  Also   naturally   feeding   into   its  
defensive  reaction  is  an  evaluation  by  the  defending  state  of  whether  an  armed  
attack  is  a  one-­off,  or  is  likely  to  be  one  of  a  series  of  attacks  from  the  same  
source.  The  history  and  relations  between  the  defending  state  and  the  attacker  
leading  up   to   the  attack,  as  well  as   the   likelihood  of  success  of   the  attacks  
themselves,   are   all   necessarily   relevant   to   this   threat   assessment.   Serious  
threats  need  to  be  distinguished  from  those  that  have  no  chance  of  realization  
and  will   depend   on   the   relative  military   strengths   of   the   parties   involved.240  
These  latter  considerations  are  teleological,  going  beyond  a  purely  quantitative  
assessment   of   harm,   to   what   is   required   to   achieve   a   defensive   purpose.  
These  factors  are  not  exhaustive  but  are  indicative  of  how  the  peril  faced  by  
the  defending  state  should  be  quantified  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  armed  
                                                                                        
238  See  Sections  3.1.1(c)  and  3.1.2.  
239  For  a  general  discussion  of  some  of  these  factors,  see  e.g.  Tams   in  Van  den  Herik  and  
Schrijver  (2013)  390–1.  
240  Ibid,  389.  
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attack(s)   it   faces   and   their   actual   or   likely   effects.   This   informs   how   its  
defensive  response  should  be  conditioned.  
b)   The  attacking  state  
The  effects,  actual  or  anticipated,  of  self-­defence  on  an  attacker  should  also  
be  evaluated  in  similar  terms,  taking  into  account  many  of  the  same  factors.241  
This  Section  considers  the  position  of  an  attacker  that  is  a  state.242  In  general,  
Gardam  describes  the  major  considerations  for  proportionality  being  ‘the  level  
of   destruction   of  enemy   territory   and   the   infrastructure   of   the  State;;  overall  
collateral  civilian  damage  and  combatant  casualties’.243  As  set  out  below,  the  
position   of   the   attacking   state   is   clearly   identifiable   in   state   practice.   This  
reflects  the  fact  that  the  defending  state’s  right  to  protect  itself  is  not  unlimited.  
Appraisal  of  its  defensive  response  takes  into  account  the  effects  of  its  actions  
on   the   attacking   state,   including   its   citizens,   and  on   the  wider   international  
community.  
One  candidate  for  establishing  the  outer  limits  of  a  general  approach  to  judging  
the   effects   of   self-­defence   on   an   attacking   state   is   the   suggestion   that   the  
wholesale  destruction  of  a  state’s  military  capability  and   the  overthrow  of  a  
hostile   regime  are   not  warranted.244  This   conclusion  will   be   true   in   the   vast  
majority  of  cases,  as  it  will  tend  to  go  beyond  a  defensive  purpose.  However,  
it  is  not  absolute,  and  must  be  viewed  in  light  of  the  Nuclear  Weapons  dictum  
regarding   the  potential   right  of  states   to   resort   to  using  nuclear  weapons   in  
self-­defence  when  their  survival   is  at  stake.  As  such,   in  extremis,  one  might  
envisage   the   complete   destruction   of   the   attacker.245  This   again   reflects   the  
overriding   teleological   element   of   proportionality.   Outside   of   such  marginal  
cases,   defensive   action   may   warrant   the   invasion   of   the   attacking   state’s  
                                                                                        
241  This  Section  assumes  that  the  identity  of  the  attacker  is  known.  It  is  often  the  case  that  both  
sides  to  a  conflict  claim  a  right  of  self-­defence,  as  well  as  maintaining  that  the  other  side  is  the  
attacker.  Ultimately,  this  is  a  question  of  fact,  depending  on  the  circumstances.  
242  Section  4.2.  considers  the  position  of  NSA  attackers  and  that  of  the  host  state.  
243  Gardam  (2004)  17.  
244  Gardam  (2005)  16.  
245  With  armed  attacks  by  NSAs   in   the  context  of   international   terrorism,   this  conclusion   is  
easier  to  reach.  See  Section  4.2.  
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territory.246  This   raises   the   issue   of   the   proportionality   of   occupation   by   the  
defending   state   of   territory   that   it   has   captured   as   a   result   of   its   defensive  
actions.  
Occupation   is   subject   to   extensive   IHL   regulation,   principally   The   Hague  
Regulations  of  1907  and  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention.247  For  the  purposes  
of  the  JAB,  occupation  of  territory  by  a  defending  state  is  rarely  going  to  be  
necessary  or  proportionate.  This  is  because  the  essence  of  self-­defence  is  the  
protection  of  a  state’s  own  territory,  and  modern  international  law  prohibits  the  
use  of  force  for  the  acquisition  of  territory.248  Occupation  of  part  of  an  attacking  
state’s   territory  will   only   be   lawful   in   exceptional   circumstances,   where   the  
threat  to  the  defending  state  is  so  great  that  it  cannot  be  adequately  resisted  
without  occupation.249  Prolonged  occupation  or  annexation   is  never   justified,  
however.250  Occupation  may  only  be  potentially  proportionate  whilst  the  threat  
to  the  defending  state  subsists.  Once  an  armed  attack  has  been  successfully  
halted,   repelled   or   prevented,   ongoing   occupation   will   be   unnecessary.  
Proportionality  at  that  point  is  irrelevant.  
3.2.5   Civilian  harm  
The   precise   impact   of   overall   combatant   casualties   on   proportionality   is  
unclear   in   state   practice. 251   Conversely,   it   is   uncontroversial   that   civilian  
casualties   resulting   from   defensive   action   are   highly   pertinent   when  
considering  its  proportionality.252  States  purporting  to  act  in  self-­defence,  either  
                                                                                        
246  Gardam  (2005)  15–16.  Operation  Desert  Storm  is  an  obvious  example.  
247  See  P.  Spoerri  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  182–205.  
248  Greenwood  (1989)  282.  Greenwood  gives  the  example  of  Israel’s  occupation  of  territories  
during  the  1967  war  as  a  possible  example  of  where  occupation  was  necessary.  
249  Ibid.  See  also  Cassese,  La  Charte  des  Nations  Unies  (2005)  1333;;  Ruys  (2010)  117.  
250  Cassese,  La  Charte  des  Nations  Unies  (2005)  1333;;  Gray  (2018)  164.  
251  Gardam  (2005)  20,  suggests  that  there  is  little  evidence  of  restraint  in  this  area.  See  also  
IIFFMCG  Report,  272,   reaching   the  same  conclusions.  Regarding   terrorist  NSA  casualties,  
see  Section  4.2.  
252   Gardam   (2005)   14,   argues   that   civilian   collateral   damage   is   generally   not   specifically  
articulated  as  being  relevant  to  proportionality,  yet  the  state  practice  referred  to  in  this  Section  
suggests  otherwise.  Moreover,   she  accepts  elsewhere   that   compliance  with  proportionality  
entails  an  analysis  of  whether  there  has  been  an  ‘unacceptable  level  of  civilian  losses  in  order  
to  achieve  the  legitimate  aims.’  Gardam  (2004)  209.  See  also  IIFFMCG  Report,  272,  counting  
collateral  civilian  damage  as  a  relevant  criterion.  
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against   other   states   or  NSAs,   frequently   stress   that   they  have  made  every  
effort  to  minimise  civilian  casualties  and  civilian  damage.253  Most  recently,  the  
American-­led   Operation   Inherent   Resolve,   consisting   of   a   Global   Coalition  
against  Daesh  and  other   terrorist  groups  (‘Coalition’)  has  defended  a  highly  
rigorous   targeting   selection   process  designed   to   avoid   civilian   casualties   in  
Syria.  They  maintain  that  more  resources  go  into  target  analysis  and  selection  
than   to   the   airstrikes   themselves,   and   their   dedicated   assessment   team  
investigates  all  claims  of  civilian  casualties.254  The  record  of  the  Coalition  on  
the  issue  of  civilian  casualties  is  controversial,  but  the  fact  that  states  generally  
regard   themselves   subject   to   an   obligation   to  minimise   civilian   harm  when  
acting  in  self-­defence  is  not.255  In  Oil  Platforms,  in  justifying  the  proportionality  
of   its   actions,   the   USA   even   argued   that   it   had   rejected   possible   targets  
because   ‘their   destruction   threated   an   excessive   level   of   casualties   or   of  
damage  to  civilian  property’.256  
However,  whilst  undoubtedly  recognizing  this  obligation,  it  is  not  apparent  that  
states  regard  it  as  deriving  uniquely  from  the  JAB.  IHL  proportionality,  focusing  
as  it  does  on  civilian  collateral  damage,  may  deflect  attention  from  this  factor  
under   the   JAB.257  States   may   be   referring   to   either   regime,   or   both,   when  
referencing  this  requirement.  Alternatively,  or  in  addition  to  constituting  a  legal  
obligation,  minimising   civilian   harm  might   be   a   consequence  of   policy,   e.g.  
based  on  the  need  to  garner  support  amongst  the  civilian  population  and  also  
                                                                                        
253   E.g.   UN   Docs   S/PV.1106   (1964)   para   54   (UK,   in   respect   of   its   raid   on   Harib   Fort);;  
S/PV.1613  (1971)  para  202  (India,  in  respect  of  the  India-­Pakistan  conflict);;  S/PV.2674  (1986)  
14–15   (USA,   justifying   its   actions   against   Libya);;   S/PV.2977   (Part   I)   (1991)   43   (USA,   in  
defence  of  its  actions  in  the  first  Iraq  War);;  S/PV.2977  (Part  II)  (1991)  74-­5  (UK,  in  defence  of  
its   actions   in   the   first   Iraq  War);;   S/26003   (1993)   (USA,   in   respect   of   its   strike   on   the   IIS  
headquarters);;  S/1998/780   (1998)   (USA,   justifying   its  airstrikes  against  Al-­Qaeda   in  Sudan  
and   Afghanistan);;   S/2001/946   (2001)   (USA,   justifying   its   actions   against   Al-­Qaeda   in  
Afghanistan);;  A/HRC/7/G/15  (2008)  (Turkey,  justifying  Operation  Sun).  
254   ‘Airstrikes,   Civilian   Casualties   and   Investigations’,   Coalition,   13   November   2017,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/airstrikes-­civilian-­casualties-­and-­investigations/>.  See  further  
Chapter  4.  
255  Regarding  the  reported  civilian  harm  and  the  proportionality  of  Coalition  action  in  Syria,  see  
Section  4.2.3(b).  
256  Oil   Platforms,   Counter-­Memorial   and   Counter-­Claim   submitted   by   the   United   States   of  
America,  23  June  1997,  paras  4.34.  
257  Gardam  (2005)  14.  
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political   support   for   the  operation  at  hand.258  Yet,   such   limitation   is  a   logical  
consequence   of   JAB   proportionality.   Moreover,   the   fact   that   states   will  
frequently  cite  the  requirement  to  minimise  civilian  harm  when  justifying  their  
purported  acts  of  self-­defence  logically  suggests  that  it  is  (also)  part  of  the  JAB  
proportionality  calculus.  As  such,  although   it   is  not  an  absolute   limitation  on  
state  action  in  the  JAB,  it  is  one  of  the  most  important.259  
This   conclusion   is   clearly   supported   in   the   reactions   of   other   states   and  
international   organizations.   Where   putative   self-­defence   leads   to   large  
numbers  of  civilian  casualties,  or  where  civilians  are  perceived  by  states  to  be  
the  main   victims   of   the   response,   this  may   form   the   core   of   their   negative  
reactions.   Israel’s   invasion  of  Lebanon   in  2006  constitutes  one  of   the  most  
frequently  cited  examples  of  disproportionate  self-­defence  based,  in  particular,  
on  civilian  collateral  damage.260  It  was  reported  that  Israel’s  actions,  justified  
as  self-­defence,  resulted  in  1,191  deaths  and  4,409  injured.261  Most  of  these  
were  civilians.  More  than  900,000  people  were  displaced.  In  addition,  major  
damage   was   inflicted   on   civilian   infrastructure,   including   large   numbers   of  
bridges   and   roads,   as  well   as   Beirut   International   Airport.   Private   housing,  
water  and  electrical   facilities,   schools,  medical   facilities,   factories,  mosques  
and   churches,   television   and   radio   transmission   stations,   historical,  
archaeological   and   cultural   sites  were   damaged  or   destroyed.262  Israel   also  
imposed  air  and  naval  blockades  resulting  in  significant  negative  humanitarian,  
environmental  and  economic  impact.263  On  the  Israeli  side,  43  civilians  were  
                                                                                        
258  It  is  argued  that  part  of  the  rationale  for  the  American  desire  for  a  ‘zero-­casualty  standard’  
in  Syria  derives  from  the  wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  where  winning  over  the  local  population  
was   considered   critical   to   success.   See   e.g.   ‘US  Aim   for   ‘Zero   Civilian   Casualties’   Draws  
Criticism’   The   Hill,   24   June   2015,   <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/policy-­strategy/245932-­
us-­aims-­for-­zero-­civilian-­casualties-­in-­war-­vs-­isis>.  
259  Concern  regarding  civilians  does  not  equate   to  requiring  a  complete  absence  of  civilian  
harm.  Such   a   position  would   not   be   a   requirement   of   either   the  JAB   or   IHL.  This   issue   is  
discussed  further  below  in  this  Section.  
260  For  detailed  descriptions  of  the  facts,  international  reaction  and  a  range  of  legal  opinion,  
see  Cannizzaro  (2006);;  Ruys  (2007);;  Zimmermann  (2007);;  Wettberg  (2007)  114–123;;  Schmitt  
(2007-­2008);;  Steenberghe  (2012);;  Gray  (2018)  213–16;;  227–231;;  Tams  and  Bruckner  in  Ruys  
and  Corten  (2018)  673–88.  
261  UN  Doc  S/2006/515  (2006).  Reported  figures  vary.  See  further  the  references  in  n  260.    
262  Report  of  the  UN  Commission  of  Inquiry  on  Lebanon,  UN  Doc  A/HRC/3/2  (2006)  (‘Lebanon  
Commission  Report’)  paras  11,  20,  76–9.  
263  Ibid,  paras  268–75.  
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killed   and   approximately   1,000   injured   (75   seriously),   6,000   homes   were  
affected  and  300,000  persons  were  displaced  by  Hezbollah’s  attacks  on  towns  
in  northern  Israel.264  
Putting  aside,  for  present  purposes,  controversies  over  the  legality  of  Israel’s  
claim  of  self-­defence  against  Hezbollah,265  most  states  focused  on  the  scope  
of   the   Israeli   action.   Proportionality   was  decisive   to   the   assessment   of   the  
conflict.   It   is   clear   that   the   principal   concern   for   states   that   criticized   or  
condemned   Israel’s   response   as   disproportionate   was   the   overall   harm   to  
Lebanese  civilians  and  civilian   infrastructure.266  This  was  also   true   for   those  
states  and   international  organizations   that  did  not  go  so   far  as   to  condemn  
Israel’s  action,  but  which  nevertheless  called  for  a  proportionate  response  that  
avoided  civilian  damage.267  The  scale  of   the  harm  to  Lebanon,  most  notably  
the  collective  impact  on  the  civilian  population  and  infrastructure,  was  deemed  
by  most  states  to  be  out  of  proportion  to  both  the  immediate  trigger  that  led  to  
the  Israeli  invasion  and  to  the  broader  threat  posed  by  Hezbollah.268  Lebanon  
had  not  actively  supported  Hezbollah’s  activities,  yet  the  Israeli  response  led  
                                                                                        
264  Ibid,  para  78.  
265  Whilst  a  majority  of  states,  as  well  as  the  UN  Secretary  General  and  various  international  
organizations,   recognized   Israel’s   right   of   self-­defence   against   Hezbollah,   controversies  
remain  regarding  that  claim.  For  details  and  commentary,  see  references  in  n  260.    
266   UN   Docs   S/PV.5489   (2006)   7–8   (Russia);;   9   (Argentina);;   11   (China);;   13   (Congo);;   13  
(Tanzania);;  17  (Greece);;  17  (France);;  S/PV.5493  (2006)  14  (Qatar);;  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  
1)   (2006)  4  (Peru);;  11  (France);;  18  (Switzerland);;  19  (Brazil);;  20  (Algeria);;  24  (Jordan);;  25  
(Indonesia);;   28   (Turkey);;   30   (Djibouti);;   33   (New   Zealand);;   34   (India);;   35   (Chile);;   36  
(Venezuela);;  41  (Guatemala);;  45  (Mexico);;  S/2006/780  (2006)  para  145  (NAM).  
267  UN  Docs  S/PV.5488  (2006)  5  (UK);;  S/PV.5489  (2006)  12  (UK);;  15  (Denmark);;  S/PV.5493  
(2006)  19  (Slovakia);;  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  1)  (2006)  7  (Denmark);;  16  (Finland,  on  behalf  
of  the  EU.  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Turkey,  Croatia,  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  
Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia,  Iceland,  Ukraine  and  the  Republic  of  Moldova  also  
aligned  themselves  with  the  statement);;  23  (Norway).  
268  The   immediate   trigger   occurred   on   12th   July   2006.  Hezbollah   launched   several   rockets  
across   the  Blue   Line   into   Israel.   Its   forces   crossed   into   northern   Israel,   killed   three   Israeli  
Defense   Forces   soldiers,   injured   two   and   abducted   two   others.   The   conflict   escalated  
thereafter,   culminating   in   Israel’s   invasion.   See   UN   Doc   S/2006/560   (2006)   and   the  
commentary   referred   to   in  n  260.   Israel   viewed   the  overall   threat  posed  by  Hezbollah  and  
regional   terrorism  as  much  broader   than   this  triggering  event.  See  e.g.   ‘With   Israeli  Use  of  
Force,   Debate   Over   Proportion’,   The   New   York   Times,   19   July   2006,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/world/middleeast/19israel.html>.   The   aforementioned  
response   by   a  majority   of   states  suggests   that,   even   accepting   such   characterisation   of   a  
broader  threat,  Israel’s  response  remained  disproportionate.  Gray  (2018)  227,  agrees  that  the  
action  was  disproportionate,  even  if  Hezbollah’s  past  attacks  could  be  taken  cumulatively.  For  
the  contrary  view,  asserting  that  the  Israel  action  was  proportionate,  particularly  viewed  in  the  
context  of  the  broader  threat,  see  Schmitt  (2007–2008)  in  particular,  155–6,  163–4.  
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to  destruction  of  large  parts  of  Lebanese  public  and  civilian  infrastructure.  In  
addition,  the  aerial  and  naval  blockade  targeted  not  only  Hezbollah,  but  also  
the  entire  Lebanese  population.269  The  deleterious  effects  of  the  blockade  were  
noted   by   a   number   of   states. 270   The   European   Union   criticized   Israel’s  
disproportionate  use  of  force,  insisting  that  ‘the  imposition  of  an  air  and  sea  
blockade  on  Lebanon  cannot  be   justified.’271  Israel’s  actions  were,   therefore,  
viewed  by  certain  states  as  a  collective  punishment  of  Lebanon’s  civilians.272  
The   UN   Secretary   General, 273   and   the   UN   Commission   of   Inquiry   on  
Lebanon,274  likewise  viewed  Israel’s  acts  in  this  way.  The  NAM  went  so  far  as  
to  condemn  Israel’s  use  of  force  against  Lebanon  as  aggression.275  Looking  at  
the  purported  act  of  self-­defence  as  a  whole,  therefore,  the  prevailing  view  on  
the   overall   disastrous  effects   on   civilians   of   Israel’s   invasion  of   Lebanon   is  
clear.276  
This   incident   is,   therefore,   expositive   of   how   states   and   international  
organizations   focus   on   civilian   harm   when   assessing   whether   or   not   a  
purported  act  of  self-­defence  is  proportionate.  It  might  be  that  for  some  states  
such  harm,   in  and  of   itself,   is  sufficient   to  reach  this  conclusion.  This  would  
constitute  a  purely  quantitative  assessment,  based  on  the  asymmetry  between  
attack   and   defence,   including   their   respective   effects.   Alternatively,   or  
additionally,  such  marked  quantitative  imbalance  might  be  viewed  as  pointing  
to   excessiveness  vis-­à-­vis   a   defensive   purpose.  As   noted   in   the   preceding  
paragraph,   a   number   of   states   (rightly,   or   wrongly)   adopted   this   view   and  
                                                                                        
269  Ruys  (2007)  292.  
270  See  e.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.5489  (2006);;  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  1)  (2006).  
271  ‘Israel  Blockades  Lebanon;;  Wide  Strikes  by  Hezbollah’,  The  New  York  Times,  14  July  2006,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html>.  
272  UN  Doc  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  1)  20  (Algeria);;  24  (Norway);;  25  (Indonesia);;  26  (League  
of  Arab  States);;  29  (Morocco);;  30  (Iran);;  32  (Djibouti);;  42  (UAE);;  44  (South  Africa).  
273  UN  Doc  S/PV.5492  (2006)  3,  describing  Israel’s  acts  as  excessive  and  disproportionate.    
274  Lebanon  Commission  Report,  in  particular,  para  331.  
275  UN  Doc  S/2006/780  (2006)  paras  142–3.  
276  As  noted,  when  reviewing  the  UNSC  debates,  it  is  not  possible  to  separate  neatly  concerns  
over  IHL  proportionality  from  JAB  proportionality.  The  legality  of  specific  targets,  for  example,  
may  be  debated  for  the  purposes  of  IHL  and  also  from  the  perspective  of  specific  necessity.  If  
targeting  fails  the  latter  test,  then  proportionality  is  irrelevant.  Regardless,  it  is  the  effect  of  the  
combination   of   all   incidents   of   targeting   that   is   the   purview   of   JAB   proportionality.   For  
commentary  regarding  the  targetability  of  bridges,  roads,  the  Beirut  International  Airport  and  
other  elements  of  Lebanese  infrastructure,  see  e.g.  Zimmermann  (2007)  133–  5;;  Ruys  (2007)  
290–2.  See  also  Lebanon  Commission  Report,  in  particular,  paras  319–37.  
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regarded  Israel’s  acts  as  punitive,  rather  than  defensive,  in  nature.  This  reflects  
a   teleological   evaluation.   Both   material   and   qualitative   elements   of  
proportionality  are  readily  apparent,   therefore.   It   is  submitted   that,  over  and  
above   the   marked   asymmetry   in   harm   between   attack   and   defence,   the  
magnitude  of  civilian  causalities  and  civilian  damage  is  impossible  to  reconcile  
with  achieving  the  defensive  aim  of  combatting  Hezbollah.  In  the  words  of  the  
Russian   delegate,   ‘the   scale   of   the   use   of   force,   the   casualties   and   the  
destruction  demonstrate  that  the  actions  (…)  go  far  beyond  a  counterterrorist  
operation.’277  
Emphasis  placed  by  other  states  and  international  organizations  on  excessive  
damage  to  civilians  and  civilian  infrastructure  is  a  consistent  and  longstanding  
theme  in  state  practice.  This  is  so  in  both  interstate  conflicts,  and  action  against  
NSAs  operating   in   foreign   territory.  Other   incidents   include  the  UK’s  raid  on  
the  Harib  Fort   in  Yemen   in   1964,278  as  well   as   Israel’s   response   to   terrorist  
attacks  carried  out  by   the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization   in  1978.   In   the  
latter   case,   Israeli   action   included   a   large-­scale   military   operation   against  
Lebanon,   resulting   in   the   occupation   of   territory,   the   death   and   injury   of  
civilians  and  the  destruction  of  Lebanese  infrastructure.  The  Israeli  action  was  
broadly  condemned  and  resulted  in  the  UNSC  calling  for  a  cessation  of  military  
action   and   the  withdrawal   of   Israeli   forces   from  Lebanese   territory.279  Other  
Israeli   interventions   in   Jordan   and   Lebanon   over   the   years   have   received  
similar  criticism,  focusing  on  the  effects  on  civilians.280  The  same  is  apparent  
when  Israel  has  claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  Hamas  in  the  occupied  
Palestinian   territories. 281   These   represent   examples   amongst   a   number   of  
                                                                                        
277  UN  Doc  S/PV.5493  (Resumption  1)  (2006)  2.  
278  UN  Docs  S/PV.1106  (1964)  paras  66–7  (Iraq);;  S/PV.1106  (1964)  para  27  (Morocco);;  paras  
48–50  (Ivory  Coast);;  S/PV.1110  (1964)  paras  24–6  (Czechoslovakia).  
279  UNSC  Res  425  (1978).  See  further  UN  Doc  S/PV.2113  (1978)  para  116  (USSR);;  (1978)  
UNYB  298–311.  
280  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.1320   (1966)   paras   79–80   (UK);;  para   89   (USA);;   S/PV.1323   (1966)  
paras  9–11  (The  Netherlands);;  S/PV.1327  (1966)  paras  14–15  (Uganda);;  S/PV.1643  (1972)  
para  118  (France);;  para  39  (Italy);;  S/PV.1644  (1972)  paras  162,  168  (Somalia);;  S/PV.1648  
(1972)   paras   120–1,   127   (Sudan);;   S/PV.1650   (1972)   paras   9–11   (France);;   paras   99–100  
(Italy);;  S/PV.2292   (1981)  paras  28–30   (Lebanon);;  S/PV.2377   (1982)  paras  34–5   (Ireland);;  
para  41  (Japan);;  S/PV.3653  (1996)  9  (Germany)  10  (Russia)  23  (Afghanistan).  
281  As  an  occupying  power,  Israel’s  claim  of  self-­defence  against  NSAs  operating  in  occupied  
territory   is  highly  questionable.  See  Palestinian  Wall,  paras  70–9  for  further  analysis  of  this  
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other  such   incidents  where  states  have  expressed  concerns  over  excessive  
civilian   harm. 282   Turkey’s   Operation   Sun   in   2008   likewise   highlights   the  
concern  placed  by  the  international  community  on  the  need  to  protect  civilians.  
It  stands,  however,  as  an  example  of  proportionate  defensive  action  against  
NSAs  in  foreign  territory.  This  is  on  the  basis  that,  although  the  PKK  incurred  
heavy  losses,  harm  to  Iraq’s  population  and  infrastructure  was  limited,  despite  
the  scale  of  the  Turkish  intervention.283  
Collateral   civilian   harm   acts,   therefore,   as   a   consistent   indicator   of  
excessiveness  for  states  in  appraising  the  proportionality  of  self-­defence.  It  will  
often   be   impossible   to   avoid   such   death   and   destruction,   but   this   practice  
reveals  how  civilian  harm  is  frequently  the  focus  of  the  debate  regarding  the  
legality  of  putative  defensive  action.  It  shows  that  a  defensive  purpose  cannot  
be   achieved   at   any   cost.  Other   interests,   in   this   case  of   civilians,  must   be  
accounted   for.   The  difficulty   is   determining  where   states  will   draw   the   line.  
There  is  no  absolute  or  mathematical  answer  to  this.  Although  high  levels  of  
civilian  casualties  may  point  to  a  lack  of  defensive  purpose,  such  levels  may  
be   unavoidable   if   a   defending   state   is   to   defend   itself   properly.   It  must   be  
recognized  that  the  defending  state’s  action  will  invariably  be  in  defence  of  its  
own  civilian  population.  Whilst  civilians  and  civilian  objects  on  the  other  side  of  
a  border  may  not  be  directly   targeted  under   the  JAB  or   IHL,   therefore,  and  
civilian  harm  must  be  kept   to  a  minimum  under  both  regimes,   this  does  not  
entirely   exclude   civilian   death   or   injury.   Identifying   excessiveness   in   such  
circumstances   will   be   context   dependant.   This   might   be   an   unsatisfactory  
                                                                                        
status.  Nevertheless,  in  one  incident  in  2004,  Russia  recognized  in  principle  Israel’s  claim  of  
self-­defence,  yet  condemned  it  as  disproportionate  on  the  basis  of  the  ‘massacre  of  innocent  
civilians’.  This  position  was  echoed  by  other  states,  such  as  Pakistan.  See  UN  Doc  S/PV.5049  
(2004)   6   (Israel);;   12–13   (Russia);;   14   (Pakistan).   See   also   generally   UN  Docs   S/PV.6060  
(2009);;   S/PV.6061   (2009);;   S/PV.7222   (2014);;   S/PV.8244   (2018);;   S/PV.8256   (2018);;  
S/PV.8272  (2018).  
282  See  e.g.   (1979)  UNYB  219–20  (USA,   in  the  context  of  the  conflict  between  Zambia  and  
Southern   Rhodesia);;   (1982)  UNYB   311–12,   315   (various   states   expressing   concern   over  
civilian  harm  arising  out  of  South  Africa’s  actions  in  a  number  of  neighbouring  countries);;  UN  
Doc   S/PV.2676   (1986)   12   (Ukraine,   in   respect   of   American   airstrikes   in   Libya);;   UN   Doc  
S/PV.2900  (1989)  14–15,  18,  28  (Finland,  Algeria  and  Cuba,  respectively,  in  respect  of  the  
USA’s  invasion  of  Panama);;  UN  Doc  S/PV.5961  (2008)  (France,  in  the  context  of  the  2008  
conflict  in  Georgia);;  IIFFMCG  Report,  272–5;;  UN  Doc  S/2011/690  (2011)  (Turkey,  in  respect  
of  Israel’s  use  of  force  against  the  Mavi  Marmara).  
283  Ruys  (2008)  362–3;;  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  414.  
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conclusion,   but   states   assess   proportionality   flexibly   and   in   light   of   the  
surrounding   circumstances.  The  analysis   regarding  Coalition   action  against  
Daesh  and  others  in  Syria  indicates  that  high  levels  of  civilian  harm  may  well  
be  accepted  where  the  threat  is  perceived  to  be  particularly  great.284  
Although   civilian   harm   is   a   clear   potential   indicator   of   excessiveness,   the  
significance  of  possible  long-­term  effects  on  the  civilian  population,  including  
the  creation  of  large  refugee  outflow,  is  less  clear  from  state  practice.285  Judge  
Higgins,  in  her  Separate  Opinion  in  Palestinian  Wall,  considered  the  general  
effect  of  defensive  force  on  the  civilian  population,  over  and  above  death  and  
injury.  In  so  doing,  she  doubted  whether  the  building  of  a  wall  could  constitute  
an  act  of  self-­defence.  Even  assuming  it  could,  she  went  on  to  query  whether  
the   particular   route   selected   could   be  necessary   or   proportionate   given   the  
‘attendant  hardships  for  Palestinians  uninvolved  in  these  attacks’.286  This  view  
was  echoed  by  Judge  Kooijmans,287  and  suggests  that  the  general  impact  on  
the  lives  of  those  affected  by,  but  not  taking  part  in,  the  conflict  may  also  be  
taken   into   account   in   concluding   whether   or   not   defensive   force   is  
proportionate.  Logically,  this  would  appear  to  apply  to  the  civilian  population  of  
both  the  defending  state  and  the  attacker.  
3.2.6   Effect  on  third-­party  rights    
a)   General  considerations  and  state  responsibility  
Scholars  have  highlighted  that  the  impact  of  defensive  force  on  the  rights  of  
other   states   is   also   relevant   to   a   proportionality   evaluation. 288   This   factor  
speaks   to   the   wider   effects   of   an   exercise   of   self-­defence,   and   how   the  
interests  of   the   international  community  operate   to  curtail   the  pursuit  of   the  
right.   Undue   interference   with   such   interests   might   be   deemed   excessive.  
There  are  many  ways   in  which  other  states  might  be  affected  by  defensive  
                                                                                        
284  See  Sections  4.1.3(b)  and  4.2.3(b).  
285  Gardam  (2005)  20.  
286  Palestinian  Wall,  sep  op  Higgins,  para  35  (emphasis  added).  
287  Ibid,  sep  op  Kooijmans,  para  34.  
288  E.g.  Gardam  (2004)  17.  
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force,   including   violations   of   sovereignty   and   territorial   integrity.   Temporary  
incursions   by   an   aircraft   or   missile   into   another   state’s   airspace,   or   the  
traversing  of  its  territory  by  the  defending  state  in  order  to  reach  its  objective,  
are  obvious  examples.  These  breaches  might  be  deliberate  or  accidental  and  
will   be   of   varying   degrees   of   gravity.   More   serious   are   those   violations   of  
territorial  integrity  that  result  in  physical  damage  to  another  state’s  territory,  or  
injury   or   death   to   its   civilian   population.   Additionally,   blockades,   exclusion  
zones  or  other  military  activity  may  interfere  with  economic,  trade  and  other  
rights  of  states  that  have  no  involvement  in  the  conflict.  The  potential  effects  
of  nuclear  weapons  have  already  been  referred  to  and  the  widespread  use  of  
conventional  weapons  might  be  equally  injurious.  Regional  instability  caused  
by  warfare  also  produces  a  range  of  deleterious  consequences.  
The  issue  of  third-­party  rights  is  clearly  relevant  to  the  proportionality  equation.  
This   feature   goes   beyond   considerations   of   a   defensive   purpose   and   the  
material  factors  referred  to  previously  in  this  Section.  Recourse  to  principles  of  
state  responsibility  assist  with  how  third-­party  rights  factor  in  the  proportionality  
review.  As  noted  in  Section  2.1,  whilst  the  ILC  recognizes  that  defensive  force  
might  affect  other  states,  including  neutral  states,  it  explicitly  leaves  open  the  
question  of  whether  Article  21  ARSIWA  precludes   the  wrongfulness  of  self-­
defence   vis-­à-­vis   other   states.289   For   the   purposes   of   Article   25   ARSIWA,  
however   (and   as   also   noted   in   Section   2.1),   an   invocation   of   a   state   of  
necessity  takes  into  account  the  interests  of  other  states,  and  the  international  
community  as  a  whole,  in  addition  to  those  of  the  acting  state.290  Competing  
interests   are,   therefore,   accounted   for   within   the   international   law   of   state  
responsibility,  291  and  parallels  may  be  drawn  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  
enquiry.    
The  following  analysis  indicates  that  the  rights  and  interests  of  other  states,  
and   of   the   international   community   as   a   whole,   also   form   part   of   the  
                                                                                        
289  ARSIWA  21  Commentary,  para  5.  
290  Art  25(1)(b)  ARSIWA  and  related  Commentary,  para  17.  
291  This  balancing  exercise  is  objective  and  based  on  a  reasonable  assessment.  Ibid.    
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determination   of   whether   or   not   a   defending   state   has   acted   excessively.  
Where   the   pursuit   of   the   right   of   self-­defence   infringes   on   other   legally  
protected   interests,   it   may   be   that   such   infringement   is   regarded   as  
proportionate.   Employing   the   justificatory   language   of   circumstances  
precluding  wrongfulness,  the  act  of  self-­defence  might  be  objectively  justifiable  
as  a  ‘lesser  evil’,  when  compared  to  the  infringement  of  the  other  right.  This  is  
to  say  that  the  result  achieved,  being  the  defending  state  protecting  itself  and  
its  citizens,  provides  a  net  benefit.292  This  will  not  always  be  the  case,  however,  
and  self-­defence  will  not  always  prevail.  The  following  review  suggests  that  the  
right  of  self-­defence  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  superior  interest  that  invariably  
trumps  all  others.  Its  exercise  might  be  considered  to  be  excessive,  depending  
on  the  circumstances.  The  situation  is  reviewed  as  a  whole.  The  right  of  self-­
defence  is  weighed  against  other  interests  affected  by  the  use  of  military  force  
in   light   of   the   particular   context.293  These   conclusions   are   explored   further  
below.  
b)   Neutrality  and  former  belligerent  rights  
The   relationship   between   defending   states   exercising   their   right   of   self-­
defence  and  how  the  rights  of  other  states  are  affected  under  the  UN  Charter  
‘awaits  full  elaboration.’294  Section  4.2.3  considers  proportionality  in  the  context  
of  the  effect  of  defensive  action  on  host  states.  A  related  question  is  whether  
adhering   to   proportionality   permits   incursions   into   the   territory   of   a   neutral  
state. 295   Traditionally,   the   law   of   neutrality   applies   only   in   the   context   of  
international   armed   conflicts   between   two   or   more   states,   not   to   non-­
international   armed   conflicts   between   states   and   non-­state   actors,  
transnational   or   otherwise. 296   It   comprises   rights   and   obligations   for   both  
                                                                                        
292  For  an  overview  of  the  balancing  and  safeguarding  of  competing  interests  in  the  context  of  
Art  25  ARSIWA,  together  with  commentary  on  the  ‘lesser  evil’  justification  in  this  context,  see  
Paddeu  (2018)  400,  415–21.  
293  In  the  context  of  Art  25  ARSIWA,  see  ibid.  
294  Gardam  (2005)  21.  
295  For  the  purposes  of  this  Section,  a  distinction  is  made  between  states  that  are  unwilling  or  
unable  to  confront  terrorist  threats  emanating  from  their  territory  and  states  that  have  no  nexus  
whatsoever  with  the  relevant  conflict.  This  Section  relates  to  the  latter  type  of  state.  
296  Seger  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  253.  
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belligerents  and  neutral  non-­belligerents.  Essentially,  this  means  that  neutral  
states  must  abstain  from  involvement  in  the  conflict  and  treat  the  belligerents  
impartially.  In  return,  the  belligerents  are  required  to  respect  a  state’s  neutral  
status. 297   Most   importantly,   parties   to   an   armed   conflict   must   respect   the  
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  neutral  state  and  must  not  use  force  
within   neutral   territory,   including   a   neutral   state’s   territorial   waters   and  
airspace.  298  The  fundamental  legal  rationale  is  to  guarantee  that  neutral  states  
will  sustain  only  minimal  injury  from  warfare,  so  long  as  they  in  turn  abide  by  
the  aforesaid  obligations  not  to  participate  and  not  to  discriminate.299  
The  law  relating  to  neutrality  holds  an  uncertain  position  in  the  post  UN  Charter  
world.300  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  the  ICJ  affirmed  the  continued  application  of  the  
law  of  neutrality,  ‘whatever  its  content,’  to  all  international  armed  conflicts,  but  
expressed  it  to  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  UN  Charter.301  This  statement  
leaves  its  application  vis-­à-­vis  the  JAB  unsettled,  including  to  what  extent  the  
rules   of   neutrality   might   affect   the   application   of   both   necessity   the  
proportionality.  302  As  a  general  proposition,  however,  given  the  seriousness  of  
intruding  into  the  territory  of  a  neutral  state,  it  would  only  be  where  the  need  to  
take  action  there  is  ‘very  great  indeed’  that  necessity  and  proportionality  would  
be  satisfied.303  To  be  regarded  as  the  ‘lesser  evil’  (described  in  the  preceding  
                                                                                        
297  Chinkin  (1993)  300.  For  a  general  overview  of  the  law  of  neutrality  see  Seger  in  Clapham  
and  Gaeta  (2014)  248–70.  
298  The  general  principle  of  neutrality  is  reflected  in  Art  1  Hague  Convention  V  Respecting  the  
Rights  and  Duties  of  Neutral  Powers  and  Persons  in  Case  of  War  on  Land,  18  October  1907,  
205  CTS  299.  It  states  that  ‘[t]he  territory  of  neutral  Powers  is  inviolable.’  See  further  Seger  in  
Clapham  and  Gaeta   (2014)  254–5.  However,  a  belligerent   can   take  defensive  action  on  a  
neutral  state’s  territory  if  such  state  allows  its  territory  to  be  used  by  another  belligerent  state  
in  violation  of  its  duties  of  neutrality.  Bowett  (1958)  167–174;;  Brownlie  (1963)  312–14.  
299  Dinstein  (2017)  27.  
300  See  generally  Chinkin  (1993)  299–314;;  Greenwood  (1989)  283–6;;  Neff  (2005)  349–56.  
301  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  89.  
302  Within  the  context  of  collective  security,  the  laws  of  neutrality  are  subject  to  the  operation  
of  Art  2(5)  UN  Charter.  This  requires  all  Member  States  of  the  UN  to  assist  the  UN  in  carrying  
out  preventive  or  enforcement  measures  under  the  UN  Charter,  and  to  refrain  from  assisting  
any  state  against  which  such  measures  are  taken.  This  operates  as  a  ‘rigorous  caveat’  to  the  
law   of   neutrality.   Dinstein   (2017)   186–7.   Furthermore,   were   the   UNSC   to   authoritatively  
determine  who  is  an  aggressor  in  a  situation  of  individual  or  collective  self-­defence,  the  logic  
of  the  Charter  would  suggest  that  all  Member  States  of  the  UN  must  do  whatever  they  can  to  
assist   the   defending   state   and   to   foil   the   aggressor’s   designs.   This   also   challenges   the  
entitlement  of   states   to  neutrality.   Ibid,   177.  Outside  of   these  contexts,  however,  neutrality  
remains  possible.  See  further  Seger  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  261–3.  
303  Greenwood  (1989)  278.  
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Section)  and  not  excessive,  the  context  would  arguably  need  to  be  such  that  
the  violation  of  neutral  territory  was  the  only  way  for  a  state  to  defend  itself.304  
The  issue  is  not  simply  intrusion  into  a  state’s  territory  however.  Neutrality  is  
perhaps   most   problematic   in   the   context   of   interference   with   neutral  
shipping.305   The   laws   of   war   and   neutrality   previously   allowed   belligerents  
considerable  freedom  to  stop  and  search  ships  on  the  high  seas,  to  seize  and  
condemn  in  prize  contraband,  to  operate  long  distance  blockades  and  even  to  
use   force   against   neutral   shipping.306  Whether   such   rights   remain   available  
under  the  post  UN  Charter  JAB,  and  might  be  compatible  with  necessity  and  
proportionality,  is  debatable.  On  the  basis  of  the  targeting  analysis  in  Section  
2.5,   it   is   reasonable   to  conclude  that  deliberate  attacks  on  neutral  shipping,  
whether  military  or  civilian,  are  never  justifiable.  Targeting  them  will  not  satisfy  
the  requirement  of  specific  necessity.  Proportionality  is  therefore  irrelevant  on  
this  point.  
More  generally,  necessity  and  proportionality  should  be  viewed  as  narrowing  
the  scope  of  former  belligerent  rights,  even  if  they  do  not  require  that  they  be  
dispensed  with   entirely.  Blockades  are   an  example   of   this   limitation.  Being  
designed  to  prevent  all  vessels  and/or  aircraft  from  entering  or  exiting  specified  
ports,  airports  or  coastal  areas  belonging  to,  or  under  the  control  of,  another  
state,   blockades   may   clearly   impinge   on   the   rights   of   neutral   states. 307  
Specifically,   they  may   affect   their   freedom   of   navigation   and   aviation   and,  
being  enforced  by  military  means,  may  constitute  an  act  of  aggression  if  not  
                                                                                        
304   The   ICJ   has   employed   this   logic,   also   in   the   context   of   considering   necessity   as   a  
circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness.  In  Palestinian  Wall,  para  140,  the  Court  rejected  the  
necessity  of  Israel’s  construction  of  the  wall  along  the  chosen  route  as  it  was  not  the  only  way  
to  safeguard  Israel’s  interests  from  peril.  
305  For  state  practice  examples  and  commentary,  see  Chinkin  (1993)  305–8.  
306  Greenwood  (1989)  284;;  Nevill  in  Weller  (2015)  274–9.  
307  See   O’Connell   1150–8;;   Guilfoyle   (2011);;   Von   Heinegg   in   Heller   (2015)   927–34   for   a  
general  overview  of  the  types  of  blockades,  their  history  and  their  current  legality,  including  
under   IHL.  Regarding   the  controversial   issue  of  whether  blockades  are   lawful   in   IHL   in   the  
context  of  non-­international  armed  conflicts,  see  in  particular  Guilfoyle  (2011);;  Von  Heinegg  in  
Heller  (2015)  928–32.  For  further  discussion  of  neutral  shipping,  including  under  IHL,  see  e.g.  
Klein  (2012)  287–300.  
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justified,   e.g.   by   self-­defence. 308   O’Connell   argues   that   the   international  
community  would  nowadays  not  accept  the  long-­distance  blockades  of  the  two  
World  Wars.   Such   widespread   interference  with   neutral   shipping   would   be  
inconsistent  with  the  theory  of  self-­defence  and  would  arguably  constitute  an  
unlawful  use  of  force.  He  suggests,  however,  that  close  blockades,  i.e.  specific  
blockades  of  more  limited  in  scope,  restricting  ingress  and  egress  of  neutral  
shipping  to  and  from  a  belligerent  port,  might  be  tolerated.309  The  UK  appears  
to  adopt  this  general  approach.310  The  USA  likewise  recognized  that  its  claim  
of  self-­defence  during  the  Vietnam  War  in  1972  allowed  for  more  limited  action  
than  a   traditional  blockade.   In  so  doing,   it  explicitly  adopted  more  restricted  
naval  operations  than  allowed  in  a  blockade  under  traditional  IHL  in  order  to  
protect  the  rights  of  neutrals.  It  saw  this  deference  to  neutrality  as  a  key  factor  
in  justifying  its  defensive  actions.311  
Von  Heinegg  also  recognizes  the  potential  acceptance  of  blockades  under  the  
JAB,   subject   to   compliance   with   necessity   and   proportionality.   He   argues,  
however,  that  there  would  need  to  be  a  clear  nexus  with  the  armed  attack.  This  
means  that  a  blockade  could  not  block  all  vessels  or  aircraft,  but  only  those  
‘associated’   with   the   self-­defence   situation.312  This   also   represents   a   move  
from   previously   accepted   traditional   blockades   to   more   limited   interdiction  
operations.  Such  action  would  presumably  include  vessels  transporting  arms  
to,   or   otherwise   supporting,   the   attacker.   Whilst   this   is   not   clear   from   his  
analysis,  this  conclusion  is  consistent  with  the  UK  Military  Manual  and  the  San  
Remo  Manual.313  Iran  has  also  followed  the  UK  in  asserting  a  right  of  stop  and  
search   in   the   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­defence,   if   there   are   reasonable  
                                                                                        
308  Art  3(c)  Definition  of  Aggression.  They  may  also  be  authorized  by  the  UNSC.  Their  legality  
also  depends  on  compliance  with  IHL.  See  generally  Von  Heinegg  in  Heller  (2015)  927–34.    
309  O’Connell  (1984)  1155–6.  
310  See  Section  13.3  UK  Military  Manual.  
311  Office   of   the   Legal   Adviser   (1972)   837–8.  See   further  Neff   (2005)   353;;  Nevill   in  Heller  
(2015)  278.  
312  Von  Heinegg  in  Heller  (2015)  931.  
313  Section  13.91  UK  Military  Manual;;  Arts  67,  118  San  Remo  Manual.  Such  action  by  a  neutral  
state  would,  however,  jeopardize  its  neutral  status.  
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grounds   to   suspect   a   vessel   of   taking   arms   to   the   other   side   for   use   in   a  
conflict.314  Greenwood  concludes  this  is  probably  permissible.315  
Following   its   investigation   into   the   blockade  of   the  Gaza   strip   in   2010  and  
Israeli  attacks  on   the   flotilla  of  ships   (including   the  Mavi  Marmara)   carrying  
humanitarian   assistance   to   Gaza,   the   Human   Rights   Council’s   fact   finding  
mission  concluded  that  such  action  could  not  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  self-­
defence.316  This  was  because  the  flotilla  was  making  no  contribution  to  the  war  
effort  and  posed  no   immediate  security   threat   to   Israel.317  The  Israeli  action,  
therefore,   went   beyond   a   defensive   purpose.   By   implication,   an   objectively  
identifiable  defensive  purpose  might  have  rendered  such  action  justifiable.  If  
accepted,  the  foregoing  analysis  suggests  that,  even  if  ‘a  right  of  interference  
with   third   States’   freedom   of   navigation   should   not   lightly   be   presumed’,318  
limited   interference   with   neutral   states   might   be   notionally   necessary.  
Proportionality   will,   therefore,   depend   on   the   acceptance   of   the   degree   of  
interference   in   the   particular   circumstances.   Widespread   blockades   of  
previous,   pre-­UN   Charter   years,   are   unlikely   to   satisfy   either   requirement  
however.  
A   further   issue   relates   to   maritime   exclusion   zones.   These   might   be  
established  by  a  defending  state  to  prevent  the  passage  through  a  designated  
area   of   vessels   and   aircraft,   including   those   of   neutral   countries,   during  
conflict.  Prima  facie,  these  zones  impinge  on  an  essential  principle  that  neutral  
shipping   is  not   to  be  denied   the   freedom  of  navigation  on   the  high  seas.319  
During   the   1982   Falkland   Islands   conflict,   the   UK   invoked   self-­defence   to  
justify   its   imposition   of   a   ‘total   exclusion   zone’   around   the   Islands,   which  
applied  to  both  Argentine  vessels  and  to  any  other  ships  or  aircraft  operating  
                                                                                        
314  Hansard,  HC  Deb  05  February  1986  vol  91  col  278.  This  assertion  by  the  UK  was  cited  by  
Iran  in  support  of  its  case  before  the  ICJ  in  Oil  Platforms.  Memorial  submitted  by  the  Islamic  
Republic  of  Iran,  8  June  1993,  para  4.59.  
315  See  Greenwood  (1989)  284.  
316  UN  Doc  A/HRC/15/21  (2010)  paras  56–61.  
317  Ibid.  
318  Ibid,  para  55.  
319  O’Connell  (1984)  1109.  For  examples  and  further  commentary,  see  ibid  1109–12.  
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in  support  of  the  Argentine  occupation.  Any  such  ships  or  aircraft  found  within  
the  zone,  without  authorization,  were  to  be  treated  as  hostile.320  
Ostensibly,  such  action  constituted  an  ‘arbitrary  interference’  with  the  freedom  
of  navigation  and  over-­flight  of  aircraft  and  ships  of  non-­parties  to  the  conflict.321  
Yet,  as  Fenrick  argues,  the  exclusion  zone:  
was  a  reasonable  temporary  appropriation  of  a  limited  area  of  the  high  
seas   away   from   major   shipping   routes   for   self-­defence   purposes   to  
prevent   non-­party   clandestine   participation   in   the   conflict.   The  
appropriation  was  accompanied  by  adequate  notice,  did  not  result  in  any  
casualties  to  the  ships  or  aircraft  of  non-­parties,  and  was  terminated  after  
a   brief   period   (…)   once   the   British   consolidated   their   position   in   the  
Falklands.322  
Indeed,  other  than  Argentina,  only  Russia  officially  protested  against  the  British  
exclusion   zone.323  Therefore,   assuming   that   there   is   an   enduring   defensive  
necessity  that  requires  such  a  maritime  operation,  exclusion  zones  might  be  
regarded  as  proportionate  measures  of  self-­defence,  provided  that   they  are  
limited,  states  are  notified  of  their  existence  and  the  danger  to  neutral  shipping  
is  kept  to  a  minimum.324  The  imposition  of  maritime  exclusion  zones  as  an  act  
of  self-­defence  nevertheless  continues  to  occupy  an  ill-­defined  position  under  
international  law.325  
The  position  of  neutral  states  also  poses  a  conundrum  for  proportionality  in  the  
context   of   the   use   of   nuclear   weapons.   In   Nuclear   Weapons,   the   ICJ  
sidestepped   this   issue,   failing   to   rule   on   the   legality   of   the   use   of   nuclear  
weapons  on  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  neutrality.  It  simply  noted  that  the  principle  
                                                                                        
320  UN  Doc  S/15006  (1982).  
321  Fenrick  (1986)  116.  
322  Ibid.  
323  M.  Binyon,  ‘Moscow  Rebukes  Britain’,  The  Times  (London),  15  May  1982,  1.  
324   O’Connell   (1984)   1110–1;;   Greenwood   (1989)   285.   See   further   Michaelsen   (2003),  
especially  379–80;;  Paddeu  (2015)  129.  
325  See  generally  Michaelson  (2003).  
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of  neutrality  ‘has  (…)  been  considered  by  some  to  rule  out  the  use  of  a  weapon  
the  effects  of  which  simply  cannot  be  contained  within   the   territories  of   the  
contending  States.’326  The  issue  of  the  effect  of  nuclear  weapons  on  neutrality  
featured   more   extensively   in   the   separate   and   dissenting   opinions.   Judge  
Shahabuddeen,   for   example,   noted   that   neutrality   was   not   understood   to  
guarantee  neutral  states  ‘absolute  immunity  from  the  effects  of  armed  conflict’,  
but  it  was  difficult  to  justify  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  given  their  potentially  
devastating  effects  on  neutral  states.327  
The   consequences   for   the   natural   environment,   territory,   infrastructure   and  
populations  of  neutral  countries  would,  therefore,  seem  naturally  to  factor  into  
any  assessment  of  proportionality.  It  logically  follows  that  such  considerations  
should  also  apply  to  all  other  weapons  (biological,  chemical  and  conventional)  
that  may  also  affect  neutral  states  in  this  way.  There  is  no  obvious  rationale  
why   the   nature   of   the   weapon,   rather   than   its   effects,   should   limit   how  
proportionality  should  be  assessed.  Nuclear  weapons  are  simply  the  extreme  
example  of  what  those  effects  might  be.328  
The   position   of   other   states,   including   the   issue   of   neutrality   and   former  
belligerent   rights,   ultimately   holds   an   uncertain   place   in   the   proportionality  
equation.329  Further  elaboration  in  the  practice  of  states  is  required  in  order  to  
draw   firm   conclusions.   Their   role   in   determining   proportionality   will   be  
contingent  on  the  context,  however.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  incident,  
other   clearer   indicators   of   excess,   such   as   civilian   harm,   may   factor   more  
prominently   in   the   appraisal   of   defensive   action.   The   foregoing   analysis  
suggests,   however,   that   even   if   the   pursuit   of   a   defensive   purpose   has  
unavoidable  repercussions   for  such  states,   it   is  not   the  case  that  defending  
states   may   freely   prioritize   their   own   defence   above   all   other   interests.  
                                                                                        
326  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  93.  
327  Ibid,  diss  op  Shahabuddeen,  44–6.  
328  The  likelihood  and  degree  of  deleterious  trans  boundary  effects  are  perhaps  more  apparent  
with  nuclear,  chemical  and  biological  weapons.  The  effects  of  such  weapons,  by  their  nature,  
can  be  devastating  and  are  harder   to  control.  Yet,  the   invasion  or  bombardment  of  neutral  
territory  with  conventional  weapons  might  be  equally  catastrophic.  
329  Gardam  (2005)  23,  maintains  that  former  belligerent  rights  are  not  necessarily  inconsistent  
with  the  right  of  self-­defence  and  their  legality  depends  on  whether  they  are  proportionate.    
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Depending  on  the  context,  third  party  rights  have  the  potential  to  limit  defensive  
action.  It   is  an  example  of  proportionality  accounting  for  how  the  exercise  of  
self-­defence  impinges  on  the  wider  international  community.  Drawing  on  the  
operation  of  necessity  as  a  circumstance  precluding  wrongfulness  assists  with  
how   we   might   view   the   operation   of   these   rights   within   the   proportionality  
equation.   The   justificatory   notion   of   a   ‘lesser   evil’   reflects   the   balancing  
exercise  that  must  be  carried  out  between  the  right  of  self-­defence  and  other  
rights  that  might  be  impaired  by  its  exercise.  This  informs  whether  defensive  
action  might  be  viewed  as  excessive.  
3.2.7   Effect  on  the  environment    
The  potential   impact  on   the  environment  of  states  using   force   is  potentially  
significant.330  During  the  1991  Gulf  War,  for  example,  over  500  oil  wells  were  
deliberately  set  on  fire  and  huge  quantities  of  oil  were  pumped  or  spilled  into  
the  Gulf  causing  widespread  environmental  damage.331  The  type  of  weapons  
used  might  also  raise  environmental  concerns.  A  notable  case  was  the  use  of  
Agent   Orange   (a   herbicide   and   defoliant)   during   the   Vietnam   War.   More  
recently,  a  UN  environmental  report  examined  potential  contamination  caused  
by   depleted   uranium   munitions   during   the   Kosovo   conflict.332   As   noted,   in  
Nuclear  Weapons,  the  Court  concluded  that  existing  international  law  does  not  
specifically  prohibit  the  threat  or  use  of  nuclear  weapons.333  It  also  considered  
that   international  environmental   law  should  not  be  construed  as  depriving  a  
state   of   its   right   of   self-­defence.334   Nevertheless,   it   did   note   the   ‘powerful  
constraints’  that  IHL  and  international  environmental  law  have  placed  on  those  
states   regarding   environmental   protection. 335   It   insisted   that   such  
environmental  law  indicates  ‘important  environmental  factors  that  are  properly  
                                                                                        
330  See  generally  Sands  and  Peel  (2018)  828–40.  
331  Roberts  (1992)  540–1.  
332   United   Nations   Environment   Programme,   ‘Depleted   Uranium   in   Kosovo,   Post-­Conflict  
Environmental  Assessment’  (2001)  <http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/uranium.pdf>.  
333  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  105(B).  
334  Ibid,  para  30.  
335   Ibid,   para   31.   See   nn   338–9   and   accompanying   text   regarding   IHL   environmental  
protections.  
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to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  context  of  the  implementation  of  the  principles  
and  rules  of  the  law  applicable  in  armed  conflict.’336  
On  this  basis,  the  Court  held  that:  
States   must   take   environmental   considerations   into   account   when  
assessing  what  is  necessary  and  proportionate  in  the  pursuit  of  legitimate  
military  objectives.  Respect  for  the  environment  is  one  of  the  elements  
that  go  to  assessing  whether  an  action  is  in  conformity  with  the  principles  
of  necessity  and  proportionality.337  
This  paragraph  is  ambiguous.  The  reference  to  ‘legitimate  military  objectives’  
in  the  first  sentence  suggests  that  environmental  considerations  relate  to  an  
IHL  assessment  of  military  necessity  and  proportionality,  whereas  the  second  
sentence  appears  to  refer  to  the  JAB.  The  position  remains  unclear.  
Furthermore,  this  assertion  does  not  provide  detail  regarding  how  to  assess  
the   proportionality   of   using   nuclear   weapons.   Given   the   potentially  
catastrophic  and  enduring  effects  that  such  weapons  could  have  on  the  natural  
environment,   it   is   reasonable   to   conclude   that   their   use   can   only   be  
proportionate   in   the  most  extreme  cases,   i.e.  where   the  very  survival  of   the  
state  is  at  stake.  Yet,  if  that  is  so,  it  might  be  questioned  to  what  degree  the  
leaders  of  a  state  subject  to  an  existential  threat  would  consider  themselves  
under   an   obligation   to   respect   the   environment.   How   are   they   to   weigh  
environmental  protection  against  the  necessity  of  protecting  their  country  and  
their   people   from  what   presumably  would  need   to   be  annihilation?   In   such  
circumstances,  we  might  question  whether   it   is   truly  meaningful   to  say   that  
respect  for  the  environment  factors  into  the  calculus.  
Perhaps  environmental  considerations,  in  terms  of  JAB  proportionality,  carry  
greater  weight  and  operate  as  more  meaningful  limitations  on  defensive  action  
                                                                                        
336  Ibid,  para  33.  
337  Ibid,  para  30.  
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in  the  context  of  conventional  weapons.  This  is  to  say  in  situations  where  the  
state  is  not  facing  an  existential  threat.  In  these  cases,  employing  other  types  
of   weaponry   might   result   in   devastating   environmental   consequences,  
depending   on   how   they   are   used   and   to   what   extent.   As   a   general   rule,  
therefore,   in   circumstances   where   the   defending   state   has   a   choice   of  
weapons   to  deploy   to  achieve  an  effective  defence,  proportionality   logically  
dictates  that  those  that  cause  the  least  harm  to  the  environment  are  chosen.  
This  accords  with   the  analysis   in   the  previous  Section   that  accounts   for   the  
interests  of  the  wider  international  community  that  might  be  affected  by  a  use  
of  defensive  force.  An  act  of  self-­defence  is  likely  to  be  more  easily  justified  as  
a  ‘lesser  evil’,  and  not  excessive,  if  the  impact  on  the  environment  (in  which  
the  international  community  in  general  has  an  interest)  is  minimised.  
This  approach  is  also  in  line  with  the  jus  in  bello  rules  that  limit  the  methods  
and  means   of   warfare.   These   include   the   general   IHL   principle   of   military  
necessity,338  and  API   that  prohibits  methods  and  means  of  warfare   that  are  
intended,   or  may  be  expected,   to   cause  widespread,   long-­term  and   severe  
damage   to   the   natural   environment,   and   that   prohibits   attacks   against   the  
natural  environment  by  way  of  reprisals.339  In  the  future,  identifying  where  the  
balance  should  be  struck  between  one  or  more  states  pursuing  a  right  of  self-­
defence  and  the  wider  issue  of  protecting  the  environment,  the  developing  law  




                                                                                        
338  See  Section  2.1.  
339  Arts  35(3)  and  55  API.  See  further  the  ICRC  Commentary  to  Art  35(3)  paras  1440–62.  More  
generally  on  IHL  protections  of  the  environment,  see  Sands  and  Peel  (2018)  832–6.  
340  Gardam   (2005)  24.  For  ongoing  consideration  by   the   ILC  of  protecting   the  environment  
during  armed  conflicts,  see  <http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/8_7.shtml>.  
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3.3   Proportionality,  IHL  and  JAB  necessity  -­  overlaps  and  distinctions  
In  order  to  formulate  a  clear  conceptual  understanding  of  JAB  proportionality,  
it  is  imperative  to  identify  both  the  overlaps  with,  and  distinctions  that  should  
be  made  between,  IHL  and  the  JAB.  Scholars  and  states  have  yet  to  conquer  
this   difficult   challenge.   Whilst   the   former   often   prefer   to   refer   to   the   more  
specific  rules  of  IHL  when  commenting  on  proportionality,  the  latter  generally  
do   not   distinguish   between   the   two   legal   frameworks  when   referencing   the  
term.341  Examining  the  differences  and  areas  of  possible,  and  actual,  confusion  
and  conflation  allows  for  an  enhanced  review  of  the  jurisprudence,  academic  
opinion  and  state  practice.  
3.3.1   JAB  proportionality  v.  IHL  proportionality    
IHL  and  the  JAB  both  regulate  the  use  of  force.  However,  on  the  whole,  they  
are  distinct  and  separate  branches  of  international  law.  The  operation  of  IHL  
does  not  take  account  of  the  legality  of  a  state’s  use  of  force  under  the  JAB,  
i.e.   whether   self-­defence   is   lawfully   established.342   This   autonomy   is   ‘holy  
gospel’ 343   and   is   ‘[o]ne   of   the   oldest   and   best   established   axiomata   of  
international   law’. 344   That   said,   the   operation   of   the   one   regime   has   the  
potential  to  influence  the  understanding  of  the  other.345  For  present  purposes,  
both   systems   share   the   concept   of   proportionality,   but   its   role   in   each   is  
different,   as   are   the   variables   against   which   the   relevant   proportionality   is  
measured.  
                                                                                        
341  Ruys  (2010)  110–1.  
342  The  preamble  to  API  reaffirms  ‘that  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  
1949  and  of  this  Protocol  must  be  fully  applied  in  all  circumstances  to  all  persons  (…)  without  
any  adverse  distinction  based  on  the  nature  or  origin  of  the  armed  conflict  or  on  the  causes  
espoused  by  or  attributed  to  the  Parties  to  the  conflict’  (emphasis  added).  
343  Schmitt  (2007–2008)  154.  
344  Gill   (1999)   614.   For   examples   of   more   recent   commentary   on   this   long   debated   and  
controversial  topic,  see  e.g.  Moussa  (2008);;  Van  Steenberghe  (2012);;  Okimoto  (2012).  See  
also  paras  215–16  of  the  2016  ICRC  Commentary  on  the  First  Geneva  Convention  relating  to  
Art  2  (‘ICRC’s  2016  Art  2  Commentary’).  
345   See   e.g.   Section   2.5,   including   analysis   of   the   meanings   of   ‘military   target’,   ‘military  
objectives’,  and  ‘military  advantage’.  
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In   the   JAB,   proportionality   measures   the   defending   state’s   response   as   a  
whole,   primarily  against   its   defensive  purpose.  This   assessment  also   takes  
into   account   material   factors   such   as   civilian   harm   and   wider   third-­party  
interests.  In  contrast,  IHL  proportionality  requires  an  assessment  of  whether  
the  expected  civilian  loss  or  injury,  or  damage  to  civilian  objects,  in  each  case  
resulting  from  a  particular  planned  attack,  would  be  excessive  in  relation  to  the  
concrete   and   direct   military   advantage   anticipated. 346   This   rule   places   an  
obligation   on   those   planning   attacks   to   assess   the   proportionality   of   their  
individual  targeting  decisions.  Proportionality  at  this  operational  level  employs  
different   variables   to   JAB   proportionality.   Whereas   JAB   proportionality  
balances  the  defending  state’s  total  use  of  force  against  its  overall  defensive  
purpose   and   wider   third-­party   interests,   IHL   proportionality   balances  
anticipated  collateral  damage  (being  civilians  and  civilian  objects)  against  the  
expected  outcome  of  specific  attacks  (that  form  part  of  the  overall  defensive  
operation).347  The  UK  Military  Manual  notes  the  importance  of  this  distinction  
between  the  two  regimes.348  
Proportionality   in   the   JAB   operates,   therefore,   at   the   macro   level.   It   is  
concerned  with  the  big  picture  and  the  totality  of  the  wider  defensive  response.  
It   is   not   concerned   with   single   acts   of   force,   unless   such   acts   constitute  
evidence   of   a   shift   in   the   overall   scale   or   scope   of   that   response. 349  
Proportionality  in  the  JAB  relates  primarily  to  the  generalities  of  self-­defence,  
                                                                                        
346  This   core   principle   of   IHL   is   encapsulated   in   Art   51(5)(b)   API.   If   collateral   damage   is  
expected  to  be  excessive,  then  an  attack  is  to  be  cancelled,  suspended  or  re-­planned.  Arts  
57(2)(a)(iii)  and  (2)(b)  API.  
347  It  is  generally  understood  that  collateral  damage  is  assessed  in  relation  to  the  anticipated  
military  advantage  from  the  attack  as  a  whole  and  not  only  from  isolated  or  particular  parts  of  
that  attack.  Ten  contracting  states  (Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Spain  and  the  UK)  made  formal  declarations  that  the  expression  
‘military  advantage’  employed  in  Arts  51,  52  and  57  API  (as  applicable)  has  this  meaning.  See  
ICRC   database,   <https://ihl–
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties
&xp_treatySelected=470>.  However,   “attack  as  a  whole’   is  not  used  as  meaning   the  whole  
military  campaign  that  may  be  conducted  in  self-­defence  but  rather  as  referring  at  best  to  a  
series  of  military  actions  which  are  part  of  the  individual  attack  launched  in  the  framework  of  
such  a  campaign.’  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  116.  See  also  Dinstein  (2010)  94–5.  
348  Section  2.8  UK  Military  Manual.  
349  The  Chatham  House  Principles  (2006)  969;;  Ruys  (2010)  110;;  Lubell  (2013)  3;;  Henderson  
(2018)  234.  See  further  Section  3.2.1.  
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operating  to  protect  against  ‘excessive  overall  reactions’350  by  states.  The  logic  
of  this  conclusion  is  based  on  the  fact  that  uses  of  force  that  are  uncontained  
and  go  beyond  what  is  strictly  necessary  for  states  to  protect  themselves  are  
likely   to  be  disruptive  of   the   international   legal  order.  This  goes  back   to   the  
point   made   in   Section   1.3.1   and   this   Chapter   more   generally   that  
proportionality  accounts  for,  and  seeks  to  balance,  the  interests  of  a  number  
of  different  actors,  including  of  the  wider  international  community.  It  has  been  
suggested,   therefore,   that   the  ultimate  rationale  of  JAB  proportionality   (over  
and   above   proscribing   excessive   uses   of   force   against   the   attacker)   is   the  
maintenance   of   international   peace   and   security. 351   This   conclusion   is  
supported   by   the   analysis   set   out   in   Section   3.2   regarding   how   essential  
interests   of   the   international   community   are   accounted   for   in   determining  
whether  defensive  responses  are  excessive.  
In  contrast,  IHL  proportionality  focuses  on  the  micro  level.  Its  purview  is  one-­
off  incidents,  being  the  specifics  of  individual  targeting  decisions.  It  requires  a  
‘concrete  and  direct  military  advantage’  from  each  and  every  military  action  to  
ensure   that   such   use   of   force   is   not   excessive   in   relation   to   civilian   harm  
resulting   from   the  particular  attack   (that   forms  part   of   the   overall   defensive  
operation).  As  such,  whilst  much  of  the  decision  making  for  the  purposes  of  
the  JAB  will  be  made  strategically,  at  the  state  level,  the  majority  of  the  decision  
making  that  is  relevant  to  the  IHL  calculus  will  happen  much  lower  down  the  
chain  of  command.352  
The  rationale  of  IHL  proportionality  is  not,  therefore,  tied  to  the  international  
order  and  the  minimization  of  the  use  of  force  between  states.  Its  purview  is  
more  localised  and  short  term.  Its  primary  concern  is  the  effect  of  such  force  
on   individuals,   not   the   effect   on   states   in   any   abstract   sense.353   It   offers  
                                                                                        
350  Simma  et  al  (2012)  1427.  
351  Greenwood  (1989)  278;;  Gardam  (2004)  16;;  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  118–19.  
352  Gardam  (2004)  21.  See  also  Lubell  (2013)  2,  noting  the  macro/micro  distinction  between  
IHL  and  the  JAB.  
353  An  exception  that  does  account  for  protection  of  wider  interests  and  international  society  
more  generally  are  the  IHL  rules  pertaining  to  protection  of  cultural  property.  For  an  overview  
of  these  rules,  see  e.g.  R.  O’Keefe  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  492–520.  
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humanitarian  protection  on  an  equal  basis  to  all  sides  in  a  conflict,  focusing  on  
minimizing  damage  and  suffering  of  non-­combatants   to   the  greatest  degree  
possible  during  the  exigencies  of  war.354  It  seeks  at  the  micro  level  to  balance  
the  two  cardinal  principles  of  IHL,  being  military  necessity  and  humanity.355  The  
function,   make   up   and   rationale   of   proportionality   in   each   regime   are,  
therefore,  markedly  different.356  
It  is  understandable  that  the  distinction  between  IHL  and  JAB  proportionality  
is  not  always  so  readily  apparent.  After  all,  both  govern  a  state’s  use  of  force,  
acting  to  constrain  it.  Yet,  whilst  a  breach  of,  or  compliance  with,  one  regime  
might  lead  to  the  same  result  in  the  other,  this  is  not  automatic.  Starting  with  
the   effect   of   IHL   violations   on   the   JAB   status,   it   is   perhaps   reasonable   to  
conclude   that   a   violation   of   IHL   proportionality   indicates   that   JAB  
proportionality  is  also  breached.357  This  might  be  the  case,  but  a  breach  of  IHL  
proportionality   will   not   violate   JAB   proportionality   as   a   matter   of   course.   It  
would   be   illogical   to   conclude,   for   example,   that   a   violation   of   IHL  
proportionality   early   on   in   a   long   defensive   campaign   renders   the   whole  
operation  disproportionate  under  the  JAB.358  
This  conclusion  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  rules  of  IHL  and  the  JAB  operate  
at   different   levels.   As   IHL   proportionality   operates   at   the   micro   level   of  
individual  decision-­making,  a  one-­off,  or  small  number  of,  IHL  disproportionate  
targeting   decision(s)  may  or  may  not   render   the  whole   defensive   operation  
disproportionate  at  the  macro  level,  where  proportionality  in  the  JAB  operates.  
A  ‘global  calculation’  of  excessiveness  at  the  JAB  level  might  accommodate  
                                                                                        
354   Greenwood   (1989)   278;;   Van   Steenberghe   (2012)   118–19;;   Simma   et   al   (2012)   1427;;  
Okimoto  (2012)  49.  
355  See  e.g.  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  78.  
356  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  115–18,  refers  to  the  distinction  described  in  this  paragraph  as  
the   ‘general   versus  particular’  dichotomy.  For  similar  conclusions  and   further  analysis,   see  
further  Akande  (1998)  191–2;;  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  969;;  Cannizzaro  (2006)  786;;  
Mousa  (2008)  976–8;;  Okimoto  (2012).  
357  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  117.  
358  Greenwood   (1983)   231,   has   suggested   that   an   act   that   contravenes   IHL   cannot   be   a  
‘reasonable   and   proportionate  measure   of   self-­defence’   under   the   JAB.  However,   he   also  
accepts  that  neither  body  of  law  is  logically  dependent  on  the  other.  Ibid.  Given  the  logic  of  the  
latter   conclusion,  and   the  analysis  set  out   in   this  Section,   it   is   this  author’s  position   that  a  
contravention  of  IHL  does  not  always  breach  the  rules  of  the  JAB.  
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individual   instances   of   excess   at   the   IHL   level.359  This   will   depend   on   the  
severity  and  number  of  IHL  breaches  when  considered  in  the  context  of  the  
overall   defensive   campaign.   Where   there   are   systematic,   rather   than  
exceptional,  violations  of  IHL  proportionality,  these  may  also  result  in  a  breach  
of  JAB  proportionality.  Consistent  violations  of  IHL  proportionality  resulting  in  
excessive   civilian   damage   (weighed   against   a   concrete   and   direct   military  
advantage)   will   likely   indicate   that   defence   is   not   the   aim   of   the   military  
campaign. 360   Compliance   is,   therefore,   contingent   on   the   particular  
circumstances.  
Likewise,   adherence   to   the   IHL   rules   of   proportionality   on   all   individual  
targeting   decisions   during   a   defensive   campaign   might   indicate   JAB  
compliance,   especially   where   collateral   civilian   harm   is   minimized   in   each  
case.   Yet,   such   compliance  might   still   breach   JAB   proportionality   if,  on   an  
overall  assessment,  the  combination  of  uses  of  force  is  excessive  in  relation  
to   the   defensive   purpose.361  Everything   depends   on   how   a   specific   act   of  
targeting  fits  within  the  bigger  defensive  picture.  This  will  be  decided  on  a  case-­
by-­case   basis.   The   Ethiopia-­Eritrea   Claims  Commission   followed   this   logic  
when,   in   adhering   to   the   strict   distinction   between   the   JAB   and   IHL,   it  
concluded  that  compliance  with  IHL  does  not  preclude  a  breach  of  the  JAB.362  
However,  whilst  a  breach  of  IHL  proportionality  might  not  lead  to  a  breach  of  
JAB   proportionality,   it   still   constitutes   a   breach   of   IHL.   It   is,   therefore,   an  
unlawful   act   that   must   not   be   carried   out   or,   if   in   progress,   must   cease  
                                                                                        
359  This   assumes   targeting   is  prima   facie   lawful   under   both   the   JAB   and   IHL.  As   noted   in  
Section  2.5(b),  a  lack  of  specific  necessity  is  also  likely  to  result  in  the  absence  of  a  ‘military  
advantage’  for  the  purpose  of  IHL.  This  denies  targeting  under  both  regimes.  In  such  cases,  
an  act  of  targeting  can  be  neither  IHL  nor  JAB  proportionate.  It  will  simply  be  unlawful  under  
both  regimes.  
360  Whilst  the  two  regimes  are  strictly  separate,  given  that  the  military  advantage  can  be  judged  
by  reference  to  the  (defensive)  campaign,  this  constitutes  a  prima  facie  bridge  between  the  
two  regimes.  One  informs  the  other.  See  Section  2.5(b).  
361   Greenwood   (1989)   279,   reaching   a   similar   conclusion.   See   also   Gardam   (2004)   11;;  
Okimoto  (2012)  58;;  Kretzmer  (2013)  278.  
362  ‘If  (…)  a  State  initiating  a  conflict  through  a  breach  of  the  [JAB]  is  liable  under  international  
law  for  a  wide  range  of  ensuing  consequences,  the  initiating  State  will  bear  extensive  liability  
whether  or  not  its  actions  respect  [IHL].  Indeed,  much  of  the  damage  for  which  Ethiopia  claims  
[JAB]  compensation  involves  conduct  that  the  Commission  previously  found  to  be  consistent  
with  [IHL].’  Eritrea-­Ethiopia  Claims  Commission  -­  Final  Award  -­  Ethiopia's  Damages  Claims,  
Decision  of  17  August  2009,  RIAA  Volume  XXVI  631,  para  316.  
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immediately.  As  such,   it  may,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  attract  both  
state  responsibility  and  individual  criminal  responsibility.363    
Conversely,   it  has  been  suggested   that  compliance  with  JAB  proportionality  
might  prevent  an  attack  on  a  target  that  would  otherwise  be  lawful  under  IHL.  
Gardam  proposes  the  example  of  an  electricity  grid  that,  she  argues,  might  be  
targetable   under   IHL,   but   the   destruction   of   which   might   be   excessive   in  
relation  to  achieving  the  aims  of  self-­defence  (thereby  constituting  a  breach  of  
JAB   proportionality). 364   However,   as   explored   in   Section   2.5   and   in   this  
Section,   to   be   targetable   under   the   JAB,   specific   necessity   must   first   be  
satisfied.   This   requires   a   connection   between   the   armed   attack   and   the  
defensive   response   (in   this  example,  being   the  destruction  of   the  electricity  
grid).  To  be  targetable  under  IHL,  there  must  also  be  a  ‘military  advantage’  to  
destroying   the   grid.   If   the   grid   is   not   connected  with   an  armed   attack,   it   is  
unlikely   to   offer   a   ‘military   advantage’   during   a   defensive   operation   and,  
therefore,  will  not  be  targetable  under  IHL  or  the  JAB.  It  is  the  bridge  between  
specific  necessity  and  IHL  that  leads  to  this  result.  Gardam’s  example  rightly  
raises   the   issue   of   how   the   two   regimes   might   influence   each   other,   but  
proportionality  is  irrelevant  to  this  targeting  analysis.    
The  instinctive  link  between  the  two  types  of  proportionality  must,  therefore,  
be   approached   with   caution.   A   contributor   to   any   potential   conflation   or  
confusion   is   that   IHL   and   JAB   proportionality   share   common,   ultimately  
humanitarian,  characteristics.  Both  account  for  how  force  affects  civilians  and  
civilian   objects   and,   thereby,   seek   to   minimise   civilian   harm.   As   noted   in  
Section  3.2.5,  states  often  focus  on  this  point  when  referring  to  proportionality  
and  tend  not  to  distinguish  between  IHL  proportionality  and  JAB  proportionality  
when   so   doing.   This   conflation,   unhelpfully   for   those   seeking   conceptual  
clarity,  leads  to  ‘a  sort  of  global  assessment  of  proportionality’.365  
                                                                                        
363  See  below  regarding  the  ongoing  and  concurrent  application  of  the  JAB  and  IHL.  
364  Gardam  (2004)  168–9.  
365  Cannizzaro  in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  348.  
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Yet,  whilst  civilian  harm  is  the  principal  variable  against  which  the  concrete  and  
direct   military   advantage   anticipated   is   measured   for   the   purposes   of   IHL  
proportionality,   it   is  only  one  of  a  number  of  factors  and   interests   that  go   to  
whether   a   purported   defensive   purpose   satisfies   JAB   proportionality.   IHL  
proportionality   is   not   concerned,   for   example,   with   broader   considerations  
such  as  the  effect  on  other  states,  including  a  host  state  where  acts  of  self-­
defence  are   carried   out   against  NSAs  within   its   territory.366  Also,  whilst   IHL  
incorporates   environmental   protections,   they   are   not   a   feature   of   IHL  
proportionality. 367   Moreover,   as   noted   above,   the   JAB   will   review   overall  
collateral   civilian   damage   (and   all   the   other   aspects   of   proportionality  
discussed  above)  from  the  perspective  of  the  defensive  military  operation  as  
a  whole,  rather  than  in  respect  of  each  individual  part  of  that  operation,  which  
is  the  purview  of  IHL.  
The  ICJ  has  contributed  to  the  confusion  regarding  the  distinction  between  the  
JAB  and  IHL  by  potentially  suggesting  that  compliance  with  JAB  proportionality  
is  dependent  upon  conformity  with  IHL.  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  the  Court  stated  
that:  
a  use  of  force  that  is  proportionate  under  the  law  of  self-­defence,  must,  
in  order  to  be  lawful,  also  meet  the  requirements  of  the  law  applicable  in  
armed   conflict  which   comprise   in   particular   the   principles   and   rules   of  
humanitarian  law.368  
This   may   be   interpreted   to   mean   that   in   order   for   self-­defence   to   be   JAB  
proportionate,   it  must   comply  with   IHL,   including   IHL  proportionality.369  This  
unnecessarily  conflates  the  JAB  and  IHL,  however.370  The  better  view  is  that,  
in  order  to  be  lawful,  any  use  of  defensive  force  must  be  JAB  proportionate  
                                                                                        
366  This  is  not  to  say  that  these  considerations  are  irrelevant  for  the  purposes  of  IHL.  The  point  
is  that  they  are  not  relevant  to  a  calculation  of  IHL  proportionality.  See  further  Section  4.2.3.  
367  See  Section  3.2.7.  The  environment  more  generally  does  not  factor  as  a  third-­party  interest  
in  IHL  proportionality,  as  it  might  do  in  JAB  proportionality,  even  though  it  is  a  protected  interest  
under  separate  IHL  prohibitions.  
368  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  42.  
369  See  e.g.  Heller  in  Ohlin  (2016)  252.  
370  Moussa  (2008)  974–7.  
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and  also  comply  with  IHL.  The  UK  adopted  this  conclusion  in  its  statement  to  
the  Court.371    
On  this  interpretation,  to  be  a  lawful  use  of  force,  the  requirements  of  both  the  
JAB   and   IHL   (including   proportionality   in   each)   must   be   met,   but  
independently.372  There   is   support   for   this   position   in   the  Nuclear  Weapons  
judgment   itself.  Compliance  with   the   two   regimes   is  set  out  separately  and  
independently   in   the  dispositif,373  and   is  also  considered  on   this  basis   in   the  
declaration   of   President   Bedjaoui, 374   and   several   separate   and   dissenting  
opinions.375   As   such,   the   JAB   and   IHL   should   be   regarded   as   cumulative  
obligations,   whilst   remaining   as   two   essentially   separate   and   independent  
bodies  of  international  law.376  Any  suggestion  that  the  JAB  is  subordinated  to  
IHL,  such  that  compliance  with  the  former  depends  on  adhering  to  the  latter,  
fails  to  recognize  the  fundamental  distinction  between  the  two.377  
3.3.2   JAB  proportionality  v.  JAB  necessity  
Adopting  the  teleological  or  ‘means-­end’  model  as  the  primary  determinant  of  
proportionality  emphasizes  the  rapport  that  necessity  has  with  proportionality  
and  explains  the  risk  of  conflation  between  the  two.  As  Kretzmer  rightly  notes,  
‘[m]eans  can  only  be  proportionate  when  they  are  necessary  to  achieve  the  
legitimate   ends.’378  The   result   is   a   possible   understanding   of   proportionality  
                                                                                        
371  ‘Assuming  that  a  State's  use  of  nuclear  weapons  meets  the  requirements  of  self-­defence,  
it  must   then  be  considered  whether   it  conforms  to   the   fundamental  principles  of   the   law  of  
armed   conflict   regulating   the   conduct   of   hostilities.’   Nuclear   Weapons,   Statement   of   the  
Government  of  the  UK,  June  1995,  para  3.44.  
372  Moussa  (2008)  975.  See  also  Greenwood  (2002)  313–4;;  Kretzmer  (2013)  240;;  Cannizzaro  
in  Clapham  and  Gaeta  (2014)  347–8;;  Gill  (2016)  369.  
373  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  105(C)  and  (D).  
374  Ibid,  declaration  of  President  Bedjaoui,  para  22.  
375   Ibid,   sep   op   Ranjeva,   paras   22,   26;;   sep   op   Fleischhauer,   paras   3,   5;;   diss   op  
Shahabuddeen,   paras   155–7;;   diss   op  Weeramantry  para   397   (although,   see   also   diss   op  
Weeramantry   para   367,   which   suggests   a   less   clear   separation.   See   further   Section   3.4  
regarding  the  continuing  application  of  both  regimes);;  diss  op  Koroma,  para  14.  See  also  sep  
op  Guillaume,  para  8  for  some  more  nuanced  views  on  this  issue.  
376  Gill   (1999)  618,  623;;  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  115,  117;;  Okimoto  (2012)  50,  57,  70.  As  
noted,  this  is  subject  to  the  interaction  between  the  JAB  and  IHL  on  the  issue  of  targeting.  See  
Section  2.5(b).  
377  For   further   discussion   of   this   case   and   the   relationship   between   IHL   and   the   JAB,  see  
Akande  (1998);;  Gill  (1999);;  Moussa  (2008);;  Van  Steenberghe  (2012)  121–3.  
378  Kretzmer  (2013)  239.  See  also  Corten  (2010)  488.  
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that  ‘the  level  of  force  used  is  not  greater  than  that  necessary  to  end  the  attack  
or  remove  the  threat.  As  such  it  is  another  way  of  looking  at  the  requirement  
of   necessity.’379  This   conclusion  brings   us  back   to   the   conceptual   circularity  
that  exists  between  these  two  customary  requirements.  
a)   Proportionality  and  general  necessity  
This  circularity,  and  the  potential  for  conflation,  is  limited  however.  As  initially  
set   out   in   Section   2.2,   understanding   necessity   and   proportionality   to   be  
equivalent   is   only   theoretically   possible   as   between   specific   necessity   and  
proportionality.   There   can   be   no   conflation   between   proportionality   and  
general  necessity.  The  two  are  conceptually  distinct.  This  can  be  explained  as  
follows.   If,   following  an  armed  attack,  self-­defence   (in  any   form)   is  deemed  
unnecessary,  such  conclusion  must   result   from  a   lack  of  general  necessity.  
This  might  be  because  peaceful  alternative  means  are  available  to  resolve  the  
situation,  or  the  UNSC  takes  effective  action.   In  such  circumstances,  where  
there  is  no  prima  facie  need  for  a  state  to  act  in  self-­defence,  it  is  meaningless  
to  say  that  a  use  of  force  is  also  disproportionate.  Absent  general  necessity,  it  
is  simply  unlawful.  An  assessment  of  proportionality,  as  against  a  defensive  
aim,   cannot   be   made,   as   such   aim   is   lacking.   Consideration   of   specific  
necessity  is  likewise  impossible  in  such  circumstances.  
If,   in   the   alternative,   some   form   of   defensive   response   is   necessary   (e.g.  
because   peaceful   options   are   not   available   and/or   were   unsuccessfully  
pursued,  and/or  the  UNSC  has  not  taken  effective  action),  then  it  is  meaningful  
to  assess  the  proportionality  of  a  defensive  operation.  This  is  because,  once  
general   necessity   is   satisfied,   a   defensive   purpose   is   present.   The   two  
concepts   function   very   differently   however.   General   necessity   requires   an  
assessment  of  whether  any  force  is  required  to  respond  to  an  armed  attack.  
Proportionality  requires  that  the  total  force  deployed  (as  a  result  of  that  general  
necessity)  is  not  excessive.  In  summary,  therefore,  a  use  of  force  that  satisfies  
                                                                                        
379  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  969.  See  also  Ruys  (2010)  112;;  Kress  in  Weller  (2015)  
587;;  Henderson  (2018)  237.  
     
     197  
general  necessity  may  be  proportionate  or  disproportionate.  However,  a  use  
of  force  that  does  not  pass  the  general  necessity  test  can  be  neither.  
b)   Proportionality  and  specific  necessity  
To  address   the  potential  conflation   issue,  we  must  examine  the  relationship  
between  proportionality  and  specific  necessity.  To  understand  proportionality,  
and  to  identify  distinctions  between  it  and  specific  necessity,  it  is  important  to  
appreciate  where  any  overlap  might  exist.  The  principal  factor  that  might  lead  
to  a  conclusion  that  defensive  force  is  both  necessary  and  proportionate,  or  
unnecessary  and  disproportionate,   is   the  nature  of   the   target.  As  set  out   in  
Section  2.5,  this  thesis  argues  that  specific  necessity  requires  that  the  target  
of  self-­defence  must  be  military  in  nature  (in  line  with  IHL  ‘military  objectives’)  
and,   in   addition,   connected   with   the   armed   attack   (thereby   establishing   a  
defensive  purpose).  The  question,  therefore,  is  whether  the  nature  of  the  target  
also  factors  in  the  proportionally  equation.  
The   ICJ   in  Oil   Platforms,   in   referring   to   both   necessity   and   proportionality,  
stated  that  ‘[o]ne  aspect  of  these  criteria  is  the  nature  of  the  target  of  the  force  
used  avowedly  in  self-­defence.’380  Some  commentators  interpret  this  to  mean  
that   proportionality   also   requires   the   target   to   have   a   connection   with   the  
armed  attack.381  Others  state  that  proportionality,   like  necessity,  requires  the  
target  to  be  of  a  military  nature.382  The  result  of  this  approach  is  to  say  that  both  
specific   necessity   and   proportionality   impose   an   identical   limitation   on   the  
choice  of  targets.  Such  conclusion  requires  further  examination.  
As  noted,  following  an  armed  attack  and  the  satisfaction  of  general  necessity,  
specific  necessity  must  be  established  before  a  proportionality  assessment  is  
possible.383  Where  specific  necessity  is  absent,  e.g.  because  the  target  is  not  
                                                                                        
380  Oil  Platforms,  para  74.  
381  Okimoto  (2012)  64.  Ruys  (2010)  121,  asserts  that  targeting,  as  well  as  forming  part  of  the  
necessity  criterion,  ‘equally  fits  into  the  proportionality  framework.’  
382  Etezazian  (2016)  284–8.  Although,  to  the  extent  his  analysis  relates  to  proportionality,  such  
conclusion  appears  to  focus  largely  on  the  resulting  civilian  harm.  
383  See  Sections  1.3.1  and  2.5(a).  
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military  and/or  not  connected  with  the  armed  attack,  ipso  facto,  a  use  of  force  
cannot  be  connected  with  a  defensive  purpose.  It  is  meaningless  in  such  cases  
to  say  that  an  unnecessary  incident  of  targeting  is  also  disproportionate.  It  will  
simply  be  an  unlawful  use  of  force.  As  an  example,  let  us  consider  targets  that  
are  prima  facie  unnecessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  JAB.  Obvious  candidates  
are  civilians  and  civilian  objects   that,  by  definition,  are  not   (and  cannot  be)  
legitimate  targets  connected  to  the  armed  attack.384  Targeting  them  directly  is  
not  capable  of  serving  a  defensive  purpose  and  will  always  be  unnecessary  
under   the   JAB,   as   well   as   constituting   unlawful   acts   under   IHL. 385   This  
conclusion,  so   far  as   it   relates   to   the  JAB,   is  not   reached  on   the  basis  of  a  
particular  prohibition  under  that  regime.  It  contains  no  such  specific  rules.  It  is  
deduced   rather   from   the   general   principles   that   logically   flow   from   the  
foregoing   analysis. 386   The   ensuing   question   is   whether   such   unnecessary  
targeting  can  also  rightly  be  labelled  as  disproportionate.  
Green  and  Waters  suggest  that   it  can  be.   In  asserting   that   targeting   is  also  
inherent  in  the  proportionality  requirement,  they  argue  that  ‘it  is  unlikely  that  a  
direct  attack  on  a  civilian  target  will  be  anything  other  than  ‘excessive’  when  
measured   against   the   state’s   defensive   need.’ 387   There   is,   therefore,   a  
                                                                                        
384  As  set  out  in  Section  2.5,  this  assumes  that  civilians  are  not  DPIH  and  that  civilian  objects  
are  not  being  used  for  military  purposes.  
385  As  a  caveat,  Green  and  Waters  (2015)  23–4,  argue  that  the  JAB  rules  on  civilian  targeting  
are  not  absolute  in  the  same  way  as  they  are  in  IHL.  The  authors  highlight  that  necessity  and  
proportionality  are  relative  criteria,  to  be  assessed  by  reference  to  the  defensive  needs  of  the  
state.  As  such,  in  extreme  situations  of  defensive  need,  such  as  where  the  very  survival  of  the  
state   is   threatened  (as  recognized  by   the  ICJ   in  Nuclear  Weapons,  paras  96–7),   then  their  
position   is   that   attacking   a   civilian   target   would   meet   the   necessity   and   proportionality  
requirements.  They  accept  that  such  instances  would  be  rare  and  that  targeting  in  this  way  
would  still  be  unlawful  under  IHL.  This  conclusion  regarding  the  JAB  seems  hard  to  reconcile  
with   the  Oil  Platforms   decision,  however,  and   the  general  proposition   that   targets  must  be  
military.  The  use  of  nuclear  weapons  might  well  be  necessary  and  proportionate   in  such   in  
extremis  circumstances,  allowing  for  the  targeting  of  a  military  target  that  leads  to  high  levels  
of   civilian   collateral   damage   (which   is   a   proportionality   consideration).   However,   there   is  
nothing   in   the   ICJ   jurisprudence,  or   the   logic   inherent   in   the  necessity  criterion,   that  would  
allow  for  the  deliberate  targeting  of  civilians  or  civilian  objects  in  these  circumstances.  Such  a  
position  effectively  allows  the  JAB  to  override  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  IHL,  which  is  
both  unwarranted  and  unwelcome.  
386  As  Okimoto  (2012)  69,   rightly  notes,   the  JAB   is  silent  as   to  which   types  of  persons  and  
objects  may  be  attacked  in  self-­defence,  as  well  as  regarding  which  weapons  can  or  cannot  
be  used.  It  is  rather  IHL  that  provides  these  detailed  rules.  However,  such  rule  is  inherent  in  
the  requirement  that  self-­defence  is  both  necessary  and  proportionate.  
387  Green  and  Waters  (2015)  11–12.  See  also  Okimoto  (2012)  65.  
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potential   argument   to   be   made   that   targeting   decisions   might   lead   to   a  
determination   of   defensive   force   being   both   unnecessary   and  
disproportionate.   Yet,   this   conclusion,   whilst   true   on   its   own   terms,   is  
problematic  regarding  how  proportionality  is  assessed.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  
order   in   which   the   necessity   and   proportionality   evaluations   are   made.   By  
considering  necessity  first,  as  we  must  do,  the  requirement  of  proportionality  
in  such  circumstances  is  rendered  inapplicable.  On  this  basis,  where  specific  
necessity  is  absent,  as  is  the  case  with  attacking  a  civilian  target,  a  use  of  force  
cannot  be  proportionate,  but  neither  can  it  be  disproportionate.  
Where   specific   necessity   is   present   (because   the   target   is   military   and  
connected  to  the  armed  attack)  the  applicability  of  proportionality  is  clear.  The  
resulting  harm  caused  by  attacking  a  target  that  is  specifically  necessary  can  
either   be   proportionate   or   disproportionate   (when   measured   against   the  
overarching  defensive  purpose  and  accounting  for  the  various  factors  referred  
to  in  this  Chapter).388  It  is  unfortunate,  therefore,  that  the  ICJ  in  Oil  Platforms  
was  not  clearer  on  how  the  ‘nature  of  the  target’  pertains  to  the  requirements  
of   necessity   and   proportionality   separately.   It   did   not   offer   any   analysis  
regarding  what  relevance  this  has  in  practice  for  proportionality,  or  how  the  two  
requirements  might  be  applied  jointly  to  issues  of  targeting.389  
If   the   concern   that   the   Court   and   certain   commentators   are   attempting   to  
address   is   the   result   of   an   act   of   targeting,   this   is   indeed   a   matter   for  
proportionality.  However,  such  concern  does  not   relate   to   the  nature  of   the  
target  per  se,  but  rather  the  consequence  of  targeting,  including  the  ensuing  
collateral   damage. 390   Gardam   argues,   for   example,   that   proportionality  
regulates,  inter  alia,  the  ‘means  and  methods  of  warfare’  and  the  ‘targets  that  
                                                                                        
388  Cf  Gray  (2018)  159,  who  argues  that  if  a  use  of  force  is  ‘not  proportionate,  it  is  difficult  to  
see  how  it  can  be  necessary.’  
389  Even   if   the   taxonomy   adopted   by   this   thesis   is   not   accepted,   including   the   distinction  
between   ‘specific’  and   ‘general’   necessity,   it   is  evident   that   the  nature  of   the   target  and   its  
connection  with  an  armed  attack  is  an  issue  for  necessity  broadly  defined.  If  there  is  no  rational  
connection  between  the  act(s)  of  self-­defence  and   the  armed  attack,  such  force  cannot  be  
necessary.  In  the  crudest  sense,  proportionality  then  considers  everything  else  in  assessing  
the  overall  defensive  response,  including  the  outcomes  of  that  use  of  defensive  force.  
390  Cf  Etezazian  (2016)  25–8.  
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are  available  to  States  in  the  exercise  of  [the  right  of  self-­defence].’391  Yet,  she  
goes  on  to  argue  that,  integral  to  decisions  relating  to  these  two  factors,  are  
the   anticipated  scale   of   the  damage  and  destruction   that   result   from   these  
decisions.392  These  latter  comments  reflect  the  foregoing  analysis  that  shows  
that  proportionality’s  purview  is  the  overall  defensive  picture,  not  the  minutiae.  
As  set  out  in  Section  3.2.1,  proportionality  should  not  be  understood  as  limiting  
the  methods  and  means  of  warfare,  nor  should  it  limit  the  nature  of  the  targets.  
Proportionality  evaluates  whether  or  not  the  total  resulting  harm  caused  by  the  
methods   and   means   of   defence   and   targeting   decisions   are   excessive   in  
relation  to  the  defensive  purpose  and  other  affected  interests.  
As   such,   whilst   both   necessity   and  proportionality   are  measured  against   a  
defensive  purpose,  and  may  risk  being  conflated  on  this  basis,  their  respective  
purposes   and   operation   are   very   different.   Specific   necessity   relates   to  
targeting.   Proportionality   evaluates   the   outcomes   of   all   instances   of  
(specifically   necessary)   acts   of   targeting   and   whether   or   not   they   are  
excessive.   Determining   the   specific   necessity   of   an   act   of   targeting   comes  
before,   and   is   separate   to,   whether   the   consequences   of   that   act   are  
proportionate.  This  does  not  mean  that  proportionality  is  limited  to  a  post  facto  
assessment,  but  rather  that  both  requirements  are  to  be  reviewed  constantly,  
and   in   this   order.   Along   similar   lines,   IHL   sets   out   rules   that   relate   to   the  
definition  of  a   ‘military  objective’   for   the  purposes  of   targeting  and  separate  
rules  that  pertain  to  proportionality,  the  analysis  of  which  is  a  consequence  of  
targeting.  For  JAB  proportionality,  the  relevance  of  the  choice  of  weapons,  and  
where  they  are  targeted,  is  that  the  ensuing  outcome  must  remain  within  the  
confines  of  a  truly  defensive  response.  If  the  resort  to  a  particular  weapon  or  
targeting  strategy  represents  a  considerable  escalation  of  hostilities,   it   is  not  
the  choice  of  weapon  and/or   target   in  and  of   itself   that  might   fail   the   test  of  
proportionality,  but  rather  the  fact  of  that  escalation.393  
                                                                                        
391  Gardam  (2005)  18.  
392  Ibid  (emphasis  added).  
393  See  Gardam  (2005)  20.  See  further  Sections  2.5,  3.2.1.  
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3.4   Overall  assessment  and  enduring  application  
In   the   JAB,   proportionality   measures   the   defending   state’s   response   as   a  
whole.  In  Oil  Platforms,  the  Court  stated  that  it  ‘cannot  assess  in  isolation  the  
proportionality  of  [a  specific  defensive  act]  to  the  attack  to  which  it  was  said  to  
be  a  response;;  it  cannot  close  its  eyes  to  the  scale  of  the  whole  [defensive]  
operation’.394  Proportionality  is,  therefore,  concerned  with  the  defending  state’s  
wider  defensive  operation.395  It   is  for  this  reason,  as  much  as  any  other,  that  
adherence  to  proportionality  must  be  understood  as  an  enduring  requirement  
that  applies  throughout  the  entirety  of  a  conflict  arising  out  of  an  exercise  of  
self-­defence.396  Evaluating  the  proportionality  of  a  defensive  response  is  only  
possible   by   reference   to   a   period   of   time   during   which   such   response   is  
occurring  or,   if  the  conflict   is  over,  has  occurred.  It  should  not  be  viewed  as  
relating  solely  to  the  initial  decision  to  deploy  defensive  force,  before  handing  
over  to  IHL  to  govern  the  conduct  of  ongoing  hostilities.397  
Proportionality   continues   to   apply   even   if   the   state   is   facing   an   existential  
threat.  In  Nuclear  Weapons,  the  ICJ  reaffirmed  its  application  to  acts  of  self-­
defence   ‘whatever   the  means   of   force   employed’,398  specifically   stating   that  
proportionality  may  not  exclude  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  in  self-­defence  in  
all   circumstances.399   It   did   not   say   that   proportionality   was   inapplicable.400  
Rather,  the  Court  envisages  an  extreme  situation  of  self-­defence,  i.e.  where  
the  very  survival  of   the  state   is  at  stake,  where  a  defensive  use  of  nuclear  
weapons  might  be  considered  proportionate.401  Proportionality  may  be  difficult,  
or  even  impossible,  to  measure  or  quantify  in  such  circumstances.402  Yet,  the  
                                                                                        
394  Oil  Platforms,  para  77.  
395  See  further  Section  3.3.1.  
396  Greenwood  (1983)  223;;  Gardam  (2005)  5.  See  further  Sections  3.3  and  3.4.  
397  See  Section  3.3.1  regarding  the  joint  application  of  IHL  and  the  distinctions  between  JAB  
proportionality  and  IHL  proportionality.  Cf  Dinstein  (2017)  282–7,  proposing  a  right  to  wage  an  
all-­out  ‘defensive  war’  against  armed  attacks  of  a  ‘critical  character’.  
398  Nuclear  Weapons,  para  41.  
399  Ibid,  para  42.  
400  As  suggested  by  Dinstein.  See  n  397.  
401  That  both  necessity  and  proportionality   continue   to  apply   to  an  exercise  of  self-­defence  
using  nuclear  weapons,  see  Nuclear  Weapons,  diss  op  Shahabuddeen,  para  158.  
402  Ibid,  diss  op  Weeramantry,  paras  371–2.  
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majority’s  conclusions  in  Nuclear  Weapons  point  to  an  acceptance  that  a  use  
of   such   a   devastating   weapon   is   permissible   in   order   to   fulfill   the   ultimate  
purpose   of   the   right   of   self-­defence,   being   the   ‘continued   existence   of   its  
beneficiary’.403  Even  if  one  may  disagree  with  the  notion  that  the  use  of  nuclear  
weapons  can  ever  satisfy  proportionality,  the  judgment  reinforces  the  fact  that,  
even  in  the  most  extreme  of  situations,  it  still  has  a  role  to  play.  The  majority  
of  the  Court,  and  seemingly  the  states  connected  with  the  judgment,  all  accept  
that  the  law  continues  to  regulate  conduct.404  
As  an  enduring  requirement,  defensive  action  must  be  continuously  monitored  
by  the  defending  state  to  ensure  that  it  is  and  remains  proportionate  and,  ipso  
facto,   lawful.405  This   JAB  evaluation   should   run  alongside  monitoring   of   IHL  
compliance.  A  useful  analogy  may  in  fact  be  drawn  with  the  IHL  rules  relating  
to  proportionality.  These   impose  an  ongoing  obligation   to  appraise  potential  
collateral  damage  and  require  the  taking  of  precautions  in  attack.406  It  is  logical  
that  both  regimes  impose  a  similar  obligation  regarding  the  need  to  evaluate  
proportionality  on  a   rolling  basis,  even   if   the  meaning  of  such   term   in  each  
regime  is  different.407  Only  when  viewed  in  this  way  does  JAB  proportionality  
have   the   capacity   to   constrain   defensive   action.   This   enduring   obligation  
means  that  proportionality  in  the  JAB  may  operate  to  capture,  at  any  point  in  
time  during  an  ongoing  act  of  self-­defence,  ‘a  snapshot  of  the  big  picture’.408  
This   snap-­shot   necessarily   involves   retrospective,   current   and   prospective  
elements.  This  is  to  ask  what  action  has  the  defending  state  taken  up  until  the  
point  that  the  snap-­shot  is  taken  (i.e.  when  the  assessment  of  proportionality  
                                                                                        
403  Steenberghe  (2012)  122.  Akande  (1998)  193,  likewise  believes  that  ‘[i]t  is  difficult  to  hold  
that   if   the   use   of   nuclear   weapons   is   the   only  way   of   repelling   an   aggressor,   that   use   is  
disproportionate  to  the  objective  of  legitimate  self-­defence.’  
404  Nuclear  Weapons,   para   22.   That   states   explicitly   viewed   the   JAB,   as   well   as   IHL,   as  
regulating  their  conduct,  see  e.g.  the  pleadings  referred  to  in  Section  3.1.1(e).  
405  Gardam  (2005)  5.  
406  If  collateral  damage  resulting  from  an  attack  is  expected  to  be  excessive,  or  if  it  becomes  
apparent  that  this  would  be  the  case,  then  the  attack  is  to  be  cancelled  or  suspended.  Arts  
57(2)(a)(iii)  and  (2)(b)  API.  
407  See  Section  3.3.1.  
408  Lubell  (2013)  2.  
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is   being   made),   what   is   it   currently   doing,   and   what   will   it   need   to   do  
prospectively,  in  each  case  to  meet  its  defensive  objective?  
The  main   importance  of   the  snap-­shot  approach   is   likely   to  be   its  use  as  a  
practical   decision-­making   tool.   It   can  aid   the   defending   state   to   take   stock,  
assess   the   current   situation,   and   then   look   forward   and   plan   its   ongoing  
defensive  strategy.  It  enables,  and  requires,  the  defending  state  to  determine  
what  next  steps  may  be  taken  to  halt,  repel  or  prevent  an  armed  attack,  whilst  
still  remaining  within  the  boundaries  of  legality.  This  cannot  be  undertaken  as  
an  exact  science  and,  because  of  the  changing  nature  of  conflict  (see  below),  
it  is  not  meaningful  when  looked  at  too  far  in  the  future.  As  such,  the  idea  of  a  
snap-­shot   should   not   be   understood   as   a   one-­off   event,   but   rather   as   a  
continuing  process  of   assessment   by   the   defending   state   that  monitors   the  
changing  defensive  need  by  reference  to  ongoing  hostilities.  
This  evaluation   is  particularly  challenging   in   the  context  of  anticipatory  self-­
defence. 409   Establishing   what   is   proportionate   to   counter   imminent   armed  
attacks   involves   a   degree  of   conjecture.410  However,   if   the   imminent   armed  
attack  is  a  threat  of  specific  action,411  or  there  is  history  between  the  defending  
state   and   the   attacker,   this   might   be   easier.   As   noted   in   Section   2.4.2(b),  
claims  of  ‘pure’  anticipatory  self-­defence  are  rare.  The  prospect  of   imminent  
armed  attacks  tends  to  arise  where  there  is  an  ongoing  threat  to  a  state  that  
has  already  been  the  victim  of  a  prior  armed  attack.  As  discussed  in  Sections  
2.4.2,  3.1.1  and  Chapter  4,  in  such  cases  states  might  be  entitled  to  respond  
on  a  cumulative  basis  to  this  threat.  Even  if  difficult,  therefore,  assessment  of  
                                                                                        
409  See  Section  2.4.1(b).  
410  As   with   all   acts   of   defence,   a   good   faith   effort   must   be   made   to   calibrate   carefully   a  
response   by   reference   to   the   reliable   and   credible   intelligence   available   at   the   time   such  
decision  is  taken.  This  requirement  takes  on  greater  significance  with  imminent  armed  attacks,  
due  to  the  increased  uncertainty  regarding  the  defensive  need.  Ultimately,  an  assessment  of  
the  proportionality  of  pre-­emptive  self-­defence  will  be  made  objectively  on  a  post  facto  basis.  
It  will   be   for   third  parties   to   judge,  after   the  event,  how   they  view  the  proportionality  of   the  
response.  In  addition,  they  will  need  to  form  a  view  on  whether  an  armed  attack  was  in  fact  
imminent  and  that   the  right  of  self-­defence  was,   therefore,  available   to   the  defending  state.  
Given   the   inherent  uncertainties  pertaining   to   imminent  armed  attacks,   it  might  be   that   the  
latter  issue  plays  the  decisive  role  in  such  cases.  
411  Gardam  (2004)  179.  
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the  threat  as  a  whole,  i.e.  looking  at  the  entire  period  during  which  the  threat  
subsists,  must  encompass  consideration  of  imminent  armed  attacks.412  
Assessing  proportionality  primarily   against   a   defensive   purpose,   and  on  an  
enduring  basis,  provides  a  flexible  and  pragmatic  model  that  takes  into  account  
the   changing   circumstances   on   the   ground,   in   conjunction   with   the   other  
interests   referred   to   in   this   Chapter   that   may   point   to   excessiveness   and  
disproportionality.  If  we  take  the  example  of  a  defensive  campaign  against  an  
ongoing   threat,   then   there  will   be  moments  during   this   campaign  when   the  
level  of  violence  rises  and  falls.  Ruys,  for  instance,  gives  the  example  of  the  
2006  Israeli  intervention  in  Lebanon  where,  over  time,  the  circumstances  gave  
rise  to  a  ‘mutually  reinforcing  cycle  of  violence’  that,  because  of  action  on  both  
sides,  escalated  well  beyond  an  initial  response  to  the  abduction  of  two  Israeli  
soldiers  .413  It   is  not  the  fact  that  Israel’s  campaign  developed  into  an  ‘all-­out  
war’  with  Hezbollah  that  automatically  rendered  the  response  disproportionate,  
however.  Rather,   it  was  the  imposition  of  a  naval  blockade  on  Lebanon  and  
the  widespread  targeting  of  civilian  infrastructure  and  Lebanese  military  bases  
that  clearly  breached  the  proportionality  requirement.414  
This   example   serves   to   highlight   why   adherence   to   proportionality   is  
necessarily  an  enduring  requirement  and  may  only  be  properly  assessed  as  
such.  Evaluating  compliance  over  the  relevant  period  of  time  accounts  for  the  
vicissitudes  of  the  factual  context  during  that  period.  This  is  the  case  whether  
                                                                                        
412  Even  if  forming  part  of  a  series  of  armed  attacks,  states  planning  to  counter  an  imminent  
armed  attack  are  advised   to  exercise  caution.  This   is  because   formulating  a  proportionate  
response  remains  precarious.  From  a  quantitative  perspective,  gauging  the  magnitude  of  an  
attack  (and  its  effects)  that  has  not  yet  occurred  cannot  be  a  precise  science.  For  the  purposes  
of   the   teleological   evaluation,   it   will   also  mean   establishing   what   is   required   to   achieve   a  
defensive  purpose  in  relation  to  such  attack.  When  the  armed  attack  will  start  and  finish  is  also  
uncertain.   States,   and   observers   of   state   action,   are   thereby   faced   with   a   laborious  
undertaking  in  identifying  the  precise  nature  of  the  threat,  how  long  it  will  endure,  and  what  a  
reasonable   response   looks   like.   Applying   proportionality   to   defence   against   an   imminent  
armed  attack  is,  therefore,  ‘somewhat  of  a  haphazard  process.’  Gardam  (2004)  179.  Where  
the  details  of   the   total   threat  are  unclear,   therefore,  a  defending  state   that   is  mindful  of  the  
legality  of  its  response  might  be  wise  to  limit  the  initial  stages  of  a  defensive  response  to  a  
high  degree  of  quantitative  equivalence  vis-­à-­vis  the  anticipated  imminent  armed  attack.  Such  
strategy   could   serve   to   avoid   a   post   facto   determination   that   a   defensive   act   was   an  
overreaction  and  disproportionate.  
413  Ruys  (2010)  118.  
414  Ibid.  See  further  Section  3.2.5.  
     
     205  
a  proportionality  calculus  is  made  on  a  snap-­shot  basis,  whilst  a  defensive  act  
is  ongoing,  or  when  looking  back  at  a  defensive  operation  as  a  whole  on  a  post  
factum  basis.  Viewing  the  requirement  in  this  manner  enables  an  evaluation  
of  the  acts  of  defence  in  the  round.  It  takes  account  of  the  fact  that  pursuing  a  
defensive  object  will  change  over  time  as  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  conflict  
ebbs   and   flows.   Developments   on   the   ground   may   mean   that   what   is   a  
proportionate   response   at   one   point   in   the   conflict   may   later   become  
disproportionate.   As   the   threat   to   the   defending   state   increases   and  
decreases,   so   long   as   self-­defence   remains   necessary,   the   corresponding  
defence  must   be   calibrated   accordingly.  Proportionality   only  makes   logical  
sense   both   theoretically,   and   as   a   matter   of   practical   application,   when  
conceptualised  in  this  manner.  
3.5   Conclusions  
Proportionality  is  often  employed  by  states  as  a  ‘ritual  incantation’  to  identify  
excess  and  illegality.  State  practice  does  not  offer  a  consistent  narrative,  and  
the  ICJ  jurisprudence  likewise  presents  a  varied  approach,  but  the  foregoing  
analysis   clarifies   proportionality’s   role   in   the   exercise   of   self-­defence.   In  
response   to   an   actual   or   imminent   armed   attack,   general   and   specific  
necessity   respectively   determine  whether   force  may  be  used,   and  where   it  
must  be  directed.  Proportionality  proceeds  to  govern  how  much  total  force  is  
permissible   to   achieve   a   defensive   purpose.   It   guards   against   excessive  
reactions.  It  does  this  by  appraising  the  act(s)  of  self-­defence  as  a  whole,  not  
the  specific  targeting  decisions,  which  is  the  domain  of  specific  necessity  and  
IHL.  It  is,  therefore,  only  relevant  when  there  is  an  actual  or  imminent  armed  
attack,  and  both  general  and  specific  necessity  have  first  been  satisfied.  Like  
necessity,   it   is   also   an   enduring   requirement   that   subsists,   and   must   be  
monitored,  throughout  the  duration  of  a  defensive  operation.  
State  practice  indicates  that  proportionality  operates  flexibly,  is  largely  context  
dependant,  and  accounts  for  a  variety  of  interests  that  go  beyond  those  of  the  
defending   state.   Whilst   proportionality   balances   defensive   force   and   its  
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outcomes  primarily  against  a  defensive  purpose,  its  application  is  not  the  neat  
binary   exercise   that   is   sometimes   suggested.   It   is   not   simply   a   question   of  
referring  to  proportionality  as  either  quantitative  or  teleological.  Material  factors  
arising   out   of   defensive   action   play   an   important   part   in   evaluating  
proportionality.   In   particular,   widespread   civilian   harm   will   tend   to   be  
condemned   by   the   international   community   as   excessive.   Manifest  
quantitative  imbalance  will  indicate  disproportionately,  either  in  and  of  itself  or,  
more  likely,  signalling  a  lack  of  defensive  purpose.  
Moreover,  states  clearly  do  not  view  themselves  as  being  able  to  do  ‘whatever  
it  takes’  to  achieve  a  defensive  purpose.  Other  interests  operate  to  restrict  how  
far  states  may  go  to  defend  themselves.  A  proportionality  analysis,  therefore,  
must  account  for  how  much  these  interests  are  affected  by  the  act(s)  of  self-­
defence.  These  factors  act  as  indicia  of  excessiveness  (viz  disproportionality).  
They  include  the  effects  of  self-­defence  on  third  parties,  the  environment  and  
international  peace  and  security  more  generally.  The  respective  importance  of  
defensive   purpose,   material   factors   and   third-­party   interests   varies   and   is  
contextual.  State  practice  and   jurisprudence  suggests,  however,   that  states  
and   the   ICJ   will   point   to   the   most   obvious   indicator   of   illegality   when  
considering   whether   or   not   self-­defence   complies   with   the   proportionality  
requirement.  Civilian  harm  is  likely  to  be  the  principal  factor.  
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CHAPTER  4:  NECESSITY  AND  PROPORTIONALITY    
AND  ARMED  ATTACKS  BY  NON-­STATE  ACTORS  
4   Introduction  
A   right   of   self-­defence   against   armed   attacks   by   NSAs   is   controversial,  
particularly  where   the  NSAs  are  acting   independently  and  their  acts  are  not  
attributable  to  a  state.1  There  remains  a  lack  of  consensus  on  this  issue,  but  
an   increasing   body   of   state   practice   and   academic   literature   indicates   that  
states  have  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  non-­attributable  armed  attacks  by  
NSAs. 2   This   is   most   clearly   evidenced   by   recent   state   practice   related   to  
combatting   transnational   terrorism   perpetrated   by   Al-­Qaeda,   Daesh   and  
similar  groups.3  For  the  purposes  of  the  ensuing  review,  this  thesis  assumes  a  
right  of  self-­defence  against  armed  attacks  carried  out  by  NSAs,  regardless  of  
attribution.  
The  analysis  set  out  in  Chapters  2  and  3  relating  to  interstate  self-­defence  also  
applies  in  general  terms  to  defensive  acts  taken  in  response  to  armed  attacks  
by  NSAs  operating   from  foreign   territory.  Yet,  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  raise  
further  specific   issues   for  necessity  and  proportionality.   In   this  context,   their  
requirements  are  adapted  and  supplemented.  NSA  armed  attacks   therefore  
represent   a   particularly   good  medium   through  which   the   content   and  outer  
parameters  of  necessity  and  proportionality  may  be  explored.4  As  will  be  made  
clear,   necessity   in   particular   plays   a   greater   role   outside   of   the   interstate  
context,   where   the   requirement   is   likely   to   be   satisfied   more   easily.5   The  
                                                                                        
1  See  e.g.  Tams  (2009);;  Ruys  (2010)  368–510;;  Trapp  in  Weller  (2015)  679–96;;  Gray  (2018)  
200–61.  
2  See  e.g.  Lubell  (2017)  217–18.  Even  if  accepted,  the  precise  content  and  parameters  of  this  
right  are  still  being  worked  out  in  state  practice.  
3  Such  practice  is  discussed  throughout  this  Chapter.  
4  There  are  other  areas  of  the  JAB  that  also  raise  additional  issues  for  these  two  concepts.  
These   include   uses   of   force   in   cyber   space   and   in   outer   space.   Consideration   of   these  
particular  topics  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  enquiry,  however.  
5  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  399–401.  
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content  and  operation  of  proportionality,  however,  are  much  more  uncertain,  
being  stretched  to  the  very  boundaries  of  meaningful  application.  
Much  of  the  following  analysis  is  set  against  the  background  of  international  
terrorism.  This  is  principally  because  the  majority  of  state  practice  pertaining  
to  NSA  armed  attacks  has   taken  place   in   this  context.  There  should  be  no  
confusion,  however,  between  a  right  to  respond  defensively  to  armed  attacks  
by  NSAs,  who  happen  to  be  terrorists,  and  to  ‘terrorism’,  howsoever  the  latter  
concept  might  be  defined.6  There  is  no  right  of  self-­defence  against  ‘terrorism’,  
only  against  actual  or  (potentially)  imminent  armed  attacks.7  The  fact  that  such  
attacks  are  being  carried  out  for  terrorist  purposes  does  not  affect  the  trigger  
of  the  right.8  However,  the  threat  posed  by  terrorism  has  consequential  effects  
on   how   we   should   understand   necessity   and   proportionality.   Universally  
accepted   as   one   of   the   most   serious   threats   to   international   peace   and  
security,9  the  phenomenon  has  undoubtedly   influenced  how  states,  and   the  
UNSC,  view  the  right  of  self-­defence.  As  will  be  made  clear,   this   feeds   into  
what  it  means  for  states  to  comply  with  necessity  and  proportionality.  
4.1   Necessity  and  armed  attacks  by  NSAs    
4.1.1   The  host  state  and  alternative  measures  
Where   NSA   armed   attacks   are   not   attributable   to   a   host   state,   serious  
implications  arise  from  a  defending  state  using  force  against  the  responsible  
NSAs  on  the  host  state’s  territory.  As  in  the  interstate  context,  whether  there  
are  reasonable  alternatives   to  using  defensive   force   is   the  starting  point.10  If  
                                                                                        
6  There  is  no  commonly  agreed  legal  definition  of  terrorism.  See  e.g.  Saul  (2005);;  Trapp  (2011)  
14–23;;  Watkin  (2016)  180–208.  
7  See   Section   2.4.1(b).   For   present   purposes,   this   Chapter   also   assumes   a   right   of   self-­
defence  against  armed  attacks  that  are  imminent.  
8  Art  51  UN  Charter.  See  further  Ruys  (2010)  496–99.  
9  2005  World  Summit   Outcome  Document,   UN  Doc  A/Res/60/1   (2005)   paras   81–91.   See  
further  Section  4.1.3(c).  
10  Ideally,   a   defending   state   should   request   the   host   state   to   take   adequate  measures   to  
forestall  or  halt   (further)   terrorist  action  and,   in  cooperation  with   it,  to  take  measures  of   law  
enforcement  to  prevent  terrorist  acts  from  being  undertaken  from  that  state’s  territory.  Gill  in  
Weller  (2015)  744;;  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  403,  408–9.  This  presumption  
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force  is  required,  the  defending  state  should  seek  prior  explicit  consent  from  
the  host  state  to  act  militarily  on  its  territory.11  Absent  consent,  for  action  in  self-­
defence   to   be   necessary,   the   host   state   should   generally   be   given   the  
opportunity   to   comply   with   its   international   law   obligations   to   prevent   and  
suppress  international  terrorism.  It  might  do  so  by  acting  on  its  own,  or  working  
in  co-­operation  with  the  defending  state.  12  If  the  host  state  adopts  measures  
against   the  NSAs  within  a  reasonable   time  period,  and  they  are  effective   to  
combat  them,  this  prima  facie  renders  defending  state  action  unnecessary.13  
If   seeking  a   viable   solution   via,   or   in   cooperation  with,   the   host   state   is   an  
option,  and  has  not  been  tried,  it  is  unlikely  that  unilateral  force  against  NSAs  
can  be   considered  necessary.14  Host   state   action,   to   use  Webster’s  words,  
thereby   offers   a   potential   additional   ‘choice   of   means’   to   that   seen   in   the  
interstate  context.  Alternative  measures  accordingly  have  the  potential  to  play  
a  much  greater  role  in  combatting  NSAs  than  they  do  in  the  interstate  context.  
                                                                                        
is   in  keeping  with   the  notion   that   terrorists  are   first  and   foremost  criminals  and,   if  possible,  
should  be  dealt  with  as  such  before  resorting  to  force.  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  
539–40;;   Wilmshurst   and  Wood   (2013)   393.   If   law   enforcement   measures   are   capable   of  
dealing  with  terrorist  acts,  force  will  not  be  necessary.  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  
542.  
11   What   constitutes   consent,   including   whether   this   might   be   implicit,   or   intervention   by  
invitation,  are  much-­debated  topics.  See  e.g.  Abass  (2004);;  Bannelier-­Christakis  (2016).  
12  In  Armed  Activities,  para  162,  the  ICJ  confirmed  as  customary  international  law  the  Friendly  
Relations  Declaration’s  requirement  that  ‘[e]very  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  from  organizing,  
instigating,  assisting  or  participating   in  (…)   terrorist  acts   in  another  State  or  acquiescing   in  
organized  activities  within  its  territory  directed  towards  the  commission  of  such  acts,  when  the  
acts  referred  to  in  the  present  paragraph  involve  a  threat  or  use  of  force.’  This  is  an  expression  
of  the  general  premise  that  every  state  has  an  obligation  not  to  allow  knowingly  its  territory  to  
be  used  for  acts  contrary  to  the  rights  of  other  states.  Corfu  Channel,  para  51.  This  is  not  an  
absolute   obligation.   It   is   a   duty   to   apply   due   diligence   in   preventing   harm   to   other   states  
stemming   from   actions   within   the   host   state’s   own   territory.   It   constitutes,   therefore,   an  
obligation  of  means  rather  than  results.  Ruys  (2007)  285.  The  obligation  to  combat  terrorism  
and  prevent  terrorist  acts,  and  to  co-­operate  with  other  states  in  so  doing,  is  likewise  reflected  
in  various  UNSC  Resolutions  (e.g.  UNSC  Res  1373  (2001)  para  2)  and  nineteen  multi-­lateral  
terrorism   suppression   conventions   (see   <http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-­
instruments.shtml>).  On  the  general  approach  to  redressing  the  situation  before  force  is  used  
on  a  host  state’s  territory,  see  further  Ruys  (2010)  505–6;;  Deeks  (2012)  519–21;;  Henderson  
(2018)  324,  326.  
13  For  example,  prior  to  Operation  Sun  in  2008,  the  Turkish  President  appeared  to  accept  that  
if  the  Iraqi  government  acted  against  the  PKK,  it  would  not  be  necessary  for  Turkey  to  act  in  
its  place:  ‘We  have  made  it  very  clear  that  if  the  terrorist  shelters  there  are  not  destroyed,  it  is  
our  legitimate  right  to  destroy  those  shelters  ourselves.’  ‘Turkey  Bombards  Northern  Iraq  after  
Ambush’,   The   Guardian,   22   October   2007,  
<www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/22/turkey.iraq1>.  
14  Lubell  (2010)  46.  
     
     210  
The   consequence   is   that   general   necessity,   at   least   in   theory,   acts   as   a  
stronger  limitation  on  exercising  the  right  of  self-­defence.  The  reality,  however,  
might  be  somewhat  different.  
Whether   peaceful   options   and/or   host   state   action   are   in   fact   reasonable  
alternatives   to   defensive   force   will   depend   on   the   context,   particularly   the  
timing  of  the  armed  attack.15  In  terms  of  resort  to  peaceful  alternatives  against  
the  NSAs  themselves,  it  may  be  that  such  action  proves  sufficient  over  time  to  
counter   an   enduring   threat   from   a   group   of   NSAs.   However,   there   is   no  
suggestion   in   state   practice   that   a   defending   state   under   direct   attack   is  
required  to  forego  its  right  of  defensive  response  in  favour  of  law  enforcement.  
A   distinction   must   be   made,   therefore,   between   long-­term   responses   to  
degrade  the  capacity  for  future  NSA  armed  attacks,  and  the  more  immediate  
needs  of  the  defending  state  to  respond  to  ongoing  violence.16  
There  may  also  be  an  understandable  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  defending  
state   to   cooperate  with   a   host   state,   or   to   rely   on  host   state  action,  before  
resorting  to  force  against  the  NSAs  operating  on  their  territory.  Deeks  notes  
that  whilst  defending  states  tend  to  point  to  the  fact  that  they  first  ask  the  host  
state   to   take  steps   to  supress  NSA  activities  on   their   territory,  before  using  
force  against  them,  this  is  not  always  the  case.  A  request  for  the  host  state  to  
take   action  might   be   considered   futile,   or   as   causing   tangible   harm   to   the  
                                                                                        
15  See  Section  2.4.1.  
16  Peaceful  alternatives  vis-­à-­vis  the  NSAs  themselves  are  not  required  by  the  UN  Charter’s  
emphasis  on  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  that  applies  between  states.  See  Section  2.3.1.  
Moreover,  they  are  unlikely,  on  their  own,  to  prove  effective  in  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  
an  armed  attack.  It  is  unrealistic,  for  example,  to  assume  that  diplomatic  pressure  or  economic  
sanctions  will  be  employable  against  terrorist  organizations  like  Al-­Qaeda  or  Daesh.  Likewise,  
it  is  doubtful  that  law  enforcement  strategies  and  non-­forcible  options  such  as  freezing  bank  
accounts  and   funds  will   be  sufficient  alone   to  halt,   repel  or  prevent  armed  attacks.  This   is  
especially  so  where  the  host  state  will  not  cooperate.  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  
(2013)  406–7.  Domestic   terrorism  occurring  exclusively  within   the  confines  of  one  national  
legal   system   is  more   likely   to  be  countered  by   traditional   law  enforcement  measures.  With  
cross  border  armed  attacks  by  NSA  terrorists  such  responses  (coupled  with  other  efforts  like  
education  and  deradicalisation  programmes)  are  essential  in  dealing  with  the  long-­term  threat,  
but   they   do   not   necessarily   contribute   to   the   immediate   defensive   needs   of   a   state   under  
attack,   or   threat   of   imminent   attack.  Where   armed   groups   of  NSAs   have   been   sufficiently  
weakened  by  military   force,  however,  alternatives   to   force  might  be  sufficient   to   tackle   the  
long-­term  threat.  See  Section  4.1.4(a).  
     
     211  
defending   state’s   national   security. 17   For   example,   prior   to   the   USA’s  
intervention   in  Afghanistan   in  2001,   the  USA  refused  to  negotiate,   let  alone  
cooperate,  with  the  Taliban  before  launching  its  airstrikes.18  The  USA  made  a  
number   of   demands   to   the   Taliban   prior   to   using   force,   but   there   was   no  
indication   that   it   felt   legally  obligated  to  resolve   the   issue  peaceably,  or   that  
such  demands  were  anything  other  than  politically  or  strategically  expedient.19  
The  American  approach  is  likely  due  to  the  Taliban’s  close  relationship  with  Al-­
Qaeda   and   the   view   that   their   support   made   the   9/11   attacks   possible. 20  
George  W  Bush  viewed  them  as  an   illegitimate  and  murderous  regime  and  
publicly  condemned  them  on  this  basis.21  Despite  this  refusal  to  cooperate  with  
the  Taliban,  the  ensuing  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  was  generally  regarded  
as  a  lawful  act  of  self-­defence.22  
Likewise,  in  the  context  of  combatting  Daesh  and  other  terrorist  groups  in  Syria  
since  2014,  those  states  claiming  a  right  of  self-­defence  to  justify  their  military  
operations  within  Syrian   territory  have  refused   to  cooperate  with   the  Assad  
regime.23  This   is  despite  potential   initial   indications  on   the   latter’s  part  of   its  
ability   to   combat  Daesh  and  a  willingness   to   do   so   by   coordinating  military  
action.24  This   raises   an   interesting   question   of   what   it  means   to   satisfy   the  
                                                                                        
17  Deeks  (2012)  521–25,  noting  that  such  procedural  requirement  is  not,  therefore,  absolute.  
18   ‘The   US   Refuses   to   Negotiate   with   the   Taliban’,   BBC   History,  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/the_us_refuses_to_negotiate_with_the_taliban>.  
19  Green  (2009)  81.  
20  UN  Doc  S/2001/946  (2001).  See  further  Section  4.1.3(a).  
21   ‘President   Bush   Addresses   the   Nation’,   The   Washing   Post,   20   September   2001,  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html>.  
22  See  2.4.2(b).  
23  States  invoking  individual  and/or  collective  self-­defence  to  justify  their  actions  against  Daesh  
in   Iraq   and   Syria   include:   UN   Docs   S/2014/695   (2014)   (USA);;   S/2014/851   (2014)   (UK);;  
S/2015/221   (2015)   (Canada);;   S/2015/563   (2015)   (Turkey);;   S/2015/688   (2015)   (UK);;  
S/2015/693   (2015)   (Australia);;   S/2015/745   (2015)   (France);;   S/2015/928   (2015)   (UK);;  
S/2015/946   (2015)   (Germany);;   S/2016/34   (2016)   (Denmark);;   S/2016/132   (2016)   (The  
Netherlands);;   S/2016/513   (2016)   (Norway);;   S/2016/523   (2016)   (Belgium).   None   of   these  
states  have  cooperated  with  President  Assad,  and  some  have  been  very  public  about  this  fact.  
The  USA,   for  example,   clearly   rejected   the  offer  of  cooperation  and  coordination,  explicitly  
stating  that  it  was  not  looking  for  the  approval  of  the  Syrian  regime.  ‘White  House  won't  commit  
to   asking   Congress   for   Syria   strike’,   The   Hill,   25   August   2014,  
<http://thehill.com/policy/defense/215905-­white-­house-­wont-­commit-­to-­asking-­congress-­for-­
syria-­strike>.  
24  For   commentary   on   this   point,   see   e.g.  Goodman   (August   2014);;  Goodman   (December  
2014);;   Goodman   (2015);;   Gray   (2018)   241.   It   later   became   clear   that   Syria   was   strongly  
opposed   to   Coalition   action   on   its   territory.   Before   the   UNSC,   Syria   insisted   that   it   was  
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necessity  requirement  in  this  context.25  In  particular,  it  is  unclear  from  practice  
whether  defending  states  consider  themselves  to  be  under  a  legal  obligation  
to   cooperate   with   a   host   state   that   is   purportedly   willing.   The   refusal   to  
cooperate  with  President  Assad  may  have  been  because  his  regime  had  lost  
control  over  significant  parts  of  its  territory  (affecting  its  ability  to  counter  the  
threat)  or  doubts  as  to  whether  Assad  was  acting  in  good  faith  regarding  any  
cooperation.26  Akin  to  the  USA’s  view  of  the  Taliban,  states  may  also  have  had  
concerns   regarding   cooperating   with,   and   potentially   strengthening,   an  
illegitimate  regime  that  stands  accused  of  crimes  against  humanity  and  war  
crimes.27  
This   latter   possibility   reflects   a   regime   interaction   issue   and   the   need   to  
interpret   international   law  systemically.  JAB  necessity  cannot  be   interpreted  
so  as  to  require  a  defending  state  to  cooperate  with,  and  thereby  support,  host  
states  that  breach  IHL  and  whose  officials  potentially  face  international  criminal  
law  liability.  Indeed,  such  collaboration  by  a  defending  state  might  engage  its  
own  international  responsibility  for  a  breach  of  the  obligation  to  respect,  and  to  
ensure  respect   for,   the  Geneva  Conventions  and   IHL  more  generally.28  The  
ICRC  maintains  that,  as  a  matter  of  customary  international  law,  this  obligation  
is   not   limited   to   the  Geneva  Conventions,  but   applies   to   the   entire  body  of  
international   humanitarian   law  binding  upon  a   particular   state.29  Where   IHL  
violations  are  ‘likely  or  foreseeable’,  defending  sates  might  be  responsible  for  
                                                                                        
combatting   terrorism  and   that  any  counter-­terrorism  efforts  had   to  be  coordinated  with   the  
Syrian   government.   UN   Docs   S/PV.7271   (2014)   43;;   S/PV.7316   (2014)   33.   It   went   on   to  
condemn  Coalition  airstrikes  and  complained  to  the  UNSC  of  aggression  against  it.  E.g.  UN  
Docs  S/2015/719  (2015);;  S/2015/727  (2015);;  S/2015/851  (2015);;  S/2015/933  (2015).  
25  See  further  Section  4.1.2  regarding  necessity  and  the  ‘unwilling  or  unable’  doctrine.  
26  The  USA  has  since  accused  the  Syrian  regime  of  focusing  on  combating  opposition  groups  
rather  than  fighting  terrorists.  UN  Doc  S/PV.8236  (2018)  7.  
27  See   the   various   reports   of   The   Independent   International  Commission   of   Inquiry   on   the  
Syrian   Arab   Republic   (‘HRC   Syrian   Commission   of   Inquiry’):  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommis
sion.aspx>.  The  EU’s  position,  for  example,  was  that  policies  and  actions  of  the  Assad  regime  
meant  that  it  could  not  be  a  partner  in  the  fight  against  Daesh.  UN  Doc  S/PV.7540  (Resumption  
1)  14  (EU).  
28  Common  Article  1  to  the  Geneva  Conventions.  See  further  the  2016  ICRC  Commentary  on  
the  First  Geneva  Convention  relating  to  Art  1.  
29  ICRC  Commentary,  ibid,  para  126.  The  ICRC’s  interpretation  of  this  obligation  is  not  without  
its  critics  however.   It  has  been  described  as   ‘expansive’  and   ‘aspirational’.  See  e.g.  Hakimi  
(2016);;  Goodman  (2016).  
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providing  support  that  could  be  construed  as  encouraging  breaches  of  IHL.30  
If  the  breaches  of  IHL  also  constitute  a  serious  breach  of  peremptory  norms  of  
international  law,  the  laws  of  state  responsibility  would  likewise  prohibit  aid  or  
assistance   to   the   responsible   state   (i.e.   Syria)   that   maintains   the   situation  
created  by  that  serious  breach.   In  fact,  these  rules  go  further  and   impose  a  
positive   obligation   on   states   to   cooperate   in   order   to   bring   to   an   end   such  
breaches.31  
Operation  Enduring  Freedom  and  Coalition  action   in  Syria  appear   to  reflect  
this  rationale.32  However,  the  lack  of  sufficient  detail  surrounding  the  relevant  
states’   positions   on   this   topic  means   that   it   is   difficult   to   conclude  whether  
cooperation  with  Assad  was  a  reasonable  alternative  to  using  force.  After  all,  
Assad  did  go  on   to  cooperate  with  other  nations,  such  as  Russia  and   Iran,  
purportedly  in  its  fight  against  Daesh.33  Ultimately,  the  USA  took  the  view  that  
the  Syrian  regime  could  not,  and  would  not,  confront  Daesh  effectively.34  Such  
inability  was  arguably  confirmed  by  UNSC  Resolution  2249.35  Despite  the  legal  
controversies   involved  with   intervention   in  Syrian   territory   against  Daesh,   a  
large  number  of  states  have  claimed  a   right  of  self-­defence  against  Daesh,  
clearly  believing  that  they  are  not,  as  a  matter  of   law,  required  to  cooperate  
and  coordinate  with  the  host  state  before  they  do  so.36  
This   most   contemporary   state   practice   highlights   that   the   particular   factual  
context   is   crucial   when   considering   necessity   and   the   resort   to   peaceable  
alternatives   in   the  context  of  combatting   terrorist  NSAs.  Whilst  emphasis   is  
placed  prima  facie  on  the  primacy  of  host  state  action  in  dealing  with  the  threat  
emanating  from  its  territory,  it  is  not  always  practicable.  The  necessity  of  the  
defending   state   taking   action   might   instead   be   established,   or   at   least  
                                                                                        
30  Nicaragua,  paras  220,  256.  
31  See  Arts  40  and  41  ARSIWA  and  related  Commentary.  
32  On  whether   cooperating  with   the  Assad   regime  would   amount   to   illegal   assistance,   see  
further  Kress  (2015).  
33  Whether   the   purpose   of   such   collaboration   was   primarily   to   combat   Daesh   or   Assad’s  
domestic  opponents,   is  highly  debatable  however.  For  an  overview  of  Russian  and   Iranian  
involvement  and  objectives,  see  e.g.  Gill  (2016)  356–7.  
34  UN  Docs  S/2014/695  (2014);;  S/PV.7565  (2015)  4.  See  further  Section  4.1.2.  
35  See  Section  4.1.3(c).  
36  See  further  Section  4.1.3(b).  
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arguable.  The  main  additional  considerations  for  necessity  pertaining  to  cross-­
border   terrorist  attacks  by  NSAs  are  the  nature  of  the  group  of  NSAs  being  
combatted,  and  of  the  regime  on  whose  territory  they  operate.  In  particular,  the  
focus  is  on  the  relationships  between  the  defending  state  and  the  host  state,  
and  between  the  host  state  and  the  NSAs.  The  risk  to  the  defending  state  of  
cooperating  with  a  host  state,   in   terms  of  whether   the   former’s   international  
responsibility  might  be  engaged  because  of  unlawful  acts  of  the  latter,  is  also  
a  feature  of  more  recent  state  practice.  These  issues  are  central  to  how  states  
view  their  obligation  to  pursue  (or  not)  peaceful  alternatives  and  cooperate  (or  
not)  with  host  states.  They  bring  an  extra  dimension  to  the  contemplation  of  
alternative  measures.  
4.1.2   ‘Unwilling  or  unable’    
The  corollary  to  the  general  premise  that  primacy  of  action  against  NSAs  lies  
with  the  host  state  is  that:  
where   a   state   is   unable   or   unwilling   to   assert   control   over   a   terrorist  
organisation   located   in   its   territory,   the   State   which   is   a   victim   of   the  
terrorist  attacks  would,  as  a  last  resort,  be  permitted  to  act  in  self-­defence  
against  the  terrorist  organisation  in  the  State  in  which  it  is  located.37  
This   ‘unwilling   or   unable’   doctrine,   like   the   general   issue  of   a   right   of   self-­
defence  against  NSAs,  remains  highly  controversial  both  conceptually  and  as  
a  matter  of  practical  application.  That  putative  defending  states  might  abuse  
any   right   to  use   force   in   the   territory  of  another  state   is  a  serious  concern.  
Sands  rightly  notes  that  the  challenge  for  international  law  is  to  ensure  that  the  
rules  balance   the   legitimate   interests  of   those  states   that   feel  vulnerable   to  
international  terrorism,  and  those  states  that  feel  vulnerable  to  the  response  to  
that  threat,  especially  unilateral  responses.38  Further  state  practice  is  required  
in  order  to  clarify  the  place,  or  otherwise,  of  the  unwilling  or  unable  doctrine  in  
                                                                                        
37  The  Chatham  House  Principles,  970.  See  also  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  540.  
38  Sands  (2005)  203,  in  the  context  of  responding  to  terrorism  more  generally.  
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the  lex  lata.39  As  matters  stand,  however,  there  is  growing  support  for  the  view  
that   where   there   is   a   ‘manifest   and   persistent   unwillingness   or   inability   to  
prevent  non-­State  attacks’,  self-­defence  will  be  justifiable:  a  host  state  cannot  
perpetually  hide  behind  its  sovereign  inviolability.40  
For  present  purposes,  a  determination  of  unwillingness  and/or  inability  on  the  
part  of  the  host  state  satisfies  (if  accepted  as  lex  lata)  or  would  satisfy  (if  lex  
ferenda)  the  necessity  requirement  of  self-­defence  against  NSAs  carrying  out  
cross-­border  armed  attacks.  That  there  has  been  an  armed  attack  that  requires  
a   defensive   response   (assuming  any  gravity   threshold   is  met)   is   a   general  
necessity   issue,   i.e.   whether   there   is   a   need   for   some   form   of   defensive  
response.  Host  state  unwillingness  and/or   inability  deny   the  defending  state  
an  alternative  means  of  redress,  meaning  that  force  is  the  only  way  to  remove  
the  threat.  Specific  necessity  accounts  for  military  action  taken  against  NSA  
targets  on  host  state  territory.  
If  accepted,  self-­defence  against  NSAs  on  the  territory  of  another  state,  absent  
its  consent,  should  still  be  viewed  as  an  exception,  exercisable  only  in  cases  
of   the  most   compelling   emergency.41  This   general   premise   recognizes   the  
difference   between   the   bilateral   situation   of   interstate   self-­defence,   where  
defending   state(s)   respond   directly   against   armed   attacks   by   the   attacking  
state(s),  and  the  situation  in  self-­defence  against  NSAs,  where  the  host  state  
is   essentially   a   third-­party.   In   the   latter   situation,   the   unwilling   or   unable  
doctrine  has  the  potential  to  act  as  an  additional  constraint  on  the  exercise  of  
self-­defence.  In  accounting  for  the  position  of  the  host  state,  it  has  the  capacity  
                                                                                        
39  For  a  general  discussion  of  the  doctrine  (representing  a  variety  of  views)  and  state  practice,  
see  e.g.  Heller  (2011);;  Deeks  (2012);;  Bethlehem  (2012);;  Kress  (2015);;  Trapp  (2015);;  Corten  
(2016);;  Gray  (2018)  243–8;;  Henderson  (2018)  322–33.  
40  Ruys  (2010)  505–6.  ‘[A]  state’s  territorial  integrity  should  not  act,  for  its  own  sake,  to  shield  
NSAs   so   as   to   provide   them   with   the   (legal   and   physical)   space   within   which   to   violate  
individual  rights  to  life  and  physical  integrity,  even  if  those  threatened  are  across  a  border.’  
Trapp   (2015)   211.   See   also   Teitel   (2011)   219,   noting   the   increasing   acceptance   of   the  
compromise  or  suspension  of   the  Westphalian  norms  of  sovereignty  and   territorial   integrity  
where  human  rights  are  at  stake.  
41  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations,  543.  
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to   constitute   a   further   barrier   to   be   overcome,   taking   necessity   beyond   its  
operation  in  the  interstate  context.42  
If  necessity  is  established  as  a  result  of  unwillingness  or  inability,  it  is  argued  
that  the  resulting  exercise  of  lawful  self-­defence  against  the  NSAs  excuses  a  
limited  breach  of  the  host  state’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.43  An  even  
more  controversial  question   is  whether  unwillingness  and/or   inability  on   the  
part   of   the   host   state,   and   the   relationship   between   it   and   the  NSAs,   also  
accounts   for  a  defending  state’s   right  of  action  against   the  host  state   itself,  
including  its  military  personnel  and  apparatus  and  civilian  infrastructure.  The  
targeting   rules   discussed   in   Section   2.5   suggest   that   specific   necessity  
requires  the  defensive  force  to  be  aimed  at,  and  only  at,  the  NSAs  responsible  
for   the   armed   attack.   This   includes   their   personnel,   equipment,   bases   and  
other  resources   located   in  host  state   territory.  Where   the  host  state  has  not  
sent,  directed  or  controlled  the  NSAs,  or  their  acts  are  not  otherwise  imputable  
to  it,  the  host  state  should  not  be  considered  the  source  of  the  attack.  44  Directly  
targeting   that   state’s   infrastructure   and  apparatus   is,   therefore,  prima   facie  
unnecessary.  Recent  state  practice  suggests,  however,  that  important  caveats  
apply  to  this  general  rule.  
First,  a  neat  distinction  between  targeting  the  NSAs  on  the  one  hand,  and  not  
targeting   the  host  state  on   the  other,  may  not  be  easy   to  make   in  practice.  
Unless  the  NSAs  are  operating  in  a  remote  location,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  host  
state  (including  its  infrastructure,  apparatus  and  civilian  population)  will  remain  
totally  unaffected  by  a  defending  state’s  military  action.  This  might  be  by  way  
of  collateral  damage,  where  the  host  state  is  not  directly  targeted,  but  suffers  
harm.   This   will   be   discussed   further   in   Section   4.2.3   in   the   context   of  
proportionality.   Moreover,   in   order   to   ensure   that   the   defensive   force   is  
effective,  the  defending  state  might  consider  it  necessary  to  target  elements  of  
                                                                                        
42  The  ability  of  necessity   to  act  as  an  effective  additional   constraint  on  state  action   in   this  
context  depends  on  establishing  a  clearer  unwilling  or  unable  test.  See  Deeks  (2012).  
43  See  e.g.  Trapp  (2007)  147;;  Moir  in  Weller  (2015)  730;;  Henderson  (2018)  323.  See  further  
Section  4.2.3.  
44  Ruys  (2010)  496.  
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the  host  state,  in  addition  to  the  NSAs.  Gardam  argues  that  it  might  be  difficult  
to  establish  to  what  degree  a  host  state  is  complicit  in  allowing  its  resources,  
territory   and   infrastructure   to   be   used   by   NSAs.   Defending   states   will  
inevitably,  therefore,  regard  themselves  as  requiring  a  degree  of  latitude  in  the  
selection   of   targets   in   such   cases. 45   She   maintains   that   targeting   the  
infrastructure   of   the   host   state   ‘will   not   be   justifiable   unless   it   can   be  
demonstrated  that  they  contribute  in  some  way  to  the  terrorist  activities.’46  
Other   scholars   support   the   notion   that   where   the   host   state   is   unwilling   or  
unable   to   meet   its   international   law   obligations   to   prevent   and   suppress  
international   terrorism,   then   this   might   have   implications   for   whether   the  
defending  state  may  also  direct  force  against  host  state  targets,  in  addition  to  
NSA  targets.47  The  authors  of  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations  maintain  
that:  
measures  of  self-­defence  against  suspected  terrorists  must  be  directed  
primarily  against  the  terrorist  groups  responsible  for  the  armed  attack  in  
question   or   their   facilities.  Only   in   exceptional   circumstances  will   self-­
defence  justify  the  use  of  force  against  the  armed  forces  or  facilities  of  
the  [host  state],  for  example,  in  circumstances  where  the  [host  state]  is  
supporting  suspected  terrorists,  as  in  Afghanistan  in  2001.48  
The   state   practice   reviewed   in   the   next   Section   is   broadly   in   line  with   this  
statement.  
                                                                                        
45  Gardam  (2005)  21.  
46  Ibid.  This  is  set  out  in  the  context  of  her  views  on  proportionality.  It  is  submitted,  however,  
that  such  analysis  is  better  understood  as  relating  to  specific  necessity.    
47  E.g.  Lubell  (2010)  47.  It  is  unclear  from  this  analysis,  however,  whether  this  conclusion  holds  
despite  due  diligence  on  the  part  of  the  host  state,  rather  than  effective  results.  
48   Leiden   Policy   Recommendations,   542.   Support   for   NSAs   clearly   amounts   to   an  
unwillingness   to   combat   them.  Whilst   expressed   as   a   requirement   of   proportionality,   it   is  
submitted  that  these  views  on  targeting  are  also  better  understood  under  the  rubric  of  specific  
necessity.  
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4.1.3   Targeting  the  host  state  -­  state  practice  
The   controversial   unwilling   or   unable   doctrine   is   not   universally,   or   even  
consistently,  referred  to  by  states  when  justifying  their  acts  against  NSAs  in  
foreign   territory.49  Yet,   the   view   that   unwillingness   or   inability,   as   a   factual  
matter,  might   lead   to   targeting  elements  of   the  host  state,   in  addition   to   the  
NSAs,   does   find   support   in   post   9/11   state   practice   in   response   to   armed  
attacks  by  Al-­Qaeda  (and  associated  groups)  and  Daesh.  Such  practice  points  
to   a   potential   relaxation   of   the   specific   necessity   requirements   within   the  
context  of  trans-­border  terrorism.  
a)   Operation  Enduring  Freedom  
The  first  example,  referred  to  in  the  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations  quote  at  
the   end   of   Section   4.1.2,   is   Operation   Enduring   Freedom.   This   action   in  
Afghanistan,  beginning  in  2001  as  a  response  to  9/11,  is  difficult  to  reconcile  
with  the  specific  necessity  analysis  set  out  in  Section  2.5.  In  this  incident,   in  
addition  to  targeting  the  source  of  the  armed  attacks  (namely  Al-­Qaeda),  the  
American-­led  coalition  also  targeted   the  military   installations,  personnel  and  
apparatus   of   the   Taliban   regime,   which   was   the   de   facto   government   of  
Afghanistan  at  the  time.50  The  action  led  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Taliban  and  
its   replacement   with   a   transitional   government   supported   by   UN  
peacekeepers. 51   This   was   despite   the   fact   that   whilst   the   Taliban   was  
considered  to  have  wilfully  and  unlawfully  harboured  Al-­Qaeda,  it  had  not  sent,  
directed  or  controlled  them,  thereby  giving  rise  to  attribution.52  The  Taliban  was  
not,   therefore,   regarded   as   being   directly   responsible   for   the   9/11   armed  
                                                                                        
49  See  e.g.  Deeks  (2012);;  Chachko  and  Deeks  (2016);;  Corten  (2016);;  Gray  (2018)  240,  243–
4.  
50  See  S/2001/946  (2001);;  Murphy  (2002)  246–7,  250.  
51  (2001)  UNYB  254;;  Murphy  (2002)  250–1;;  Gray  (2018)  231–3.  
52  The  Taliban  refused  the  UNSC’s  demand  (acting  under  Chapter  VII  UN  Charter)  to  hand  
over  Osama  bin  Laden.  UNSC  Res  1267  (1999)  para  2.  The  failure  was  expressly  noted  by  
the  UNSC  in  UNSC  Res  1390  (2002)  1.  See  further  Murphy  (2002)  243–4,  248;;  Ruys  (2010)  
440.  
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attacks,  only  for  acquiescing  in  terrorism,53  and  making  the  attacks  possible.54  
Yet,  despite  divided  scholarly  opinion,  states  and  international  organizations,  
including  the  UNSC,  generally  accepted  the  coalition  action  in  Afghanistan  as  
lawful,  encompassing  it  would  seem,  the  targeting  of  the  Taliban.55  
There  is  no  definitive  interpretation  of  this  incident  of  state  practice,  in  terms  of  
establishing  an  agreed  justification  for  targeting  the  Taliban  in  addition  to  Al-­
Qaeda.56  One  option  is  to  say  that  action  against  them  was  simply  necessary  
to   achieve   the   defensive   purpose  of   defeating  Al-­Qaeda,   given   the   support  
they   received   from   the  Taliban.57  Indeed,   the  USA  and   the  UK  appeared   to  
take   the   view   that   they   could   not   destroy   Al-­Qaeda   without   removing   the  
Taliban.58  The  Americans  justified  taking  defensive  action  against  the  Taliban  
on  the  basis  that  they  had  made  the  9/11  attacks  possible  by  allowing  parts  of  
Afghanistan  to  be  used  by  Al-­Qaeda  as  a  base  of  operation.59  This  allowed  Al-­
Qaeda   to   use   Afghan   territory   to   plot   and   prepare   for   the   attacks   and   the  
                                                                                        
53  Whilst  not  amounting  to  an  armed  attack,  acquiescence  in  terrorist  acts  involving  a  threat  or  
use  of  force  constitutes  an  unlawful  use  of  force  in  breach  of  Art  2(4)  UN  Charter.  See  Friendly  
Relations  Declaration,  para  1;;  UNSC  Res  748  (1992).  Following  9/11,  this  general  approach  
was  encapsulated  in  UNSC  Res1373  (2001)  para  2.  
54  E.g.   UN  Docs  S/2001/946   (2001);;   S/2001/947   (2001).   For   arguments   over   the   issue   of  
attribution  see  references  in  nn  49,  55,  57.  
55  See  Section  2.4.2(b).  See  further  Trapp  (2007)  149–56  (including  footnoted  citations);;  Ruys  
(2010)  495,  503–510,  including  in  relation  to  the  question  of  attribution  and  the  controversies  
surrounding  targeting  the  Taliban  in  addition  to  Al-­Qaeda.  
56  On  the  question  of  indeterminacy,  see  Milanovic  (2010).  
57  Other  arguments  focus  on  establishing  a  link  between  the  armed  attacks  and  the  state  of  
Afghanistan.  Such  positions  include  that  the  Taliban  was  complicit  in  Al-­Qaeda’s  actions,  with  
complicity  satisfying  a  lower  standard  of  attribution  and  giving  rise  to  a  right  of  self-­defence  
directly  against  it.  See  e.g.  Tams  (2009)  385  (albeit  not  in  the  specific  context  of  this  incident).  
This  approach  is  conceptually  flawed,  however.  It  unnecessarily  conflates  the  primary  rules  of  
the  JAB  with  the  secondary  rules  of  state  responsibility.  Trapp  (2009);;  Tsagourias  (2016)  806–
7.  Another  possible   justification   is   that   the  Taliban’s   ‘substantial   involvement’   in  Al-­Qaeda’s  
activities  (per  Art  3(g)  Definition  of  Aggression)  makes  it  the  author  of  the  9/11  armed  attacks  
and,  therefore,  subject  to  a  defensive  response.  See  Tsagourias  (2016)  816–19,  arguing  that  
substantial   state   involvement   (whether   acts   or   omissions)   with   NSAs   that   commit   armed  
attacks  might  satisfy  this  requirement,  where  the  state  knows  that  the  NSA  is  willing  to  commit  
attacks  and  such  aid  or  assistance  facilitates  this.  See  also  Ruys  and  Sten  Verhoeven  (2005)  
314–17,  making   a   similar   argument.   Alternatively,   sheltering   and   refusing   to   surrender  Al-­
Qaeda  might  be  viewed  as  endorsement  of  the  9/11  attacks,  thereby  constituting  the  Taliban  
as   accessories-­after-­the-­fact   and   justifying   direct   defensive   action   against   them.   Dinstein  
(2017)   243,   arguing   the   incident   is,   therefore,   interstate.   This   does   not   appear   to   be   the  
position  of  the  USA  or  the  UK,  however.  
58  Greenwood  (2002)  309.  
59  UN  Doc  S/2001/946  (2001).  As  to  whether  this  amounts  to  a  lower  ‘harbouring’  standard  of  
attribution,  and  analysis  of  the  attribution  issue  more  generally,  see  Henderson  (2018)  314–
16,  319–22.  
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Taliban  were  unwilling  to  prevent  this.60  The  UK  likewise  noted  the  Taliban’s  
support.61  The  UK  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  concluded  that  ‘the  defeat  of  the  
Taliban   did   achieve   its   major   objective,   which   was   to   destroy   Al-­Qaeda’s  
support  base  in  Afghanistan  and  significantly  to  weaken  the  organization.’62  
We  might  hesitate,  however,  in  accepting  this  incident  as  a  precedent  based  
on  necessity  for  future  action  against  a  host  state,  absent  attribution  to  it  of  an  
armed  attack.  The  particular  circumstances  of  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  
mean   that   it   has  been   viewed  as   an  exception   to  anti-­terrorist   self-­defence  
state  practice  that  has  been  understood  as  justifying  force  against  terrorists,  
not  against  states.63  Relevant  factors  include  the  magnitude  of  the  Al-­Qaeda  
terrorist  attacks,  the  unique  symbiosis  between  Al-­Qaeda  and  the  Taliban  and  
the   express   recognition   of   the   right   of   self-­defence   by   the   UNSC. 64   This  
conclusion  is  explored  further  in  the  following  Section.  
b)   Coalition  action  in  Syria  
More   recent   state   practice,   in   the   form   of   the   global   response   to   Daesh,  
suggests  that  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  is  indeed  sui  generis,  at   least  in  
relation  to  directly  targeting  manifestations  of  the  host  state.  Such  practice  also  
highlights   the   potential   for   specific   necessity   to   act   as   a   restraint   on   a  
defending   state’s   actions   when   responding   to   NSA   armed   attacks   on   the  
territory  of  a  host  state.  The  American-­led  Coalition  operating  against  Daesh  
and  other   terrorist   groups  was  established   in  September   2014.65  As   of   July  
2018,  it  consists  of  a  coalition  of  over  seventy  states,  in  addition  to  international  
organisations  such  as  the  Arab  League,  NATO  and  the  EU.  Its  stated  mission  
is   to  degrade  and  ultimately  defeat  Daesh   in  Syria  and  Iraq.66  The  Coalition  
                                                                                        
60  Bellinger  (2006).  
61  UN  Doc  S/2001/947  (2001).  
62  House  of  Commons  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Report  HC  384,  20th  June  2002,  para  87.  
63  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  411.  
64  Ruys  (2010)  435,  495.  
65  The  number  of  terrorist  groups  operating  in  Iraq  and  Syria  is  diverse  and  complex.  The  main  
groups,  however,  are  Daesh,  Al-­Qaeda,  and  Al-­Qaeda-­associated  forces.  See  e.g.  Gill  (2016)  
357–9;;  Gray  (2018)  237–48.  See  also  Corten  in  Ruys  and  Corten  (2018)  873–98.  
66   See   <http://www.inherentresolve.mil/>;;   <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/home/>.   There   is  
controversy  regarding  the  precise  ultimate  aim  of  some  coalition  partners.  For  example,  the  
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action   in   Syria   represents   a   factually   and   legally   complex   picture   for   the  
application  of  the  JAB,  as  well  as  IHL  and  international  human  rights  law.  Such  
action   takes   place   in   the   same   space   as   a   bloody   civil   war   and   is   further  
complicated  by  other  non-­Coalition  actors   fighting  Daesh  and  other   terrorist  
groups  in  the  same  vicinity.  These  include  Russia,  Iranian-­back  militia  groups  
and  the  Syrian  regime  itself.  
Measures  taken  by  the  Coalition  in  Syria  consist  of  well-­documented  air  strikes  
and  less  detailed  action  by  special  forces  and  other  military  personnel  within  
Syrian   territory.67  Given   the   lack  of   information   regarding  ground  operations  
and  related  troop  numbers,  it  is  the  former  category  of  action  that  best  assists  
for  the  present  analysis.68  As  of  9  August  2017,  the  Coalition  had  conducted  
over  11,000  air  strikes  in  Syria.69  Even  a  cursory  glance  at  the  strike  release  
reports   quickly   reveals   the   scale   of   the   targeting   of   public   and   private  
apparatus  and   infrastructure  within  Syrian   territory.70  These   include  bridges,  
tunnels,  factories,  ‘ISIL-­held  buildings’,  ‘ISIL  headquarters’,  ‘fighting  positions’,  
‘storage  facilities’  and  ‘supply  routes’.  Economic  targets  are  also  evident,  such  
                                                                                        
USA  appears  set  on  regime  change.  See  e.g.  ‘The  Trump  Administration  Appears  to  Embrace  
Regime   Change   in   Syria’,   The   Atlantic,   6   April   2017,  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/us-­syria-­policy/522117/>;;   ‘US  
envoy   Nikki   Haley   says   Syria   regime   change   is   inevitable’,   CNN,   10   April   2017,  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/09/middleeast/syria-­missile-­strike-­chemical-­attack-­
aftermath/index.html>.  In  and  of  itself,  such  goal  goes  beyond  a  defensive  purpose.  Given  that  
the   Assad   government   is   also   combatting   Daesh,   it   is   unlikely   to   be   either   necessary   or  
proportionate  to  achieving  that  defensive  goal.  See  further  Section  1.3.2.  
67  See  e.g.  ‘US  Special  Forces  Carry  Out  Secret  Ground  Raid  Against  ISIL  in  Syria,  'Killing  at  
Least   25   Jihadists',   The   Telegraph,   9   January   2017,  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/09/us-­special-­forces-­carry-­ground-­raid-­against-­
isil/>.  
68  Regarding  the  ambiguity  regarding  troop  numbers,  see  e.g.  ‘Full  Transcript  of  Media  Q&A  
with   Major   General   Jones’,   Coalition   Media’,   28   June   2017,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/full-­transcript-­of-­media-­q-­a-­with-­major-­general-­jones/>;;  
‘There   are   four   times   as   many   U.S.   troops   in   Syria   as   previously   acknowledged   by   the  
Pentagon’,   The   Washington   Post,   6   December   2017,   <  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/06/there-­are-­four-­times-­as-­
many-­u-­s-­troops-­in-­syria-­as-­previously-­acknowledged-­by-­the-­
pentagon/?utm_term=.830a0949682d>.  On  Turkey’s  ground  operations  in  Syria,  see  n  117.  
69   Latest   figures   provided   by   the   Coalition.   See   U.S.   Department   of   Defense,   Operation  
Inherent  Resolve,  Airstrike  Updates  <https://www.defense.gov/OIR/>  [last  accessed  23  July  
2018].  
70  Operation  Inherent  Resolve  Strike  Releases,  <http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/Strike-­
Releases/>.  Coalition  partners  also  publish  details  of  their  individual  activities.  E.g.  UK  Ministry  
of   Defence,   British   Forces   Air   Strikes   in   Iraq   and   Syria:   Monthly   List,  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-­forces-­air-­strikes-­in-­iraq-­monthly-­list>.  
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as  oil  collection  facilities  that  have  provided  the  necessary  funds  for  Daesh  to  
govern   the   areas   that   have   been   captured   and   to   carry   out   military  
operations.71  
Putting   aside,   for   the  moment,   the   issue   of   the   proportionality   of   these   air  
strikes   and   the   ensuing   collateral   civilian   damage, 72   the   current   issue   is  
whether,  as  a  general  matter,  targeting  Syrian  infrastructure  and  apparatus  in  
this  way  might  satisfy  the  test  of  specific  necessity.73  First,  let  us  consider  the  
Coalition’s  use  of  force  against  the  military  apparatus  and  personnel  of  Syrian  
and  pro-­Syrian  forces.  There  are  a  handful  of  examples.  They  include  strikes  
against  pro-­Syrian  forces  advancing  inside  so-­called  ‘de-­confliction  zones’,  the  
shooting  down  of  unmanned  aerial  vehicles  and  a  SU-­22  fighter-­bomber.74  In  
these  cases,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  reason  given  by  the  Coalition  for  targeting  
Syrian  and  pro-­Syrian  forces  directly  has  been  the  defence  of  Coalition  and/or  
partnered  forces.75  The  Coalition  has  consistently  insisted  that  its  mission  is  to  
defeat  Daesh   in   Iraq  and  Syria  and  that   it  does  not  seek   to   fight   the  Syrian  
regime  or  forces  partnered  with  them.76  In  fact,  the  Coalition  has  gone  so  far  
as   to   publicly   admit   error   in   unintentionally   targeting   Syrian   government  
forces.77  This  does  not  explain  away  all  Coalition  action  in  and  against  Syria  
                                                                                        
71  For  example,  ‘Operation  Tidal  Wave  II  Deprived  ISIS  of  80%  of  its  Oil  Collection  Facilities  
as   well   as   $25   Million   a   Month   in   Oil   Revenue  Which   Negatively   Impacted   ISIS   Military  
Operations   and   Halted   Enemy   Expansion.’   Operation   Inherent   Resolve   History,  
<http://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/Documents/Mission/HISTORY_17OCT2014-­
JUL2017.pdf?ver=2017-­07-­22-­095806-­793>.   Regarding   whether   such   economic   targets  
constitute  ‘military  objectives’  for  the  purposes  of  IHL,  see  n  147.  
72  See  Section  4.2.3.  
73  The  aim   is  not   to  analyze   individual   instances  of   targeting,  but   rather   the  general  policy  
adopted  by  the  Coalition.  
74  For  details  of  these  incidents,  see  Ruys  et  al  (2017)  391–4.  The  US  airstrike  against  a  Syrian  
military  base  in  response  to  a  use  of  chemical  weapons  is  a  separate  issue.  See   ibid,  396–
402.  For  commentary  regarding  whether  such   targeting  renders   the  conflict   international  or  
non-­international  in  nature,  see  e.g.,  ICRC’s  2016  Art  2  Commentary,  para  257–64;;  Akande  
in  Wilmshurst   (2012)   70–9;;   Gill   (2016)  Just   Security;;  Watkin   (2016)   Just   Security;;   Haque  
(2016).  See  further  n  93  and  accompanying  text.  
75  Ruys  et  al  (2017)  21–24.  An  analysis  of  the  legality  of  such  claim  is  beyond  the  scope  of  
this  thesis.  See  e.g.  Haque  (June  2017).  
76  See  ibid  and  the  documents  cited  in  n  23.  
77  ‘US  Military  Admits  it  Mistakenly  Targeted  and  Killed  Loyalist  Syrian  Forces’,  The  Guardian,  
29   November   2016,   <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/us-­military-­airstrikes-­
mistake-­syria-­assad-­deir-­ez-­zor>.   This   action   was   criticized   by   Russia   and   Syria   and  
condemned   by   Venezuela   before   the   UNSC.   UN   Doc   S/PV.7777   (2016)   10   (Russia);;   14  
(Venezuela);;  22  (Syria).  See  also:  ‘Syrian  War:  US  Military  Strikes  Pro-­Assad  Convoy  Amid  
Clashes   with   Coalition   Forces,   Officials   Say’,   ABC   News,   19   May   2017,  
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however.  The  nature,  purpose  and  justification  of  the  so  called  ‘de-­confliction  
zones’  are  unclear  and  reports  of   the  USA  occupying  a  Syrian  airfield  raise  
troubling  legal  issues,  not  least  for  necessity  and  proportionality.78  
Yet,  the  general  trend  implies  that  the  Coalition  does  not  deem  it  necessary  to  
engage  the  military  of  the  Syrian  regime  and  its  partners  in  order  to  carry  out  
its  defensive  operation  against  Daesh.79  Instead,  they  will  only  engage  them  
directly   if   the   defensive   operation   is   threatened   by   force.   This   approach  
accords   with   previous   practice.   Over   the   years,   states   have   consistently  
asserted,  and  justified,  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  NSAs  in  foreign  territory  
by  expressly  stating  that  they  are  not  using  force  against  the  host  state  itself,  
rather  their  targeting  is  limited  to  the  NSAs.80  This  was  the  case,  for  example,  
with  American  action  against  Al-­Qaeda  in  Sudan  and  Afghanistan  in  1998.81  
Israel  has  also  consistently  made  this  claim  in  its  fight  against  the  PLO  and  
Hezbollah.82  During  the  2006  invasion  of  Lebanon  Israel  insisted  that  it  was  not  
attacking   the   government   of   Lebanon,   but   rather   the   military   assets   of  
Hezbollah   located   in   that   country.   It   went   on   to   assert   that   it   had   avoided  
striking  Lebanese  military  assets,  unless  they  were  used  to  assist  Hezbollah.83  
Most  recently,  Turkey,  in  its  claim  of  self-­defence  against  what  it  characterizes  
as  Kurdish  terrorists  operating  in  Syria,  expressly  limited  its  actions  to  terrorist  
targets.   At   the   same   time,   it   emphasized   its   commitment   to   the   territorial  
                                                                                        
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-­05-­19/us-­strikes-­syria-­convoy-­threatening-­us-­backed-­
forces/8540070>.  
78  Further  conclusions  are  difficult  to  draw  in  the  absence  of  additional  details.  See,  however,  
Horowitz  (2016);;  Bridgeman  (2017).  
79  Regarding  scholarly  support  for  this  general  position,  Dinstein  (2017)  300,  agrees  that  host  
state  armed  forces  must  not  be  engaged  and  host  state  ‘installations’  must  be  exempt  from  
attack.  He  does  not  provide  reasons  for  such  conclusion  however.  This  author  suggests  that  
the  best  interpretation  of  state  practice  is  that  it  is  due  to  specific  necessity.  Such  explanation  
is   supported,   e.g.   by   Tsagourias   (2016)   823.   Tams   and   Devaney   (2012)   105,   however,  
characterise  this  as  an  issue  of  proportionality.  
80  Indeed,  up  until  2007,  Trapp  (2007)  155,  noted  that  all  invocations  of  self-­defence  against  
terrorists  since  2001  had  operated  on  this  basis.  
81  UN  Doc  S/1998/780  (1998).  
82  In   relation   to   action   against   the   PLO,   see   e.g.   UN  Docs   S/PV.2071   (1978)   paras   52–8  
(Israel);;  S/PV.2611  (1985)  paras  65–7  (Israel).  
83   ‘Behind   the   Headlines:   Israel's   Counter   Terrorist   Campaign’,   Israel   Ministry   of   Foreign  
Affairs,   15   August   2006,  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Israels%20counter%20terrorist%20
campaign%20-­%20FAQ%2018-­Jul-­2006.aspx>.  
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integrity   and   political   unity   of   Syria. 84   Such   practice   constitutes   a   direct  
expression  of  what  states  consider  to  be  the  defensive  necessity,  even  if  not  
explicitly  characterized  in  these  terms.  If  the  armed  attacks  and  enduring  threat  
originate  from  NSAs,  then  defensive  targeting  should  be  limited  accordingly.  
State   practice   supports   the   general   proposition,   therefore,   that   the  
governmental  and  military  apparatus  and  infrastructure  of  the  host  state  (and  
its  allies)  are  not  to  be  targeted  directly  whilst  acting  in  self-­defence  against  
NSAs  on  the  territory  of  the  host  state.85  Absent  attribution  of  the  armed  attack,  
it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  targeting  such  sovereign  trappings  of  ‘the  state’  will  
ever  be  necessary  to  support  a  self-­defence  claim.  A  narrow  exception  to  this  
general  rule,  as  exemplified  by  the  targeting  of  the  Taliban  during  Operation  
Enduring  Freedom,  might  be  where  there  is  complicity  between  the  host  state  
and  the  NSAs,  or  the  former  is  somehow  supporting  or  protecting  the  latter.  
This  remains  a  unique  and  unclear  precedent,  however,  and  is  controversial.  
Absent  a  very  close  connection   indeed,   there  can  be  no  defensive  purpose  
served  by  directly  targeting  the  host  state  in  this  manner.86  
However,  the  Syria  incident  does  show  that  states  participating  in  the  Coalition  
action  against  Daesh  accept   that  certain  elements  within   the  host  state  are  
targetable.  Such  targets  are  reflected  in  the  strike  release  reports  referred  to  
above.  They  exemplify  the  difficulties  with  trying  to  separate  neatly  permissible  
‘NSA   targets’   from   impermissible   ‘host  state   targets’.  However,  prima   facie,  
many  of  these  targets  are  capable  of  satisfying  the  test  of  specific  necessity,  
regardless  of  whether  we  consider  such   targets   to  be   inherently  civilian,  or  
public/state  owned.  This  on  the  basis  that  they  are  either  under  the  control  of  
Daesh  and  are  being  used  by  them  to  conduct  their  armed  activities  (e.g.  ‘ISIL-­
held   buildings’,   ‘ISIL   headquarters’,   ‘fighting   positions’   etc),   or   directly  
contribute  to  such  activities  and  the  ongoing  threat  that  such  activities  pose  to  
                                                                                        
84  UN  Doc  S/2018/53  (2018).  
85  As  noted,  controversial  claims  of  local  force  protection  might  be  an  exception  to  this  general  
rule.  Further  clarity  is  required  on  this  point,  however.  
86  A  fortiori  if  the  failure  to  combat  the  NSAs  is  due  to  inability,  rather  than  unwillingness,  on  
the  part  of  the  host  state.  Directly  targeting  its  military  would  serve  only  to  further  impair  that  
ability.  This  could  not  logically  be  regarded  as  necessary.  
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Coalition  partners  (e.g.  bridges,  tunnels,  factories,  oil  collection  facilities  and  
so   forth).   Destroying,   capturing   or   neutralizing   such   targets   either   directly  
affects  Daesh’s  capacity  to  conduct  military  operations  or  cuts  off  the  financing  
that   allows   them   to   continue. 87   Targeting   them   is,   therefore,   potentially  
necessary   for   the   effective   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­defence  against   the  
NSAs,  which  is  the  primary  purpose  of  such  action.  Any  effect  on  the  assets  
or  persons  of  the  host  state  is  incidental  to  this  necessity.88  
In   attempting   to   draw   a   line   between   permissible   ‘NSA   targets’   and  
impermissible  ‘host  state  targets’,  there  is  a  strong  argument  to  be  made  that  
when  public  property  is  under  the  control  of  NSAs,  and  not  under  the  effective  
control  of  the  host  state,  it  can  no  longer  be  identified  with  that  of  ‘the  state’.  
This   accords   with   Coalition   action   that   is,   as   a   matter   of   policy,   limited   to  
targeting  Daesh,  and  only  Daesh,  in  order  to  counter  the  threat  that  they  pose.  
This   is   the   position   explicitly   adopted   by   the   Coalition,89  and   separately   a  
number  of  its  partners.90  It  also  reflects  the  position  of  the  Coalition  that  their  
military   operations   are   carried   out   in   areas   controlled   by  Daesh   (and,   ipso  
facto,  not  in  control  of  the  Syrian  government),  in  partnership  with  Syrian  allies  
on  the  ground  and  aimed  at  liberating  the  local  Syrian  population.91  
For  the  purposes  of  specific  necessity,  therefore,  where  the  Coalition  targets  
public  or  private  buildings  that  have  been  captured  or  occupied  by  Daesh  or,  
in  the  case  of  bridges,  roads  and  the  like,  are  being  used  by  them,  this  is  not  
to  be  equated  with  targeting  the  state  of  Syria  itself.92  The  Coalition  should  only  
                                                                                        
87  See  further  Section  2.5;;  n  147  and  accompanying  text.  
88  Tsagourias  (2016)  823,  also  adopts  this  position.  The  permissible  extent  of  such  incidental  
effects  is  an  issue  for  proportionality.  See  Section  4.2.3.  
89  ‘Q&A  Session:  Transcript  of  Major  General  Jones’  Opening  Remarks’,  Coalition  Media,  26  
June   2017,   <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/qa-­session-­transcript-­of-­major-­general-­jones-­
opening-­remarks-­june-­26-­2017/>.  
90  See  e.g.  the  reports  of  self-­defence  to  the  UNSC  referred  to  in  n  23;;  USA  State  Department  
Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  240–1.  




92  Syria  has  complained,  however,   that  by  striking  Syrian  service,  economic,   industrial  and  
productive  infrastructure,  the  Coalition  has  demonstrated  hostile  intentions  towards  it.  E.g.  UN  
Doc  S/2016/31  (2016).  
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be  regarded  as  using  force  against  the  Syrian  state  when  it  engages  its  armed  
forces  directly,  attacks  national  assets  that  are  under  Syrian  state  control,  or  
occupies  its  territory.  The  fact  that  the  Coalition  is  avoiding  doing  all  of  these  
things,  albeit  without  a  perfect  success  rate,  provides  support  for  the  general  
premise.   Drawing   an   analogy   with   the   classification   of   conflicts   under   IHL  
supports  this  conclusion.  Gill  argues  that  where  intervening  states  direct  their  
force  solely  against   the  NSAs,  albeit  without  consent  on  host  state   territory,  
the   classification   is   one   of   a   non-­international   armed   conflict   between   the  
intervening  state(s)  and  the  NSAs,  not  an  international  armed  conflict  between  
the  intervening  state(s)  and  the  host  state.93  Taking  the  same  approach  to  JAB  
necessity  is  logical  and  accounts  for  the  Coalition  state  practice  in  Syria.  
This   argument   is   strongest   with   respect   to   those   areas   where   the   Syrian  
government  has  lost  effective  control  of   its  territory.  In  these  circumstances,  
the   necessity   of   taking   action   is   greatest,   given   the   inability   of   the   Syrian  
regime  to  counter  Daesh  activities   in  such  areas.94  This  argument   is  often  a  
feature   of   state   justifications   for   cross-­border   action   against   NSAs.   This   is  
reflected,  for  example,  in  the  attitude  of  Coalition  states  that  have  referred  to  
ungoverned  space  and/or  a  lack  of  effective  territorial  control  when  justifying  
their  actions   in  Syria.  95  Likewise,  Turkey  has   relied  on   Iraq’s   lack  of  control  
                                                                                        
93  Gill  (2016)  367–73.  In  contrast,  Akande  in  Wilmshurst  (2012)  70–9,  maintains  that  a  use  of  
force  on  the  territory  of  another  state,  without  its  consent,  is  a  use  of  force  against  that  state.  
This   is   the  case,  he  argues,  even   if  such   force   is  directed  only  against   the  NSAs  and  not  
against   the  governmental  structures  of   that  state.  This  gives  rise   to  an   international  armed  
conflict  between  the  two  states.  The  ICRC’s  2016  Art  2  Commentary,  paras  224,  260–3,  also  
follows   this  approach.  Akande,   ibid,   notes  however   that  his   is   the  minority  view,  with  most  
commentators   focusing   on   the   nature   of   the   parties   to   a   conflict   (i.e.  where   the   conflict   is  
between   a   state   and   NSAs,   this   renders   it   a   non-­international   armed   conflict).   Akande’s  
conclusion  also  runs  contrary  to  the  state  practice  referred  to  in  this  Chapter  that  suggests  that  
defending  states  do  not  consider  themselves  as  being  in  an  armed  conflict  with  the  host  state,  
regardless  of  the  latter’s  lack  of  consent.  
94  Even  if  necessary,  targeting  NSAs  in  territory  in  which  the  host  state  lacks  effective  control  
might   still   be   regarded   as   breaching   that   state’s  sovereignty.   Tsagourias   (2016)   811.  See  
further  Section  4.2.3.  
95  E.g.  ‘Memorandum  to  the  Foreign  Affairs  Select  Committee,  Prime  Minister’s  Response  to  
the  Foreign  Affairs  Select  Committee’s  Second  Report  of  Session  2015-­16:  The  Extension  of  
Offensive   British   Military   Operations   to   Syria’,   November   2015,  
www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-­committees/foreign-­affairs/PM-­Response-­to-­FAC-­
ReportExtension-­of-­Offensive-­British-­Military-­Operations-­to-­Syria.pdf,   2,   9.   See   also   the  
reports  of  self-­defence  to  the  UNSC  referred  to  in  n  23.  
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over  its  northern  territory  when  justifying  using  force  there  against  the  PKK.96  
Israel  made  a  similar  claim  regarding  its  actions  against  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  
in  2006.97  In  response,  the  importance  of  Lebanon  extending  control  over  its  
territory  was   generally   emphasized   by   states   and   the  UNSC.98  The   lack   of  
effective  control  over  territory  is  also  a  feature  of  the  implicit  endorsement  of  
Coalition  action   in  Syria  offered  by  UNSC  Resolution  2249,99  as  well  as   the  
ostensibly  supportive  observations  made  by  the  UN  Secretary  General.100    
State  practice  arising  out  of  the  Syrian  incident  suggests,  therefore,  that  self-­
defence  against  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  might  necessarily  involve  damage  to,  
and  destruction  of,  a  host  state’s  apparatus  and  infrastructure.  This  points  to  
an  increasing  acceptance  by  the  states  involved  of  harm  to  a  host  state.  Yet,  
in   contrast   to  Operation  Enduring  Freedom,  Coalition   action   against  Daesh  
does  not,   as  a  matter   of  policy,   involve   the  deliberate   targeting   of   the   host  
state.  There  are,  therefore,  limits  on  how  far  states  will  go  in  the  pursuit  of  a  
defensive  purpose.  Whilst  there  may  be  any  number  of  explanations  for  such  
limits,   one   of   the   most   obvious   is   specific   necessity.   Put   simply,   it   is   not  
necessary   to   target   directly   manifestations   of   the   Syrian   state   in   order   to  
defend  against  the  Daesh  threat.    
This  distinction  between  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  and  Coalition  action  in  
Syria  partly  comes  down   to   the  relationship   in  each  case  between   the  host  
state  and  the  NSAs.  In  the  former  case,  the  active  harbouring  of  the  Taliban  
regime,  and  the  refusal  to  hand  over  Osama  bin  Laden,  meant  that  to  combat  
Al-­Qaeda  effectively   it  was  also  deemed  necessary   to   target  the  Taliban.   In  
contrast,   there   is   no   suggestion   that   President   Assad   has   a   positive  
relationship  with  Daesh  or  other   terrorist  organizations.  To   the  contrary,   the  
                                                                                        
96  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/1996/479   (1996)   2;;  S/1997/7   (1997)   2.  Whilst  Turkey   did   not  make   an  
express  claim  of  self-­defence  in  these  instances,  the  language  employed  comes  close  to  it.  
Gray  (2018)  147–8.  
97  UN  Doc  S/2006/515  (2006).  
98  UNSC  Res  1701  (2006)  para  3;;  Ruys  (2010)  451–3.  
99  The  Resolution  exhorted  Member  States  to  take  action  on  the  territory  of  Syria  under  the  
control  of  Daesh.  UNSC  Res  2249   (2015).  See  Section  4.1.3(c)   for   further  analysis  of   this  
Resolution.  
100  See  n  126  and  accompanying  text.  
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Syrian   government   has   insisted   that   it   is   ‘waging   a   relentless   war   on   the  
terrorists’.101  The  issue,  therefore,  in  the  latter  case  is  not  one  of  unwillingness,  
but  rather  inability  (or  perceived  inability)  to  deal  with  the  threat  effectively.102  
Coalition  action   is,   therefore,  supplementing  stated  host  state  policy,   rather  
than  conflicting  with  it.  It  operates  in  place  of  it  in  territory  beyond  the  control  
of   the   Assad   regime.   Targeting   Syrian   armed   forces   is   not,   therefore,  
necessary   to   achieve   a   defensive   purpose.   This   explains   why   the   Syrian  
military   has   not   been  deliberately   targeted  as   a  matter   of   policy,   but   rather  
sporadically   by   accident   or   as   a   result   of   claims   of   local   force   protection.  
Degrading  the  Syrian  military  would  only  increase  the  inability  of  the  regime  to  
deal  with  the  Daesh  threat.    
Regarding  the  extent  of  state  practice  in  support  of  these  general  propositions,  
of  the  approximately  seventy  states  taking  part  in  the  Coalition,  eleven  have  
publicly  claimed  to  be  acting  in  self-­defence  against  Daesh  in  Syria  and  have  
reported  this  to  the  UNSC.103  The  fact  that  not  all  Coalition  partners  operating  
in  Syria  have  explicitly  made  this  claim,  or  made  a  report,  is  indicative  of  the  
inconsistent  state  practice   in  this  area.  This  makes  assessing  such  practice  
difficult,   especially   as   the   absence   of   a   report   to   the  UNSC  may   speak   to  
whether  or  not  a  state  genuinely  believes  itself  to  be  acting  in  self-­defence.104  
However,   the   actions   of   Coalition   partners,   both   those   that   have   explicitly  
claimed  a  right  of  self-­defence  and  those  that  have  not,  as  well  as  the  reactions  
of   other   states,   speak   directly   to   the   issue   of   targeting   in   the   course   of  
defensive  operations.  
A  number  of  Coalition  states  have  taken  part  in  airstrikes  in  Syria,  whilst  others  
have  provided  weapons,  equipment,  training  and  other  support  as  part  of  the  
                                                                                        
101  E.g.  UN  Doc  S/2016/46  (2016)  2.  
102  See  further  Sections  4.1.1  and  4.1.2.  The  unwilling  and  unable  doctrine  in  the  context  of  
the  fight  against  Daesh  is  particularly  controversial.  This  is  partly  because  President  Assad  
has  asserted   that  he   is  actively   fighting  Daesh  (and  has  requested   the  assistance  of  other  
states  to  do  so),  potentially  suggesting  that  he  is  complying  with  the  obligation  of  due  diligence  
to  combat  terrorist  threats  originating  from  Syrian  territory.  Moreover,  only  a  handful  of  states  
have  explicitly,  or  implicitly,  invoked  the  unable  or  unwilling  doctrine  in  justifying  their  acts  of  
self-­defence  against  Daesh  in  Syria.  See  Corten  (2016),  in  particular  778,  780–5,  791–3.  
103  See  n  23.  
104  Nicaragua,  para  200.  
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military  action  against  Daesh.105  In   terms  of  active  participation   in  airstrikes,  
from  North  America  the  USA  was  assisted  by  Canada.106  European  partners  
have   included   the   UK, 107   France, 108   Germany, 109   Denmark, 110   The  
Netherlands,111  Norway112  and   Belgium.113  From   north   Africa,   Morocco   sent  
warplanes,114  and  several  Arab  countries  have  carried  out,  or  supported,  air  
strikes.  The  latter  include  Saudi  Arabia,  the  UAE,  Jordan,  Bahrain  and  Qatar.115  
Australia  has  also  taken  part,116  with  Turkey  undertaking  both  air  and  ground  
operations.117  Italy   and  Estonia   have  materially   contributed   to   these  military  
activities.118  Furthermore,   a   number   of   states   have   explicitly   supported   the  
                                                                                        
105 See   generally   ‘Military’,   Coalition   website,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/category/military/>.  
106  UN  Doc  S/2015/221  (2015).  Canada  later  withdrew  its  fighter  jets  following  the  election  of  
Prime  Minister  Trudeau   in  October  2015,  but  continues   to  participate   in  Operation   Inherent  
Resolve.  ‘Canada’s  New  Approach  to  Addressing  the  Ongoing  Crises  in  Iraq  and  Syria  and  
Impacts   on   the   Region:   Promoting   Security   and   Stability’,   Prime   Minister   of   Canada,   8  
February   2016,   <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/02/08/canadas-­new-­approach-­addressing-­
ongoing-­crises-­iraq-­and-­syria-­and-­impacts-­region>.  
107  UN  Docs  S/2015/688  (2015);;  S/2015/928  (2015).  
108  UN  Doc  S/2015/745  (2015).  
109  UN  Doc  S/2015/946  (2015).  
110  UN  Doc  S/2016/34  (2016).  
111  UN  Doc  S/2016/132  (2016).  
112  UN  Doc  S/2016/513  (2016).  
113  UN  Doc  S/2016/523  (2016).  
114  ‘Moroccan  F16s  Undertake  20  Missions  against  ‘Islamic  State’:  British  Magazine’,  Morocco  
World   News,   3   February   2015,  
<http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2015/02/150884/moroccan-­f16s-­undertake-­20-­
missions-­islamic-­state-­british-­magazine-­2/>.  
115  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,  ‘US  Military,  Partner  Nations  Conduct  Airstrikes  in  Syria’,  23  
September   2014,   <www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123234>.   None   of   these  
Arab  states  have  communicated  a  report   to  the  UNSC  or  otherwise  made  explicit  the   legal  
basis   for   their  actions   in  Syria.  Prior   to   the  start  of   the  Coalition  action,  however,   the  Arab  
League  stressed  ‘the  right  of  each  member  state,  in  accordance  with  its  wish,  to  provide  all  
means   of   self-­defense,   including  military   support   to   back   the   steadfastness   of   the   Syrian  
people   and   the   free   army.’   24th  Arab  Summit   Issues  Doha  Declaration,  Arab   League   24th  
Summit,   21–27   March   2013,  
<http://arableaguesummit2013.qatarconferences.org/news/news-­details-­17.html>.  
116  UN  Doc  S/2015/693  (2015).  
117  See  UN  Doc  S/2015/563  (2015);;  ‘Ministry:  Turkey  Joins  Coalition  Airstrikes  against  ISIS  in  
Syria’,   CNN   News,   29   August   2015,   <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-­
airstrikes/>;;  UN  Doc  S/2016/739  (2016);;  ‘Turkish  Tanks  Roll  into  Syria,  Pushing  Islamic  State  
out  of  Key  Border  Town’,  Reuters,  24  August  2016,  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­mideast-­
crisis-­turkey-­operation-­idUKKCN10Z07L>.   Turkey’s   actions   in   Syria   are,   however,  
complicated  by  the  military  action  it  is  also  taking  against  Kurdish  forces.  In  respect  of  the  most  
recent   offensive   in   Afrin,   entitled   Operation  Olive   Branch   see   UN   Doc   S/2018/53   (2018);;  
‘Airstrikes  Pound  Syria's  Afrin   as   Turkey   Launches   'Operation  Olive  Branch'’,   Reuters,   20  
January   2018,   <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­mideast-­crisis-­syria-­turkey/airstrikes-­pound-­
syrias-­afrin-­as-­turkey-­launches-­operation-­olive-­branch-­idUKKBN1F90RS>.  
118  UN  Docs  S/PV.7527  (2015)  38  (Italy);;  S/PV.7670  (Resumption  1)  (2016)  34  (Estonia).  
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Coalition’s  military  action  in  Syria  in  deliberations  before  the  UNSC,119  as  has  
the  European  Union.120  Other  states  have  given  implicit  backing.121  
The  UNSC  gave  implicit  approval  of  defensive  action  against  Daesh  by  way  of  
UNSC  Resolution  2249.122  What  is  more,  the  UNSC  has  since  reiterated  its  call  
to  the  international  community  to  combat  Daesh  and  other  terrorist  groups.123  
Far  from  condemning  Coalition  action,  the  UNSC  instead  noted  the  progress  
made  in  2016  in  taking  back  Daesh  controlled  territory  in  Syria.  In  so  doing,  it  
expressed  grave  concern  that  areas  remained  under  their  control,  noting  the  
negative   impact   of   their   continued   presence,   ideology   and   actions   in   the  
region.  It  linked  the  devastating  humanitarian  impact  on  the  civilian  populations  
to  the  acts  of  Daesh  and  other  terrorist  organizations,  not  to  the  actions  of  the  
Coalition.  124  It   is   also   significant   that   the   UNGA   has   avoided   criticizing   the  
Coalition.   As   ‘world-­wide   juries’,   the   reaction   of   these   two   bodies   is  
important.125  
The  UN  Secretary  General  has  followed  this  trend.  He  noted  the  lack  of  Syrian  
consent   when   the   airstrikes   began   in   September   2014   (without   further  
comment  on   this  point)  and   the  need  for   those   involved   in   the  campaign   to  
abide  by  IHL.  He  went  on  to  remark,  however,  that  the  Syrian  government  was  
informed   beforehand,   that   the   strikes   took   place   in   areas   not   under   the  
effective  control  of  the  government  and  that  ‘these  extremist  groups  pose  an  
                                                                                        
119   UN   Docs   S/PV.7281   (2014)   25   (Rwanda);;   S/PV.7316   (2014)   35   (Iraq);;   65   (Albania);;  
S/PV.7527  (2015)  55  (Bulgaria);;  73  (Ukraine).  
120  E.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.7281  (2014)  42;;  S/PV.7540  (Resumption  1)  14.  
121  E.g.  ‘It  is  incumbent  upon  individual  Member  States  to  take  the  steps  needed  to  protect  the  
Syrian  people  -­  steps  that  they  are  legally  entitled  to  take  -­  and  to  establish  a  no-­fly  zone  over  
part   of   Syria.’  UN  Doc  S/2015/190   (2015)  Annex,   2–3   (Lithuania).   Japan   has   called   upon  
Russia  to  limit  its  air  strikes  against  Daesh  targets  in  Syria.  In  so  doing,  it  appears  to  accept,  
as   a   general   principle,   the   legality   of   targeting   Daesh   in   that   country.   It   goes   on   to   note,  
however,  that  targeting  non-­Daesh  targets  ‘would  be  a  cause  for  concern.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7540  
(Resumption  1)  19  (Japan).  ‘We  also  welcome  the  broad-­based  international  coalition  to  fight  
the  so-­called  Islamic  State/Daesh  and  other  terrorist  groups.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7588  (2015)  14  
(Angola).  See  also  UN  Doc  S/PV.8178  (2018)  11  (Sweden);;  12  (Kazakhstan).  
122  This  is  discussed  in  detail  in  Section  4.1.3(c).  
123  UNSC  Res  2254  (2015)  para  8;;  UNSC  Res  2332  (2016)  2.  
124  UNSC  Res  2332  (2016)  2.  
125  Tsagourias  (2016)  824.  
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immediate  threat  to  international  peace  and  security.’126  At  the  very  least,  such  
statement  shows  an  acceptance  of  the  necessity  of  the  action  taken  and,  at  
best,  may  be  interpreted  as  supportive  of  it.  Since  then,  the  focus  of  the  UN’s  
concern  has  been  on  such  matters  as  compliance  with  IHL  and  human  rights  
law,   as   well   as   peaceful   settlement   and   the   humanitarian   situation   on   the  
ground.  The  legality,  or  even  the  legitimacy,  of  the  Coalition  operating  within  
Syrian  territory  has  been  noticeably  absent  from  its  agenda.127  
Support  has  not  been  universal,  however.  During  the  many  UNSC  meetings  
held  since  2014  that  have  considered  the  situation  in  Syria,  a  limited  number  
of   states   expressed   general   concern   for   action   taken   absent   UNSC  
authorization,   as   well   as   the   effect   on   the   sovereignty,   independence   and  
territorial   integrity   of   Syria. 128   Whilst   these   pronouncements   may   point   to  
unease   regarding  Coalition  military   action   in  Syria,   they   also   recognize   the  
threat  posed  by  Daesh  and  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  question  the  legality  of  such  
action.  Likewise,  Sweden  has  urged  the  Coalition  to  take  ‘greater  care’  in  order  
to  protect  civilians  in  Syria  but  stopped  short  of  directly  criticizing  the  military  
action   itself,   and   Kazakhstan   has   adopted   a   similar   line.129  However,   both  
states  have  since  expressed  greater  implicit  support.  130  
Beyond  the  UNSC,  the  NAM  has  adopted  a  more  nuanced  approach.  In  2016,  
they  condemned  the  actions  of  Daesh  and  other  Al-­Qaeda  affiliated  groups  in  
Syria  and  elsewhere,  recognizing  the  threat  posed  by  terrorism  to  the  region  
                                                                                        
126  Ban  Ki-­Moon,  ‘Remarks  at  the  Climate  Summit  Press  Conference  (including  comments  on  
Syria)’,   23   September   2014,   <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2014-­09-­
23/remarks-­climate-­summit-­press-­conference-­including-­comments-­syria>.  
127  See  e.g.  ‘Report  of  the  Independent  International  Commission  of  Inquiry  on  the  Syrian  Arab  
Republic’.  UN  Doc  A/HRC/36/55   (2017);;   ‘Syria:  UN  Relief  Officials  Condemn  Targeting   of  
Civilians,   Infrastructure   as   Airstrikes   Hit   Raqqa’,   UN   News   Centre,   22   August   2017,  
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57396#.WlNLuFSFhqd>.  See  also  UNSC  
Res  2332  (2016)  2.  
128  See  e.g.  UN  Docs  S/PV.7271  (2014)  15  (Argentina);;  17–18  (Chile);;  20  (China);;  S/PV.7419  
(2015)  53  (Pakistan);;  S/PV.7527  (2015)  48–9  (Brazil);;  ‘South  African  Ambassador:  Syria  Is  an  
Independent  Sovereign  State,  Can  Handle   Its  Own  Affairs’,  Syrian  Arab  News  Agency,  22  
June  2015,  <http://sana.sy/en/?p=45877>.  See  further  Corten  (2016)  789,  citing  a  number  of  
state  reactions  that  point  to  a  general  concern  regarding  the  infringement  of  state  sovereignty.    
129  UN  Doc  S/PV.7931  (2017)  5–6  (Sweden);;  UN  Doc  S/PV.7983  (2017)  6  (Kazakhstan).  
130  UN  Doc  S/PV.8178  (2018)  11  (Sweden);;  12  (Kazakhstan).  
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and  the  world.131  They  did  not  offer  any  comments  on  the  military  actions  of  the  
Coalition,  however.  Their  hesitance  to  condemn  Coalition  action  contrasts  with  
previous   incidents  where   they  have  unequivocally  stated   their  objections   to  
expansive  military   interventions.132  Without   referencing   any   specific   bodies,  
states  or  acts,  they  simply  affirmed,  under  the  general  heading  of  terrorism,  
that   they   ‘totally   reject[ed]   targeting   other   States   under   the   pretext   of  
combating   terrorism’.133  We   should   be   hesitant   in   drawing   firm   conclusions  
from   silence   regarding   particular   incidents,   and   this   statement   could   be  
interpreted   in   a   number   of   ways. 134   However,   Daesh,   Syria   and   concern  
regarding   the   targeting  of  states  were  all   referenced  by   the  NAM  within   the  
context   of   combatting   terrorism.   As   such,   one   might   have   expected   more  
specific   language,   had   the   summit   wished   to   express   disapproval   of   the  
Coalition  action  in  Syria.  
A  smaller  group  of  states  have  been  more  emphatic  in  their  negative  reactions.  
Despite  not   initially  submitting  a  complaint   to   the  UNSC  regarding  Coalition  
action,  Syria  was  increasingly  critical,  going  on  to  denounce  the  intervention  
as  aggression  and  illegal  intervention.135  Its  closest  ally  in  the  conflict,  Russia,  
condemned  the  airstrikes  and  questioned  their  legitimacy.136  Iran  characterized  
                                                                                        
131  Final  Document  of  the  17th  Summit  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  of  the  Non-­Aligned  
Movement,   17–18   September   2016,  
<http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/XVII-­NAM-­Summit-­Final-­Outcome-­
Document-­ENG.pdf>,  paras  258,  258.29.  
132  Following  the  1999  NATO  bombings  of  Kosovo,  for  example,  the  Group  of  77  and  China  
were   swift   to   reject   the   so-­called   ‘right’   of   humanitarian   intervention.   Group   of   77   South  
Summit,  ‘Declaration  of  the  South  Summit’  held  in  Havana,  Cuba  (10–14  April  2000)  para  54.  
133  Ibid,  para  258.34.  
134  Conclusions   are   difficult   to   draw   from   silence,   in   particular   as   to   whether   it   should   be  
construed   as   acquiescence,   or   even   support.   The   issue   of   interpreting   silence   when  
attempting  to  divine  normative  change  (whether  by  way  of  customary  development  or  treaty  
interpretation)   is  a  complex  and  controversial   issue.  See  e.g.  Corten   (2005)  817–18;;  Ruys  
(2010)  38;;  Henry  (2017);;  Starski  (2017).  
135  See  e.g.  UN  Docs  S/2015/719  (2015);;  S/2015/727  (2015);;  S/2016/745  (2016);;  S/2015/851  
(2015);;  S/2015/933  (2015);;  S/PV.7774  (2016)  27–28;;  S/PV.7785  (2016)  19;;  S/PV.7882  (2017)  
46–7;;  S/PV.7921  (2017)  18–20.    
136  ‘Russia  Condemns  U.S.  Strikes  on  Islamic  State  Without  Syria’s  Approval’,  The  Moscow  
Times,  25  September  2014,  <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-­condemns-­us-­strikes-­
on-­islamic-­state-­without-­syrias-­approval-­39759>.  
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them   as   illegal.137  Other   states   followed   suit,   including   Ecuador,138  Cuba,139  
Venezuela,140  Egypt,141  China,142  and  Bolivia.143  There  are,  therefore,  a  number  
of  states  that  have  expressly  rejected  the  right  of  other  states  to  intervene  in  
Syria,  absent  consent,  in  order  to  combat  Daesh.  Yet,  it  is  notable  that  Russia  
and   China   have   only   taken   their   opposition   so   far.   In   their   capacity   as  
permanent   members   of   the   UNSC   and,   therefore,   as   agents   of   the  
international  community,144  they  have  not  vetoed  UNSC  resolutions  (like  UNSC  
Resolution  2249)   that  are   implicitly  supportive  of  anti-­terrorist  military  action  
within  Syrian  territory.  
Moreover,  where  states  have  denounced  Coalition  action,  this  has  tended  to  
be  in  general  terms.  This  makes  it  hard  to  engage  with  the  legal  question  of  
whether  and  how  they  relate  to  claims  of  self-­defence  and,  more  specifically,  
the   necessity   of   targeting   elements   of   Syria’s   civilian   infrastructure   and  
apparatus   controlled   or   used  by  Daesh.  Yet,   given   the  nature   and   scale   of  
Coalition  action  and  the  fact  that  it  began  in  2014,  there  has  been  a  relative  
lack  of  specific  and  direct  condemnation  by  other  states.  This  is  despite  the  
fact  that  the  Syrian  incident  has  been  a  constant  feature  of  the  UNSC  agenda  
ever   since.   In   that   time,   only   a   relatively   few   states   have   explicitly  
characterized  Coalition  action  as  unlawful.  
                                                                                        
137  ‘Syria  Air  Strikes:  Iran  'Says  US  Attacks  on  Isis  are  Illegal'’,  Independent,  23  September  
2014,   <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-­east/syria-­air-­strikes-­iran-­says-­us-­
attacks-­on-­isis-­are-­illegal-­9751245.html>.  
138  ‘Ecuador  Rejects  US  offensive  in  Syrian  Territory’,  Ecuadorian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  
and   Human   Mobility,   <http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-­rechaza-­ofensiva-­
estadounidense-­en-­territorio-­sirio/>  (translation  by  this  author).  
139  ‘We  reject  unilateral  actions  and  those  taken  outside  the  United  Nations,  such  as  those  of  
the  United  States,  which  is  launching  air  strikes  across  boundaries  of  sovereign  States  in  clear  
violation  of  international  law.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7281  (2014)  62.  
140  ‘We  denounce  the  current  attempt  to  apply  the  same  formula  in  Syria  as  was  done  in  Iraq  
and  Libya.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7419  (2015)  24.  
141  ‘Egypt  Defends  Syria’s  Territorial  Unity  after  Turkey  Moves  against   IS’,  Reuters,  29  July  
2015,   <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­mideast-­crisis-­syria-­egypt-­
idUKKCN0Q31AY20150729>.  
142  ‘[The  USA’s]  gross  violations  of  Syria’s  sovereignty  have  resulted  in  the  further  spread  of  
the  terrorist  threat.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7857  (2017)  22.  
143   ‘[W]e   see   that   completely   illegal,   unilateral   military   actions   are   still   occurring,   (…)  
undermining  the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  the  Syrian  Arab  Republic  and  Government  efforts  
to  combat  Da’esh.’  UN  Doc  S/PV.7944  (2017)  7.  
144  Art  24  UN  Charter.  
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In  summary,  whilst  not  unequivocal,  a  careful  review  of  the  numerous  UNSC  
deliberations  and  other  sources  concerning  the  situation  in  Syria  since  2014  
shows  substantial  support  for  the  Coalition  military  action  against  Daesh  within  
Syrian   territory.   Crucially,   this   consists   of   state   backing,   as  well   as   implicit  
support   from  principal  UN  organs  (or,  at   least,  a   lack  of  condemnation   from  
them).  To  the  extent  that  this  reaction  is  viewed  as  a  positive  endorsement,  its  
precise  parameters  are  still  debatable.  The  position  of  the  unwilling  or  unable  
doctrine,  for  example,  is  particularly  contentious  and  the  legal  basis  for  military  
action  in  Syria  varies  from  defending  state  to  defending  state.  Yet,  this  incident  
points  to  an  acceptance  of  a  general  right  to  use  defensive  force  against  Daesh  
in  Syria.  This  is  despite  a  lack  of  attribution  of  armed  attacks  to  that  state,  or  
substantial  involvement  by  the  Assad  regime  in  Daesh’s  activities  (per  Article  
3(g)  Definition  of  Aggression).  This  furthers  the  general  trend  of  state  practice  
since  9/11  on   this   issue  and   is  part  of   the   international  community’s  stance  
towards   international   terrorism   as   reflected   in,   and   supported   by,   UNSC  
Resolution  2249  and  subsequent  resolutions.145  
Furthermore,  the  post  9/11  state  practice  suggests  that  where  the  host  state  is  
unwilling  or  unable  to  tackle  the  threat  itself  (including  where  it  is  acquiescing  
in  such  threat),  defending  states  may  deem  it  necessary  to  target  non-­military  
elements  of  a  host  state  being  used  or  occupied  by  the  NSAs  that  were  directly  
responsible  for  the  armed  attack.  In  such  cases,  the  defending  state  has  no  
choice  of  means  but  to  use  force  both  on,  and  potentially  against,  the  territory  
of   the   host   state   in   order   to   achieve   an   effective   defensive   outcome.   This  
necessity   is   also   reflected   in   UNSC   Resolution   2249,   where   the   UNSC  
unanimously  recognized  the  need  to  ‘eradicate’  Daesh  safe  havens  in  Syria.146  
This  conclusion  sits  as  a  general  premise  however.  At  present,  firm  guidelines  
are  difficult  to  deduce  from  the  aforementioned  state  practice  regarding  what  
                                                                                        
145  Wood  (2016)  8,  for  example,  argues  that  Resolution  2249  reflects  the  UNSC’s  unanimous  
approval  of  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  unattributable  to  a  state.  
See  further  Section  4.1.3(c).  
146  Wood   (2016)   8,   notes   that   the  UNSC’s   reference   to   taking   all   necessary  measures   on  
Syrian   territory   under   the   control   of   Daesh   to   eradicate   Daesh   safe   havens   ‘may   be   an  
important  statement  of  what  is  necessary  and  proportionate  in  the  circumstances.’  See  further  
Section  4.2.1.  
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particular  aspects  of  the  host  state’s  civilian  apparatus  and  infrastructure  are  
viewed  by  states  as   lawful   targets   for   the  purposes  of   the  JAB.  However,  a  
review   of   the  Operation   Inherent   Resolve   strike   release   reports   referred   to  
above  suggests  that  the  members  of  the  Coalition  carrying  out  military  strikes  
generally  consider  that  targets  must  be  directly  connected  to,  or  supportive  of,  
the  military  activities  of  Daesh.147  Whether  they  are  also  connected  with  actual  
or   imminent   armed   attacks,   however,   and   serve   an   identifiable   defensive  
purpose   is  unclear.148  Further  clarification   from  states  on   this  point  would  be  
welcome.  
c)   UNSC  involvement  -­  a  limiting  factor  
This  conclusion  is  potentially  troubling,  pointing  as  it  does  to  an  expansive  right  
for  states  to  use  force  in  self-­defence,  once  general  necessity  is  established.  
Yet,  there  does  appear  to  be  a  significant  limiting  factor  on  the  ability  to  target  
elements  of  the  host  state  in  this  way.  This  is  the  central  role  played  by  the  
UNSC  in  these  specific  incidents  and  in  the  global  response  to  terrorism  more  
generally.  The  Coalition  action  in  Syria  is  a  prime  example.  During  2014  and  
2015,  and  in  line  with  its  previous  practice,  the  UNSC  consistently  condemned  
the  acts  of  Daesh  and  other  terrorist  groups,  whilst  calling  upon  all  Member  
States   to   act   collectively   to   combat   the   threat   to   international   peace   and  
security   caused   by   terrorist   acts. 149   The   UNSC   proceeded   to   adopt  
unanimously  Resolution  2249,  which  reaffirmed  that  ‘terrorism  in  all  forms  and  
manifestations   constitutes   one   of   the   most   serious   threats   to   international  
peace   and   security.’   It   called   upon   all   Member   States   to   ‘redouble   and  
                                                                                        
147  As  noted,  to  be  lawful  targets,  they  must  also  constitute  military  objectives  for  the  purposes  
of   IHL.   See   Section   2.5.   A   controversial   category   of   targets   includes   objects,   such   as   oil  
facilities  and  tankers,  that  contribute  to  financing  Daesh’s  military  activities.  If  the  oil  production  
facilities   generate   revenue   that   sustain   Daesh’s   operations,   this  might  make   an   ‘effective  
contribution  to  military  action’  for  the  purposes  of  targeting  them  under  Art  52(2)  API.  This  will  
depend   on   their   precise   connection   with   the  military   action.  On   this   basis,   they   are   to   be  
contrasted  with  ‘war  sustaining’  objects  that,  although  a  controversial  issue,  are  not  generally  
viewed  as  targetable  under  IHL.  See  further  International  Law  Association  Study  Group  Final  
Report   (2017)  15–16.  The  USA   takes  a  different  approach   to   ‘war  sustaining’  objects.  For  
commentary  in  the  context  of  the  fight  against  Daesh,  see  e.g.  Watkin  (2014);;  Van  Schaack  
(2015).  As  to  whether  Daesh’s  money  is  a  legitimate  target,  see  Richemond-­Barak  (2016).    
148  See  Section  2.5.  
149  E.g.  UNSC  Res  2178  (2014);;  2195  (2014);;  2199  (2015);;  2214  (2015).  
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coordinate   their   efforts   to   prevent   and   suppress   terrorist   acts   (…)   and   to  
eradicate  the  safe  haven  [that  terrorists]  have  established  over  significant  parts  
of  Iraq  and  Syria’.150  
Such  resolution  does  not,   in  and  of  itself,  authorise  the  use  of  force  against  
Daesh  and  other  named  terrorist  groups.151  Instead,  the  UNSC  called  upon  the  
international  community  ‘to  take  all  necessary  measures,  in  compliance  with  
international   law’   to   respond   to   the   stated   terrorist   threat. 152   Yet,   such  
exhortation  applies,  implicitly  at  least,  to  each  state  employing  its  right  of  self-­
defence   in   response   to  armed  attacks.   It   confers  a  degree  of   legitimacy  on  
states  making  this  claim.  Wood  characterises  it  as  an  endorsement  of  claims  
of   self-­defence   against   Daesh   in   Syria, 153   whilst   Akande   and   Milanovic  
maintain  that  its  constructive  ambiguity  may  provide  political  cover  for  military  
intervention,   without   endorsing   any   particular   legal   basis   for   such   action.154  
Significantly,   following   the   passing   of   UNSC   Resolution   2249   in   2015,   six  
states   invoked   it   in  support  of   their   claims  of  self-­defence  against  Daesh   in  
Syria,  explicitly  referencing  it   in  their  Article  51  reports  to  the  UNSC.155  More  
specifically,   this   practice   can   be   interpreted   as   such   states   accepting   a  
collective  determination  of  the  necessity  of  action  against  Daesh  in  Syria.  As  
a  factual  matter,  the  UNSC  is  confirming  the  unwillingness  or  inability  on  the  
part  of  Syria  to  counter  Daesh  on  its  territory.156  
                                                                                        
150  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015).  See  further  UN  Doc  S/PV.7565  (2015).  
151  The  Resolution  was  not  passed  under  Chapter  VII  UN,  nor  does  it  authorise  or  decide  that  
force  should  be  used.  See  further  Akande  and  Milanovic  (2015);;  Wood  (2016)  7.  
152  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015).  
153  Wood   (2016)   8,   noting   that   no   one   at   the   UNSC  meeting   that   adopted   the   Resolution  
suggested  otherwise.  
154  Akande  and  Milanovic  (2015).  
155   UN   Docs   S/2015/928   (2015)   (UK);;   S/2015/946   (2015)   (Germany);;   S/2016/34   (2016)  
(Denmark);;  S/2016/132  (2016)  (The  Netherlands);;  S/2016/513  (2016)  (Norway);;  S/2016/523  
(2016)   (Belgium).  Whilst   not   unanimous,   or   necessarily   explicit,   the   views   of   a   number   of  
individual   UNSC  members   of   UNSC  Resolution   2249   can   also   be   interpreted   as   it   being  
supportive  of  military  action  against  Daesh  in  Syria.  See  UN  Doc  S/PV.7565  (2015)  2  (France);;  
4  (USA);;  5  (Nigeria);;  6–7  (Jordan);;  7  (Angola)  8–9  (UK).  
156  Hakimi  and  Cogan  (2016),  along  similar  lines,  argue  that  the  six  states  are  using  UNSC  
Res  2249  to  establish,  as  a  legal  fact,  that  the  preconditions  for  defensive  force  have  been  
met.  See  also  Henderson  (2018)  327.  For  the  effect  of  this  resolution  on  proportionality,  see  
Section  4.2.1.  
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The  UNSC’s  role  in  this  incident  is  not  unique.  In  response  to  9/11,  it  explicitly  
recognized  and  reaffirmed  the  right  of  self-­defence,  thereby  providing  implicit  
support   for   the   ensuing   Operation   Enduring   Freedom.157   Prior   to   this,   the  
UNSC   had   insisted   that   the   Taliban   cease   supporting   terrorism   and   take  
effective   action   against   it,   including   by   cooperating   with   the   international  
community. 158   It   had   also   demanded   that   the   Taliban   hand   over   the  
mastermind  of  the  attacks,159  determined  that  the  Taliban  was  itself  a  threat  to  
international  peace  and  security,160  and  condemned  the  Taliban  for  allowing  its  
territory  to  be  used  as  a  base  for  the  export  of  terrorism  and  for  providing  a  
safe   haven   for   terrorists.161  There   was,   therefore,   much  more   than   a   mere  
unwillingness  or  inability  on  the  part  of  host  state  giving  rise  to  a  necessity  of  
self-­defence.  
Since  9/11,  therefore,  there  has  been  an  increased  acceptance  by  states  of  
the  necessity  of  taking  defensive  action  against  NSAs  that  results  in  material  
harm  to  the  host  state.  This  might  even  include  the  direct  targeting  of  elements  
of  a  host  state.  This   is  conditioned,  however.  The  UNSC’s   response   to   the  
nature  of  the  terrorist  threat,  and  to  the  particular  host  state,   is  significant  in  
each  of  these  incidents.  They  are  not  simply  cases  of  unilateral  determinations  
of  inability  or  unwillingness  and  ensuing  actions  by  a  state,  or  groups  of  states.  
First,  these  incidents  of  practice  arise  in  the  context  of  international  terrorism  
that   the  UNSC  has   reacted   to   in  a   very   specific  manner.  Second,   they   are  
limited  to  cases  where  the  host  state  has  failed  to  take  effective  remedial  action  
against  NSAs  at   the   express   behest   of   the   international   community,   acting  
through   the  UNSC.162  As  Zimmerman  notes,  where   the  UNSC   requests   the  
                                                                                        
157  UNSC  Res  1368  (2001);;  1373  (2001).  
158  UNSC  Res  1267  (1999)  para  1.  
159  UNSC  Res  1267  (1999)  para  2.  
160   This   was   because   the   Taliban   had   failed   to   respond   to   demands   to   ‘stop   providing  
sanctuary  and  training  for  international  terrorists  and  their  organizations,  and  [to]  cooperate  
with  efforts  to  bring  indicted  terrorists  to  justice.’  Ibid;;  UNSC  Res  1214  (1998)  para  13.  
161  UNSC  Res  1378  (2001).  
162  This  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the  case  of  the  Taliban  and  Al-­Qaeda.  With  Syria,  there  is  an  
argument   that  President  Assad  has  been  actively   fighting  Daesh  and  other   terrorist  groups  
and  has  enlisted  the  help  of  its  allies,  Russia  and  Iran,  to  do  so.  However,  Coalition  action  in  
Syria   suggests   that   much   of   the   international   community   view   these   efforts   as   being  
ineffective.  UNSC  Resolution  2249  confirms  this  view.  
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host  state   to   take  action  against  armed  groups  operating  within   its   territory,  
and  it  fails  to  do  so,  this  constitutes  a  specific  form  of  qualified  inaction  on  the  
latter’s  part.163  
Third,  as  noted,  in  such  cases  the  UNSC  has  implicitly  established  as  a  factual  
matter  the  necessity  of  defending  states  taking  action  within  the  host  state’s  
territory.   It   has   expressed   a   collective   view,   as   agent   of   the   international  
community,  on  the  unwillingness  or  inability  of  the  host  state  and,  therefore,  a  
determination   of   the   necessity   of   defensive   action.   Such   a   collective  
determination  of  necessity  acts  as  an  additional  limiting  factor  on  the  ability  of  
defending  states  to  take  action  in  and  against  a  host  state.  Any  ensuing  harm  
to   the  host  state   is,   therefore,   the  price  of   repeated   failure   to   live  up   to   the  
collective   demands   placed   upon   such   states   by   international   law   and   the  
international  community.164  
4.1.4   NSA  armed  attacks  -­  timing  and  imminence  
a)   Temporal  duration  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  
Identifying   the   period   of   time   over   which   the   right   of   self-­defence   against  
terrorist   NSAs   subsists   is   more   complex   than   in   the   interstate   context.  
Factually  determining  when   the  goals  of  self-­defence  are  achieved   is  much  
less  clear.  From  a  temporal  perspective,  what  does  the  end  point  look  like?  In  
contrast   to   traditional   interstate  conflict,   terrorists   tend  not   to  disarm  or  sign  
formal   instruments   of   surrender   in   order   to   enter   into   a   political   process  
ensuring  peace.  Moreover,  groups  such  as  Al-­Qaeda  and  Daesh  are  unlikely  
                                                                                        
163  Zimmermann  (2007)  120–1.  Whilst  Zimmerman  does  not  specify  that  the  failure  by  the  host  
state   is   to  take  effective  action  against   the  NSAs  at  the  UNSC’s  behest,   this   is   the  natural  
implication.   A   similar   pattern   occurred   prior   to   Israel’s   invasion   of   Lebanon   in   2006.  On   a  
number  of  occasions,   the  UNSC  called  upon  Lebanon  to  exercise  effective  control  over   its  
territory  and  to  prevent  attacks  over  the  Blue  Line   into   Israel.  E.g.  UNSC  Res  1583  (2005)  
para  4;;  1614  (2005)  para  6;;  1655  (2006)  para  8.  This  may  account  for  the  initial  widespread  
support  for  Israel’s  actions,  which  were  later  broadly  condemned  as  disproportionate  due  to  
the  scale  of  the  operation.  See  Section  3.2.5.  
164  As  to  the  proportionality  of  that  harm,  see  Section  4.2.3.  
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to  renounce  their  ideology  and  give  up  their  terrorist  activities.165  As  a  general  
premise,  however,  even  if  the  eradication  of  international  terrorism  is  the  stated  
goal   of   the   international   community,   self-­defence   cannot   stand  as   the   legal  
justification  for  it.  It  is  not,  lawfully,  a  basis  for  a  permanent  war  footing,  or  for  
achieving  a  long-­term  solution  to  the  threat  posed  by  terrorist  NSAs.166  
Section  3.2.2  posits   that  general  necessity,   rather   than  proportionality,  most  
naturally  imposes  an  independent  time  limit  on  the  exercise  of  self-­defence.  In  
the   context   of   international   terrorism,   general   necessity’s   potential   as   a  
meaningful  JAB  restraint  on  state  action   is   readily  apparent.  At  some  point,  
states   will   have   degraded   and   dismantled   the   operational   capacity   and  
supporting  networks  of  terrorist  organizations  like  Daesh  to  such  an  extent  that  
they  will  have  been  effectively  destroyed  and  will  no  longer  be  able  to  attempt  
or  launch  strategic  attacks.167  It  is  unlikely  that  it  will  be  possible  to  identify  the  
precise  moment  in  time  when  this  happens,  and  the  concept  of  ‘defeat’  is  open  
to  varying  interpretations.168  However,  as  the  USA  has  argued,  there  is  likely  
be  a   tipping  point  when   the  military   operation   against   a   particular   group  of  
NSAs  has  had  such  an  effect  that  a  counterterrorist  law  enforcement  operation  
will  be  capable  of  replacing  it.169  
                                                                                        
165  These  issues  were  noted,  e.g.,  in  ‘Report  On  The  Legal  And  Policy  Frameworks  Guiding  
The   United   States’   Use   Of   Military   Force   And   Related   National   Security   Operations’,  
December   2016,   <https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-­
content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf>   11   (‘Military   Framework   Report’);;  
Speech  by  J.   Johnson,  General  Counsel  of   the  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,   ‘The  Conflict  
Against  Al-­Qaeda  and   its  Affiliates:  How  Will   it  End?’,  Oxford  Union,  Oxford  University,  30  
November   2012,   <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211954.pdf>   (‘Johnson  
Oxford  Speech’)  8.  
166   Achieving   a   long-­term   solution   to   international   terrorism,   including   a   politically   stable  
environment  in  the  countries  concerned,  should  not  be  viewed  as  part  of  the  emergency  right  
that  is  self-­defence.  Rather,  a  solution  should  be  sought  through  collective  action  via  the  UNSC  
and  other  international  bodies,  working  in  conjunction  with  a  host  state.  
167  Military  Framework  Report,  11–12.  
168   Ibid.   Blank   (2017),   especially   282–316,   provides   a   general   overview   of   the   issues  
surrounding  an  enduring   right  of   self-­defence  against   terrorist  NSAs  and  what   it  means   to  
defeat  them.  
169  Johnson  Oxford  Speech,  4,  8–9.  
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This  conclusion  was  reached  in  the  context  of  whether  the  USA  is  in  a  non-­
international  armed  conflict  with  Al-­Qaeda  for  the  purposes  of  IHL.170  Yet,  the  
same   logic   is   compelling  when   considering   JAB   general   necessity   and   the  
duration  of   the  right  of  self-­defence.  When  hostilities  are  reduced  to  such  a  
level  that  armed  conflict  can  be  replaced  by  law  enforcement,  force  is  not  the  
only  reasonable  option,  and  will  be  unnecessary  (other  than  to  counter  further  
imminent  armed  attacks).  This  may  be  in  one  particular  territory  or  region,  or  
globally.  As  such,  focusing  on  general  necessity  has  the  potential  to  assuage  
concerns   regarding   the   (im)possible   application   of   proportionality   in   these  
circumstances.171  As  necessity  is  the  first  requirement  to  be  satisfied,  it  bears  
the   burden   of   ensuring   that   a   defensive   response   is   temporally   limited.  
Unfortunately,  the  capacity  of  general  necessity  to  operate  in  this  way  is  being  
put  under  pressure  by  how  states  and   the  UNSC  approach   the  question  of  
imminence.  
b)   Imminence  
The  fact  that  armed  attacks  by  terrorist  NSAs  tend  to  be  one-­off,  or  temporally  
limited  surprise  attacks,  rather  than  forming  a  military  campaign  with  a  clear  
beginning  and  end,  mean   that   defending   state   responses  are   likely   to   take  
place   after   such  attacks   have   ended,   or   before   they   have  begun.172  Where  
armed  attacks  form  part  of  an  enduring  threat,  the  right  to  respond  defensively  
depends  on  whether  further  armed  attacks  are  imminent.173  Imminent  attacks  
by  terrorists  are  often  much  more  difficult  to  identify  than  traditional  interstate  
threats,174  although  the  accumulation  of  events  doctrine  might  assist  states  to  
knit  together  past  and  imminent  armed  attacks  in  order  to  maintain  a  right  of  
self-­defence  against  terrorists  conducting  a  campaign  over  time.175  This  ability  
                                                                                        
170  On  the  classification  of  non-­international  armed  conflicts  and  applicable  IHL,  see  e.g.  1949  
Geneva  Conventions  Common  Article  3;;  Fleck  (2013)  581–610.  Regarding  identifying  the  end  
of  such  conflicts,  see  Fleck  (2013)  68–71;;  Lewis  et  al  (2017)  especially  51–66,  96–105.  
171  See  Section  4.2.  
172  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  394.  
173  See  Section  2.4.1(b).  
174  Lubell  in  Weller  (2015)  707.  
175  See  Section  2.4.2(b).  
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is  controversial,  however.  Its  adoption  risks  widening  the  ambit  of  self-­defence  
to  unacceptable  dimensions  and  states  abusing  this  right.  
As  noted  in  Section  2.4.1(b),  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  imminent  armed  
attacks   is  not  understood  to   include   responses   to  non-­specific,  potential,  or  
perceived  threats.  Yet,  in  the  context  of  countering  NSA  terrorist  threats,  state  
practice   suggests   a   wide   interpretation   of   imminence.   It   is   noteworthy   that  
UNSC  Resolution  2249  stipulates  that  Daesh  ‘has  the  capability  and  intention  
to   carry   out   further   attacks’. 176   This   reference   prima   facie   pertains   to   an  
ongoing   threat,   comprising   possible   future   attacks.  Weller   refers   to   this   as  
recognizing  a  ‘permanent  imminence’  of  armed  attacks.  He  concludes  that,  in  
considering   Daesh’s   track   record   and   confirming   that   it   represents   a  
permanent  and  active   threat  of   further  attack,   the  UNSC  appears   to   relieve  
individual  states  from  having  to  fulfil  the  criteria  for  self-­defence.  ‘It  is  no  longer  
necessary   to   demonstrate   that   they   are   acting   in   response   to   an   actual   or  
imminent   armed   attack   and   in   a   situation   of   instant   and   overwhelming  
necessity  leaving  no  choice  of  means  and  no  moment  of  deliberation.’177  The  
UK   Parliament   has   also   expressed   concerns   regarding   the   notion   of  
permanent  imminence  in  respect  of  the  UK’s  response  to  individuals  that  have  
been  identified  as  posing  a  terrorist  threat.178  
On  the  whole,  states  intervening  in  Syria  against  Daesh  and  others  have  been  
hesitant   to   rely   on   imminence   alone   to   justify   self-­defence. 179   They   have  
instead  opted,  in  whole  or  in  part,  for  the  more  easily  established  justification  
of  the  collective  self-­defence  of  Iraq.180  Nevertheless,  in  support  of  their  right  
of  action,  such  states  have  also  tended  to  refer  to  the  ongoing  ‘threat’  posed  
by  Daesh.  Such  threat   is   identified  as  being  either   to   that  state  specifically,  
and/or   to   other   states,   and/or   to   international   peace   and   security   more  
                                                                                        
176  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015).  
177  Weller  (2015)  EJIL:  Talk!.  
178   House   of   Lords,   House   of   Commons,   Joint   Committee   on   Human   Rights,   ‘The  
Government’s  Policy  on   the  Use  of  Drones  for  Targeted  Killing’,  Second  Report  of  Session  
2015–16,  HL  Paper  141,  HC  574,  para  3.39.  
179  See  Section  2.4.1(b),  however,  regarding  claims  made  by  the  USA  and  the  UK.  See  also  
UN  Doc  S/2015/127  (2015)  (Turkey).  
180  See  the  reports  to  the  UNSC  of  self-­defence  referenced  in  Section  4.1.1.  
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generally. 181   As   noted,   certain   states   have   explicitly   referenced   UNSC  
Resolution  2249  to  support  such  claim.182  There  may  be  situations,  therefore,  
where  specific  future  armed  attacks  against  a  particular  state  are  not  identified,  
yet  NSA  terrorists  are  deemed  by  states,  and  the  UNSC,  as  posing  an  ongoing  
threat  justifying  an  enduring  exercise  of  self-­defence.    
Where  this  is  so,  imminence  and  necessity  more  broadly  are  stretched  to  the  
extremes  of  their  conceptual  boundaries.183  The  concern  is  that  they  are  being  
disregarded  as  requirements  for  lawful  self-­defence  against  the  threat  posed  
by  terrorist  NSAs.  Alternatively,  and  more  optimistically,  we  might  say  that  this  
state   practice   points   to   the   continuing   general   necessity   of   some   form   of  
defensive  response  against  an  enduring  terrorist  threat.  Given  the  particular  
nature  of  that  threat,  and  the  absence  of  effective  UNSC  action  and  peaceful  
alternatives,  this  conclusion  recognizes  that  states  simply  have  no  choice  of  
means  to  counter  it.  Such  a  view  is  still  disconcerting,  however.  It  constitutes  
an   extremely   broad   conception   of   self-­defence,   stretching   it   far   beyond   a  
temporary  right  to  respond  to  a  situation  of  emergency.  It  also  risks  ignoring  
the   analysis   set   out   in   Section   4.1.4(a),   namely   that   when   hostilities   are  
reduced  to  such  a  level  that  they  can  be  replaced  by  law  enforcement,  force  is  
not  the  only  reasonable  option,  and  will  be  unnecessary.  Yet,  if  this  expansive  
view   of   self-­defence   is   ultimately   accepted   by   states,   the   burden   falls   to  
specific  necessity  to  govern  whether  a  particular  defensive  response  is  lawful,  
i.e.  against  a  particular  terrorist  group  operating  in  a  particular  state.  This  is  a  
very   heavy   burden   for   specific   necessity   to   bear.   These   conclusions   are  
discussed  further  in  the  next  Section.  
                                                                                        
181   UN   Docs   S/2014/695   (2014)   (USA);;   S/2015/221   (2015)   (Canada);;   S/2015/563   (2015)  
(Turkey);;   S/2015/745   (2015)   (France);;   S/2015/928   (2015)   (UK);;   S/2015/946   (2015)  
(Germany);;  S/2016/34  (2016)  (Denmark);;  S/2016/132  (2016)  (The  Netherlands);;  S/2016/513  
(2016)  (Norway);;  S/2016/523  (2016)  (Belgium).  
182  See  Section  4.1.3(c).  
183  Along   these   lines,   Bethlehem   (2012)   2,   argues   that   states  must   be   able   to   act   in   self-­
defence   where   there   is   evidence   of   further   imminent   terrorist   attacks,   even   if   there   is   no  
specific  evidence  of  where  such  attack  will  take  place  or  of  the  precise  nature  of  the  attack.  
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4.2   Proportionality  and  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  
In  extreme  situations  of  abuse  of  the  right  of  self-­defence,  states  can  adopt  a  
near-­unanimous   view   of   the   disproportionality   of   a   particular   action. 184  
However,  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  pose  significant  challenges  to  the  interstate  
conception  of  proportionality  set  out  in  Chapter  3.  Proportionality  operates  in  
state-­on-­state  self-­defence  to  avoid  large-­scale  wars,  yet  recent  state  practice  
in  the  context  of  international  terrorism  suggests  a  much  more  liberal  approach  
to   this   requirement.   As   will   be   seen   below,   states   often   act   beyond   their  
immediate  defensive  needs.  This  might  encompass  preventing  potential  future  
armed   attacks   by   eliminating   the   NSA   terrorists   entirely.   Customary  
international  law  is  evolving  on  this  point,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  where  it  
will  settle.  However,  a   thorough  review  of  the  state  practice,  coupled  with  a  
developed   consideration   of   theory,   results   in   a   more   clearly   articulated  
description  of  the  content  of  proportionality  in  this  context.  
The   ensuing   analysis   reveals   that   proportionality,   better   understood,   is   not  
irrelevant  to  regulating  state  responses  to  international  terrorism.  Yet,  it  does  
divulge  the  deficiencies  in  the  ability  of  proportionality  to  control  state  action  
against   terrorist   NSAs,   revealing   it   to   be   weak. 185   A   solution   is   offered,  
therefore,   that   focuses   on   necessity.   As   a   general   premise,   the   main  
challenges   to   the   interstate   understanding   of   proportionality   relate   to  
measuring  the  danger  posed  to  the  defending  state  by  actual  and  future  NSA  
armed  attacks  and  whether,   in   this  context,   the   legitimate  purposes  of  self-­
defence  are  consequently  broader.  In  addition,  as  with  necessity,  much  of  the  
debate  focuses  on  the  host  state,  in  particular  how  it  is  affected  by  a  defending  
state’s  defensive  acts  on  its  territory.  
                                                                                        
184  E.g.  Israel’s  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  2006.  See  Section  3.2.5.  
185  See  Tams  and  Devaney  (2012)  102,  reaching  the  same  conclusion.  
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4.2.1   A  more  permissive  response  vis-­à-­vis  terrorist  NSAs  
States  will  often   take  extensive  action   to  defend   themselves  against  armed  
attacks   by   NSAs   that   they   designate   as   terrorists.   A   putative   defensive  
response  will  often  be  greatly  in  excess  of  the  corresponding  armed  attack(s)  
and   may   contain   far-­reaching   aims   that   might   encompass   weakening   and  
ultimately   eradicating   a   terrorist   group.  Such  expansive   defensive   action   to  
counter  further  threats  from  the  same  source  has  already  been  referred  to  in  
Section  2.4.2(b).  One  notable  example  is  the  American-­led  response  to  9/11.  
Whilst  not  authorizing  force,  the  UNSC  explicitly  recognized  and  reaffirmed  the  
inherent  right  of   individual  and  collective  self-­defence.  It  also  concluded  that  
any  act  of  international  terrorism  is  a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security  
and  should  be  combatted  by  ‘all  means’.186  This  was  the  prelude  to  the  invasion  
of   Afghanistan   and   the   removal   of   the   Taliban   regime,   which   was   widely  
supported  by  the  international  community.187  The  analysis  in  Sections  4.1.3(b)  
and  4.2.3(b)  regarding  Coalition  action  against  Daesh  in  Syria  constitutes  the  
most   recent  example  of  a  defensive   response   that   is,  prima   facie,   vastly   in  
excess  of  the  threat  faced  by  those  states  purportedly  acting  in  self-­defence.  
State  practice,  particularly  following  9/11,  reflects  the  fact  that  states  consider  
that  they  have  much  greater  flexibility  in  acting  in  self-­defence  against  terrorist  
NSAs   than   they   do   in   the   interstate   context.188  Irrespective   of   the   objective  
dangers   of   terrorism,   states   consider   it   legitimate   to   eliminate   the   terrorist  
threat,  and  to  take  decisive  action  against  it.189  With  a  few  notable  exceptions  
                                                                                        
186  UNSC  Res  1368  (2001);;  1373  (2001).  
187  See  Section  4.1.3(a).  
188  This  Section  highlights  that  the  ‘threat’  of  international  terrorism  appears  to  account  for  a  
more  permissive  attitude   to  proportionality   than   is   seen   in   the   interstate  context.  The   term  
‘threat’  has  been  referred  to  in  various  contexts  throughout  this  thesis  and  is  discussed  further  
below   in   this   Section.   As   has   been  made   clear,   however,   to   allow   for   a   lawful   defensive  
response   such   threat   must   comprise   past,   ongoing   and/or   imminent   armed   attacks.   See  
further  Section  2.4.2(b)   regarding   the  accumulation  of  events  doctrine.  As  noted   in  Section  
4.1.4,  however,  the  often-­sporadic  nature  of  NSA  armed  attacks  makes  evaluating  the  totality  
of  a  terrorist  NSA  threat,  and  whether  it  is  current  or  has  ended,  very  difficult.  
189  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  411–12,  arguing  that  the  strong  international  
response  to  terrorism  has  led  to  a  normative  reorientation  that  means  that  terrorist  threats  are  
invariably  considered  grave,  even  where  the  likelihood  of  attack  or  risk  to  the  defending  state  
is   realistically   not   great.   The   state   practice   set   out   in   this   Chapter,   and   the   thesis   more  
generally,  supports  this  conclusion.  
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referenced   in   this   Chapter,   practice   also   shows   how   other   states   and  
international   organizations   will   tend   to   give   defending   states   much   greater  
leeway  in  their  responses  to  terrorist  NSAs,  when  compared  to  interstate  self-­
defence.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  cases  where  there  has  been  a  history  
of  attacks  from  NSAs  and  the  fear  of  repeated  attacks  is  well  founded.190  UNSC  
Resolution  2249  is  illustrative  of  this  more  permissive  attitude.  In  it,  the  UNSC  
determined  unanimously  that  terrorist  groups  such  as  Daesh,  together  with  all  
acts  of  terrorism,  constitute  a  global  and  unprecedented  threat  to  international  
peace   and   security.191  As   noted,   the   UNSC   also   asserted   that   the   named  
terrorist  groups  have  the  capability  and  intention  to  carry  out  further  attacks,  
which  might  be  read  as  confirming  the  ‘permanent  imminence’  of  future  armed  
attacks.192  Remarkably,  the  UNSC  has  also  called  for  the  eradication  of  safe  
havens   that  such  groups  have  established  over  significant  parts  of   Iraq  and  
Syria.193  
The  language  adopted  by  the  UNSC  leaves  states  considerable  discretion  to  
act   in   accordance   with   its   exhortation.   Its   approach   also   informs   an  
understanding  of   the  nature  of   the   threat  and  the  required  response.  UNSC  
Resolution   2249   endorses   the   view   that   self-­defence   might   include   as   a  
legitimate   aim   the   total   elimination   of   the  NSA   terrorists   or,   at   a  minimum,  
eradicating   all   safe   havens   from   which   they   benefit.   The   Resolution   can,  
therefore,  be  read  as  the  unanimous  view  of  the  UNSC,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  
international   community,   regarding  what   is   a   proportionate   response   in   the  
circumstances.194  This  is  significant,  particularly  for  those  six  states  that  have  
explicitly  referenced  UNSC  Resolution  2249  to  support  their  claim  of  acting  in  
self-­defence  against  Daesh  in  Syria.195  The  eventual  destruction  of  Daesh  is  
also   the  common  theme  amongst   the  approximately  seventy  states  that  are  
part  of  the  Coalition  against  it.196  This  collective  view  prevails  even  if  it  cannot  
                                                                                        
190  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  413.  
191  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015).  
192  See  Section  4.1.4(b).  
193  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015).  
194  Wood  (2016)  7.  
195  See  n  155.  
196   ‘Together,   the   Coalition   is   committed   to   degrading   and   ultimately   defeating   Daesh.’  
Coalition,  <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/home/>.  
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sensibly  be  concluded  that  the  NSAs  are  an  existential  threat  to  the  states  that  
respond  defensively  against  them.  Such  practice  reflects  the  notion,  therefore,  
that  a  proportionate  defensive  response  against  terrorist  NSAs  may  be  greater  
than  a  comparable  threat  in  the  interstate  context.197  
Whilst  it  is  not  this  author’s  position,  it  is  tempting  to  say  that,  in  the  context  of  
transnational  terrorism,  the  aims  of  self-­defence  are  more  broadly  defined.198  
If  this  view  is  adopted,  such  that  destroying  NSAs  is  an  accepted  purpose  of  
self-­defence,  this  pushes  the  right  far  beyond  the  boundaries  of  an  emergency  
act  of  protection.  A  stated  purpose  of  ‘destruction’  unacceptably  blurs  the  line  
between  lawful  self-­defence  and  unlawful  armed  reprisal.  Moreover,  it  deprives  
proportionality   of   meaning.   A   defensive   act   cannot   be   proportionate   to  
‘destruction’.  The  eradication  of  NSAs  should  not,  therefore,  be  viewed  as  a  
defensive  aim  any  more  than  regime  change,  or  occupation.199  Destruction  is  
a  means,  rather  than  an  end.  This  is  to  say  that  it  might  well  be  necessary  to  
destroy  the  group  of  NSAs,  but  the  necessity  arises  from  a  defensive  purpose,  
i.e.  halting,  repelling  or  preventing  an  armed  attack.  Destruction  is  potentially  
proportionate  to  achieving  that  purpose,  but  this  will  rarely  be  the  case.  Only  
understood  in  this  way,  can  necessity  and  proportionality  have  any  meaning  
and,   therefore,   the   capacity   to   restrain   state   action.  Otherwise,   such  action  
against  NSAs  is  rendered  unrestricted.  
UNSC  Resolution  2249  reflects  that  fact  that  defensive  action  against  terrorist  
NSAs  is  more  permissive,  yet  it  must  nevertheless  be  restrained.  The  call  to  
Member   States   in   UNSC   Resolution   2249   is   not   to   take   unlimited   action  
against  Daesh  and  other  named  groups.  The  UNSC  asks  states   to   take  all  
necessary  measures  in  compliance  with  international  law.  Whilst  not  specified,  
by   implication,   this   must   include   the   provisions   of   the   UN   Charter   (most  
pertinently  Article  51),  as  well  as  customary   international   law   (including   the  
requirements  of  necessity  and  proportionality).  Moreover,   the  objects  of   the  
                                                                                        
197  In  interstate  self-­defence,  absent  an  existential  threat,  an  equivalent  goal  would  usually  be  
regarded  as  disproportionate.  See  e.g.  Sections  3.2.4(b)  and  3.4.  
198  See  e.g.  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  412–13.  
199  See  Section  1.3.2.  
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defensive   response   are   specified   groups, 200   and   the   area   of   operation   is  
geographically  confined  to  the  territories  of  Iraq  and  Syria.201  These  limitations  
accord  with   the   general   principles   of   necessity   and  proportionality,   as   they  
apply  to  the  right  of  self-­defence.202  
The   UNSC   approach   should   not,   therefore,   be   read   as   an   open-­ended  
endorsement  of  combatting  terrorist  NSAs  or  terrorism  in  an  abstract  sense.  
Phrases  such  as  the  ‘war  on  terror’,  the  ‘fight  against  terrorism’,  and  the  like,  
are  often  expressed  by  states  and  commentators,  but  this  goes  well  beyond  
what  is  envisaged  and  permitted  by  the  terms  of  the  UN  Charter  and  applicable  
custom.  States  have  no  right  of  self-­defence  against  an  ‘ism’,  only  an  actual  or  
imminent  armed  attack.  Fighting  terrorism  as  a  concept  negates  the  limitations  
imposed   by   necessity   and   proportionality.   It   is   impossible   for   these  
requirements  to  have  any  meaningful  application   in  respect  of  combatting  a  
nebulous   abstraction   like   ‘terrorism   in   all   forms   and   manifestations’.  
Dispensing  with  them  would  be  contrary  to  the  exhortation  in  UNSC  Resolution  
2249  to  comply  with  the  law.  
As   set   out   in  Section   1.3.2,   our   understanding  of   the   goals   of   self-­defence  
should  remain  limited  to  the  defensive:  halting,  repelling  and/or  preventing  an  
armed   attack.   However,   what   in   the   interstate   context  might   be   viewed   as  
legitimate   to   achieve   these   aims  might   take   on   different   dimensions   in   the  
context   of   terrorist  NSA  armed  attacks.  States   and   the  UNSC  undoubtedly  
recognize  greater  elasticity  in  this  context.  The  UNSC’s  general  approach  to  
terrorism   is   particularly   interesting   for   a   proportionality   analysis.   As   noted,  
international  peace  and  security  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  overall  balancing  of  
interests  that  proportionality  seeks  to  achieve.  That  the  UNSC  has  determined  
that  terrorist  NSAs  pose  a  threat  to  such  peace  and  security  perhaps  accounts  
                                                                                        
200  Being  Daesh,  Al  Qaida  and  its  associates,  and  other  UNSC  designated  groups.  
201  Para  5  of  UNSC  Res  2249  (2015)  purports  to  further  limit  the  geographical  scope  of  action  
to  Iraqi  and  Syrian  territory  under  the  control  of  Daesh.  
202  As  noted  in  Section  4.1.3(c),  the  Resolution  implicitly  speaks  to  this  right.  Absent  UNSC  
authorization  to  use  force,  which  this  Resolution  does  not  provide,  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  
the  only  other  lawful  alternative  to  use  force  under  the  UN  Charter.  
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for  the  more  permissive  attitude  that  the  UNSC  and  states  generally  adopt  vis-­
à-­vis  those  states  that  combat  them.  
The  nature  of  the  actors,  and  the  perceived  harm  that  they  threaten,  appear  to  
be  determinative   of   this   permissive   attitude.  States   are   not   considering   the  
threat  of  harm  to  only  one  state,  or  even  a  group  of  states.  It  is  a  global  threat,  
faced  by  all  states,  and  it  is  viewed  as  enduring.  Moreover,  it  goes  beyond  an  
interstate  paradigm  to  one  where  non-­states  are  seeking  to  destabilise,  and  
even  destroy,  states  and  the  global  order  more  generally.203  Such  states  are  
victims  of  actual  or  imminent  armed  attacks,  and/or  are  acting  in  defence  of  
other  direct  victims,  but  their  defensive  action  is  also  potentially  in  the  collective  
interests   of   the   international   community. 204   They   act   with   its   implicit  
endorsement  to  counter  a  threat  to  that  community  and  to  restore  international  
peace  and  security.205  
We  should  hesitate,  however,   in  accepting  that  a  group  of  defending  states,  
such  as  the  Coalition,  may  legitimately  act  in  place  of  the  collective  security  
function   of   the   UNSC.206  The   UNSC’s   approach   to   terrorist   NSAs,   and   the  
steps  taken  by  defending  states  in  support  of  it,  have  significant  implications  
for  how  we  might  conceive  of  the  proportionality  of  defensive  action  against  
                                                                                        
203  Regarding  Daesh,  including  its  partly  apocalyptic  ideology,  see  Byman  (2016)  136–9.  For  
an  overview  of  the  goals  of  Al  Qaeda,  see  Byman  (2015)  47–51.  
204  In  contrast,  in  the  context  of  state  responsibility,  the  ability  of  ‘non-­injured  states’  to  respond  
on   an   actio   popularis   basis   in   the   collective   interest   is   circumscribed.   There   is   no   clearly  
recognized  right  to  take  collective  countermeasures  against  a  wrongdoing  state.  Commentary  
to  Art  54  ARSIWA,  paras  2–6.  In  any  event,  countermeasures  may  not  involve  the  threat  or  
use  of  force.  Art  50(1)(a)  ARSIWA.  With  self-­defence  against  armed  attacks  by  NSA  terrorists,  
however,  the  target  of  collective  military  action  is  not  a  state  (even  if  the  NSA  target  operates  
on   the   territory   of   a   state)   and   the   implicit   support   of   the   UNSC   (acting   as   agent   of   the  
international  community)  means  that  it  is  part  of  the  collective  response,  not  excluded  from  it.  
205  The  number  of  states  and  international  organizations  involved  in  the  Coalition,  coupled  with  
the  implicit  support  of  the  UNSC,  points  to  this  action  being  in  the  pursuit  of  this  shared  goal.  
By   analogy,   see   further   Henderson   (2018)   234–5,   noting   that   proportionality   is   more  
permissive  in  the  context  of  force  authorized  by  the  UNSC.  Defending  state  action  that  goes  
beyond   the  bounds  of  necessity  and  proportionality  of   course   risks  disrupting   international  
peace  and  security.  
206   Albeit   that   such   state   action   is   perhaps   a   product   of   the   absence   of   explicit   UNSC  
authorization  to  use  military  force  against  terrorist  NSAs,  as  well  as  the  UNSC’s  preference  to  
date   for   adopting   non-­military   sanctions   against   terrorist   NSAs   and   employing   peaceful  
measures  to  counter  terrorism  on  a  general  thematic  basis.  See  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  
Schrijver  (2013)  401.  
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these   actors   when   compared   to   self-­defence   against   states.   Yet,   practice  
suggests   that   there   are   restrictions   even   in   this   context.   The   notion   of   a  
defending  state  having  greater  latitude  to  respond  to  a  terror  threat  to  it,  and  
the  entire  world,  has  been  advanced  before.  Israel  adopted  this  approach,  and  
its  role  in  the  ‘war  on  terror’,  to  justify  its  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  2006.207  The  
majority  of   the   international  community  refused  to  allow  Israel   to  stretch   the  
boundaries  of  proportionality  too  far,  however.  They  employed  proportionality  
as  a  rhetorical  tool  to  condemn  Israel’s  actions.208  Although  there  is  certainly  a  
more   permissive   attitude   to   proportionality   in   the   context   of   responses   to  
terrorist  NSA  armed  attacks,  there  are  limits  to  how  far  defending  states  can  
take  the  notion  that  they  are  acting  in  the  collective  interest  to  counter  them.  
4.2.2   Geography  
The  post  9/11  responses  to  terrorist  attacks  by  a  number  of  defending  states  
have  taken  acts  of  self-­defence  far  beyond  their  own  borders.  The  objects  of  
defensive   force   have   often   been   thousands   of   kilometres   away   from   the  
defending  state  and  the  armed  attacks  to  which  they  purport  to  respond.  This  
reflects  the  fact  that  terrorist  attacks  will  typically  occur  on  the  defending  state’s  
territory,  but  the  terrorists  themselves  may  be  operating  from  safe  havens  in  
third   countries   on   the   other   side   of   the   globe.   American   action   against   Al-­
Qaeda   and   affiliated   groups   in   Afghanistan   and   other   parts   of   the   world  
following  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks  on  American  territory  is  an  obvious  example.  
More  recently,  the  Coalition  military  action  against  Daesh  in  Iraq  and  Syria  is  
occurring   far  away   from  many  of   the  countries   that  have   invoked   individual  
and/or  collective  self-­defence  to   justify   their  actions   there  (most  notably   the  
USA,  Canada,  Australia  and  the  various  European  Coalition  partners).209  
                                                                                        
207  UN  Doc  S/2006/515  (2006).  
208  See  Section  3.2.5.  
209  See  Section   4.1.3(b).  Assertions   of   collective   self-­defence   of   Iraq  may   be   regarded   as  
geographically  proximate  to  the  armed  attacks.  However,  a  number  of  these  states  are  also  
claiming  individual  self-­defence  in  relation  to  terrorist  attacks  on  their  own  soil.  
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Proportionality,  conceptualised  in  interstate  terms,  struggles  to  accommodate  
this   response   and   remain   consequential   to   self-­defence   against   terrorist  
NSAs.210  In  particular,  the  response  to  international  terrorism  casts  doubt  on  
whether   proportionality   imposes   a   requirement   of   a   geographical   nexus  
between   the   armed   attack   and   defensive   response,   or   whether   customary  
international  law  applicable  to  self-­defence  against  terrorist  NSAs  is  evolving  
to   accommodate   more   flexible   notions   pertaining   to   the   distance   between  
them.   Alternatively,   are   the   rules   applicable   in   the   interstate   context   being  
breached?   That   the   UNSC   appears   to   be   encouraging   (and   certainly   not  
condemning)   anti-­terrorist   action   well   beyond   the   borders   of   the   defending  
states,   and   that   other   states   have   generally   supported   coalition   actions   in  
Afghanistan,  Syria  and  Iraq  suggests  that  geography  plays  much  less  of  a  role  
in  this  context,  or  perhaps  no  role  at  all.  
This  conclusion  is  reflective  of  the  global  reach  of  international  terrorism  and  
is  a  consequence  of  the  nature  of  the  terrorist  organizations  themselves.  Such  
groups  often  function  across,  and  irrespective  of,  borders.  They  may  be  based  
in,  and  operate  from,  a  number  of  different  states  and  work  with  affiliates  and  
like-­minded  groups  around  the  globe.211  When  facing  a   threat  of   this  nature,  
one  of  the  fundamental  questions  for  proportionally  appears  to  be  whether  the  
defending  state  may  mount  a  military  response  in  various  theatres  of  operation  
or  countries  that,  together,  constitute  the  same  conflict.212  Fulfilling  a  defensive  
need   might   mean   that   limiting   a   defensive   response   to   a   particular   locale  
makes  no  sense  when  faced  with  a  threat  of  this  type.  Such  limitation  might  
render   the   defensive   response   inadequate.   Multiple   military   actions   in   a  
number  of  states  may  be  the  only  effective  way  to  counter  the  threat.  
If  a  geographical  restriction  does  exist   in  respect  of  armed  attacks  by  NSAs  
that  are  disparate  and  splintered  in  this  way,  the  challenge  for  clarifying  any  
role  for  proportionality  is  to  identify  from  state  practice  criteria  to  establish  the  
                                                                                        
210  See  Section  3.2.3.  
211  Al  Qaeda  is  the  classic  example.  See  Byman  (2015)  95–8;;  141–61.  
212  Lubell  (2010)  66.  
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locale   to   which   the   defensive   response   is   to   be   confined.   The   question   is  
whether  this  is  possible  given  the  foregoing  commentary  regarding  the  global  
responses  to  terrorism  and,  more  fundamentally,  if  it  desirable.  Arguably,  the  
more  meaningful   and   readily   applicable   limitation   on   state   action   in   cases  
where  a  defending  state  is  seeking  to  combat  NSAs  in  a  number  of  different  
territories  is  not  proportionality  at  all,  but  necessity.213  Before  the  proportionality  
of   a   response  against  a   group  of  NSAs  as  a  whole  may  be  evaluated,   the  
general  necessity  of  any  forceful  response  must  be  first  established,  followed  
by  the  specific  necessity  of  targeting  that  group  within  a  particular  state.  The  
right  of  self-­defence  that  has  previously  arisen,  or  been  claimed,   in  order   to  
fight  a  group  in  one  territory  may  not  automatically  be  exported  to  another  part  
of  the  world.  The  USA,  for  example,  appears  to  adopt  this  general  premise.214  
Absent  host  state  consent,  the  right  of  self-­defence  must  exist  independently  
every  time  a  defending  state  wishes  to  use  force  within  the  territory  of  another  
state.   This   includes   the   analysis   referred   to   in   Section   4.2.3   regarding   the  
position   of   a   host   state,   whose   right   to   sovereignty   and   territorial   integrity  
remains  intact  unless  established  otherwise.215  If  necessity  is  absent  because  
the  ‘new’  host  state  is  willing  and  able  to  combat  the  NSAs,  the  right  to  exercise  
self-­defence  is  also  absent  in  respect  of  the  particular  group  of  NSAs  operating  
from  within  that  territory.  Proportionality  is  then  a  moot  point.  This  fact  places  
added  emphasis  on   the  unable  or  unwilling  doctrine,  which  operates  as   the  
main  gateway  to  the  right  of  self-­defence  in  this  context.216  
                                                                                        
213  Note  that  targeting  members  of  the  same  group  on  a  territory  without  the  consent  of  a  host  
state  is  an  issue  for  the  JAB.  It  is  separate  from  the  question  of  whether  members  of  the  same  
group  are  targetable  under  IHL.  
214  ‘[I]nternational  law  not  only  requires  a  State  to  analyze  whether  it  has  a  legal  basis  for  the  
use  of  force  against  a  particular  non-­State  actor  -­  which  I’ll  call  the  “against  whom”  question  -­  
but  also  requires  a  State  to  analyze  whether  it  has  a  legal  basis  to  use  force  against  that  non-­
State  actor  in  a  particular  location  -­  which  I’ll  call  the  “where”  question.’  USA  State  Department  
Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  240.  
215  On  expanding  self-­defence  into  new  states,  see  generally  Lubell  (2015)  222–7.    
216  See  Section  4.1.2.  
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4.2.3   Effect  on  the  host  state  and  its  citizens  
If  the  necessity  of  a  defending  state  acting  against  NSAs  on  the  territory  of  the  
host   state   can   be   established,217  the   ensuing  question   is   how,   and   to  what  
extent,  the  position  of  the  host  state  factors  in  assessing  the  proportionality  of  
self-­defence.   The   violation   of   a   host   state’s   sovereignty   in   the   pursuit   of   a  
defensive  purpose   is  a  highly  contentious   issue.  Yet,  as  with  neutral  states,  
recent  state  practice  suggests  that  host  states  might  be  viewed  as  having  to  
endure,  to  a  degree,  defending  state  action  against  NSAs  on  their  territory.  218  
Where   the   line   is   to   be  drawn,   however,   remains   unclear.  Whilst   necessity  
preserves  such  acts  of  self-­defence  as  exceptional  measures  of   last   resort,  
proportionality  acts  to  minimise  their  effect  on  the  host  state.  
State  practice  on   this   issue   is   limited,  but   the   investigation  below  combines  
what  practice  is  available  with  an  analytical  framework  that  seeks  to  describe  
how   the   effect   on   the   host   state   (including   its   civilian   population   and  
infrastructure)  might  point  to  excessiveness.  The  analysis  set  out  in  Section  
3.2.6(a)   regarding   the   justificatory   language   of   circumstances   precluding  
wrongfulness  is  also  helpful  in  this  context.  Depending  on  the  circumstances,  
an  act  of  self-­defence  might  be  objectively   justifiable  as  a   ‘lesser  evil’  when  
compared   to   the   infringement   of   a   host   state’s   rights   and   the   effect   on   its  
citizens.  
  
                                                                                        
217  Whether   intrusion   into   the   territory  of   the  host  state  can  ever  satisfy   the   requirement  of  
proportionality  is  dependent  on  whether  necessity  can  first  be  satisfied.  The  necessity  analysis  
largely  depends  on  the  acceptance  of  the  controversial  unwilling  or  unable  doctrine  to  excuse  
the  limited  breach  of  the  host  state’s  territory.  See  Section  4.1.2.  
218  See  Section  3.2.6(b).  Where  a  host  state  violates  its  international  law  obligations  to  prevent  
and  suppress  terrorism,  this  might  be  equated  with  the  position  of  a  neutral  state  that  violates  
the  laws  of  neutrality.  In  such  cases,  a  belligerent  can  take  defensive  action  on  a  neutral  state’s  
territory  if  it  allows  such  territory  to  be  used  by  another  belligerent  state  in  violation  of  its  duties  
of  neutrality.  Bowett  (1958)  167–74;;  Brownlie  (1963)  312–14.  See  also  San  Remo  Manual  Art  
22.  The  propriety  of  the  transposition  of  this  rule  into  the  JAB  is  debatable  (see  e.g.  Tsagourias  
(2016)  812),  but  Coalition  state  practice  in  Syria  might  provide  support  for  such  position.  See  
further  Deeks   (2012)   497–501,   considering   neutrality   in   respect   of   the   unwilling   or   unable  
doctrine.  
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a)   General  considerations  
A   number   of   general   propositions   that   derive   from   the   incidents   of   state  
practice  referred   to   throughout   this   thesis   inform  the   following  analysis.  The  
first  is  that,  absent  attribution  of  NSA  armed  attacks  to  a  host  state,  defending  
states  do  not  claim  a  right   to  act  against   the  host  state  when   taking  action  
against  NSAs  operating  in  that  state’s  territory,  although  they  implicitly  assert  
a  right  to  violate  the  host  sate’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.219  Instead,  
defending  states  tend  to  justify  their  acts  by  emphasising  that  they  limit  their  
targeting   to   NSAs,   and   do   not   target   host   state   military   personnel   and  
apparatus.  With  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  standing  as  an  exception,  their  
actions  largely  conform  to  this  rule.220  Second,  it  is  only  where  there  has  been  
widespread  damage  to  the  host  state,  and  harm  to  its  civilians,  that  other  states  
and   international   organizations   label   such   putative   defensive   action   as  
disproportionate.221  Finally,  the  perceived  threat  from  terrorist  NSAs  invariably  
informs  the  how  states  will  respond  defensively,  and  how  the  proportionality  of  
such  response  is  consequently  assessed.222  
From   a   proportionality   perspective,   where   defending   states   limit   their  
defensive  actions  by  only  targeting  NSAs  and  their  base  of  operations  within  
the  territory  of  the  host  state,  the  use  of  defensive  force  nevertheless  violates,  
at  a  minimum,  the  host  state’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.223  Whilst  not  
to  be  readily  dismissed,  if  (and  only  if)  necessity  can  be  established  in  such  
circumstances  to  excuse  the  harm  caused  to  the  host  state  by  way  of  a  limited  
and   temporary   breach   of   its   sovereignty   and   territorial   integrity,   then   the  
                                                                                        
219  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  410.  
220  See  Section  4.1.3(a).  
221  See  Section  3.2.5.  See  further  Tams  in  Van  den  Herik  and  Schrijver  (2013)  410.  
222  See  Section  4.2.1.  
223  Trapp  (2007)  145.  Tsagourias  (2016)  822–3,  suggests  that  lawful  defensive  force  does  not  
breach  Art  2(4),  or  constitute  unlawful  intervention,  because  it  is  not  targeted  at  the  host  state,  
but   rather  at   the  NSAs,  and   is  not   interned   to  coerce   the  host   state.  See  Section  4.1.3(b)  
regarding  the  implications  for  IHL  conflict  classification.  In  terms  of  state  responsibility,  the  ILC  
in   its   Commentaries   explicitly   left   open   the   question   of   defensive   force   on   other   states.  
ARSIWA  21  Commentary,  para  5.  
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minimal  material  effect  on  the  host  state  is  potentially  proportionate.224  A  fortiori  
if   the   protection   of   the   defending   state’s   own   citizens   is   regarded   as   an  
obligation.225  Without  this  resulting  outcome,  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  nullified  
and  international  law  would  require  a  state  to  sacrifice  the  life  of  its  citizens  to  
the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.226  
On  this  analysis,  proportionality  acts  in  tandem  with  necessity  to  restrain  the  
use   of   force   against   the   NSAs,   and   to   limit   the   impact   on   the   host   state.  
Adherence  to  these  requirements  maintains  a  balance  between  two  equally  
foundational   principles   of   international   law:   sovereignty   (and   the   attendant  
right  of  territorial  integrity)  and  the  right  of  self-­defence.  Schmitt  argues  that:  
International   law   does   not   require   an   either-­or   resolution   of   these  
counterpoised   norms.   Rather,   when   principles   clash,   law   seeks   that  
accommodation   which   best   achieves   their   respective   underlying  
purposes.   Although   the   territorial   state   need   not   suffer   unconstrained  
violations  of  its  borders,  neither  does  the  victim  state  have  to  sit  idly  by  
while  insurgents  and  terrorists  attack  it  with  impunity  from  abroad.227  
The  two  requirements  therefore  ‘operate  as  a  mediator  between  the  competing  
security  interests  of  States  victim  to  armed  attacks  by  non-­State  terrorist  actors  
operating   from   foreign   territory,   and   States   in   whose   territory   terrorists  
operate.’ 228   State   practice,   particularly   with   respect   to   the   operation   and  
                                                                                        
224  Where  necessity  is  not  established,  proportionality  is  irrelevant.  The  use  of  force,  even  if  
targeted  solely  at  the  NSAs,  will  breach  Article  2(4).  It  will  be  an  unlawful  use  of  force  against  
the  host  state,  even  though  the  apparatus  or  infrastructure  of  the  state  is  not  damaged  and  
none  of  its  armed  forces  are  engaged.  
225  In  Palestinian  Wall,  para  141,  the  ICJ  stated  as  a  general  premise  that  Israel  had  ‘the  right,  
and  indeed  the  duty,  to  respond  in  order  to  protect  the  life  of  its  citizens’  (emphasis  added).  
Trapp   (2015)   209,   argues   that   states   not   only   have  an   obligation   to   respect   rights,   but   to  
ensure  respect  for  those  rights.  As  regards  the  right  to  life  and  physical  integrity,  this  obligation  
means,  inter  alia,  that  individuals  are  entitled  to  expect  that  the  state  that  exercises  jurisdiction  
over   them  will   do   everything  within   its   capacity   to   protect   them   from  an   existential   threat,  
whatever  its  source.  
226  Schmitt  (2002–2003)  542,  argues  that  ‘the  unwillingness  or  inability  of  one  State  to  meet  
its   legal   obligations   cannot   deprive   other   States   of   the   most   important   right   found   in  
international  law,  the  right  to  defend  oneself  against  an  armed  attack.’  
227  Schmitt  (2010)  316.  
228  Trapp  (2007)  146–7.  
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content  of   the  unwilling  or  unable  doctrine,   is  yet   to  provide   firm  guidelines  
regarding  how  this  ‘mediation’  is  operationalized  on  a  general  basis.  Practice  
suggests,  however,  that  states  nonetheless  recognize  that  there  is  a  balance  
to  be  struck  such  that  defensive  force  is  exercisable,  but  not  excessive.  This  
analysis   reflects   the   ‘lesser   evil’   justification   referred   to   above.   As   with  
Operation  Sun  in  2008,  therefore,  where  harm  to  the  host  state  and  its  citizens  
is   minimal,   the   conclusion   is   that   defensive   action   might   be   regarded   as  
proportionate.229  
This  conclusion   is  most  easily   reached  where   the  defensive   force  does  not  
result  in  any  physical  harm  to  the  host  state’s  military  forces  or  apparatus,  its  
civilian  population,  or  public   infrastructure.  An  example  might  be  a   targeted  
missile  strike  by  a  drone  on  a  desert  camp,  where  only   the  NSAs  and  their  
property   are   damaged   or   destroyed.   As   the   state   practice   referred   to   in  
particular  in  Sections  3.1.1  and  4.1  demonstrates,  however,  it  will  not  always  
be  the  case  that  the  host  state  and  its  citizens  are  insulated  from  defensive  
reactions  within  host  state   territory.   Incidental  collateral  damage  may   result  
from  self-­defence  against  the  NSAs,  or  even  direct  damage  if  elements  of  the  
host  state  itself  are  targeted.  
The  meeting  of  the  two  foundational  principles  of  sovereignty  and  self-­defence  
referred  to  above  also  holds  true  for  these  cases  where  the  host  state  and  its  
citizens  are  materially  harmed.  However,  such  material  effects  mean  that  the  
balance  might  be  perceived   to  shift   such   that  other  states  and   international  
organizations  conclude  that  the  defending  state’s  actions  are  excessive  and,  
therefore,   disproportionate.   Israel’s   intervention   in   Lebanon   in   2006   is   the  
classic   example   of   this.230  In   such   cases,   the   pursuit   of   self-­defence   is   not  
perceived   to  be   the   lesser  evil.  The  defensive  response  must,   therefore,  be  
carefully  crafted  to  achieving  the  destruction  of  the  NSAs,  with  the  minimum  
impact  on  the  host  state,  its  population  and  infrastructure.231  Moreover,  the  use  
                                                                                        
229  See  Section  3.1.1(d).  
230  See  Section  3.2.5.  
231  Gardam  (2005)  17;;  Ruys  (2010)  509.  
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of   defensive   force   must   not   amount   to   punishment   for   the   host   state’s  
unwillingness   or   inability   to   combat   the   NSAs.   This   would   go   beyond   a  
defensive  purpose.232  
Further   state   practice   is   required   in   order   to   clarify   how   far   the   foregoing  
analysis  might  settle  in  the  lex  lata,  with  the  issue  of  necessity  (and  unwilling  
or   unable   in   particular)   being   the   key   point   of   controversy.   Regarding   any  
assessment  of  proportionality,  the  major  concern  is  the  death  and  injury  to  the  
host   state’s   civilians   resulting   from   the   defensive   riposte.   Section   3.2.5’s  
review   of   state   practice   affirms   that   civilian   collateral   damage   is   the  
predominant  feature  of  the  practice  of  those  states  seeking  to  justify  purported  
uses   of   defensive   force,   as   well   as   of   the   reactions   of   other   states   and  
international  organizations  that  scrutinise  them.  
Concern   over   civilian   harm   sits   in   stark   contrast   to   the   death   of   the   NSA  
terrorists   themselves,   however.   Terrorist   casualties   are   largely   accepted  by  
states,   provided   that   civilian   casualties   and   civilian   collateral   damage   are  
avoided. 233   Even   the   total   destruction   of   terrorist   groups   appears   to   be  
acceptable   to   the   international   community. 234   From   the   JAB   perspective,  
therefore,   terrorist   NSA   casualties   are   either   not   counted   as   part   of   the  
proportionality  calculus  at  all  or,  alternatively,  even  very  high  casualty  figures  
are  generally  accepted  and  not  regarded  as  excessive.235  In  either  case,  the  
potential   for   proportionality   to   act   as   a   restraining   influence   is   severely  
reduced.  This  sits  in  contrast  to  the  position  in  interstate  self-­defence,  where  
                                                                                        
232  Likewise,  force  intended  to  coerce  the  host  state  to  abide  by  its  international  law  obligations  
to  prevent  and  suppress   international   terrorism  would  go  beyond  the  remit  of  self-­defence.  
Unilateral  inducement  to  abide  by  international  law  is  the  province  of  countermeasures,  which  
may  not  involve  the  threat  or  use  of  force.  Art  50(1)(a)  ARSIWA.  
233  Tams   in  Van   den  Herik   and  Schrijver   (2013)   412.  Tams   cites   the   example   of   Turkey’s  
Operation  Sun  in  2008.  Resulting  PKK  casualties  were  twenty  times  the  number  of  Turkish  
nationals   killed   in   attacks   preceding   the   invasion,   yet   the   invasion   generally   was   not  
considered  excessive  and  was,  in  fact,  lauded  by  states.  See  further  ibid  395–6.  
234  See  Section  4.2.1.  
235  How  ‘terrorists’  are  identified  and  deemed  to  be  targetable  for  the  purposes  of  the  JAB  and  
IHL  determines  how  this  calculus   is  made.  As  noted,  civilians  may  not  be  directly   targeted  
under  either  regime.  See  further  Section  2.5.  
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proportionality  accounts   for   the  needs  and  rights  of   the  attacker,  as  well  as  
those  of  the  defending  state.236  
Turning  to  other  effects  on  the  host  state  that  are  relevant  to  considerations  of  
proportionality,  over  and  above  civilian  harm,  the  2006  Lebanon  incident  also  
demonstrates  unease  amongst  scholars  regarding  the  geographical  scope  of  
the   Israeli   response.   For   some,   the   initial   Israeli   action   taken   in   southern  
Lebanon   appeared   to   abide   by   the   principle   of   proportionality,   given   that  
Hezbollah’s  attacks  had  originated  from  that  area.  Later  measures  taken  far  
beyond   this   zone,   however,   were   viewed   as   problematic   from   this  
perspective.237  Such  concerns  are  in  keeping  with  the  argument  that  actions  in  
self-­defence,   particularly   along   a   border,   should   generally   be   confined  
geographically  vis-­à-­vis  the  armed  attacks  that  provoked  them.238  However,  as  
noted,  this  is  perhaps  better  understood  as  an  issue  of  specific  necessity.  It  is  
difficult  to  reconcile  with  a  defensive  objective  the  destruction  of  civilian  and  
military   infrastructure   well   away   from,   and   unconnected   with,   the   armed  
attack.239  
Finally,  minimising  the  impact  on  the  host  state  also  requires  that  any  incursion  
into   its   territory   is   temporally   limited.  As   soon  as   the   defensive   objective   is  
attained,   i.e.   once   the   threat   is   effectively   countered,   the   cross-­border  
operation  must  be  terminated,  and  all  forces  withdrawn.240  As  with  the  effects  
on  an  attacking  state,  whilst  temporary  occupation  of  parts  of  the  host  state  
might   be   considered   necessary,   depending   on   the   circumstances,   it   must  
remain  proportionate  to  the  defensive  objective.  Despite  the  more  permissive  
attitude  towards  combatting  terrorist  NSAs,  widespread  occupation  of  territory  
beyond   the   area   of   NSA   operations   is   likely   to   be   considered  
                                                                                        
236  See  Section  3.2.  
237  Cannizzaro  (2006)  784;;  Zimmermann  (2007)  124;;  Ruys  (2007)  290–2.  
238  See  Section  3.2.3.  
239  Ibid.  This   is  a  general  premise.  Depending  on   the  circumstances,  command  and  control  
centres  and  other  military  targets  well  away  from  the  armed  attack  might  well  be   legitimate  
targets  that  satisfy  the  requirements  of  specific  necessity.  This  is  most  likely  in  large-­scale  and  
enduring  conflicts.  Regardless,  the  issue  of  targeting  is  still  better  analysed  under  the  rules  of  
specific  necessity  and  IHL,  rather  than  proportionality.  
240  Schmitt  (2002–2003)  543.  
     
     258  
disproportionate.241  Moreover,  enduring  occupation  after  the  defensive  object  
is  achieved  will  be  unnecessary,  with  proportionality  being  irrelevant  in  such  
cases.242  It  is  for  this  reason  that  statements  that  America  intends  to  ‘maintain  
a  military  presence  in  Syria  focused  on  ensuring  ISIS  cannot  re-­emerge’,  are  
disconcerting.243  Open-­ended  occupation  by  the  USA  long  after  the  threat  to  it  
has  been  significantly  diminished,  goes  well  beyond  an  immediate  defensive  
purpose.244  The  protection  of  long-­term  security  interests  is  not  the  purview  of  
self-­defence.  The  onus  in  such  instances  reverts  to  the  host  state,  international  
co-­operation  and  to  measures  not  involving  the  use  of  force.245  
b)   Coalition  action  in  Syria  
The  Coalition  military   campaign   against   Daesh   in   Syria   poses   a   challenge  
when  considering   the  effects  of  defensive  action  against  NSAs  on   the  host  
state,   in   particular   with   respect   to   collateral   civilian   damage.   Despite   the  
Coalition’s  insistence  that  it  takes  great  efforts  to  minimise  civilian  harm,  their  
strike  reports  reveal  the  extent  of  the  targeting  within  and  against  the  Syrian  
state.246  Undoubtedly,  the  campaign  has  caused  considerable  damage  to  the  
civilian   population   and   infrastructure,   including   high   numbers   of   reported  
casualties.   It   has   also   contributed   to   the   almost   complete   destruction   of  
Daesh’s  self-­proclaimed  capital,  Raqqa.247  Syria  has  accused  the  Coalition  of  
deliberately  destroying  90  per  cent  of  the  city  and  causing  widespread  civilian  
                                                                                        
241  As  a  general  premise,  Schmitt  (2010)  317,  argues  that  it  would  be  ‘unlawful  to  deploy  forces  
into  locations  void  of  terrorists  or  insurgents.’  
242  See  Section  3.2.4(b).  
243  ‘Remarks  on  the  Way  Forward  for  the  United  States  Regarding  Syria’,  U.S.  Department  of  
State,   17   January   2018,  
<https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/01/277493.htm#https://www.state.gov/secret
ary/remarks/2018/01/277493.htm>.  
244  Whilst  Daesh  is  not  totally  defeated  in  Syria  and  elsewhere,  at  the  time  of  writing  it  has  lost  
its  capital  Raqqa  and  98%  of   territory   it  once  held   in   Iraq  and  Syria.   ‘UK  Action  to  Combat  
Daesh’,  UK  Government,  <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-­events/daesh/about>  [last  
accessed  23  July  2018].  
245  See  Sections  1.3.2  and  4.1.4(a).  
246  See  Section  4.1.3(b).  
247  ‘The  City  Fit  for  No-­One:  Inside  the  Ruined  'Capital'  of  the  Islamic  State  Group’  BBC  News,  
27   September   2017,   <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-­
sh/the_city_fit_for_no_one_raqqa_syria_islamic_state_group>.   Regarding   reported   civilian  
casualties   resulting   from   Coalition   airstrikes,   see   e.g.   Airwars,   <https://airwars.org>;;   The  
Syrian  Observatory  for  Human  Rights,  <http://www.syriahr.com/en/>.  
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harm.248  Russia  has  stated   that   the  Coalition  has   ‘flattened’  Raqqa,  and  has  
remarked   upon   the   resulting   civilian   casualties   and   lack   of   international  
concern  regarding  Coalition  action.249  An  Amnesty  International  report  goes  so  
far  as  to  suggest  that  Coalition  airstrikes  indicate  possible  war  crimes.250  The  
Coalition   denies   this,251  and   the  USA  has  defended   the   legality   of  Coalition  
action   before   the   UNSC.252   How   then   should   we   approach   assessing   the  
proportionality   of   the   effect   of   such   action   on   Syria?   Given   the   ongoing  
campaign,  and  the  continued  fight  against  Daesh  globally,  it  is  too  early  to  say  
whether  or  not  states  and  international  organizations  will  ultimately  conclude  
that  the  defensive  action  is  proportionate.  Even  if  one  were  to  attempt  to  take  
a  ‘snapshot’  of  the  proportionality  of  the  ongoing  response,  it  is  doubtful,  given  
the  particular  circumstances  of  this  incident,  that  a  clear  answer  is  discernible.  
Nevertheless,  the  following  analysis  suggests  a  number  of  observations  and  
possible  conclusions.  
The  first  possibility  is  to  label  this  incident  as  a  violation  of  JAB  proportionality.  
This  verdict  is  partly  based  on  what  appears  to  be  gross  quantitative  imbalance  
between   the  amount   of   harm  suffered,   or   anticipated,  as   a   result   of  Daesh  
armed  attacks  and  the  harm  caused  by  the  military  response  of  the  Coalition.253  
Whilst   the   extent   of   civilian   casualties   is   debated,   it   is   clear   that   cities   like  
Raqqa  have  been  decimated  and  large  numbers  of  its  citizens  killed  and  forced  
to  flee.  There  have  even  been  reports  of  whole  buildings  being  targeted  and  
destroyed  in  the  pursuit  of  killing  individual  Daesh  fighters.254  Such  individual  
targeting  decisions  might  be  IHL  compliant  and,  therefore,  explain  the  actions  
                                                                                        
248  UN  Docs  S/PV.8181  (2018)  11;;  S/PV.8186  (2018)  19;;  S/PV.8206  (2018)  9.  
249  UN  Docs  S/PV.8186  (2018)  4;;  S/PV.8217  (2018)  15.  
250  Syria:   ‘“War   of   Annihilation”:  Devastating   Toll   on  Civilians,  Raqqa–Syria’,   5   June   2018,  
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2483672018ENGLISH.PDF>  
(‘Amnesty’s  Syria  Report’).  
251  ‘Coalition  Response   to  Amnesty  Report  on  Civilian  Casualties   in  Raqqa’,  5  June  2018,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/coalition-­response-­to-­amnesty-­report-­on-­civilian-­casualties-­
in-­raqqa/>.  
252  UN  Doc  S/PV.8236  (2018)  7.  
253  The  threat  posed  by  Daesh  to  states  is  undoubtedly  great,  but  it  cannot  be  compared  to  
the  nature  and  scale  of  the  defensive  response,  as  clearly  articulated  in  the  strike  reports  of  
the  Coalition.  
254  As  reported   in:   ‘The  City  Fit   for  No-­One:  Inside   the  Ruined   'Capital'  of   the   Islamic  State  
Group’   BBC   News,   27   September   2017,   <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-­
sh/the_city_fit_for_no_one_raqqa_syria_islamic_state_group>.  
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of  Coalition  partners.  Yet,  regardless  of  whether  this  is  in  fact  the  case,  they  
raise   real   concerns   for   JAB   proportionality   when   targeting   decisions   are  
reviewed  cumulatively.  Moreover,  if  Amnesty’s  Syria  Report  is  proved  correct,  
the  potential  violations  of  IHL  set  out  therein  might  indicate  a  breach  of  JAB  
proportionality.255  Undoubtedly,   the  overall  effect  of  Coalition  action  on  Syria  
and   its  people  has  been  widespread  and  severe.  This   is  despite   the   lack  of  
Syria’s  acquiescence  in,  or  support  for,  Daesh’s  activities.  Rather,  its  inability,  
or  perceived  inability,  to  deal  with  the  threat  has  led  to  such  devastating  harm.  
It  is  arguable,  therefore,  that  along  the  lines  of  Israel’s  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  
2006,   the   Coalition   action   goes   beyond   what   is   necessary   to   achieve   a  
defensive  purpose.  
This  conclusion  might  be  too  hasty,  however.  Coalition  action  against  Daesh  
in  Syria  sits   in  marked  contrast   to   Israel’s   intervention   in  Lebanon   in  2006.  
First,   is   the   complexity   of   the   Syrian   civil   war   and   the   sheer   number   of  
interlocutors   fighting  within  Syrian   territory,  all  with  competing  agendas,  and  
all   causing  death   and  damage   to   civilians   and   civilian   infrastructure.256  The  
Assad   regime,   its  allies   and  Daesh  have  all   been  accused  of   targeting   the  
civilian  population  directly,  as  well  as  causing  widespread  collateral  damage.  
This  is  an  evidential  issue,  therefore,  of  ‘who  did  what’.  Even  if  it  were  possible  
to  separate  the  effects  of  the  ongoing  civil  war  from  the  harm  resulting  from  
the  purported  counterterrorism  actions  of  a  number  of  states  acting  on  claims  
of  self-­defence,  a  proportionality  assessment  of  the  Coalition  action  remains  
difficult.  This  is  due  to  the  other  stark  difference  between  the  Syrian  conflict  
and  the  2006  Lebanese  invasion.  The  latter  was  in  response  to  the  threat  faced  
by   one   state   (Israel)   and   was   confined   to   the   territory   of   another   state  
(Lebanon).257  In  contrast,  the  Coalition  consists  of  a  number  of  states  that  are  
purporting  to  act  in  self-­defence  against  a  threat  not  only  to  such  states,  but  
                                                                                        
255  Particularly  if  they  are  systematic  and  widespread.  See  Section  3.3.1.  
256  For  a  factual  overview  of  the  conflict,  including  the  main  parties  involved  in  the  conflict,  see  
e.g.  Gill  (2016)  354–362,  373–7.  
257  This  is  despite  Israel’s  insistence  that  the  threat  it  faced  was  also  faced  by  the  world.  UN  
Doc  S/2006/515  (2006).  See  Section  4.2.1.  
     
     261  
which   is   characterised   by   the   UNSC   as   an   ongoing   threat   to   international  
peace  and  security.  
As  noted  in  Section  4.2.1,  since  9/11  great  latitude  has  been  given  by  other  
states  and  international  organizations  to  states  acting  in  self-­defence  against  
terrorist  NSAs.  Such  actions  might  be  regarded  as  also  being  in  the  collective  
interests  of  the  international  community.  Despite  concern  over  civilian  harm,  
and  regardless  of   the   legality  of  particular   instances  of   targeting  under  both  
IHL  and  specific  necessity,  a  significant  number  of  states  appear  to  accept  that  
the  fight  against  Daesh  necessitates  a  response  of  this  scale  and  effect.  Such  
states  may  be  taken  as  acknowledging  that  the  price  to  be  paid  for  combatting  
the  NSA  terrorist  threat  to  them,  and  the  international  community  as  a  whole,  
includes  cities  like  Raqqa  being  destroyed  and  its  citizens  killed  and  forced  to  
flee.  After  all,  retaking  Raqqa  represented  one  of  the  milestones  in  defeating  
Daesh.  The  Coalition  hailed  the  ‘liberation’  of  the  former  capital  of  Daesh’s  so-­
called   ‘caliphate’. 258   Russia,   whilst   blaming   the   Coalition   for   Raqqa’s  
‘methodical   destruction’,   has   even   credited   the  Coalition  with   ‘smoking  out’  
Daesh  from  the  city.259  It  also  presumably  constitutes  the  eradication  of  a  key  
safe  haven,  as  per  the  exhortation  of  UNSC  Resolution  2249.260  
Ultimately,   the   tragic   humanitarian   fallout   from   the   Syrian   incident   has   not  
prevented  the  Coalition  from  pursuing  its  goal  of  defeating  Daesh,  and  there  
has  been  a  paucity  of  other  states  labelling  the  purported  defensive  action  as  
excessive.  Ostensibly,  there  appears  to  be  widespread  recognition  that  if  the  
ultimate  defensive  goal  is  the  annihilation  of  Daesh,  then  there  is  no  other  way  
to  achieve  this  aim.  Although  not  unequivocal,  this  suggests  the  possibility  that  
they   consider   the   harm   caused   to   Syria   and   its   civilian   population   to   be  
notionally  proportionate  to  that  necessity.  
                                                                                        
258 ‘Syrian   Democratic   Forces   Liberate   Raqqa’,   20   October   2017,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/syrian-­democratic-­forces-­liberate-­raqqa/>.  
259  UN  Doc  S/PV.8186  (2018)  4.  
260  Although,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  UNSC  envisaged  such  an  outcome  in  its  call  for  states  
to  act  against  Daesh.  
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This  permissive  attitude  renders  the  proportionality  assessment  rather  surreal.  
It  also  raises  the  unpleasant  prospect  of  an  increased  willingness  on  the  part  
of   certain   states   and   international   organizations   to   place   issues   of   security  
above   the   human   rights   and   humanitarian   protections   of   those   civilians  
affected  by   defensive   action.   It   suggests   an  unfortunate   rebalancing  of   the  
‘lesser  evil’  equation,  tipping  it  in  favour  of  self-­defence  to  the  detriment  of  the  
rights  of  the  host  state,  and  the  rights  and  lives  of  its  civilian  population.  The  
result  is  the  prioritisation  of  the  interests  of  the  citizens  of  the  defending  state(s)  
over  those  of  the  host  state.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  self-­defence  in  the  NSA  
terrorist  context  is  conceived  of  very  differently  than  in  the  traditional  interstate  
setting.  This  conclusion  is  extremely  troubling  for  the  humanitarian  situation  of  
those  innocent  civilians  caught  up  in  anti-­terrorism  conflicts.  
Determining   the   (dis)proportionality   of   Coalition   action   is   no   easy   task,  
therefore.  It  is  further  complicated  by  how  the  Coalition  approaches  the  issue  
of   civilian   harm   in   this   context,   and   what   that   means   for   assessing  
proportionality.  As  noted  above,  the  Coalition  insists  that  it  is  not  targeting  the  
Syrian  state  or  its  people,  but  only  Daesh.  The  strike  reports,  taken  on  face  
value,  confirm  that  targets  are  confined  to  civilian  buildings,  infrastructure  and  
apparatus  that  are  used  or  controlled  by  Daesh,  and  thus  outside  of  the  Syrian  
state’s  effective  control.  261  These  targets  are  also  justified  as  military  objectives  
under  IHL,262  which  raises  the  question  of  whether  IHL  is  the  principal,  or  only,  
concern  of   the  military  when  carrying  out   these  strikes.263  The   issue  for  JAB  
proportionality,  however,   is  whether  damage  and  destruction  to  such  targets  
should  count  as  harm  to  Daesh,  or  harm  to  the  host  state  (Syria),  or  both.  State  
practice  does  not  provide  a  clear  answer.  
                                                                                        
261   Gill   (2016)   375,   agrees   that   Coalition   actions   are   directed   almost   exclusively   against  
Daesh,  which  controlled  a  significant  portion  of  Syrian  territory,  population  and  infrastructure,  
rather  than  Syrian  government-­held  territory,  population  or  infrastructure.  
262   ‘Airstrikes,   Civilian   Casualties   and   Investigations’,   Coalition,   13   November   2017,  
<http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/airstrikes-­civilian-­casualties-­and-­investigations/>.  
263  However,   see   Section   2.5   regarding   the   need   for   targeting   also   to   serve   a   defensive  
purpose  to  be  compliant  with  JAB  specific  necessity.  
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The   distinction   is   crucial,   however.   As   noted,   state   practice   indicates   that  
states  tend  not  to  concern  themselves  with  harm  to  terrorist  NSAs,  including  
buildings,  infrastructure  and  apparatus  that  belong  to  them,  or  that  are  under  
their   control.   Therefore,   purported   defensive   actions   are   more   likely   to   be  
characterised  as  proportionate  by  states  if  the  harm  is  viewed  as  pertaining  to  
the  NSAs,  rather  than  the  host  state.  As  noted  in  Section  4.1.3(b),  when  public  
property  is  under  the  control  of  NSAs,  and  not  under  the  effective  control  of  
the   host   state,   it   should   not   be   identified   with   that   of   the   host   state.   This  
perhaps  accounts  for  the  action  taken  in  Syria,  as  well  as  the  attitude  of  other  
states  to  it.  If  states  view  harm,  i.e.  to  buildings,  infrastructure  and  apparatus,  
principally  caused  to  Daesh  in  those  areas  that  it  controls  and  (at  most)  only  
secondarily   to   Syria,   then   Coalition   action   as   a   whole   is  more   likely   to   be  
regarded  as  proportionate  as  the  damage  to  ‘Syria’  is  that  much  less.  
As  noted  above,  the  facts  regarding  the  amount  of  collateral  civilian  injury  and  
death  is  a  highly  contested  subject.  Regardless  of  whether  the  Coalition  and  
other  states  view  the  harm  caused  by  Coalition  action  to  relate  principally  to  
Daesh,  and  not  Syria,  greater  clarity  is  required  regarding  the  extent  of  such  
civilian  death  and  injury,  and  which  party  to  the  conflict  caused  it.  Part  of  the  
JAB  proportionality  analysis  will  then  hang  on  the  IHL  status  issue  of  whether  
an   individual   was   in   fact   a   civilian,   or   DPIH.264  The   JAB   contains   no   such  
specific  rules  to  distinguish  between  them.  In  addition  to  IHL  rules  governing  
DPIH,   however,   it   does   require   that   targeting   also   serves   a   defensive  
purpose.265  Without  further  details  of  the  civilian  harm,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  
conclude  whether  it  will  feature  as  it  has  in  previous  incidents,  namely  as  an  
indicator  of  excessiveness  that  other  states  would  normally  not  accept.  
Forming  a  final  view  on  the  proportionality  of  the  ongoing  assault  on  Daesh  in  
Syria  and  beyond,  in  order  to  destroy  a  threat  that  the  UNSC  has  deemed  to  
be  global  and  enduring,  is  akin  to  being  confronted  with  the  Gordian  knot.  As  
a  starting  point,  determining  the  factual  elements  of  the  Syrian  incident,  as  they  
                                                                                        
264  See  Section  2.5(a).  
265  Ibid.  
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relate  to  actions  of  the  Coalition,  will  require  further  investigation.266  Even  then,  
it  is  highly  questionable  whether  any  state,  court  or  international  body  has  the  
capacity   to  reach  a  definitive  conclusion  regarding   the  proportionality  of   the  
response  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  international  community  to  such  threat.  
The  permissive  attitude  of  states  and  international  organizations  in  the  context  
of  international  terrorism  suggests,  however,  that  they  are  likely  to  take  a  more  
relaxed  attitude  to  proportionality  in  the  case  of  Syria  than  they  would  with  an  
interstate  exercise  of  self-­defence.  This   is  despite   the  disparity  between  the  
(relatively  minimal)  threat  that  is  faced  by  many  of  the  defending  states  and  
their  citizens  from  the  NSAs,  and  the  (extensive)  harm  to  the  host  state  and  its  
citizens  that  results  from  action  to  counter  that  threat.  
This   conclusion   is   extremely   troubling   for   the   general   balance   that  
proportionality  seeks  to  achieve.  It  also  points  to  the  ability  of  militarily  powerful  
states   to   intervene   in   their   less   powerful   neighbours   in   the   name   of   self-­
defence.  The  Syrian  incident  showcases,  therefore,  the  need  for  greater  clarity  
in   the   law   to   enable   better   regulation   of   such   conduct.   Pending   that  
development,   it  demonstrates  the  emphasis  that  must  be  placed  on  specific  
necessity  and  IHL  as  potential  constraints  on  state  behaviour.  These  are  likely  
to   be  more  meaningful  markers   of   legality   of   state   action   in   such   complex  
scenarios.   This,   perhaps   unsatisfactory,   conclusion   is   discussed   further   in  
Chapter  5,  together  with  proposals  for  legal  development.  
  
  
                                                                                        
266  The  HRC  Syrian  Commission   of   Inquiry  was   established   in   2011   to   investigate   alleged  
violations  of  international  human  rights  law.  It  has  already  produced  a  number  of  reports.  Their  
work   is  ongoing  and   is  welcome,  not  only   for   the  purposes  of   their  mandate,  but  also  as  a  
possible   aid   to   examining   the   state   practice   pertaining   to   the   Syrian   incident.   See:  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommis
sion.aspx>.  
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4.3   Conclusions    
The   content   and  parameters   of   a   right   of   self-­defence  against  NSAs   is   still  
being  worked  out  in  state  practice.  When  compared  to  interstate  self-­defence,  
however,  necessity   is  revealed   to  have  the  potential   to  play  a  much  greater  
role   in   the   ability   of   states   to   act   in   self-­defence   against   NSAs   in   foreign  
territory.  Prima  facie,  the  focus  is  on  the  primacy  of  host  state  action  against  
the  NSAs  operating  on  its  territory.  However,  the  host  state’s  relationship  with  
both  the  terrorist  group  and  the  victim  state  is  central  to  whether  this  represents  
a  reasonable  alternative  to  defensive  force  in  the  particular  circumstances.  The  
latter  association  determines  whether  consent  to,  or  cooperation  with,  the  host  
state   to  counter   the   terrorist   threat  constitutes  a  viable  option.  Whether   the  
host  state  is  seen  as  a  legitimate  partner,  or  cooperation  with  it  will  engage  the  
international  responsibility  of  the  defending  state(s),  might  also  determine  the  
necessity  of  defensive  action.  
The   contentious   unwilling   or   unable   doctrine   is   central   to   the   ability   of  
defending   states   to   act   against   NSAs   in   foreign   territory.   Debates   over   its  
existence  in  the  lex  lata,  as  well  as  regarding  its  possible  content  and  practical  
operation   are   ongoing,   however.   If   accepted   by   states,   it   constitutes   an  
additional  barrier  to  a  defending  state  resorting  to  military  action.  Regardless  
of   whether   this   principle   explains   state   practice   against   NSAs   in   foreign  
territory,  such  practice  suggests  that  defending  states  are  not  to  target  directly  
the  governmental  and  military  apparatus  and   infrastructure  of   the  host  state  
(and  its  allies)  whilst  acting  in  self-­defence  against  NSAs  on  the  territory  of  the  
host  state.  This  practice  highlights  the  importance  of  specific  necessity  in  such  
cases.  Drawing  on  the  principles  of  IHL,  it  defines  what  is  a  permissible  NSA  
target  and  an  impermissible  host  state  target.  
How  far  any  defensive  action  on  the  host  state’s  territory  may  ultimately  go  is  
an  issue  for  proportionality.  The  potential  for  this  requirement  to  operate  as  a  
restraint  on  state  action  is  much  more  uncertain.  In  the  context  of  combatting  
international   terrorism,   its   meaning   is   stretched,   and   its   review   is   more  
permissive.  States  often  act  globally,  on  an  enduring  basis,  and  beyond  their  
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immediate  defensive  needs.  Their  responses  may  receive  the  blessing  of  the  
international  community,  in  whose  interests  they  might  also  be  perceived  to  be  
acting.  This  is  a  troubling  development  and  makes  identifying  the  lesser  evil  
much  more  difficult.  The   law   is   in   flux,   but   it   appears   that   the   right   of   self-­
defence   in   the   context   of   international   terrorism   may   unfortunately   be  
prioritised  above  third-­party  interests  and  the  human  rights  and  humanitarian  
protections  of  civilians.  
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CHAPTER  5:  CONCLUSIONS  
Claims   of   self-­defence   are   almost   ubiquitous   when   states   resort   to   force  
beyond  their  own  borders.  Although  the  JAB  does  not  contain  absolute  and  
rigid   rules   regarding  what   amounts   to   lawful   self-­defence,   states   invariably  
accept  that  their  conduct  is  governed  by  international  law  and  the  requirements  
of  necessity  and  proportionality.  Even  states  that  argue  for  an  expansive  right  
of   self-­defence   recognize   this   fact.   As   a   breach   of   either   requirement  
transforms   lawful  acts  of  self-­defence   into  unlawful  uses  of  force,   increased  
determinacy  regarding  their  scope  and  substance  is  crucial  to  how  force  might  
be  constrained  by  operation  of  international  law.  Necessity  and  proportionality  
are   revealed   to   be   flexible,   however,   with   their   application   and   appraisal  
contingent  on  the  particular  facts  of  each  case.  Establishing  general  rules  for  
their  application  is,  therefore,  challenging.  Despite  these  challenges,  and  the  
fact  that  the  law  is  in  flux,  this  thesis  provides  much  greater  precision  regarding  
the   conceptual   meaning   of   necessity   and   proportionality   and   its   normative  
content.  Their  operation  is  highly  contextual,  but  the  analytical  framework  set  
out  herein  allows  for  a  more  coherent  exposition  of  both  requirements.  This  
increases  their  potential  to  exert  a  normative  pull  towards  compliance.  
The  Caroline  incident  of  1837  endures  as  the  locus  classicus  of  international  
law   governing   the   exercise   of   the   right   of   self-­defence.  Webster’s   formula,  
whilst  not  synonymous  with  the  contemporary  lex  lata,  encapsulates  its  core  
elements.  Once  the  availability  of  the  right  of  self-­defence  is  triggered  by  an  
actual   or   (potentially)   imminent   armed   attack,   necessity   and   proportionality  
condition   the   exercise   of   the   right.   More   specifically,   necessity   determines  
whether   defensive   force  may   be   used   to   respond   to   an   armed   attack,   and  
where   it  must   be   directed.   Proportionality   governs  how  much   total   force   is  
permissible.   Crucially,   this   thesis   contends   that   the   two   requirements   are  
conceptually  distinct,  and  must  be  applied   in   the   foregoing  order  and  on  an  
ongoing  basis  throughout  the  duration  of  an  armed  conflict  prompted  by  self-­
defence.  Their  operation  ensures  that  the  purposes  of  self-­defence  are  met,  
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and   nothing  more.1  At   the   same   time,   necessity   and   proportionality   guard  
against   defensive   force   being   unduly   disruptive   to   third   party   interests   and  
international  peace  and  security  more  broadly.  
The  new  taxonomy  proposed  by  this  thesis  of  ‘general  necessity’  and  ‘specific  
necessity’  captures  the  two  distinct  elements  of  the  necessity  requirement  that  
are   reflected   in   state   practice,   ICJ   jurisprudence   and   scholarship.   Drawing  
these  brighter   lines   and  applying   the   order  of   application   referred   to   in   the  
previous  paragraph,  challenges  states,  courts  and  scholars  to  consider  what  it  
is   specifically   about   a   purported   act   of   self-­defence   that   is   necessary   or  
unnecessary,   proportionate   or   disproportionate.   This   approach   avoids   the  
tendency  to  determine  and  describe  the  legality  of  resorting  to  force  in  a  ‘catch-­
all’  manner,  which  fails  to  distinguish  between  these  requirements.  It  requires  
a  more  detailed   articulation   of   the   law  and   its   application   to   the   facts.  This  
serves  to  clarify  the  JAB’s  operation  and  review.  
The   concept   of   general   necessity   reflects  Webster’s   ‘no   choice   of   means’  
formulation   and   whether   resort   to   peaceable   options   is   reasonable   in   the  
circumstances.  State  practice  reveals  a  nuanced  application  of  this  premise,  
however.  Whilst  states  consider  defensive  force  to  be  a  measure  of  last  resort,  
they  have  yet  to  provide  a  consistent  approach  to  what  this  means  in  practice,  
beyond  this  generally  accepted  hypothetical  presumption.  The  importance  of  
alternatives  to  force  in  determining  the  legality  of  purported  defensive  force  is  
highly   contextual.   Resort   or   otherwise   to   peaceable   options  may   stand   as  
evidence   of   general   necessity,   but   it   may   not   factor   at   all   in   either   the  
justification  for,  or  review  of,  military  action.  
Ultimately,   general   necessity   will   be   satisfied   where,   in   the   particular  
circumstances,  there  is  a  reasonable  need  for  a  defending  state  to  respond  to  
an  armed  attack  using   force.  This  will   typically  be  established  per  se   in   the  
case  of  an  ongoing  armed  attack,  where  recourse  to  peaceable  resolution  will  
                                                                                        
1  The  purposes  of  self-­defence  have  been  established  as  halting,   repelling  and,   if  a   limited  
right  of  pre-­emptive  self-­defence  is  accepted,  preventing  an  armed  attack.  See  Section  1.3.2.  
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not  usually  constitute  a  reasonable  alternative  to  force.  The  ability  of  general  
necessity  to  act  as  a  meaningful  restraint  on  the  exercise  of  self-­defence  is,  
therefore,  limited.  This  is  especially  so  in  the  context  of  armed  attacks  against  
terrorist   NSAs   where,   in   the   face   of   a   perceived   enduring   threat,   general  
necessity  is  revealed  to  be  a  weak  limitation  on  state  action.  
In  contrast,  specific  necessity  operates  as  a  clear  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  
the   right   of   self-­defence.   It   confines   defensive   action   to   military   targets  
connected   with   the   armed   attack,   thereby   ensuring   that   their   capture,  
neutralisation  or  destruction   is   limited   to  a  defensive  purpose.  A   lack  of   this  
nexus   suggests   that   a   use   of   force   has   a   purely   punitive   and,   therefore,  
unlawful  purpose.  Specific  necessity’s  importance  as  a  separate  and  distinct  
element  of  necessity  has  been  underappreciated  to  date.  There  is  potential  for  
future  development,  therefore,  regarding  how  states  conceive  of  the  targeting  
requirements  of   the  JAB,  and  how  these  rules  run  alongside   IHL  to   impose  
parallel  and  cumulative  obligations.  
Proportionality  is  shown,  as  a  general  precept,  to  prohibit  excessive  uses  of  
defensive  force.  By  operating  to  restrain  the  outcomes  of  a  defending  state’s  
overall  defensive  response,  it  has  the  potential  to  contribute  to  the  preservation  
of   international   peace   and   security.   It   seeks   to   minimise   the   disruption   of  
defensive   action   to   the   international   order   and   to   the   rights   of   those   that  
operate  within  it.  Proportionality  is  the  more  complex  of  the  two  requirements,  
however,  with  its  content  and  outer  boundaries  lacking  detail  when  compared  
to  necessity.  It  is  also  more  difficult  to  apply  in  practice.  Yet,  states  tend  to  use  
this   term   as   their   preferred   measure   of   the   legality   of   self-­defence.   As   a  
rhetorical  tool,2  it  will  likely  be  employed  to  determine  whether  or  not  a  state’s  
use  of  putatively  defensive  force  is  deemed  excessive  by  other  states.  This  is  
so,  even  if  it  is  not  always  clear  whether  the  reference  to  (dis)proportionality  is  
to  the  JAB,  IHL,  or  both.    
                                                                                        
2  Gardam  (2005)  25.  
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Despite   this   lack  of  clarity,  and   the   fact   that  state  practice  does  not  offer  a  
consistent   narrative,   a   number   of   conclusions   are   apparent   regarding   how  
states  view  JAB  proportionality.  This  thesis  shows  that  states  do  not  commonly  
require   precise   equivalence   between   an   armed   attack   and   self-­defence   in  
terms  of  the  nature,  scale  or  means  of  the  action  taken,  or  its  outcomes.  When  
justifying   and   appraising   defensive   action,   states   primarily   balance   the  
defensive   response   and   its   outcomes,   as   a   whole,   against   the   legitimate  
purposes   of   self-­defence.   States  may,   therefore,   respond   defensively   on   a  
retrospective   and   prospective   basis,   whilst   considering   the   wider   threat  
comprising   past,   ongoing  and   (potentially)   imminent   armed  attacks.  Yet,   its  
application   is   not   the   neat   binary   exercise   proposed   by   some   academic  
commentators,  but   rather   involves  weighing  a  diversity  of   interests.   It   is  not  
simply  a  question,  therefore,  of  referring  to  proportionality  as  either  quantitative  
or  teleological.  
A   mixed   model   of   proportionality   calls   for   a   balance   to   be   struck   so   that  
defensive  military   action   does   not   result   in   harm   that   is   completely   out   of  
proportion  to   the  armed  attack(s)   that  prompted   it.  There  must  be  a  rational  
connection   between   the   two.   In   addition,   when   other   states,   courts   and  
scholars   review   proportionality,   third-­party   interests   are   also   accounted   for.  
These  constitute  potential  additional  limitations  on  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  
self-­defence,   although   the   importance   of   neutrality   and   former   belligerent  
rights,  as  well  as   the  effect  of  defensive  action  on   the  environment,   require  
further  elaboration  in  state  practice.  What  is  apparent,  is  that  defending  states  
cannot  prioritise  their  right  to  self-­defence  over  the  rights  and  interests  of  other  
states,  and  of  the  international  community  more  broadly,  and  pursue  it  at  any  
cost.   Civilian   collateral   harm  will   typically   stand   as   the   principal   factor   that  
leads   to   a   conclusion   that   an   act   of   self-­defence   is   excessive   (viz  
disproportionate).  
This  thesis  has  also  elaborated  on  the  often-­overlooked  relationship  between  
IHL  and  the  JAB.  These  are  essentially  separate  regimes  of  international  law,  
but   they  have   the  potential   to   influence  the  understanding  and  operation  of  
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each   other.   The   issue   of   IHL   and   the   JAB   operating   together   to   regulate  
targeting  is  referred  to  above.  In  addition,  this  author  has  explained  that  JAB  
proportionality   operates   at   the   macro   level   of   generality,   with   IHL  
proportionality   being   concerned   with   the   micro   level   of   individual   targeting  
decisions.  The  exception  is  where  widespread  or  systematic  breaches  of  IHL  
constitute   evidence   of   a   shift   in   the   overall   scale   or   scope   of   a   defensive  
response.   Crucially,   the   analysis   confirms   that   the   JAB   and   IHL,   whilst  
remaining   as   two   separate   and   independent   bodies   of   international   law,  
impose  cumulative  obligations  that  apply  to  the  entire  defensive  operation  and  
must   be   consistently   applied   and   monitored   over   that   period.   A   clearer  
appreciation   of   this   relationship   between   IHL   and   JAB   provides   scope   for  
further   theoretical  development  of  how  these   legal   regimes   interrelate  more  
generally,   as   well   as   contributing   to   real   world   decision-­making   regarding  
resorting  to,  conducting,  and  reviewing  acts  of  self-­defence.  
Finally,  this  thesis  has  examined  necessity  and  proportionality  as  they  apply  
to   self-­defence   in   response   to  armed  attacks   by  NSAs  operating   in   foreign  
territory,   principally   in   the   context   of   international   terrorism.   Against   this  
background,  their  requirements  are  adapted  and  supplemented.  This  author  
notes  the  potential  of  general  necessity  to  play  a  greater  role  outside  of  the  
interstate  context,  where  the  requirement  is  likely  to  be  satisfied  more  easily.  
This  is  because  the  option  of  seeking  a  solution  via,  or  in  cooperation  with,  the  
host  state  theoretically  constitutes  an  additional  limiting  factor.  However,  this  
potential  is  not  as  strong  as  is  sometimes  suggested  in  the  literature.  Whether  
it  stands  as  a  reasonable  alternative  to  the  defending  state  using  force  is  highly  
contextual.   It   is   contingent   on   the   timing   of   the   armed   attack   and   the  
relationships  between  the  defending  state  and  the  host  state,  and  between  the  
host  state  and  the  NSAs.  The  risk   to  the  defending  state  of   its   international  
responsibility  being  engaged  by  cooperating  with  a  host  state  is  also  revealed  
to  be  a  feature  of  more  recent  state  practice.  
Moreover,  the  response  by  states  and  the  UNSC  to  international  terrorism  has  
severely   tested   the   application   of   both   necessity   and   proportionality   as  
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conceived  of  in  the  interstate  context.  State  practice  points  to  the  continuing  
general   necessity   of   some   form   of   defensive   response   against   what   is  
perceived  to  be  an  enduring  terrorist  threat.  This  account  takes  the  right  of  self-­
defence  beyond  being  a  temporary  right  to  respond  to  emergency  situations.  
In  terms  of  proportionality,  states  often  act  beyond  their  immediate  defensive  
needs  in  their  responses  to  international  terrorism.  They  may  take  preventive  
action  against  potential  future  armed  attacks  by  seeking  to  totally  eliminate  the  
NSA  terrorists.  It  is  clear  that  there  is  a  much  more  permissive  attitude  on  the  
part  of  states  and  the  UNSC  when  reviewing  such  action.  The  law  is  in  flux,  
but  it  appears  that  the  right  of  self-­defence  in  this  context  might  be  prioritised  
above  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  host  state  and  its  civilians.  A  clear  balance  
between  these  rights  and  interests,  and  a  meaningful  role  for  proportionality,  
is  yet  to  be  worked  out  in  practice.  The  Syrian  conflict  stands  as  a  worrying  
example,   however,   of   potential   imbalance   and   the   resulting   detriment   to  
humanitarian  protections.  
Pending  clarification  of  the  lex  lata  through  further  state  practice,  this  author  
argues   that   the  burden  falls  to  specific  necessity   to  constrain  military  action  
and  to  determine  the  legality  of  a  particular  defensive  response.  Where  general  
necessity  and/or  proportionality  are  in  doubt,  specific  necessity  is  the  JAB  tool  
that  has  the  greatest  determinacy  and,  therefore,  potential  to  govern  whether  
self-­defence  is  permissible  against  a  particular  terrorist  group  operating  in  a  
particular  state.   It   is   for   this   reason  that   the  highly  controversial  unwilling  or  
unable   debate   is   so   crucial. 3   Whilst   the   law   is   unsettled,   post   9/11   state  
practice  suggests  that  where  the  host  state  is  unwilling  or  unable  to  tackle  the  
NSA  threat  itself,  defending  states  may  deem  it  necessary  to  target  persons  
and   objects   on   its   territory.   This   ability   raises   concerns   for   the   effect   of  
defensive  action  on   the  host  state,  and   for   international  peace  and  security  
more   generally.   However,   drawing   on   principles   of   IHL,   specific   necessity  
establishes  what  is  a  permissible  NSA  target  and  an  impermissible  host  state  
                                                                                        
3  The  unable  or  unwilling  doctrine  relates  to  both  general  and  specific  necessity,  although  it  is  
submitted   that   the   latter  position   is   clearer   in   the  practice  of   states  and,   therefore,  has   the  
greatest  potential  at  this  point  in  time  to  regulate  conduct.  
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target.  This   author’s   analysis   suggests   that  defending   states   do  not   regard  
themselves  as  having  a  licence  to  target  governmental  and  military  apparatus  
and  infrastructure  of  the  host  state  (and  its  allies)  when  acting  in  self-­defence  
against  NSAs  on  its  territory.  Targeting  is  confined  to  non-­military  elements  of  
a  host  state  being  used  or  occupied  by  the  NSAs  that  were  responsible  for  the  
armed  attack.  This  limits  the  potential  impact  on  the  host  state  itself.  
Normatively,  the  arguments  and  conclusions  set  out  herein  provide  a  basis  for  
how  future  scholarship  and  jurisprudence  might  better  conceive  of,  and  help  
to   develop,   the   right   of   self-­defence.  This   thesis   provides   a   scholastic   and  
judicial  tool  for  tackling  some  of  the  long-­standing  debates  in  the  JAB  relating  
to,  inter  alia,  a  right  of  self-­defence  against  NSAs,  responding  defensively  to  
imminent  armed  attacks,  and  whether  there  is  a  gravity  threshold  that  triggers  
the  right.  The  additional  detail  and  nuance  offers  scope  to  move  away  from  the  
focus  to  date  on  the  armed  attack  and  the  examination  of  these  controversies  
through  that  particular  lens.  The  focus  of  scholars  and  international  courts  and  
tribunals  should  turn  to  the  elements  of  self-­defence  that  constitute  the  most  
prominent   features   of   state   practice   and   opinio   juris:   necessity   and  
proportionality.  
These  requirements  best  represent  how  states  view  their  right  of  self-­defence,  
explain  their  actions  and  review  the  acts  of  other  states.  A  more  coherent  and  
determinate  conception  of  necessity  and  proportionality  speaks  directly  to  this  
fact  and  the  operation  of  self-­defence.  It  offers  a  better  practical  and  theoretical  
statement   of   the   law   and   constitutes   a   more   effective   determinant   of   the  
legality  of  state  responses  to  armed  attacks.  The  analytical  framework  set  out  
in   this   thesis   offers,   therefore,   the   opportunity   for   a   doctrinal   switch   that  
recognizes  necessity  and  proportionality,  and  not  armed  attack,  as   the  core  
regulating   requirements   of   the   exercise   of   self-­defence. 4   It   challenges  
academics  and   judges   to  engage  more   fully  with   the  detail  of  state  practice  
and  to  avoid  the  conflations  and  inaccuracies  of  the  past.  
                                                                                        
4  See  further  Green  (2009)  109,  209,  making  a  similar  argument.  
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It   has   been   suggested   that   ‘[t]he  maintenance  of  world  peace  and   security  
depends   importantly   on   there   being   a   common   global   understanding,   and  
acceptance,   of   when   the   application   of   force   is   both   legal   and   legitimate.’5  
International  law  provides  the  independent  standard  for  judging  the  legitimacy  
of  international  actions.6  Most  importantly,  therefore,  this  thesis  argues  that  the  
analytical  framework  set  out  herein  constitutes  a  tool  for  states  to  justify  and  
legitimate   more   clearly   their   actions.   It   also   establishes   a   structure   and  
procedure   for   other   states,   courts   and   international   organizations   to   review  
more  effectively  putative  acts  of  self-­defence  and  to  assess  compliance  with  
the  law.  Instead  of  pointing  to  the  most  obvious  indicator  of  illegality,  as  has  
been  the  tendency  of  states  and  the  ICJ  to  date,  this  requires  consideration  of  
the   armed   attack,   followed   by   general   necessity,   specific   necessity   and  
proportionality,  in  that  order.    
Adopting   this   systematic   approach   assists   with   improved   and   more  
transparent   decision-­making.   Such   approach,   and   the   greater   normative  
determinacy  provided  by  this  thesis,  contribute  to  the  clarity,  coherency  and  
predictability  that  underpin  the  operation  of  the  JAB  and  the  maintenance  and  
legitimacy   of   the   international   rule   of   law.7  Whilst   the   JAB   remains,   by   its  
nature,  an  essentially   indeterminate   legal   regime,   this  development  has   the  
potential   to  curtail   the  number  of  occasions   that  states  resort   to  using   force  
and  to  lead  to  fewer  instances  of  excess  where  they  do  so.  That  this  approach  
allows  for  more  effective  resolution  of  the  question  of  the  legality  of  defensive  
action,  means  that  it  might  also  reduce  how  states  can  abuse  their  right  of  self-­
defence.    
The  current  endeavour  constitutes  a  greatly  clarified  and  coherent  statement  
of   the   lex   lata.  There   is  scope,  however,   for  necessity  and  proportionality’s  
                                                                                        
5   ‘A   More   Secure   World:   Our   Shared   Responsibility’,   Report   of   the   High-­Level   Panel   on  
Threats,  Challenges  and  Change,  UN  Doc.  A/59/565  (2004)  para  184.  
6  Sands  (2005)  238.  
7  A  degree  of  indeterminacy  will  be  found  in  any  legal  system  and,  for  international  law,  it  is  
arguable  that  indeterminacy  is  central  to  its  acceptability,  allowing  for  the  legal  rules  to  fulfill  
the   purposes   for   which   they   are   adopted.   Koskenniemi   (2006)   591.   However,   increased  
determinacy   means   a   greater   potential   for   law   to   exert   a   more   powerful   pull   towards  
compliance.  See  generally  Franck  (1988);;  Deeks  (2012),  especially  508–14.  
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potential   to   restrain   defensive   force   to   be   further   strengthened   and  
operationalized.  Recent  efforts  by  states  to  engage  with  JAB  issues  are  very  
welcome   and   indicate   the   potential   for   future   legal   development   in   this  
direction.8  Better   articulation   by   states   of   their   understanding   of   legal   rules  
benefit  the  operation  of  the  JAB  and  promote  its  advancement.  In  particular,  
putative  defending  states  should  articulate  their  reasons  for  using  force,  what  
information  and  facts  these  decisions  were  based  on,  and  what  they  consider  
to   be   the   legitimate   goals   of   self-­defence   in   the   circumstances.   Defending  
states   should   explain   in   detail   why   their   actions   are   necessary   and  
proportionate  and  provide  data  and  information  to  support  their  claims.  Such  
information  should   ideally  be   included   in  every   report  of  self-­defence   to   the  
UNSC,   as   required   by   Article   51   UN   Charter.   Other   states   should   actively  
scrutinize  claims  of  self-­defence  and,  where  absent,  insist  on  explanations  and  
available  supporting  evidence.  They  need  to  engage  with  the  detail.  Debates  
before  the  UNSC  are  the  natural  place  for  this  dialogue  to  happen  and  should  
occur  as  a  matter  of  course  following  a  state  resorting  to  force.  Statements  in  
other   public   fora   that   relate   to   the   legality   of   self-­defence   are   also   to   be  
encouraged.   Such   public   explanations,   or   ‘legal   diplomacy’,   enable   better  
international  cooperation  and  joint  action  between  states,  as  well  as  a  common  
understanding   of   international   law   and   a   way   to   manage   differences   in  
interpreting  obligations  that  are  binding  upon  states.9  
There   is   no   substitute   for   better   engagement   by   states   with   these   issues,  
although  this  author  accepts  that  such  action,  and  a  transparent  dialogue,  may  
not   be   forthcoming,   or   produce   an   obvious   consensus   amongst   states  
regarding  the  applicable  rules.  As  such,  legal  development  would  be  aided  by  
work  that  could  build  on  the  framework  set  out  in  this  thesis.  An  equivalent  of  
the  UNGA  Definition  of  Aggression  might  be  too  much  to  hope  for  by  way  of  
an  attempt  to  codify  the  principles  of  necessity  and  proportionality,  but  there  is  
                                                                                        
8  E.g.  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016;;  UK  Attorney  General  Speech  2017;;  
Australian  Attorney  General  Speech  2017.  
9  USA  State  Department  Legal  Adviser  Speech  2016,  237,  244–5.  See  further  Tams  in  Van  
den   Herik   and   Schrijver   (2013)   419–21;;   The   Leiden   Policy   Recommendations,   540–4,  
considering  certain  of  these  issues  and  the  prospect  of  normative  development.  
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certainly  scope  for  bodies  such  as   the   ILC  to  develop   further   their  meaning  
and   operation.   Projects   akin   to   the   Chatham   House   Principles,   the   Tallinn  
Manual,10  or  The  Leiden  Policy  Recommendations  could  offer  states  the  raw  
materials  to  further  advance  the  law.11  This  thesis  represents  an  important  step  
for  our  understanding  of  necessity  and  proportionality,  therefore,  but  it  is  not  
the  end  of   the  story.  The  need   for  ever  greater  clarity   is  clear.  As   the  JAB  
evolves  to  meet  new  challenges,  states,  scholars  and  the  ICJ  must  focus  on  
these  requirements  to  enable  international  law  to  regulate  more  effectively  how  
states  exercise  their  right  of  self-­defence.  
     
                                                                                        
10  Schmitt  (2013).  
11  For  a  recent  example  of  a  state  actively  engaging  with,  and  recognizing  the  importance  of,  
such  projects  (in  this  case  Tallinn  Manual  2.0),  see  e.g.  ‘Speech  by  Minister  Bijleveld  at  the  
Tallinn   Manual   2.0   Symposium   in   The   Hague’,   20   June   2018,  
<https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/toespraken/2018/06/20/toespraak-­minister-­bijleveld-­op-­
het-­symposium-­tallinn-­manual-­2.0>.  A  further  example  is  reliance  by  states  on  the  Bethlehem  
Principles.  See  Section  2.4.1(b).  
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